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Abstract  
Countries are increasingly implementing pay for performance (P4P) as a way to 
improve health services. The evidence base is conflicting and difficult to interpret. It is 
necessary to more systematically explore evaluations of P4P schemes in order to 
synthesize more useful evidence to inform the use of P4P schemes in health care.  
This thesis starts with a literature review, which shows that the results of evaluations of 
P4P schemes are heterogeneous, which may possibly be explained by differences in 
programme design, context, implementation, and evaluation study design. I sought to 
find ways to better analyse and make sense of these evaluations using two approaches. 
A quantitative approach was used to systematically explore the heterogeneity. I 
developed and tested a theoretical typology to categorise P4P schemes by their design 
features. This typology considers who receives the incentive, type of incentive, size of 
incentive, and perceived risk of not earning the incentive. I then used the typology to 
quantitatively explore the influence of P4P design features and evaluation designs on it 
effectiveness using meta-regression and multilevel logistic regression analyses.  I also 
undertook a formative evaluation of a pilot P4P scheme in Nigeria (a case study). This 
used semi-structured in-depth interviews with 36 purposively sampled health workers to 
explore how contextual and implementation factors (e.g. delay in incentive payment) 
influenced the impact of the scheme.  
This research presents three notable and novel contributions to knowledge about P4P in 
healthcare. First a useful typology was developed, which can be used to help categorize, 
think about, structure and report P4P schemes in a standardized and theoretically 
informed way. Second, I show that P4P schemes with design features such as payment 
to groups, large incentive size (>5% of salary or usual budget), and low perceived risk 
of not earning the incentive are more likely to be effective compared to schemes 
characterized by payment to individuals, small incentives, and high perceived risk of 
not earning the incentive. In addition, I demonstrate that P4P evaluations without 
adequate controls over-estimate the effectiveness of P4P. Third, I show that contextual 
factors such as incentive payment delays, poor health worker understanding of the P4P 
scheme, and poor infrastructure affect the effectiveness of the Nigerian P4P scheme and 
need to be addressed in its future development.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
 
This chapter provides background and context for the thesis. This includes definitions, 
theoretical framework, and how financial incentives (pay for performance) work in 
healthcare. It also describes the significance of the research (how it can improve 
understanding), the aim and focus of the thesis, and the thesis outline. 
1.1. Background 
The use of financial incentives targeted at health service providers has increasingly been 
adopted internationally to improve health services across different contexts and different 
clinical areas (Eldridge and Palmer, 2009). Many low and middle-income countries 
(LMICs) are experimenting with these sorts of incentive schemes, even though evidence 
of effectiveness appear mixed (Eichler, 2006, Oxman and Fretheim, 2009b).  
These incentive-based interventions take varied but broadly similar forms, which are 
characterized by different terminologies. The commonly used terminologies are 
Performance based financing (PBF), Results based financing (RBF), and Pay for 
Performance (P4P), which are often used synonymously. Despite the different labels, 
these incentive-based interventions all have the same systematic structure in which 
payment of incentives is made, conditional on meeting pre-set targets (Hahn, 2006).  
This thesis shall adopt the term P4P to refer to such incentive-based interventions. 
 
Eichler (2006, p.5), gives a typical working definition of P4P as “a system of health 
financing that employs the transfer of money or/and material goods conditional on 
taking a measurable action or achieving a predetermined goal”.   
 
A more detailed definition is that of McNamara (2006, p.5S), who defined P4P as:  
“A strategy to improve health care delivery that relies on the use of market or purchaser 
power…depending on the context, refers to financial incentives that reward providers 
for the achievement of a range of payer objectives, including delivery efficiencies, 
submission of data and measures to payer, and improved quality and patient safety” 
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1.2. How P4P works 
It has been argued that the usual method of paying health service providers to deliver 
health services with a focus on inputs does not deliver the necessary outcomes and that 
the health care providers may not be sufficiently motivated to perform better or improve 
quality of care, because money flows are not linked to results (Hecht et al., 2004, 
Eldridge and Palmer, 2009, Appleby et al., 2012, Rusa and Fritsche, 2010). This has led 
to the heightened interest in P4P where payment is linked to performance. In this 
section I describe how P4P might work, using the agency theory and motivation. I also 
outline the practicalities of P4P, before going on in the final sections of this chapter to 
describe the relevance and contribution of this thesis.  
1.2.1. Underpinning theory (agency theory)  
Agency theory is concerned with resolving conflict of interest between principals and 
agents through the agency contract (Eldridge and Palmer, 2009). In healthcare, the 
typical principal(s) are patients, the government, health insurance companies, health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs), and development partners or international donors. 
The agents are the providers of health services, which includes local health 
administrations, health facilities, private sector contractors, non-profit organisations, 
and individual health workers (Mehrotra et al., 2010). 
This principal-agent relationship entails a principal contracting an agent to execute a 
task on his behalf in exchange for a reward which generates utility (Eldridge and 
Palmer, 2009). In this type of agreement, both the principal and the agent gain utility 
when the principal is not able or willing to perform the task himself and the agent 
possesses excellent knowledge and technical capacity in that specific field to carry out 
the task (see Figure 1.1). 
The principal-agent relationship can work well if the principal can judge fully how well 
the agent is acting on their behalf  (e.g. delivery of high quality and appropriate health 
services, which benefit the principals or those on whose behalf they are acting) (Folland 
et al., 1993). However, in a typical principal-agent relationship there is asymmetry of 
information, which is when the providers of services (agents) have more information 
than the consumers or the commissioners of services (principals) about the market 
transaction (Kinoti, 2011, Hahn, 2006). Health service providers generally have 
superior knowledge than the patients, on diagnosis and treatment of the patients’ 
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condition or disease. The supplier in this case knows the problem and the solution better 
than the consumer (or purchasers) hence the need for the principal-agent relationship. 
This causes some problems, which include: 
1. Moral hazard: this is when the agent takes advantage of the fact that he has more 
information than the principal (asymmetry of information) and makes decisions not 
aligned with the interest of the principal often at the expense of the principal (Nilakant 
and Rao, 1994). 
2. Difficulty in verifying the performance of the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
This could potentially lead to asymmetry of power in health care provision in which it 
appears that the health services providers have most of the power. This makes the 
purchasers and funders of healthcare weak, causing major policy problems in health 
care. 
1.2.2.1. The agency contract (pay for performance) 
According to the agency theory, the two problems associated with the principal-agent 
relationship can be resolved by the agency contract. This agency contract is a type of 
pay for performance plan that helps reconcile the asymmetry of information between the 
principal and the agent by aligning both parties’ interests (see Figure 1.1). In the agency 
contract, the agent’s pay is linked to performance, which is assessed by measuring the 
things that reflect the principal’s goals. Paying for performance allows for provision of 
objective measurements, which allows the principals (health service purchasers) to 
know if the agents (health service providers) have provided the quantity and quality of 
care required, and to adjust the payment accordingly. 
 
Figure 1.1 Illustration of the Agency Theory 
Principal    Agent  Asymmetric 
information  
             Agency contract (P4P) 
 Agent is hired 
 The agent(s) carries out the specific task 
 Performance is measured 
 Payment is made according to how well the task is carried out 
      
Self interest Self interest 
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According to Nilakant and Rao (1994), the potential of success of P4P schemes is 
related to the degree to which the payment plan can align the goals of the principal and 
the agent and change the behaviour of the agent, meaning the design of the 
performance-based plan is likely to be important to the effectiveness of the P4P scheme. 
The P4P system might not be effective if, for instance, the measures of performance are 
inaccurate, the system of monitoring is flawed, or if the incentives are not sufficient to 
motivate the agent to work in alignment with the principals’ goals (Eisenhardt, 1989, 
Shetterly, 2000).  
1.2.2. P4P as a strategy to improve motivation of clinicians  
Another perspective on how P4P might work relates to the effects of financial incentive 
on motivation (Kohn, 1987). Motivation is defined as the tendency to initiate and 
sustain effort towards a goal, which can perhaps be measured by how hard one works 
(Clark and Estes, 2002). Motivation is broadly classified into two types: intrinsic (an 
inherent satisfaction that stems from the job done or task carried out e.g. altruism, 
compassion) and extrinsic (where individuals act as a result of external factors e.g. 
money, recognition) (Ryan and Deci, 2000).  
The general idea connecting P4P and motivation is that financial incentives are able to 
appeal to extrinsic motivation of individuals to work harder or longer (Kohn, 1987). 
This assumption seems logical for individuals who want to increase their income and 
are willing to do more work for it. This assumption might be more applicable in 
contexts where clinicians/health workers are poorly paid and often have to work under 
poor working conditions. In such cases, financial incentives from P4P could indeed go a 
long way in increasing extrinsic motivation through bonuses (to supplement salaries) 
and improved infrastructure, which might have otherwise hindered delivery of quality 
health services (Willis-Shattuck et al., 2008, Luoma, 2005).   
Some researchers however, have argued the use of financial incentives could crowd out 
intrinsic motivation in clinicians (Deci et al., 1999, Cameron et al., 2001). It is argued 
that a continual use of incentives may violate clinicians’ sense of professionalism and 
altruism (Wynia, 2009). This may result in the clinicians being solely reliant on 
incentives to do anything, which could in turn be very costly and inefficient (Gneezy 
and Rustichini, 2000). In addition, Kohn (1987) argued that the continued use of 
financial incentive as a means on motivation could backfire because if the incentive 
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comes to be seen as the main reason one is engaging in an activity, the activity can be 
viewed as less enjoyable in its own right thereby crowding out intrinsic motivation. This 
means that the perceived increase in quality could recede after the removal of 
incentives.  
 Others argue that intrinsic and extrinsic motivation are intertwined and cannot easily be 
separated, and that extrinsic motivation can help sustain or support intrinsic motivation 
especially in LMICs (Willis-Shattuck et al., 2008, Luoma, 2005, Covington and 
Müeller, 2001). For example, in the case of clinicians who may be motivated by the 
pride they get in doing their job (or job satisfaction) but who have no basic 
infrastructure like laboratory or diagnostic tools in their health centres might be forced 
to treat patients based on trial and error which could lead to poor health outcomes and in 
turn dampen the intrinsic motivation of the clinician. However, if financial incentives 
are used (a form of extrinsic motivation), some of the incentives earned might go into 
purchase of equipment needed thereby sustaining/supporting the intrinsic motivation. 
1.2.3. Practicalities of pay for performance scheme  
Agency theory described in the previous section highlights the relationship between 
incentive and performance or behaviour.  However, P4P schemes in healthcare 
implemented on a large scale are often complex undertakings, and their potential to 
improve performance in health services might depend on other important factors that are 
able to affect motivation such as job satisfaction or adequate/safe working environment 
(contextual factors) (Henderson and Tulloch, 2008, Willis-Shattuck et al., 2008, Robyn 
et al., 2014).  
 
Furthermore, the P4P approach is based on strict rules of accountability (setting targets, 
and measuring and verifying duties), which often replaces a system based on trust 
whereby agents are paid a salary and assumed/assured to act on behalf of the principal. 
Thus, making P4P a more costly approach compared to a system based on trust. Also, 
P4P introduces the possibility of creating perverse incentives where agents/health 
service providers are not willing to do anything unless they are paid (O'Neill, 2004). 
Other negative or unintended consequences of P4P in health care include ‘cherry 
picking’ of healthier patients, neglect of incentivised activities, and the potential of 
patients undermining the trust of health professionals as a results of the perception of 
perverse incentives (a case where patients think health professionals are delivering 
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certain health services because of the incentive and not because it is needed) (Powell et 
al., 2012, Chen et al., 2011, Doran et al., 2011). 
 
The success of P4P schemes also depend on implementation factors such as adequate 
regulatory authority for monitoring, evaluation, and appropriateness of quality 
indicators (Glasziou et al., 2012, Campbell et al., 2011). Furthermore, literature 
suggests that design features and contexts are likely to influence the impact of the P4P 
schemes (Epstein, 2012, Eijkenaar, 2013, Van Herck et al., 2010, Mehrotra et al., 2010, 
McDonald and Roland, 2009). Despite this, little attention has been given to exploring 
and understanding of the differences within the schemes and how this can inform 
development of more effective and cost effective P4P programmes.  
1.3. Thesis context 
Even though P4P has been gaining global popularity (Epstein, 2012), it is not a new 
strategy in healthcare and it has been experimented with as far back as the early 1970’s 
when the Korean government offered financial incentives to community distributors to 
recruit more users of family planning schemes (Cometto, 2008).  
P4P schemes could be implemented either on their own or as part of a wider quality 
improvement strategy in health care. Where quality health care is defined by six 
characteristics: safe, effective, person-centred, timely, efficient (avoiding waste), and 
equitable (Institute of Medicine, 2001). 
Other quality improvement strategies include non-financial incentives (public/peer 
reporting), performance profiling, technical assistance, tiered networks, and integrated 
care management (Roland and Campbell, 2014, Boaden et al., 2008, Grol, 2013).  
Some have argued that a combination of P4P and other strategies (e.g. case 
management, audit, and feedback) might be more effective in improving quality of care 
(Mauger et al., 2014, Tricco et al., 2014). Whilst critics of P4P have argued that less 
expensive, strategies for quality improvement such as peer or public reporting might be 
enough to improve quality of care, with similar outcomes to P4P (Llanos and Rothstein, 
2007, Jha et al., 2012). Despite the debate surrounding P4P, it is increasingly being 
adopted in many countries. 
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So far, P4P schemes have been implemented to address a number of dimensions of 
quality in health care. This includes safety, reduction in medical error, reducing 
variation in clinical practice, cost containment, efficiency, utilization of health services, 
and delivery of services in a timely manner (Chaix-Couturier et al., 2000).  Examples of 
such P4P schemes include Premier hospital alliance (USA), Advancing Quality (AQ) 
incentive programme, Quality and Outcomes Framework (UK), P4P in Rwanda, 
Cordaid P4P (Tanzania), and Iranian P4P (Eijkenaar, 2012, Canavan et al., 2008, 
Aryankhesal et al., 2013).  
1.3.1. P4P in Nigeria  
There has been a surge of implementation of P4P in LMICs, primarily funded by 
international donor organisations such as the World Bank and Save The Children 
Organisation. Nigeria is one of the countries where P4P has recently been introduced 
(NPHCDA, 2012).  
Over several decades, Nigeria has suffered from a weak healthcare system, 
characterised by lack of coordination, lack of transparency, poor infrastructure, and high 
health worker absenteeism (Abdulraheem et al., 2012, Akinwale, 2010, Asuzu, 2005). 
This, along with other factors, is reflected in poor health outcomes such as a maternal 
mortality rate of 840 per 100, 000 live births (ninth highest globally) and a child 
mortality rate of 138 per 1000 live births (WHO, 2012).  
P4P in Nigeria was implemented in 2011 as a strategy to improve maternal and child 
health outcomes. This P4P scheme incentivises health service providers to improve 
quality and increase utilisation of basic maternal and child health service in primary 
health care facilities in seven out of 36 States: Zamfara, Kaduna, Katsina, Kano, Ondo, 
Nassarawa, and Adamawa (Figure 1.2).  
The rationale for introducing P4P to the Nigerian health system was that it had potential 
to directly address some of the weakness in the Nigerian health system by payments 
aligned to performance, potentially increasing health worker motivation. Also, through 
the monitoring and evaluation required by these schemes, it would have the potential to 
improve transparency and accountability (Nair, 2012, Nair, 2011). 
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Figure 1.2 P4P States in Nigeria (Abuja is the Federal Capital Territory) 
 
1.4. Relevance and contribution of thesis 
In contrast to what the increasing popularity of P4P might suggest, its effectiveness and 
cost-effectiveness has not been convincingly demonstrated, despite over a decade of 
experimentation. 
The evidence base on what works, what does not and why is mixed and fragmented 
(Epstein, 2012, Van Herck et al., 2010). Furthermore, theoretical evidence on how 
individuals respond to incentives is not sufficiently used to inform these schemes, and 
literature on the best ways to maximize the effectiveness of P4P schemes through the 
exploration of design features, contexts, and implementation factors) is sparse 
(Mehrotra et al., 2010, Eijkenaar, 2013). P4P in Nigeria is a relatively new cost 
intensive project, which is lacking strong evidence to inform its implementation. 
Therefore, to avoid wastage of scarce resources, there is the need for careful 
consideration of literature, theory, and empirical evidence to make sense of the available 
evidence and contribute to understanding of the influence of design on P4P. Exploratory 
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research of P4P in Nigeria is also required to provide a better understanding of the 
influence of design features, contexts, and implementation on P4P schemes in Nigeria.   
 
In this thesis I reflect critically on the design, context, and implementation of P4P in 
healthcare. Specifically, this thesis contributes to (1) ways of categorising P4P scheme 
based on a conceptual understanding of factors that might influence their effectiveness, 
(2) improving the evidence base by empirically testing what factors influence the 
effectiveness of P4P schemes, (3) the understanding of the influence of design features, 
contextual factors, and implementation factors on the effectiveness of the Nigerian P4P 
scheme, to inform, improve, and strengthen the design and implementation of the 
Nigerian P4P scheme and provide some guidance for the scaling up of the scheme over 
the next five years.  
1.4.1. Aim 
The aim of this thesis was to better understand important aspects of design, context, and 
implementation, and to consider their implications on the effectiveness P4P in health 
care.  
1.4.2. Objectives 
In order to achieve the aim, I set the following relevant objectives: 
1. To review the available evidence on P4P and identify the key findings and gaps 
in the evidence 
2. To develop a reliable framework to categorize P4P schemes in a systematic way 
to aid evidence synthesis 
3. To systematically and quantitatively explore which design features are critical to 
the effectiveness of P4P  
4. To explore the impact of design features, contexts, and implementation factors 
on the effectiveness of the Nigerian P4P scheme (a formative evaluation). 
 
1.5. Thesis outline 
This thesis is divided into two main parts. The first part (chapters two to five) focuses 
on addressing the first three objectives and the second part (chapter six to nine) focuses 
on addressing objective four (see Table 1.1).  
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In chapter two, I conduct a review of literature exploring the effects of P4P in healthcare 
in different countries in order to summarise the key findings and the limitations of the 
available evidence. I summarise empirical evidence in distinct relevant sections as 
identified from literature. This includes effectiveness, country specific evidence, cost 
effectiveness, and unintended consequences. I further explore and assess the available 
evidence by conducting a meta-analysis to estimate the pooled effectiveness of P4P. I 
also use subgroup analyses to explore the impact of different evaluation designs (e.g. 
RCTs and quasi-experimental studies) and the domain of performance used to measure 
effect (e.g. process or outcomes). I then discuss shortcomings of the available evidence 
such as poor evaluation design (lack of adequate control group) and heterogeneity, 
which makes evidence synthesis difficult. Finally, I identify the need to develop a way 
to investigate this heterogeneity to help make better sense of the evidence. 
 
Chapter three describes the development of a theoretically informed framework (a P4P 
typology) to help categorize the P4P schemes based on design features, in order to 
explore heterogeneity to aid in evidence synthesis. The typology was constructed using 
theory from behavioural science and economics and empirical evidence relevant to 
understanding how people respond to incentives. The developed typology consists of 
four relevant design features of P4P: who receives the incentive, type of incentive, size 
of incentive, and uncertainty of earning the incentive.  
 
In chapter four, I test the inter-rater reliability of the P4P typology using multiple raters. 
I also assess the ease of use of the P4P typology as a tool to categorise descriptions of 
P4P schemes in literature.  
 
In chapter five, I use the developed P4P typology to systematically categorize P4P 
schemes reported in the review of evaluations. I then carry out quantitative analyses to 
systematically explore the influence of design features on effectiveness of P4P. I apply 
several regression models to investigate the relationship between the estimates of effect 
sizes of P4P and the design features (using the typology), while adjusting for the degree 
to which evaluation studies had adequate controls. 
In Chapter six, I introduce the Nigerian health care system to provide a context for the 
formative evaluation of the P4P scheme in Nigeria. I describe the extent of the issues in 
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the health system, such as poor maternal and child health indicators and low quality of 
healthcare. I also discuss previously implemented health reforms to tackle the issues, 
drawing out core underlying challenges of the health system. 
Chapter seven describes and reviews the design features of the P4P scheme in Nigeria. I 
also present, review, and discuss the early findings of the schemes; highlighting 
potentially relevant contextual and implementation factors influencing the results of the 
scheme. This includes: delay in payment, communication, managerial competence, 
health worker understanding of the scheme, and infrastructure. 
 In chapter eight, I report the aims and methods of an interview study I conducted in 
P4P sites in Nigeria to explore the influence of contextual and implementation factors 
on the effectiveness of the scheme. I also justify the methods of data collection and 
analysis used. This involves the use of semi-structured interviews (an in-depth 
qualitative approach) to explore health workers’ views and experiences on potentially 
relevant contextual and implementation factors in the Nigerian P4P scheme.  
Chapter nine presents the findings of my formative evaluation of the Nigerian P4P 
scheme. I provide extensive participants’ quotes from multiple perspectives, discuss the 
findings, strengths and weaknesses of the study, and provide policy and research 
recommendations to inform and improve the Nigerian P4P scheme.  
In chapter ten, I summarise the findings of this thesis, identify contribution to 
knowledge, reflect on the strengths and limitations, and discuss the implications of the 
findings for policy, practice and research with respect to developing, designing, and 
implementing effective P4P in healthcare. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.1 illustrates the objectives of the thesis and what chapters address them. 
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Table 1.1 Chapters addressing thesis objectives 
Objectives  Addressed in 
chapter  
To review the available evidence on P4P and identify the 
shortcomings of the evidence 
2 
To develop a reliable framework to categorize P4P schemes in a 
systematic way to aid evidence synthesis 
3 and 4 
To systematically explore what design features are critical to the 
effectiveness of P4P  
5 
To explore the impact of design features, contexts, and 
implementation factors on effectiveness of the Nigerian P4P 
scheme 
6-9 
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Chapter 2 Pay for performance (a review of 
reviews) 
2.0. Introduction 
There are several systematic reviews assessing the impact and effectiveness of P4P in 
health care e.g. (Witter et al., 2012, De Bruin et al., 2011, Reda et al., 2009, Hamilton et 
al., 2013). Despite this, evidence regarding the use of P4P in health care is inconclusive, 
thereby making it of limited use in informing policy and practice (Van Herck et al., 
2010, Eijkenaar et al., 2013). It is therefore, important to identify and understand the 
available literature in order to facilitate and improve the synthesis of evidence, which 
could be more useful in informing policy and practice of the use of P4P in health care. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to summarise the available evidence and identify features of 
relevant literature on the effects of P4P for health service providers in healthcare by 
conducting a review of reviews and a meta-analysis (using primary studies identified 
from the reviews). 
 
In the following sections, I describe my information sources (including search terms, 
search strategies, and databases), eligibility criteria, identification and extraction of the 
relevant studies, synthesis of results, and the findings of the review and meta-analysis.  
 
2.1. Information sources  
First, to conduct the review of reviews, I systematically searched and identified 
published reviews of P4P in literature. Second, to conduct the meta-analysis, primary 
studies were identified from the reviews identified. Additional primary studies were 
identified from other sources, such as the bibliography of the studies found and 
databases of organisations experienced with the use of P4P in healthcare e.g. Cordaid, 
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisations (GAVI), and The World Bank. In the 
following sections, I first describe the search strategy for identifying the reviews, before 
going on to describe how the primary studies were identified from the reviews and 
additional sources.  
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2.1.1. Search strategy (databases and search terms to identify reviews) 
I searched five electronic databases: Centre for Reviews and Disseminations (CRD), 
[Database of Abstracts and Reviews of Effect (DARE), National Health Service 
Economic Evaluation Database (NHS EED), Health Technology Assessment (HTA)], 
Cochrane reviews and PubMed. DARE, NHSEED, HTA, (Centre for Reviews and 
Dissemination), and Cochrane reviews were selected for the search because of the 
quality of the reviews produced by these databases. PubMed database was searched to 
ensure relevant reviews were not excluded.  
I searched using keywords (commonly used in P4P literature), such as financial 
incentives, performance based financing, and pay for performance. There were no 
language and publication date restrictions. I conducted the through a period of two years 
and four months (January 2012-June 2014).  See Table 2.1 for the search strategy output 
for the CRD database (outputs from other databases are shown in Appendix A1 and 
A2).  
I included only reviews that assessed the impact or effects of P4P on health provider’s 
quality of health care (see appendix A3 for a summary of included reviews). Other than 
that, there were no strict inclusion and exclusion criteria, as I was interested in 
summarising all relevant evidence on the impact or effects of P4P in health care. 
Finally, I assessed the quality of the identified reviews using AMSTAR (a measurement 
tool to assess the methodological quality of systematic reviews). 
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Table 2.1 Search strategy output for CRD database 
Database Centre for Reviews and Dissemination (CRD) 
Host http://www.york.ac.uk/inst/crd/  
Date of search January 2012-June 2014 last search date: 26/6/14 
Years covered 1990-June 2014 (no date restrictions) 
Search 
Strategy 
Key word search: Financial incentives, Pay for performance, Performance 
based financing (Pay for performance) OR (financial incentives) OR 
(performance based financing) IN DARE, NHSEED, HTA 
Language 
restrictions 
None  
Number of 
citations 
70 
 
Number of 
relevant 
reviews 
8: Huang et al., 2013, Reda et al., 2012, Chaix-couturier et al., 2012, 
Hamilton et al., 2013, Witter et al., 2012, Scott et al., 2011, Petersen et al., 
2006, Houle et al., 2012 
 
2.2. Identification of primary studies (from the reviews and other 
sources) and data extraction  
To identify primary studies from the reviews, there were no strict exclusion criteria or 
date restrictions. The only inclusion criterion for primary studies was that it should be 
an evaluation study of P4P. Studies describing P4P schemes and other incentive 
schemes not targeted at health service providers were excluded (see Appendix A4 for 
included and A5 for excluded studies). 
In addition, I updated one of the systematic reviews identified (identified in the previous 
search) to identify current or new primary studies conducted after publication of these 
reviews. I selected the review by Van Herck and colleagues (2010), which scored 11/11 
on the AMSTAR checklist indicating a well conducted review (see Appendix A3 for 
grades of other identified reviews) (Shea et al., 2007). In addition, the review was 
comprehensive, in that it was not specific to one area of health service delivery, but 
included P4P studies across different health care interventions including, smoking 
cessation, disease management, cancer screening, prescription behaviour, and cost 
containment. I updated this review by extending their search terms from the date of their 
last search (2009) to 2014 (see Table 2.2).  
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Table 2.2 Search output for the updated review by Van Herck et al. (2010) 
Database Medline 
Host http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez (Pubmed) 
Date of 
search 
26/6/2014 
Years 
covered 
01/07/2009 to 28/07/2014 
Search 
Strategy 
("Salaries and Fringe Benefits"[Majr] OR "Reimbursement, Incentive"[Majr] OR 
"Fees and Charges"[Majr] OR p4q OR p4p OR pay* OR incentive* OR bonus*) 
AND ("Treatment Outcome"[Majr] OR "Medical Errors"[Majr] OR "Quality 
Control"[Majr] OR "Cost-Benefit Analysis"[Majr] OR "Safety"[Majr] OR "Health 
Services Accessibility"[Majr] OR quality OR outcome* OR performance OR error* 
OR safety* OR access* OR equity OR effectiveness) AND ("Hospitals"[Majr] OR 
"Physicians"[Majr] OR hospital* OR physician* OR practitioner*) AND 
(hasabstract[text] AND ("2009/07/01"[EDat]:"2014/07/28"[EDat]) AND 
(Humans[Mesh]) AND (Clinical Trial[ptyp] OR Randomised Controlled Trial[ptyp] 
OR Case Reports[ptyp] OR Clinical Trial, Phase I[ptyp] OR Clinical Trial, Phase 
II[ptyp] OR Clinical Trial, Phase III[ptyp] OR Clinical Trial, Phase IV[ptyp] OR 
Comparative Study[ptyp] OR Controlled Clinical Trial[ptyp] OR Evaluation 
Studies[ptyp] OR Technical Report[ptyp] OR Validation Studies[ptyp])) 
Language 
restrictions 
None 
Number of 
citations 
1356 
 
There was no detailed assessment for risk of bias for the primary studies identified (to 
be included in the meta-analysis) due to the poor reporting quality of the primary 
studies. This would have hindered objective judgement of the risk of bias in most 
studies. What was clear, however, from the reviews was that a majority of the P4P 
evaluations were studies with poor methodological quality, and that the P4P literature 
was populated with evaluation studies without adequate control groups (see Appendix 
A3 for details), which was taken into consideration in the synthesis of results of this 
review (see section 2.3).  
Data from primary studies was extracted in a standardized way.  A uniform template 
was used for all studies to extract information on intervention area/summary, outcomes, 
and effect estimates of individual studies for all outcomes considered: whether P4P had 
a positive effect or not, evaluation design (whether there was an adequate control group 
or not).  I also extracted information on sample size and raw numbers of events, from 
                                                                           Chapter 2: Pay for performance (a review of reviews) 
 
32 
 
studies that reported them (see Appendix D1 and D4
1
 for characteristics of included 
studies). 
 
2.3. Synthesis of results (narrative review and meta-analysis) 
To summarise the key findings of the evidence and to identify its shortcomings, I 
conducted both a narrative review and meta-analyses (quantitative pooling of effect). 
The narrative review examined the identified reviews and the additional primary 
studies. I illustrated the results using summaries of the findings of the reviews and some 
primary studies that provided a background or examples that elucidated on the nature of 
the evidence. I summarised evidence on clinical effectiveness of P4P, country specific 
evidence, sustainability of effect of P4P, cost effectiveness, and unintended 
consequences, while drawing out the issues with the evidence.  
 
The meta-analysis included primary studies identified from the reviews and additional 
primary studies identified from other sources. I first pooled together all relevant 
included studies. I then stratified the analyses by evaluation design (presenting separate 
pooled estimates of RCTs, quasi-experimental studies, and studies with no adequate 
control group). This was because there is a considerable literature that suggests results 
or effects of intervention from studies with poor evaluation designs (lacking convincing 
control groups) are more susceptible to bias, and likely to over-estimate the effect of 
interventions (Shadish et al., 2002, Tilling et al., 2005, Eccles et al., 2000, Ferriter and 
Huband, 2005). Thus stratification of the meta-analyses by rigour of evaluation could 
help shed some light in the context of the evaluation of P4P in healthcare.  
For the meta-analyses, a random effects model was used because of the heterogeneity 
between the primary studies (differences in objectives, designs, countries, contexts, and 
size). A random, effects model was used as opposed to a fixed effect model because a 
fixed effects model assumes that the observed differences among study results are due 
solely to the play of chance, i.e. that there is no heterogeneity. The random effects 
model on the other hand assumes that the effects being estimated in the different studies 
                                                          
1
 The data extracted here are used substantially in other chapters, where they have other elements 
added unto them. Therefore in order to avoid repetition of large sized tables, the appendices referred to 
here (and in some other parts of this chapter) are not in chronological order but in the order of where 
they are seen or used subsequently in the thesis. 
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are not identical, but considers the differences as if they were random (i.e. it assumes 
that there is heterogeneity, which is considered in the model) (Engels et al., 2000, 
Borenstein et al., 2009). 
In the meta-analysis, heterogeneity was also measured and quantified using the I
2 
test 
statistic, which describes the percentage of the variability in effect estimates that is due 
to heterogeneity rather than chance (Higgins and Green, 2011). Finally, publication bias 
was assessed by a visual inspection of a funnel plot (Sterne et al., 2011).  
 
STATA statistical package (version 12) was used to perform the random effects meta-
analysis using the ‘metan’ command. I took two things into consideration for the 
analysis. First, the outcome measures reported in the primary studies were in different 
forms, which included: odds ratio, percentage point differences, means, and mean 
differences. It was not possible to combine all these measures of effect in one meta- 
analysis. In addition, pooling estimates for the different measures would have been 
difficult to interpret. Therefore, I converted the outcome measures into a common 
standardised measure (standardised mean difference and associated standard errors), 
which required extraction of additional data such as absolute differences (percentages or 
numbers), sample size, standard deviations or standard errors or variance (Bland, 2000, 
Borenstein et al., 2009). Second, some of the primary studies reported multiple principal 
outcome measures. If these were all included in the analyses, it would overestimate the 
amount of independent information included, which could produce possibly biased 
estimates (Moerbeek, 2004, Snijders and Bosker, 2012). I therefore computed a 
summary effect and its associated standard error for studies that reported multiple 
outcomes using the formulas suggested by Borenstein et.al. (2009) (details of these 
calculations are described in chapter 5).  
 
2.4. Results 
The first two sections below provide a description of reviews identifies and an overview 
of their effect findings in the form of a narrative review. Following that, the findings 
from the meta-analyses are presented.  
2.4.1. Description of studies (reviews and primary studies) 
I identified 15 relevant reviews in total (see Table 2.3). The identified reviews varied in 
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methodological quality (see Appendix A3 for summary of the reviews). The publication 
dates of the reviews ranged from 2000 to 2013. Using the AMSTAR criteria, all the 
reviews apart from one were moderate to high quality (see Table 2.3). Two reviews 
scored four and below: low quality, five reviews scored between five and seven: 
moderate quality, and eight reviews scored between eight and twelve: high quality (see 
Appendix A3).  
Table 2.3 Quality of identified reviews using the AMSTAR checklist 
Reviews  AMSTAR score Quality  
Van Herck et al., 2010 11 High  
Witter et al., 2012 11 
Reda et al., 2009 10 
Houle et al., 2012 10 
Hamilton et al., 2013 9 
Gillam et al., 2012 9 
Scott et al., 2011 9 
Huang et al., 2013 8 
Petersen et al., 2006 7 Moderate  
De Bruin et al., 2011 6 
Eijkenaar, 2012 6 
Chaix-Couturier et al., 2000 6 
Christianson et al., 2008 5 
Oxman and Fretheim, 2009 4 Low  
Canavan et al., 2008  3 
 
I identified 326 primary studies (excluding duplicates) spanning from 1990-2013 from 
15 reviews, from other sources (bibliography etc.), and from updating the review 
conducted by Van Herck and colleagues (2010) (see Figure 2.1). I screened out P4P 
studies not targeted at health service providers (12) and studies that I could not find the 
full text articles (13). I assessed 301 studies for eligibility: I excluded non-evaluation 
P4P studies (146)
2
, descriptions of P4P schemes (36), and studies with unclear and/or 
poorly reported outcomes (12).  In total, I identified 102 primary studies (including nine 
                                                          
2
 Studies that did not specifically evaluate the effects of P4P on healthcare 
quality/cost/performance/outcomes e.g. implementation studies or studies exploring the take up of p4p  
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qualitative studies) (see Figure 2.1).  Out of the primary studies identified, only nine 
studies were randomised controlled trials (RCTs), 63 other studies had an adequate 
control group (quasi-experimental), and 30 studies had no control group.  
 
For the meta-analyses, only 36 studies were included (6 RCTs, 20 quasi-experimental 
studies, and 10 pre-post studies with no control group) (see Figure 2.1). The reduced 
number of studies included in the meta-analyses was due to poor reporting of important 
data to aid conversion of the different reported outcome measures into a standard 
measure to enable the inclusion of as many as possible studies in the meta-analysis (see 
section 2.3.). The authors of the other studies were not contacted for more detailed 
information due to time constraints. Nevertheless, it was considered that the included 
studies provided some indication of the nature of the available evidence.   
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Figure 2.1 Flow chart of identification of included studies  
Total number of primary 
studies identifies                           
(n = 456) 
Records screened  
(n =326) 
Records excluded  
n = 13: full text articles not found 
n=12: P4P schemes not targeted 
at health service providers 
 
Full-text articles assessed for 
eligibility  
(n = 301) 
Full-text articles excluded 
n=146: non evaluations of P4P 
(e.g. studies on physician 
participation of views on P4P) 
n = 38: descriptions of P4P 
schemes 
n=12: outcomes evaluated not 
clear  
 
Studies included in narrative review  
(n =96) with numeric results on 213 process and 
75 outcome measures                                             
(n=9) qualitative studies   
Studies excluded from meta- 
analyses due to poor and 
incomplete reporting of 
outcomes  
(n=60)   
Studies included in meta-analyses 
(n=36) 
 
Duplicates  
(n =130) 
 
Number of reviews identified through 
database search (n=15)  
Number of primary studies from the 
reviews (n=414) 
 
Number of studies identified 
through updated review by Van 
Herck and colleagues (2010), (n=42)  
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2.4.2. Overview of evidence (narrative review) 
In this section, drawing from the identified reviews and primary studies, I summarise 
the available evidence and highlight the problems therein. First, I summarise the 
evidence on the general effectiveness of P4P. Then, I summarise the effectiveness of 
P4P on the most common areas in which it is used health care: smoking cessation and 
chronic disease management, pointing out variation in effects of P4P on process and 
outcome measures. Afterwards, I summarise country specific evidence, including the 
quality and outcomes framework (QOF) in the UK and some evidence in low and 
middle-income countries (LMIC), highlighting differences in results according to the 
rigour of evaluation. Finally, I summarise the available evidence on cost-effectiveness, 
sustainability of the effect of P4P, and the unintended consequences of P4P, 
highlighting the limited evidence base.  
2.4.2.1. Evidence on general effectiveness 
An early review by Chaix-Couturier  and colleagues in 2002, found that financial 
incentives could be used to reduce the use of health care resources by increasing 
compliance with practice guidelines, but that it is more effective to use combinations of 
financial and non-financial incentives. Other systematic reviews that assessed the 
impact of financial incentive on health service providers for health quality measures 
also found mixed results. For example, Petersen et al., (2006), found that about half of 
the studies included in their review reported mixed results on the impact of financial 
incentives on quality measures. About 20% of their included studies showed no 
statistically significant results (for indicators assessed) while the other 20% showed 
positive impact, with one study even reporting negative effects of P4P on quality 
measures. Similarly, the review by Christianson et al., (2008) found improvements in 
some of the quality measures assessed, but the degree of contribution of P4P was not 
clear because the financial incentives were typically implemented in conjunction with 
other quality improvement efforts and there were no convincing comparison groups.  
More recent reviews show similar mixed results. The review by Scott et al., (2011) 
found positive but modest effects in a few measures of quality of care, provided by 
primary care physicians. Houle et al., (2012) also found that financial incentives 
modestly improved preventive activities, such as immunization rates, but there was little 
evidence that it was effective for other activities such as mammography referrals and 
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cancer screening. Further showing the variations in the effect of P4P schemes was a 
very comprehensive systematic review by Van Herck and colleagues (2010), which 
assessed impact evaluations of P4P schemes, as well as evidence on the impact of 
design choices and contextual mediators on the effectiveness of P4P. They found that 
financial incentives result in the full spectrum of possible effects for specific targets, 
from absent or negligible to strongly beneficial and that the effects findings of P4P are 
likely to relate to context.  
Finally, the study by Basinga et al. (2011), which assessed the effects of P4P on 
maternal and child health services in Rwanda (using an RCT design) also found that 
P4P resulted in significant improvements in institutional deliveries and preventive 
(child) visits, but had no effect on prenatal visits (pregnant women) and childhood 
immunizations.  
It is noteworthy that despite the overwhelming evidence of varied/mixed effects of P4P, 
none of these reviews explored this variation using statistical methods.  
2.4.2.2. Evidence on management of chronic diseases and smoking cessation (process 
vs. outcomes) 
Two of the systematic reviews assessed the effect of financial incentives on chronic 
care. De Bruin et al., (2011) assessed the effectiveness of P4P schemes used to stimulate 
delivery of chronic care through disease management (by health service providers) with 
regards to quality and costs. They found that most studies showed positive effects of 
P4P on healthcare quality. However, five out of the eight P4P schemes were part of a 
larger scheme of interventions to improve quality of care and it was not clear how much 
of the improvement observed is attributed to P4P. The review by Huang et al., (2013), 
further showed the inconsistency of effects of P4P on diabetes treatment and 
management, (e.g., patients with records of total cholesterol or blood pressure). The 
authors also found that process indicators such as recording of blood pressure and 
cholesterol levels had higher rates of improvement than outcome indicators 
(intermediate) such as cholesterol and blood pressure reduction. 
In the same way, evidence on smoking cessation interventions was mixed and suggests 
that P4P might be more effective for process measures compared to outcomes. A review 
by Hamilton et al. (2013) assessing the impact of financial incentives to health service 
providers on smoking cessation found that P4P improved some process indicators such 
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as recording smoking status, advice and referrals but not for outcome measures such as 
smoking quit rates. Reda and colleagues (2009), also found no evidence of effectiveness 
of P4P on smoking cessation interventions (both processes and outcomes).  
Following this, a descriptive analysis of data extracted from primary studies showed 
that P4P had a positive effect on 148 out of the 213 reported process measures (70%), as 
opposed to the positive effect on 41 out of 75 reported outcome measures (55%) (see 
Appendix D1). The findings demonstrate that evidence of whether pay for performance 
will lead to better patient outcomes is unclear (Huang et al., 2013, Hamilton et al., 
2013).  
Understandably, some outcome measures would be dependent on patient behaviour as 
well as the quality of health care. Therefore, it might be more difficult for financial 
incentives to health service providers to have a positive impact on those measures. In 
addition, some incentivised processes might not necessarily impact directly or at all on 
patient outcomes. It is important that process of care measures used in P4P schemes 
should be chosen based on good and robust evidence that improving these processes 
leads to improved health outcomes (Oxman and Fretheim, 2009b, Oxman and Fretheim, 
2009a).  
2.4.2.3. Rigour of evaluation  
All the reviews identified reported that there were large numbers of primary studies 
with poor evaluation quality (lacking adequate controls) (see Appendix A3). A number 
of reviews concluded that the evidence base was too weak (due to poor evaluation 
quality) to draw reliable and valid conclusions or that the validity of the effect of 
financial incentives on healthcare is limited (Chaix-Couturier et al., 2000, Witter et al., 
2012, Gillam et al., 2012, Canavan et al., 2008). In the following paragraphs, I describe 
evidence on rigour of evaluations using country specific examples of P4P such as the 
Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) in the UK, and developing countries such as 
Rwanda. 
The QOF is one of the largest and most evaluated financial incentive programmes. The 
systematic review by Gillam et al., (2012) assessed the impact of the QOF on quality 
measures. They found that the QOF programme improved the incentivised activities in 
the first year of the programme at a faster rate than the pre-intervention trend. They also 
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found negative effects such as worsening quality measures for non-incentivised 
conditions, decline in person-centeredness of consultations, and decline in patients’ 
satisfaction with continuity of care. The conclusion of this review was limited because 
of the lack of adequate control groups in the evaluations of the QOF programme. A few 
researchers have evaluated the QOF scheme using a convincing control group. An 
example is the study by Serumaga et al. (2010) assessing the impact of the QOF on 
management and outcomes of hypertension using an interrupted time series design (a 
quasi-experimental design). The study found that improvements in hypertension 
management and outcomes were as a result of gradual improvements before the 
introduction of P4P and that P4P had no effect on hypertension management and 
outcomes. On the other hand, retrospective and cross sectional studies assessing the 
impact of the QOF on hypertension management and outcomes concluded that the 
introduction of P4P improved treatment and management (Ryan and Doran, 2012, 
Simpson et al., 2011). 
In the same way, evaluations suggest that P4P might be effective for some quality 
measures in LMICs, especially in Rwanda, Haiti, and Burundi (Oxman and Fretheim, 
2009a, Witter et al., 2012, Canavan et al., 2008). However, the review by Oxman and 
Fretheim (2009a) demonstrated that it was difficult to disentangle the effects of 
financial incentives from other quality improvement measures. Similarly, Canavan et 
al., (2008) found that that P4P evaluations showed remarkable improvements in health 
indicators (utilization, coverage and emergency referral) in Afghanistan, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Haiti but that it was not clear the extent of attribution 
of improvements to financial incentives because of the presence of confounding 
contextual factors e.g. differences in infrastructure. Likewise, the review by Witter et 
al., (2012) found mixed results from their review of the effectiveness of P4P in LMIC. 
They found that P4P was effective for some quality measures but not others. The high 
and moderate quality studies included in this review reported that some quality 
indicators improved while there was no improvement in others. Two of the studies 
showed significant improvement for the intervention group, while two showed no 
significant difference.  
2.4.2.4 Evidence on Cost Effectiveness 
The cost effectiveness of these schemes is very important and should be central to the 
debate together with effectiveness because implementing a P4P programme can be quite 
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costly (the costs to be considered includes the incentive cost, administrative costs, 
monitoring and evaluation costs).  
There were two published systematic reviews with an explicit focus on economic 
evaluations of P4P schemes. One of the reviews (Emmert et al., 2012), considered costs 
and consequences of the P4P intervention, and included nine studies. Out of these nine 
studies included, only three were considered to be full economic evaluations with good 
methodological quality, and these reported that P4P was not cost effective. For example, 
the study by Nahra et al. (2006), assessed the cost effectiveness of a P4P programme 
focusing on improving the quality of heart care (process measures) in the hospital 
setting over a period of four years. It found a cost per quality adjusted life year (QALY) 
of £30,081, which was above the cost-effectiveness threshold of around £25,000 as 
suggested by The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) (McCabe et 
al., 2008). 
The other six studies that were considered as partial economic evaluations demonstrated 
mixed results of cost effectiveness, with poor methodological quality to draw valid or 
strong conclusions.  
A more recently published review by Meacock  et al., (2013) focused on assessing the 
cost effectiveness of the Advancing Quality (AQ) incentive programme in England. 
They critiqued the narrow range of costs and outcomes considered within previous 
economic evaluations of P4P schemes, before proposing a new and more 
comprehensive framework, which they applied to the Advancing Quality (AQ) 
programme. Their findings suggest that the AQ is likely to have represented a cost-
effective use of resources during the 18-month period of their study by generating 
approximately 5200 quality-adjusted life years and £4.4million of savings in reduced 
length of stay in the hospital. The AQ programme was shown to be cost effective within 
the study period. An important question remains whether the benefits and cost savings 
are sustainable. An impact evaluation of the AQ conducted by McDonald and 
colleagues (2014) found smaller mortality reductions in five clinical areas (acute 
myocardial infarction, heart failure, coronary artery bypass graft, pneumonia, and hip 
and knee replacement) in the long term (i.e. at 42 months) compared to mortality 
reductions at 12 months.  
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Some other reviews have looked at the cost effectiveness of P4P schemes but not 
comprehensively. Christianson et al., (2006) found two economic evaluations, which 
demonstrated that P4P was efficient. The methodology for these studies, however, was 
not assessed. The review by Van Herck et al (2010) also assessed the cost effectiveness 
of P4P schemes. They found mixed results and varying methodological quality from 
eight economic evaluations, which mirrored the studies included in the Emmert et al. 
(2012) review (see Appendix A6 for abstract of review). 
In summary, there is little and mixed evidence regarding the cost-effectiveness of P4P 
schemes. Most of the studies were methodologically weak, apart from the recent study 
by Meacock et al., (2013), which sets the standard so far for cost-effectiveness studies 
of these schemes. It is important to question the cost effectiveness of these schemes 
even if they appear to be effective. It is important to know whether benefits observed 
are worth the investments. There might be other alternatives that could be implemented 
at lower costs producing similar or greater impact on outcomes or the same resources 
might be spent in other ways that may produce greater total health or health equity 
benefits.  
2.4.2.5. Evidence on Sustainability of effect 
The evidence regarding the long-term effects of P4P is even more scarce, and longer-
term evaluations are needed to capture this. No reviews explicitly assessed the long-
term effects of financial incentives and effects after removal of the incentives. However, 
there were a few primary studies assessing the sustainability of the effect of financial 
incentives in a few countries.  
Researchers explored the removal of financial incentives in the QOF (UK) on some 
clinical quality indicators: influenza immunisation, lithium treatment monitoring, blood 
pressure monitoring, cholesterol concentration monitoring, and blood glucose 
monitoring. They found that all the indicators appeared to remain stable after the 
removal of incentive, apart from influenza immunisation which showed a statistically 
significant reduction (Kontopantelis et al., 2014). 
 
Jha et al., (2012) assessed the long-term effect on the US Medicare Premier programme 
on patient outcomes. They compared data from hospitals implementing P4P and 
hospitals implementing public reporting alone on 30-day mortality of patients with 
acute myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure, or pneumonia, or who underwent 
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coronary-artery bypass grafting (CABG) between 2003 and 2009. They found similar 
rates at baseline for both premier and non-premier hospitals, similar decline in mortality 
rates in both, which remained similar after six years under the P4P scheme. Werner  and 
colleagues (2011) also investigated the effects of the Premier programme for a period of 
five years. They found that even though performance (based on some of the indicators) 
in the intervention group improved within the first three years of the study, the 
performance of the hospitals in the control group caught up with and matched them in 
the last two years. The authors suggest the findings could be due to two things:  
1. Participating hospitals could not improve their performance much more than they 
already had in the past two years. 
2.  It is also possible that the incentive programmes led non-participating hospitals to 
change their practices. For example, the hospitals in the control group assumed that 
the incentive programme might be extended to their hospitals therefore focused on 
improving their performance.  
If true, this suggests that P4P might have knock on effects on non-participating 
hospitals or health facilities, which in turn might increase cost effectiveness.  
2.4.2.6. Evidence on Unintended consequences 
Two reviews and a few primary studies reported unintended and adverse effects of 
financial incentives on health care (Van Herck et al., 2010, Petersen et al., 2006). These 
include gaming, cheating, cherry picking, and neglect of non-incentivised services 
(Mannion and Braithwaite, 2012, Van Herck et al., 2010, Petersen et al., 2006).  
A study conducted by Gravelle et al. (2008) showed evidence of gaming in the QOF. 
There is also evidence which shows that health service providers in P4P studies focus 
most of their attention on the monitored and evaluated health service(s), leading them to 
ignore/neglect other unevaluated but equally important aspects of health services 
(Cometto, 2008, Doran and Kontopantelis, 2013).  
There is some evidence that P4P may worsen racial care disparities (Karve et al., 2008, 
Alshamsan et al., 2012). For example, the study by Karve and colleagues (2008) 
showed that under the Medicare P4P scheme, African American patients were less 
likely to receive evidence-based therapies compared to than white patients.  
There is also some evidence that P4P may encourage health service providers to induce 
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demand for incentivised services over and above that which is clinically needed 
(Cometto, 2008, Canavan and Swai, 2008, Powell et al., 2012). This behaviour takes the 
focus off the patient, possibly exposing the patients to the risk of iatrogenic injury, 
which could undermine the patients’ trust in the clinician (Cometto, 2008, Canavan and 
Swai, 2008, Powell et al., 2012). An example is the study conducted by Powell et al. 
(2012) on the QOF, which showed that P4P induced pressure on clinicians to achieve 
high performance scores on incentivised services. This led to actions to improve scores 
even when they were not necessarily in the patients’ best interests, which took the focus 
off patient concerns and patient service, and made it difficult for patients to make 
informed decisions.  
Lastly, evidence suggests that P4P may divert resources away from medically indigent 
communities or high-risk patients making health disparities worse (Friedberg et al., 
2010). For example, a study exploring the impact of P4P on diabetes care in Taiwan 
found that P4P did indeed improve quality of care for enrolled patients. However, only 
a minority of the population were enrolled due to the physicians ‘cherry picking’ the 
healthiest patients because they were most likely to perform better on the selected 
measures compared to more complicated patients (with greater health needs) (Chang et 
al., 2012). This example is also similar to the issue of patients with multiple conditions, 
as most P4P programmes currently focus on single condition measures that might not 
necessarily reflect the complex nature of patient care with multiple conditions. 
Following the rigid guideline of single condition measures (in order to meet targets) 
might hinder the care of the other condition and might limit the freedom of the 
providers in deciding the best treatments for this set of patients (Chen et al., 2011, 
Silversmith, 2011).  
 
2.5. Meta-analyses results 
First, I present results of meta-analysis (including pooled estimates, heterogeneity tests, 
and forest plots) of all 36 included studies and explore evidence of publication bias in 
the form of a funnel plot. I then present results of meta-analyses by rigour of evaluation 
(RCTs, quasi-experimental studies, and studies with no adequate control groups).  
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The pooled effect of all included studies in each meta-analysis is illustrated in the forest 
plot presented. Each study’s specific standardized mean difference (SMD) is plotted as 
a solid square symbol whose size is proportional to the weight of each study, with a 
horizontal line through each square representing the 95% confidence interval. The study 
with the smallest square symbol (widest 95% CI line) means that it is the least precise 
and carries the least weight in the meta-analysis (Rudnicka and Owen, 2012). A positive 
SMD value would indicate that P4P was superior to controls on improving quality of 
care or health outcomes (e.g. improved immunisation rates or reduction in hospital 
mortality), whilst a negative SMD value would represent superiority of the control 
group over P4P in improving quality of care (Higgins and Green, 2011).  
The vertical line at SMD of 0.0 (also known as the null effect line) is the line of ‘no 
effect’, meaning that the effect of the incentive group is the same as that of the control 
group (no incentive). All the square symbols to the left hand side of the line of ‘no 
effect’ SMD <0 suggests that no incentives are favoured over incentives in these 
studies. Studies with block estimates to the right hand side of the ‘no effect’ line suggest 
that incentives are more effective than no incentives (favours incentive). However, the 
95% CI lines for some of the studies overlaps the line of ‘no effect’, this is because the 
lower end of the 95% CI is <0 or the upper end is <0. Consequently, for these studies, 
the 95% CI includes the possibility of no benefit from incentives (for studies with 
blocks on the right side of the null effect line) or the possibility of benefit from 
incentives (for studies on the left side of the null effect line). 
2.5.1. Meta-analysis results for all 36 evaluation studies  
Figure 2.2 shows a pooled meta-analytical estimate (and a forest plot) of all 36 studies 
included in the meta-analysis. It also shows results of subgroup analyses by evaluation 
design (RCT, quasi-experimental, and no control groups) and by domain of 
performances (processes or outcomes). I now describe these results. 
 
The pooled overall effect (meta-analytic estimate) of all included studies is illustrated 
on the forest plot (Figure 2.2) by the solid diamond, the centre of which is at 0.14 and 
the tips of the diamond represent the 95% CI limits, at 0.03 and 0.25, which indicates a 
very small but statistically significant (p<0.0001) overall positive effect of incentives. 
However, the measure of heterogeneity 1
2
 was 99.9%, which suggests considerable 
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heterogeneity (>75%) according to Cochrane handbook of systematic reviews (Higgins 
and Green, 2011). This means that 99.9% of the variation between studies is due to true 
heterogeneity between the studies rather than chance alone. The funnel plot suggests 
that there is no evidence of publication bias, as the plot is roughly symmetrical (see 
Figure 2.3).  
 
2.5.2. RCT studies (meta-analysis results) 
The subgroup analysis for RCT studies in Figure 2.2 included the six RCTs included in 
the meta-analysis. The pooled effect indicates a much smaller effect (0.08 95% CI 0.01-
0.15) compared to results of pooled estimates of all studies (in favour of P4P). The large 
study by Basinga et al., (2011) is dominant (accounting for about 75% of the overall 
weight). However, the results look similar and there is no heterogenity between these 
six studies: (I
2 
)=0.00, which suggests that variation between the pooled studies is likely 
due to chance. The funnel plot shown in Appendix A7 also suggests that there is no 
evidence of publication bias. 
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Figure 2.2 Forest plot with pooled estimate of all 36 studies (and subgroup analyses by 
evaluation design)
NOTE: Weights are from random effects analysis
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ID
Cupples et al., 2014
Chen et al., 2010
Simpson et al., 2011
Sutton et al, 2012
Chien et al., 2010
Glikman et al., 2007
Vaghela et al, 2008
no control
Basinga et al., 2011
Kontopantelis et al. 2012
Lindenauer et al., 2007
Jha et al., 2012
Cutler et al., 2007
Quasi-experimental
Chang et al, 2008
Study
Kuo et al., 2011
Lee et al., 2010
Simpson et al., 2010
Salize et al.,
Kouides et al 1998
St Jacques, et al, 2004
Twardella and Brenner, 2007
Rosenthal et al., 2005
Subtotal  (I-squared = 99.9%, p = 0.000)
Campbell et al., 2009
RCT
Srirangalingam et al., 2006
0.14 (0.03, 0.25)
0.08 (0.01, 0.15)
0.26 (0.21, 0.32)
0.01 (-0.01, 0.03)
0.15 (0.09, 0.21)
0.19 (0.15, 0.23)
0.06 (-0.03, 0.14)
0.06 (-0.12, 0.23)
-0.04 (-1.22, 1.15)
0.31 (-1.36, 1.98)
0.06 (-0.02, 0.14)
0.76 (0.22, 1.30)
-0.12 (-0.48, 0.24)
0.05 (-0.08, 0.18)
0.07 (-0.99, 1.13)
0.19 (-1.02, 1.40)
ES (95% CI)
-0.01 (-0.24, 0.22)
0.04 (0.01, 0.06)
0.10 (0.04, 0.16)
0.02 (-0.01, 0.04)
0.12 (-0.14, 0.38)
-0.01 (-0.06, 0.03)
0.12 (0.12, 0.12)
0.09 (0.01, 0.18)
0.27 (0.25, 0.29)
0.16 (0.14, 0.17)
0.00 (-0.01, 0.01)
0.18 (-0.02, 0.38)
-0.01 (-0.06, 0.04)
0.66 (0.66, 0.67)
0.65 (0.65, 0.66)
0.30 (0.08, 0.53)
0.06 (-1.66, 1.78)
0.20 (-0.28, 0.67)
0.34 (0.28, 0.40)
0.05 (-0.43, 0.54)
0.09 (0.03, 0.15)
0.14 (-0.03, 0.31)
-0.23 (-0.68, 0.22)
0.02 (-0.26, 0.30)
.
100.00
12.48
13.67
100.00
13.22
6.07
16.08
1.51
0.87
6.08
1.14
3.80
5.94
1.79
1.46
Weight
5.52
6.16
12.30
6.16
5.38
6.14
13.91
75.76
6.16
6.17
6.17
5.69
12.66
%
6.17
6.17
4.74
0.17
2.16
12.39
2.04
6.12
100.00
4.28
3.49
  
0-1.98 1.98
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Figure 2.3 Funnel plot of all 36 pooled P4P studies 
 
2.5.3. P4P Evaluation studies with no control groups (meta-analysis results) 
Ten studies with no control group were included in the subgroup analyses presented in 
the forest plot shown in Figure 2.2. The pooled effect was 0.15 (95%CI 0.09-0.21), a 
higher effect estimate compared to RCTs and quasi-experimental studies. I
2 
was 
96.06%, which indicated substantial heterogeneity between pooled studies. There was 
no evidence of publication bias from the funnel plot presented in figure Appendix A9. 
2.5.4. Quasi-experimental studies (meta-analysis results) 
Twenty quasi-experimental studies were included in the subgroup analysis in the forest 
plot presented in Figure 2.2. This included non-randomised control studies, interrupted 
time series, and cross sectional studies. The overall pooled estimate shown in Figure 2.2 
was 0.14, 95% (CI 0.03-0.31), an effect almost twice the size of the RCTs studies 
shown in section 2.5.2. Measure of heterogeneity (I
2 
)
  
was 99.9%, which indicated 
substantial heterogeneity between pooled studies. The funnel plot presented in figure 
Appendix A8 exhibits asymmetry, which is likely as a result of heterogeneity and or 
poor methodological design (which leads to inflated effects in smaller studies), rather 
than publication bias (Lau et al., 2006, Sterne et al., 2011). Since there where different 
categories of quasi-experimental studies in P4P literature (pre-post design with control 
groups, cross sectional, interrupted time series (ITS), and longitudinal), I extended the 
subgroup analysis to reflect this. This is illustrated in Figure 2.4. Pre-post evaluations of 
P4P with control groups appeared to have the largest effect (0.22 95%CI -0.33, 0.47) 
0
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compared to cross sectional designs (0.03 95%CI 0.01, 0.05) or ITS designs (0.07 
95%CI -0.40, 0.55). This might have been largely due to two studies (Lee et al., 2010 
and Kuo et al., 2011), which appeared to have skewed the effect of P4P in pre-post 
studies with controls considerably to the right (thus appearing to have a larger pooled 
effect compared to other quasi-experimental designs). 
 
Figure 2.4 Forest plot showing subgroup analyses by quasi-experimental 
evaluation design 
2.5.5. Subgroup analyses for domain of performance (process vs. outcomes)  
Following the evidence from the narrative review that P4P is likely more effective for 
process measures as opposed to outcomes (section 2.4.2.2), I performed a subgroup 
NOTE: Weights are from random effects analysis
.
.
.
.
Overall  (I-squared = 99.9%, p = 0.000)
Li et al.,2010
Jha et al., 2012
Fagan et al., 2010
Kontopantelis et al. 2012
Subtotal  (I-squared = .%, p = .)
pre-post with control
Tsai et al., 2010
ITS
Lindenauer et al., 2007
Rosenthal et al., 2005
McMenamin et al, 2003
Kuo et al., 2011
Gavagan et al., 2010
Subtotal  (I-squared = 78.7%, p = 0.030)
Campbell et al., 2009
Chien et al., 2010
Glikman et al., 2007
Sutton et al, 2012
Subtotal  (I-squared = 0.0%, p = 0.459)
Cupples et al., 2014
Chen et al., 2010
Gilmore et al., 2007
Lee et al., 2010
cross sectional
Cutler et al., 2007
ID
Kruse et al., 2013
Longitudinal
Subtotal  (I-squared = 100.0%, p = 0.000)
Study
0.14 (-0.03, 0.31)
0.07 (-0.99, 1.13)
0.00 (-0.01, 0.01)
-0.04 (-1.22, 1.15)
0.27 (0.25, 0.29)
0.04 (0.01, 0.06)
0.05 (-0.08, 0.18)
0.16 (0.14, 0.17)
0.09 (0.03, 0.15)
0.31 (-1.36, 1.98)
0.66 (0.66, 0.67)
0.19 (-1.02, 1.40)
0.07 (-0.40, 0.55)
-0.23 (-0.68, 0.22)
0.12 (-0.14, 0.38)
-0.01 (-0.06, 0.03)
0.02 (-0.01, 0.04)
0.03 (0.01, 0.05)
-0.01 (-0.24, 0.22)
0.04 (0.01, 0.06)
0.06 (-0.03, 0.14)
0.65 (0.65, 0.66)
0.18 (-0.02, 0.38)
ES (95% CI)
0.06 (-0.02, 0.14)
0.22 (-0.03, 0.47)
.
4.07
13.77
0.04
60.59
100.00
3.03
13.77
13.28
0.02
13.77
0.04
100.00
39.41
0.78
13.72
80.48
100.00
0.98
100.00
13.56
13.77
1.36
Weight
13.58
100.00
%
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analyses on the studies included in the meta-analysis to investigate this statistically. 
This is illustrated in Figure 2.5. P4P studies focused on improving process measures 
(e.g. cancer screening or smoking cessation advice) appeared to have a bigger effect 
(0.18 95%CI 0.06, 0.31) compared with studies focused on improving outcomes such as 
smoking cessation or reduction in hospital mortality (0.00 95%CI -0.01, 0.01). P4P 
studies focused on intermediate outcomes such as blood pressure or cholesterol 
reduction also had a smaller effect (0.07 95%CI -0.01, 0.15) compared to studies 
focused on processes but a larger effect compared to studies focused on outcomes. 
 
Figure 2.5 Forest plot showing subgroup analyses by domain of performance 
NOTE: Weights are from random effects analysis
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Srirangalingam et al., 2006
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Chen et al., 2010
Lindenauer et al., 2007
Kruse et al., 2013
Chien et al., 2010
Campbell et al., 2009
Cupples et al., 2014
Outcome measures
Intermediate outcome measures
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Coleman et al., 2007
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Simpson et al., 2011
Kouides et al 1998
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0.14 (0.02, 0.26)
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0.27 (0.25, 0.29)
0.19 (0.15, 0.23)
0.07 (-0.01, 0.15)
0.04 (0.01, 0.06)
0.16 (0.14, 0.17)
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0.00
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2.6. Discussion  
This aim of this review was to summarise evidence and identify and describe the 
shortcomings of the current evidence of the effects of P4P in healthcare. There was 
substantial evidence on the effectiveness of P4P but very limited evidence on cost-
effectiveness. Guidelines suggested by Cohen (1998) indicate that P4P might have a 
very small effect (SMD= 0.14).  In addition, there was evidence that P4P might be more 
effective in improving process measures (e.g. cancer screening coverage) compared to 
intermediate outcomes (e.g. blood pressure reduction) or final outcomes (e.g. smoking 
cessation or mortality reduction) (SMD process=0.18, intermediate outcomes=0.07, 
outcomes=0.00).  
This review demonstrated that the evidence was, however, inconclusive due to 
substantial heterogeneity on the effect of P4P between and within schemes, 
discrepancies in the effects of P4P in studies with different evaluation design (as poorly 
evaluated P4P studies demonstrated a higher effect: SMD=0.15 compared to 0.08 for 
RCTs), and paucity of RCTs (and or high quality studies with adequate control groups) 
to make reliable and convincing conclusions. In the following subheadings, I briefly 
highlight the limitations of the review, before going on to discuss the shortcomings of 
the evidence: rigour of evaluation and heterogeneity.   
 
Limitations 
It might have been beneficial to assess the risk of bias (in detail) for all included studies 
in order to have a comparative subgroup analysis at an outcome level in the meta-
analysis. In addition, the results of the review might have been further strengthened if 
all relevant primary studies were included in the meta-analyses. However, this was not 
possible due to poorly reported studies (and time constraints in contacting authors for 
more information). In the future, authors of P4P evaluation studies should endeavor to 
report more fully, providing raw data on sample size, and standard errors of estimates 
where possible.  
2.6.1. Rigour of evaluation 
There were very few RCTs that evaluated the effectiveness of P4P in healthcare. The 
majority of the studies were quasi-experimental and studies with no adequate control 
groups. The findings from this review suggest that estimates of the effects of P4P are 
                                                                           Chapter 2: Pay for performance (a review of reviews) 
 
52 
 
smaller in RCTs compared to quasi-experimental studies or evaluations without 
adequate control groups. This is in line with literature surrounding the effects of 
evaluation design in health care, which suggests that non-RCT studies are likely to 
over-estimate the effect of interventions (Shadish et al., 2002, Tilling et al., 2005). 
RCTs are likely to give less biased estimates than other evaluation designs (Booth and 
Tannock, 2014, Higgins and Green, 2011). Evaluations with no adequate control groups 
and to a lesser extent, quasi-experimental studies are prone to multiple biases and 
confounding factors such as additional funds or other quality improvement strategies (in 
the P4P context), which makes it difficult to disentangle the effects of P4P (Shadish et 
al., 2002). This could create ambiguity among researchers regarding the extent of 
attribution of success of P4P, as potential confounders may have influenced the 
observed effects. 
It is understandable that the contexts in which P4P is implemented, a randomised 
controlled trial is not always feasible, especially in cases where the schemes have 
already been implemented without control groups. However, a rigorous evaluation is 
still possible using well conducted quasi-experimental designs with adequate controls, 
such as interrupted time series and controlled before and after studies (Tilling et al., 
2005). This gives more credibility to the inferences made about cause and effect 
relationship, provided careful attention is paid to address potential confounders (Shadish 
et al., 2002, Higgins and Green, 2011).  
 
Drawing from the findings, the important point to note is that rigorous evaluations are 
needed to generate more convincing evidence on the use of P4P in health care. The 
evidence of the effects of P4P will benefit from improved evaluation of future schemes 
using RCTs where possible and well-designed quasi-experimental studies (where RCTs 
are not feasible). In addition, exploration and analysis of current literature should take 
into consideration the influence of evaluation design on evidence of P4P.  
2.6.2. Heterogeneity 
The findings of this review provided evidence of substantial heterogeneity in the effects 
of P4P in health care, which is one of the reasons researchers struggle to make sense of 
the available evidence. The statistical heterogeneity observed in the findings of this 
review refers to the variation in the effects sizes of P4P in health care beyond that 
attributable to chance (Higgins and Green, 2011). Researchers have suggested that this 
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is mainly due to the differences in design features of the P4P schemes i.e. ‘the problem 
of combining apples and oranges’ (Van Herck et al., 2010, Witter et al., 2012, De Bruin 
et al., 2011). These schemes vary in terms of incentivised activities (quality measures: 
process vs outcomes), basis for providing incentive, recipients of incentive, size of 
incentive, frequency of payment, and duration of the incentive. For example, P4P may 
have a different effect on process measures e.g. smoking cessation advice, as compared 
to patient outcomes e.g. smoking cessation rates (as demonstrated in section 2.4.2). In 
the same way, P4P schemes incentivizing health service providers with large sized 
incentives may have produced better effects than P4P schemes giving small sized 
incentives.   
Others suggest that other sources of variation may also explain the observed 
heterogeneity (Eichler and Levine, 2009, Ssengooba et al., 2012). These include: (1) 
context in which the P4P scheme is implemented (health systems, increased funding, 
and complexity/degree of implementation of the scheme), (2) how well the programme 
has been piloted: use of baseline measurement, setting of targets, degree of preliminary 
work done, (3) evaluation design (as demonstrated in section 2.5), and (4) area of 
intervention e.g. prevention (immunizations and screenings), and disease management 
and outcomes (blood pressure monitoring and reduction) (Eichler and Levine, 2009, 
Ssengooba et al., 2012). Furthermore, P4P may work differently in contexts where 
preliminary work on what works in that context has been done, as opposed to contexts 
where no groundwork was done.   
Emerging P4P literature is beginning to place more emphasis on careful consideration 
and selection of design choices, informed by the knowledge of ‘what works’ 
theoretically and empirically (Epstein, 2012, Eijkenaar, 2012, Scott et al., 2009). 
However, the evidence of what works is limited and has not been explored in a 
systematic way, despite the presence of theoretical and empirical evidence in this area. 
Therefore, in order to make sense of the available evidence and to explore ‘what works’ 
in P4P, it is important to examine sources of heterogeneity and the possible ways to 
address or investigate them.  
2.6.3. Exploring heterogeneity 
The heterogeneity observed in the findings of this review may be due to clinical 
difference between the schemes (for example, differences in elements of the P4P 
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intervention, contexts, or outcomes considered), or methodological differences (such as 
evaluation design) (Morton et al., 2004). The possible ways of systematically exploring 
this heterogeneity include a subgroup analyses and or a meta-regression, which both can 
be used to determine which elements might be contributing to the intervention effect 
and the extent of their influence on the intervention effect (Higgins and Green, 2011, 
Engels et al., 2000).  
Subgroup analyses involve stratifying the studies into homogeneous categories, and 
fitting a separate effects estimate e.g., of the pooled standardised mean difference in 
each category to produce average effects for each category (Higgins and Green, 2011). 
For example, pooled estimates of studies by evaluation designs (RCTs, quasi-
experimental studies, and studies with no control groups) shown in section 2.5. Meta 
regression (an extension of the subgroup analyses) quantifies the relationship between 
the sizes of effect of the interventions and the categories or characteristics of the studies 
using weighted regression-based techniques. Thus, allowing multiple categories or 
characteristics to be investigated simultaneously (Morton et al., 2004).  
 
In order to explore and investigate heterogeneity in the evidence of the effects of P4P 
using subgroup analyses and (or) meta-regression, a clear and reliable framework to 
categorise these studies into practical and coherent groups is required (for example, 
coherent categories based on designs, evaluation designs, and contexts of P4P). While 
there is clear and established literature for the basis of categorising studies by evaluation 
design, literature on categorisation of P4P designs or contexts is less clear and lacking 
structure (lacking a systematic approach). There is no reliable framework available in 
literature to categorise these studies into informed categories that would allow 
exploration of heterogeneity in a practical way. Therefore, a logical step in making 
sense of the evidence of P4P was to develop a reliable framework to categorise these 
schemes to facilitate exploration of heterogeneity. 
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2.7. What this chapter adds 
This chapter reviewed and appraised the evidence surrounding the effects of P4P 
schemes in healthcare. Despite the popularity of financial incentives in healthcare, their 
effectiveness on improving quality of care are shown to be modest, fragmented 
(heterogeneous), and evaluations are of poor quality and often lacking adequate control 
groups. Improving the evidence of the effect of P4P requires more rigorous evaluations 
of future P4P schemes and exploring heterogeneity in the current evidence, while taking 
into consideration the evaluation designs of the P4P schemes. This forms the basis of 
the subsequent chapters of this thesis. In the next chapter, I focus on the development of 
a framework (typology) to systematically categorise P4P schemes in healthcare to help 
facilitate exploration of heterogeneity between the schemes, before going on in 
subsequent chapters to systematically explore heterogeneity by conducting a meta- 
regression analyses. 
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Chapter 3 Developing a framework to categorise 
P4P schemes (A P4P typology) 
 
3.0. Introduction 
The review and appraisal of evidence on effects of P4P in the previous chapter 
demonstrated the need for an informed, systematic, and reliable framework to categorise 
P4P schemes in order to systematically explore heterogeneity in P4P studies to allow 
researchers to make better sense of the available evidence to inform the use of P4P in 
health care. This is because heterogeneous evidence could be better explained by 
considering the difference in design, implementation, and contexts (Eichler and Levine, 
2009, Meessen et al., 2006, Soeters et al., 2006, Epstein, 2012).   
 
While it may be worthwhile to develop a common framework for contextual and 
implementation variables, it would be difficult for three reasons: (1) they vary 
extensively across P4P schemes, (2) they variables are less readily reported in evaluated 
P4P studies, as opposed to design features, and (3) they are setting specific and 
qualitative work or surveys is often required in that context to understand it (which is 
explored in the second part of this thesis).  
 
Some researchers have reviewed and described common design features of P4P (e.g. 
what kind of incentive: fines or bonuses) based on the current empirical literature 
(Stockwell, 2010, Eijkenaar, 2013). However, consideration of the literature was not 
approached in a systematic way because both studies were informed only by empirical 
evidence, which has been shown to be substantially heterogeneous (see chapter two).  
For example, it seems logical that incentives could either be fines or bonuses (or both). 
However, some P4P schemes implementing fines or bonuses have resulted in improved 
quality, while other programmes have not had any desirable effect. Furthermore, 
literature suggests that P4P design features may interact with one another. For example, 
P4P schemes that have a certain combination of variables might be more effective than 
others (Stockwell, 2010, Eijkenaar, 2013). There are however no studies in literature 
combining design features in a sensible framework to possibly reflect this.  
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Despite the potential importance of design features of P4P, research that focuses on the 
impact of these design features on effectiveness of P4P is rare. There is, however, a 
range of theories and concepts in behavioural science and economics, which can be used 
to understand better how clinicians respond to incentives. This can contribute to the 
understanding of the impact of these design features on the effectiveness of P4P. 
However, this knowledge is unstructured and rarely explicitly used in the design of P4P 
schemes. Designers of P4P schemes rarely make clear the theoretical basis and 
justification for the designs of the schemes. Similarly, evaluations of some of these 
schemes do not relate the findings to the design features of the P4P schemes under 
scrutiny (Mehrotra et al., 2010, Doran, 2008).  
A way to harness and structure this knowledge into a more reliable and practical 
framework to explore heterogeneity and ‘what works’ in P4P is through the 
development of a theoretically informed typology. This is a systematic form of 
classification (often having their roots in theory) that helps in description, identifying 
patterns, aids in reducing complexity in the empirical world, and theory testing (Bailey, 
1994).  
This chapter focuses on the development of a theoretical typology that categorizes P4P 
schemes based on their design features in order to attempt to sensibly describe, develop, 
and compare the results of evaluations of P4P schemes. This typology could aid in the 
description and comparison of P4P schemes. It would also aid in systematic exploration 
of the influence of the design features on the effectiveness of these schemes; whether 
certain design choices lead to more effective schemes or not (as theory suggests). 
3.1. Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this part of my research was to construct a P4P typology, which could be 
used to explore the heterogeneity in evaluations of P4P. In order to construct this 
typology, I set three objectives.  
 First, to construct a typology based on design features of P4P schemes and 
relevant theories.  
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 Second, to test and refine the typology to ensure that it can be used to efficiently 
identify and categorise P4P design features on the basis of intervention 
descriptions.  
 Third, to label the types in the typology to ensure that it is an efficient tool that 
would aid in systematic exploration of heterogeneity in results of evaluations of 
P4P schemes.  
3.2. Methods 
There are two common forms of typology namely, the ideal type and the constructed 
type (Bailey, 1994). For this research, I developed a constructed typology as opposed to 
the ideal type because the constructed type allows for categorisation, comparison and 
analysis of empirical cases (which was key in exploring heterogeneity in the effects of 
P4P). The ideal typology on the other hand is developed with only the most prominent 
features of the phenomenon (in their purest states), in which empirical cases might not 
exist, thereby making an ideal typology less relevant to cases in literature, and not 
helpful in exploring heterogeneity (Bailey, 1975; Bailey, 1994). 
The constructed type is defined as “a purposive, planned selection, abstraction, 
combination, and (sometimes) accentuation of a set of criteria with empirical referents 
that serves as a basis for comparison of empirical cases” (McKinney, 1966).  
The methods I used to develop the constructed typology (and the other two objectives of 
the study) involved six major steps (See Figure 3.1 for a summary of the steps taken). 
First, I identified nine potential design features to be included in the typology from the 
literature. Second, I identified and explored theories relevant to these design features. 
Third, I gave standard descriptions of the variables within the P4P design features and 
combined them in a multidimensional space, which resulted in 96 possible types. 
Fourth, to assess the functionality of the P4P typology, I piloted it on descriptions of 
P4P studies from a randomly selected review of the literature. After this, I reduced and 
refined the typology in order to make it more manageable and to meet the standard of 
what a good typology should be according to literature (Bailey, 1994). Finally, I 
labelled the types in the typology to ensure that it could be used efficiently in systematic 
exploration of heterogeneity in results of evaluations of P4P schemes (Bailey, 1994). 
Each step is described in more detail in the subsequent sections.  
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3.2.1. Identification of potential design features 
A few studies have identified and described design features in P4P literature (Stockwell, 
2010, Eijkenaar, 2013). Both studies identified nine similar design features (patterns): 
 Who receives the incentives (hospitals, individual clinical staff, teams) 
 Type of payment (non-monetary or monetary) 
 Type of incentives (fines or bonuses) 
 Size of incentives 
 Payment mechanism (absolute or tiered thresholds) 
 Method of payment (is the incentive payment coupled/uncoupled from usual 
salary or budget) 
 Performance measure (absolute or relative measure) 
 The domain of performance measured (process, structures, and outcomes).  
 The time lag between the measurement of performance and payment of the 
incentive 
I used these nine design features as my starting point. Furthermore, to ensure 
comprehensiveness of the design features, I scanned 138 studies describing and 
evaluating P4P schemes identified in chapter two (see Appendix A4 and A5). There 
were no apparent design features that appeared to be left out. In the following sections, I 
Identification of P4P 
design features  
Identification 
of relevant 
theories and 
concepts 
Consolidation of theories and p4p 
design features: to give standard 
descriptions P4P design features 
Combination of the design features in a 
multidimensional space  
Reduction, testing, and refining the typology 
Labelling the created ‘types’ 
Figure 3.1 Flow chart of methods used to develop the P4P typology 
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explore these design features in more detail with theory and empirical cases, where I 
also give standard descriptions and refining categories of P4P design features.  
3.2.2. Identification and exploration of relevant theories to P4P design features  
Potential relevant theories were identified from literature identified by a review using 
keyword searches (behavioural economics, behavioural theories, incentive theories, 
economic theories) on three databases (PubMed, PsycINFO, and EconLit) (see 
Appendix B1 for search output). I also found relevant theories from references in the 
identified P4P literature.  
Since there were various economic theories that relate to how individuals respond to 
incentives. I purposively selected theories that had been used to describe or understand 
behaviour of clinicians or health service professionals in the context of P4P.   
In the subsequent sections, the identified theories and concepts were consolidated and 
applied to the identified design features, to explore, explain, or predict human behaviour 
relative to design choices.   
3.2.2.1. Who receives the incentives?  
P4P schemes involve payment of incentives to individual health professionals, health 
institutions, clinical teams, or other organisations providing health care (Gross et al., 
2008, Tahrani et al., 2008, Chee et al., 2007).  
 
Trisolini (2011) suggests that P4P schemes with incentives targeted at groups (such as 
clinical teams, health institutions/facilities, and organisations) rather than individual 
health professionals are more likely to result in improvements in quality of care. This is 
because organizations are capable of setting up good management structures that could 
be strong enough to elicit a change in behaviour. For example, incentives paid to groups 
are used in different ways (purchase of equipment or hiring more staff), which could 
lead to improvements in quality and performance (Basinga et al., 2011, Vergeer and 
Chansa, 2008, Ssengooba et al., 2012). This argument is in line with the organisation 
theory, which proposes that payment of incentives to groups rather than individuals are 
more likely to bring desired effects because organisations are capable of promoting 
behaviour change in employees through a wide range of strategies e.g. better structures, 
improved supervision, enacting stricter guidelines and policies etc. (Stewart, 1998). 
However, this is dependent on the level of the managerial or organisational skills. So 
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paying incentives to the organisation as opposed to individuals is likely to result in 
higher impact provided managerial skills are good. 
 
A counter argument against paying incentives to groups compared to paying directly to 
individual health care professionals is what is known as the ‘free rider’ theory (Kidwell 
and Benneth, 1993, Cooper et al., 1992, Shepperd, 1993). The free rider theory suggests 
that individuals are more likely to undersupply the service being incentivised when they 
share responsibility of providing that service because they might feel that the payment 
might be shared equally rather than based on individual contributions. Therefore there is 
less incentive to try to perform better because as an individual, one can ‘get away with’ 
not changing behaviour and still receive the incentive (free-riding). Furthermore, some 
researchers suggest that paying individual health professionals could create competition 
among the individual providers, which could heighten adverse consequences such as 
hoarding of knowledge and skills, thereby undermining the promotion of team based 
care, which is believed to be important to improving the quality of care (Town et al., 
2004). This ‘free rider’ problem however, can be somewhat ameliorated if 
organisational structure and management is strong. For example, management can 
implement stricter policies/guidelines or create an opportunity for individual clinicians 
to earn part of the incentive received based on their contribution. 
3.2.2.2. What type of incentive: Non-monetary or Monetary? 
Financial incentives can be in the form of money or gifts, also known as monetary or 
non-monetary incentives. Monetary incentives are the most commonly used incentives 
in P4P programmes (Eijkenaar, 2013). 
Non-monetary incentives (Justifiability and Evaluability Theories) 
Two theories known as evaluability theory and justifiability theory support the use of 
non-monetary incentives as a more effective form of incentive to change behaviour 
compared to the use of monetary incentive (Jeffery, 2010, Hsee and Zhang, 2010). 
Evaluability theory suggests that some non-monetary incentives are more difficult to 
attach a monetary value to (Hsee and Zhang, 2010). For instance, an incentive of an all-
expense paid holiday to Hawaii is likely to be considered a pleasurable experience. The 
things that come to mind are good weather, beaches, luxury, and room service. These 
positive attributes are difficult to ‘put a price on’ and thus may be ascribed a higher 
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value than the cash equivalent of the all-expense paid holiday. While justifiability 
theory proposes that when individuals are able to justify an award/incentive, there is a 
greater motivation to achieve the award or incentive (Jeffery, 2010). A number of non-
monetary incentives are perceived as luxuries that individuals would not usually 
purchase with their own cash, primarily because they cannot justify the purchase.  
Behaviour change then becomes an effective way of acquiring something that someone 
could not normally justify purchasing with their own money. Non-monetary incentives 
can have both evaluability and justifiability. This means that they allow the 
earner/payee to justify the consumption of the incentive, thereby motivating the receiver 
to change behaviour and earn something that might have otherwise been more difficult 
to buy with money. 
In 2007, Crifo and Diaye developed an economic model using both monetary and non-
monetary incentives in which they gave the agents non-monetary incentives (an 
incentive of what matters to the agent was assumed, as it is important for the principal 
to be aware of the agents’ preferences). They showed that non-monetary incentives are 
as important as monetary incentives in changing behaviour. They also found that there 
is the possibility of reward inflation occurring if agents are continually rewarded with 
money i.e. the agents can get adjusted to the incentives and might no longer be 
motivated to change behaviour by it. Crifo and Diaye (2007) also argued that non-
monetary incentives are memorable, thereby creating a possibility of greater 
behavioural change compared to monetary incentives which might be combined with 
usual pay checks or salaries, making it less memorable. Despite this, non-monetary 
incentives are rarely used in P4P schemes. 
Monetary incentives (Expectancy Theory) 
Expectancy theory, proposed by Vroom (1964), suggests that: “individuals act to 
maximize expected satisfaction with outcomes”.  The theory assumes that individuals’ 
motivation to work is dependent on two factors: (1) the expectancy about the 
relationship between effort and a particular outcome and (2) the valence (attractiveness) 
of the outcome. These two factors are believed to create the motivation that will lead to 
individuals changing their behaviour towards achieving the desired outcome. Vroom 
argued that money has valence because it is effective in acquiring things desired by 
individuals such as material goods of their choice. Therefore, money might be more 
effective in driving behavioural change compared to non-monetary incentives. This 
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might be particularly true for individuals whose salaries are barely sufficient. In such 
cases, money might be a more effective driver of behaviour change than non-monetary 
incentives.   
  It is also possible that giving money as incentives might be more effective in driving 
behaviour change compared to non-monetary incentives because the different agents 
might have different material goods that they desire and it might be almost impossible 
and challenging to determine what is of material good that is of value to every agent 
involved in the particular P4P scheme. A particular non-monetary incentive might be of 
value to one agent but might be of little value to another agent within the same P4P 
scheme (Furnham and Argyle, 1998). Furnham and Argyle further argue that money has 
symbolic value due to its perceived relationship to prestige, status, and other factors. 
Monetary incentives may have higher valence than non-monetary incentives, depending 
on the relative payment schedules.  
3.2.2.3. Type of incentive: Fines or Bonuses (Loss Aversion Theory)  
There are two forms of financial incentive used in P4P schemes: fines and bonuses. 
Kahneman and Tversky developed The Loss Aversion Theory in 1979 and it refers to 
the tendency for people to prefer to avoid losses compared to acquiring gains. Adam 
Smith said, “Pain... is in almost all cases a more pungent sensation than the opposite 
and correspondent pleasure. The one almost always depresses us much more below the 
ordinary or what might be called the natural state of our happiness, than the other ever 
raises us above it” (Smith, quoted in Maynard, 2012, p.8). From this perspective, fines 
are more likely to motivate behavioural change than bonuses. In addition, P4P schemes, 
which use fines, might be more sustainable compared to P4P programmes that only use 
bonuses because they could be less costly (Pope, 2011). This is supported by some 
experimental studies that have demonstrated that losses could be twice as effective as 
gains/bonuses in eliciting a positive behavioural response to increase performance 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 2004). The implication of this in P4P in health care is that 
practitioners will be more inclined to change behaviour or increase performance if they 
think they might lose something rather than get a bonus.  
Despite theory suggesting that the use of fines compared to bonuses are more effective 
in implementing behaviour change, bonuses are still the most common form of 
incentives used in P4P programmes in healthcare. One of the reasons might be because 
fines can lead to a loss of intrinsic motivation in clinicians (Mehrotra et al., 2010, 
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Kinoti, 2011). This is because the use of fines might annoy clinicians who have 
altruistic purposes and they might feel they are not being appreciated for their job. In 
addition, it might be very difficult to implement the use of fines in certain contexts with 
weak health systems and poor governance because trade unions might object and create 
opposition leading to disruption in health services. For example, a country such as 
Nigeria where the union of doctors call strikes for several days because of delay in 
salary payments would most likely be against the use of fines (Hargreaves, 2002). The 
political challenge of using fines means that the few P4P schemes that implement fines 
usually include an opportunity to earn bonuses as well. 
3.2.2.4. Size of incentives (The Target Income Hypothesis) 
The most common form of description of size of incentive is the amount of money 
relative to the clinicians’ salary, usual budget of the health institution or anticipated 
payment regarding the health service(s) in question, which ranges from 0.5% to 100%. 
Other P4P programmes simply report the size of incentive in absolute terms as the 
actual amount earned in the appropriate currency (Pope, 2011). 
Hahn (2006) suggested that the effect of an incentive might be influenced by its size 
compared to the recipient’s usual salary, budget, or anticipated payment (Hahn, 2006). 
Consequently, it is very important to specify appropriate reward levels as the incentives 
might be too small compared to the usual salary. This may produce little or no change 
even when the objectives are measured accurately and are fairly evaluated. 
Alternatively, the incentive might be too large resulting in paying more than necessary 
to bring about the desired behavioural change, thereby making it less likely to be cost 
effective. 
 As the size of the incentives (fines or bonuses) increase (everything else being equal), 
people may be motivated to work harder to reach the set targets. However, the 
relationship is likely to demonstrate diminishing marginal returns (see Figure 3.2). After 
a certain point, increasing the size of incentive will not bring about the required 
behaviour change and this will lead to a waste of resources (Mold et al., 2010).The size 
of incentive also raises the question of cost-effectiveness of P4P schemes, as money 
spent on the incentive might not be justified by the potential benefits in patient 
outcomes resulting from behaviour change. 
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There is some evidence that “physicians have a desired income that they want to 
achieve whenever their actual income is below that income”  (Evans, 1974, p.162). This 
is commonly referred to as the Target Income Hypothesis and if this hypothesis is valid, 
it means that increasing the size of incentive would result in an increase in performance 
only until the clinicians reach their target income after which, increasing the size of 
incentive would reduce performance or not increase it any further (see Figure 3.2). 
  
Figure 3.2 Illustration of physician target income relative to performance 
Desquins and colleagues in 2009 further found that 80% of physicians would be willing 
to perform better to reach a target income, a finding supported by a number of other 
researchers (Folland et al., 1993, Rizzo and Blumenthal, 1994). 
Though the Target Income Hypothesis provides some understanding as to how 
clinicians behaviour or performance might vary relative to size of incentive needed to 
achieve their target income, the size of incentive needed to reach this target is likely to 
differ according to context, as the target income would be related to the cost of living of 
that region.  
Providers might judge the adequacy of the size of incentive to change behaviour based 
on the amount or difficulty of reaching the performance or targets that is required of 
them. This could mean that what constitutes an adequate incentive to improve 
performance or reach a certain target in a certain area of healthcare (e.g. immunisation 
rates) is likely to differ across contexts.  For example, quarterly incentives of £100 to 
increase childhood immunisation rates to clinicians in developing countries (where 
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salaries are often insufficient) might be deemed sufficient, while clinicians in developed 
countries might not view the incentive as something worth doing.  It is therefore 
important to have an idea of the average target income of the clinicians participating in 
the P4P programmes as this could contribute to the effectiveness of P4P schemes. The 
average target income could be determined through preliminary surveys before the 
implementation of the P4P schemes (Rizzo and Zeckhauser, 2003), which could help 
P4P scheme designers determine the appropriate size of incentive to ensure cost-
effectiveness of these programmes.  
The information that could help in meaningful categorisation of size of incentive in P4P 
schemes is limited and even if readily available, might be difficult to structure using 
absolute amounts. The closest way to subjectively capture the size of incentive is to use 
a function relative to the clinicians’ usual salary/reimbursement. There are no set cut-
offs in theory as to what size of incentive is adequate to change behaviour, I suggest 
arbitrary cut-offs guided by some empirical evidence.  
The size of incentives in P4P schemes in healthcare tend to range from 0.5% to up to 
100% increase in individual salary or institution budget. Studies indicate that most P4P 
initiatives with less than 5% increase/decrease in payment had no statistically 
significant effect on the performance indicator compared to P4P schemes with above 
5% in salary or budget (Chen et al., 2011, Pope, 2011). For example, a P4P programme 
in the USA which rewarded hospitals with small incentives (less than 5% of usual 
reimbursement) showed no significant difference in 30-day mortality rates for 
conditions that were explicitly linked to incentives (acute myocardial infarction and 
Coronary artery bypass grafting) and among conditions not linked to incentives 
(congestive heart failure and pneumonia) (Jha et al., 2012). While the QOF programme 
in the UK with relatively larger incentives (up to 40% of usual reimbursement) showed 
significant reduction in 30-day mortality rates for pneumonia and non-significant 
reductions in myocardial infarction and heart failure (Sutton et al., 2012). Based on 
these examples and following the rationale of the target income hypothesis, for the 
purpose of developing the P4P typology, I proposed 3 categories of size of incentive 
namely: small (<5%), medium (5-10%), and large (>10%). I hypothesized that small 
incentives were likely to be the least effective in driving behaviour change, and the 
medium sized incentives and large incentives were likely to be more effective (although 
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large incentive sizes may not bring about the commensurate amount of behaviour 
change for the value of money) (see figure 3.2.). 
3.2.2.5. Payment mechanism (absolute or tiered thresholds): The Goal Gradient 
Theory  
There are two main kinds of payment mechanisms in P4P schemes. The first kind 
involves a payment for achieving an absolute target (e.g. 70% fully vaccinated children) 
and the second kind involves different payments triggered at tiered targets (e.g. 60%, 
70%, and 80%) or a sliding scale.  
Goal Gradient Theory (Hull, 1932) predicts a greater positive behavioural response if 
there are a series of stepped target thresholds to meet, for example paying increasing 
incentives for achieving a 65%, an 80%, and a 90% performance threshold rather than 
one target e.g., a payment for an absolute 80% increase in performance (Mehrotra et al., 
2010). Therefore an incentive payment made for reaching an absolute threshold or a 
single target (only if you reach the target) might be less effective in changing behaviour 
compared to an incentive payment, which increases as you achieve higher thresholds. 
This might be because individuals in an incentive programme intensify their efforts as 
they sense that they are getting closer to their target goal (Heath et al., 1999). 
Furthermore, individuals are more likely to be motivated when the target goals appear 
to be ‘realistic’. If the target goal is far from the baseline, it might be viewed as 
unrealistic or unachievable to the individuals who may see no reason to try to meet the 
target, as they are likely to fail. In addition to the risk of not getting any payment, this 
might also reflect the perceived cost to them of achieving it, when considered, the 
expected benefit might be too low. 
There is also the risk of loss of interest or motivation when the target goal is achieved 
(this might contribute to an understanding of why some successful P4P programmes 
seem to reach a plateau or even dip after sometime) where there is just one target 
(Campbell et al., 2009). This suggests that having tiered targets or a sliding scale might 
challenge the clinicians to a continued effort in improving performance.  
3.2.2.6. Method of payment (coupled or decoupled from usual reimbursement): 
Mental accounting theory  
The method of payment in incentive programmes can be coupled or decoupled from 
salary or income. For example, increasing the usual salary of £2000 to £2080, compared 
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to making a separate payment of £80. Mental Accounting Theory states that individuals 
divide their current and future assets into separate, non-transferable portions and will 
assign different levels of utility of each asset in each group (Thaler, 1999). This predicts 
that people will value incentives more highly if not coupled with the usual salary 
(Jeffery, 2010). Applying this theory to P4P schemes means that it is likely that 
individuals would place more value on incentives not coupled with the usual salary 
compared to incentives coupled with salary (even though they might be the same 
amount). Decoupling the incentives from usual reimbursement might be 
administratively more burdensome. It could however be worth the additional cost, if it 
contributes to the success of the P4P programmes. 
3.2.2.7. Performance measure, domain of performance, and time lag: Risk Aversion 
Theory  
The last three identified design features; Performance measure, Domain of measurement 
and Timing of payment, share a common relevant theory known as the risk aversion 
theory, which is explained below. 
Risk Aversion Theory predicts the behaviour of individuals when exposed to risk or 
uncertainty. An individual is less ready to accept an uncertain contract or agreement 
compared with another contract with a more certain consequence (Arrow, 1965). In P4P 
schemes in healthcare, when there are several elements of risk or uncertainty of not 
getting paid the anticipated or desired amount. This could reduce the impact of the 
scheme.  
The riskiness of a scheme may be explained in terms of three design features: 
a. The degree to which the target takes into account achievement in absolute terms 
or relative to how others perform (performance measure: absolute or relative 
measure) 
b. The degree to which the person/organisation being incentivised can directly 
control the performance measured (domain of performance measured) 
c. The confidence the agent has in being paid if they do achieve the relevant target. 
This might reflect reliability of measurement and (or) time lags between 
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performance and payment of incentive or belief in the administration
3
 of the 
scheme (timing of payment and reliability of measurement). 
 These design features are explained below. 
Performance measure (absolute and relative measures) 
Absolute measure of performance is when an incentive is paid for quality improvement, 
not dependent on other providers (e.g. incentive paid per patient immunized). A relative 
measure on the other hand is when incentive is paid for attaining above a specified rank 
relative to other providers (e.g. incentives paid to clinicians for exceeding the bottom 
quartile immunisation rate). Relative performance measures create greater uncertainty 
for health service providers because their achievement depends also on how well others 
do. Hence providers may be less motivated to invest in improving performance. On the 
other hand, P4P schemes where absolute performance measures are used are more likely 
to be more effective. For example, paying health care workers per number of children 
they immunize against paying those above the median performance. This is because the 
clinicians or clinical teams are more certain of earning the incentive if they improve 
their performance. 
Domain of performance (to what extent is it within the control of the provider) 
The domain of performance measured is also important to the health service providers 
in assessing the risk involved in the P4P scheme. The domains of performance that 
could be measured include:  
 Structure: this involves the use of resources to deliver care e.g. information 
technology (IT) including personnel, facilities, IT, and materials) 
 Process: involves performing routine mechanical operations, specific tasks or 
recommended treatments e.g. periodic cholesterol screening, immunization.  
 Intermediate outcomes: Intermediate outcomes are the steps or outcomes 
between the change in behaviour and the final health outcome (e.g. reduction in 
cholesterol levels, reduction in blood pressure). This means that the progress 
made towards achieving the intermediate outcome is likely to improve final 
outcomes (if evidence-based).  
                                                          
3
 In developing this typology, I considered only the time lag dimension because administration of the 
scheme is highly contextual and such information is not readily available in published studies. One might 
need to conduct in-depth interviews to explore the belief of health workers in the administration of 
each P4P scheme. 
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 Final outcome: these are effects on the quality and length of life and wellbeing 
of people (e.g. reduction in mortality and morbidity rates). 
The structural, process and intermediate outcome domains of performance are often 
seen as more easily achievable or at least more under the control of the healthcare 
organization or clinician, compared with the health outcome measures which are 
influenced by a variety of other factors (including the patients) and so less under the 
control of the health services. Whilst some process and intermediate outcomes might 
partly depend on patient behavioural change as well (e.g. getting patients to show up for 
cancer screening in hard to reach areas), some outcome measures might be more 
dependent on external factors, and so might be viewed as more difficult to achieve 
compared to processes and intermediate outcomes. In addition, process and structural 
measures may be more sensitive to quality differences than outcome measures, because 
poor health outcomes do not always mean there is a quality problem (Oxman and 
Fretheim, 2009a). For example, if a clinician is to be incentivised based on a reduction 
in cardiovascular mortality rates, the positive efforts by the clinician may be 
confounded by other lifestyle choices of the patients e.g. exercise, diet and other factors 
outside their direct control for example, reduction of high blood pressure. Therefore, 
improvements in quality of care might not necessarily translate to improvements in 
patient outcomes. 
For this reason, P4P interventions that focus on the final health outcome domain of 
performance might be perceived as higher risk (greater uncertainty in earning the 
incentive) and might not be as effective as P4P interventions that focus on structure and 
process domains of performance, because even though the healthcare professional might 
have changed behaviour, this might not necessarily reflect in the final outcomes as the 
patient might also need to change behaviour to obtain the desired final outcome. 
Timing of payment (and frequency of payment) 
Timing of incentive payment ranges from monthly to annually. When the time lag 
between the measurement of performance and payment of incentives is longer, it can 
create some uncertainty, particularly in countries with a track record of corruption, 
political instability and/or poor administrative infrastructure. This uncertainty in 
payment might reduce the motivation to improve performance. In addition, shorter time 
lags between payments may indicate smaller more frequent payments, which are more 
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likely to motivate a higher behavioural response in an individual compared to a one-
time lump sum incentive (Thaler, 1985).  
 
Furthermore, according to Price (1993), individuals often exhibit time preference (or 
time discounting) where  “happiness now is worth more to me than happiness next 
year”. Consequently, individuals perceive incentives received soon after the 
behavioural change as having more value than incentives received in the future, a 
phenomenon called ‘pure time preference’. Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) also suggest 
that time lag between measurement of performance and the receipt of the incentives 
could affect behavioural response.  Individuals tend to ask themselves; is there anything 
that I could do now that will bring me immediate rewards instead of what I could do 
now that would reward me in a years’ time? Consequently, P4P designs with minimal 
time lags between provision of care and receipt of incentive might be expected to 
produce greater behavioural response.  
 
Arguably, in some P4P schemes, it may take months or even a year or more to collect 
and validate performance data. This means that payments based on performance might 
not be made until several months or a year after the delivery of care. People might be 
relatively motivated to change their behaviour even if the payment is a year away (after 
measurements of performance) for very large incentives (e.g. up to 40% increase), 
which implies that these design features might interact with each other to influence the 
impact of the scheme. This is another advantage of developing this typology, as each 
type (category) from the typology developed will be a unique combination of the 
dimensions of the design features of P4P. 
 
There are no clear descriptions in theory or literature of what constitutes a ‘long’ time 
lag of payment. Previous studies have suggested that monthly, bi-monthly, or quarterly 
payments constitute shorter time lags, while payments after four months constitute a 
long time lag (Eijkenaar, 2013, Stockwell, 2010). An RCT conducted in the USA 
comparing annual payments of incentives to individual physicians totalling $5000 to 
quarterly payments totalling the same amount for quality improvements in treatments 
and outcomes of diabetes, cancer screening, and smoking, found that the difference in 
effect observed between the two arms were not as a result of the timing of payment, but 
rather likely as a result of difference in the timing of reporting of outcomes (Chung et 
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al., 2010). The quarterly payment group had to present reports every quarter to be 
approved for the payment of the incentive, which might have contributed to motivating 
the physicians in this group compared to submitting yearly reports. Therefore, based on 
these observations, for the purpose of categorisation in this typology, monthly to 
quarterly payments were considered as short time lags, whereas, payments made after 
four months were considered long time lags. 
Reliability of measurement of performance  
Similar to the timing of payment, the reliability of measurement of performance could 
also affect the confidence that the agent (health service provider) has in being paid if 
they do achieve the relevant target. Clinicians are likely to perceive the potential of 
earning the incentive as out of their control and uncertain if the tool for measuring 
performance is not reliable. Clinicians will most likely not change their behaviour even 
if the target is relatively easy to reach because they might think that the measurement 
tool might not accurately reflect behaviour change, thus, reducing motivation to change 
behaviour if it is unlikely to be measured correctly. 
 
The reliability of measurement as perceived by the health service providers is important 
in exploring risk or uncertainty of not earning the incentive. However, it is difficult to 
judge this, as it depends on the views of the clinicians in the particular context, which 
are not commonly reported in P4P evaluations. It is, however, still important and should 
be explored in the implementation contexts when designing a scheme.  
 
3.2.3. Combining the features in a multidimensional space 
Following the exploration of the identified design features with theory, I proceeded to 
define a set of criteria for the variables in each design feature identified. This is 
presented in Appendix B2. This was done in preparation for the combination of these 
features in a multidimensional space to create the typology (see Appendix B3). This 
combination resulted in a typology of 108 possible types
4
. There were too many types, 
and therefore considered to serve little or no use as an analytical tool (overly simplified 
with too many categories). To deal with the large number of possible types, I followed 
                                                          
4
 Formula of estimating number of possible types: assuming all 9 variables are dichotomous= 9
2
 (81) but 
since there is one variable with 3 categories (81 + 27 (adjusting for the 1 category left out)= 108 possible 
types. 
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Bailey (1994) suggestion that the typology could be reduced to ensure greater 
efficiency, manageability, and usability of the typology. The methods for reduction of 
this typology are discussed in the next section. 
3.2.4. Reducing the Typology  
I reduced the typology through (1) dichotomization of variables, which involved 
merging the categories within design features so that there are just two categories, (2) 
pragmatic reduction, which involved combining or compressing design features with the 
same underlying theory or concept, and (3) rescaling, which involved the removal of 
less relevant features from the typology. These methods were selected over other 
methods such as functional reduction (involving the removal of cells/types in which 
empirical cases cannot be found) and subtyping (involving the use of subtypes/versions 
within in type) in order to minimise loss of information, while retaining the typology’s 
ability to be useful as a descriptive and analytical tool. Functional reduction and 
subtyping leads to loss of information and might create a typology in which some P4P 
schemes might not be categorised suitably (Bailey, 1994, Elman, 2005). The reduction 
processes are presented in more detail in the following sections. 
3.2.4.1. Dichotomization of variables (reducing categories with multiple variables into 
two) 
There were nine design features in the original typology and each one had two variables 
apart from the design feature ‘size of incentive’, which had three variables: small, 
medium, and large. According to Bailey (1973), one of the first steps to consider 
reducing a typology is to dichotomize the variables in the features of the typology, 
where there are limited features that do not have dichotomized variables because this 
reduces the loss of information associated with this form of reduction.  
For the design feature of size, I collapsed the three categories: small, medium, and large, 
into two categories: small and large, by categorizing medium size of incentive as large 
because the target income theory (discussed in section 3.2.2.4) suggests that medium 
and large incentives are more likely to have similar effects compared to small and 
medium incentives. This resulted in a reduced typology of 81 types, which was still too 
large. 
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3.2.4.2. Pragmatic compression 
According to Bailey (1994), it is permitted to collapse certain variables in a typology if 
they have the same underlying characteristic or theory, which is called a pragmatic 
compression. For this typology there were three design features that shared the same 
underlying theory- Risk Aversion theory. These features were timing of payment, 
domain of performance measured, and performance measure, which were subsequently 
collapsed into one conceptual variable called the ‘the perceived risk of not earning the 
incentive’ (see Table 3.1).  
If a P4P scheme pays incentives one year after measurement of performance and the 
performance measure is a relative measure, it is more likely that the incentive payment 
will be considered as uncertain by agents (the recipients) even if they work hard to 
change performance. In the ‘low risk’ category, clinicians perceive the incentivised 
entity as a performance target that is easily achievable and there is little or no risk of not 
getting paid the incentives if the target is achieved. There is actually a guaranteed 
payment as long as they improve their performance. On the other hand, in the ‘high 
risk’ category, there is no guarantee of payment because they may not be among the 
target rank to be incentivised or/and that the incentivised entity will be achievable 
which introduces an element of risk (Arrow, 1965). 
The three variables that might influence the risk or the uncertainty of payment as 
perceived by the recipients of the incentives is illustrated in this hypothetical case: “If I 
spend five more minutes with Mrs. Jones discussing the advantages of a mammogram I 
could increase my overall mammogram rate to X% (domain of performance: process 
measure, within clinicians control) which might put me in the 75
th
 percentile for my 
peer physicians (performance measure: relative measure) and possibly lead to an 
incentive at the end of the year (long time lag). This situation constitutes a high level of 
risk or uncertainty for the individual earning the incentive, as opposed to if the 
performance measure was absolute (e.g. payment for reaching a set target, which is not 
dependent on how others perform) and if the time lag was shorter (e.g. monthly 
payments), which constitute lower risk or higher guarantee of earning the incentive if 
targets are met. 
Following this rationale, I set a dichotomous variable namely ‘Perceived risk of not 
earning the incentive (Risk): low risk and high risk. Individuals who perceive the risk or 
uncertainty associated with earning the incentive as low are more likely to change 
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behaviour because there is a higher guarantee about earning the incentive compared to 
when individuals perceive the risk associated with earning the incentive as high.  
After compressing the three design features into one variable, I defined a set of criteria 
for the two categories (high and low) for this new conceptual feature: Perceived Risk of 
not earning the incentive (RISK). In Table 3.1, I present features that are associated 
with a higher risk under the heading high risk and I present the factors that are 
associated with a lower risk of not earning the incentive under low risk. 
Table 3.1 Collapsed design features to form a conceptual variable 'Risk' 
          Categories of new    
                         variable  
                                (Risk) 
Collapsed variables 
Low risk 
 
High risk 
 
Performance measure Absolute: incentive is paid for 
quality improvement not 
dependent on other providers 
e.g. incentive paid per patient 
immunized 
Relative: incentive is paid for 
attaining a specific rank 
relative to other providers e.g. 
incentives paid to clinicians or 
hospitals in top 2 performing 
quartiles 
Domain of performance 
measured 
Within clinicians control: 
incentive payments are based 
on process and structural 
outcomes e.g. number of 
children immunized, routine 
measurement of blood 
pressure of patients every 
month  
Not within clinicians control: 
payment of incentives to 
health providers for health 
outcomes e.g. reduction in 
blood pressure of patients or 
reduction in mortality rates 
from a specific disease 
Time lag Short time lag: Payment of 
incentives immediately after 
measurement of performance) 
or four months or less. 
Long time lag: Payment of 
incentives more than 4months 
after measurement of 
performance 
 
To ensure that the typology was mutually exclusive (implying that no P4P schemes falls 
into more than one type) and to ensure that as many as possible P4P schemes could be 
categorized (despite poor reporting/missing some features in some evaluation studies), I 
set a decision rule that: P4P schemes are categorized as low risk if it has two or more of 
the characteristics in the new elements of the conceptual design feature: short time lag, 
domain of performance within clinicians’ control, and absolute performance measure. 
While P4P schemes should be categorized under high risk if it has two or more of the 
characteristics in the new elements of the conceptual design feature: long time lag, 
domain of performance out of clinicians’ control, and relative performance measure.  
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3.2.4.3. Rescaling 
Rescaling was the third method used to reduce the number of types. This involved 
reducing the number of variables used in constructing the typology (Elman, 2005), to 
exclude redundant features, i.e. features that do not vary that much in empirical cases 
(and do not contribute much to the usefulness of the typology), which made loss of 
information minimal (Elman, 2005, Bailey, 1994).  
 
In this typology, design features that did not vary significantly across the P4P studies 
were considered redundant. This does not mean they are not important in the 
consideration of designing P4P schemes. However, for the purpose of the development 
of the typology, it was likely the redundant features might not contribute significantly to 
the analytical and theory-testing functions of the typology (exploration of 
heterogeneity). Although they might be worth reintroducing as the typology evolves in 
the future.  
Three design features were removed from the typology, which were kind of incentive 
(monetary and non-monetary), method of payment (coupled and decoupled), and 
mechanism of payment (absolute and tiered threshold). This was because in current P4P 
schemes the main form of incentive used was money (monetary incentive), payment 
usually is decoupled from usual payments, and the mechanisms of payment for a 
majority of the schemes were absolute payments.  
The final features included in the typology therefore were: 
 Who to incentivise (individuals or groups) 
 Type of incentive (fines or bonuses) 
 Size of incentives (small or large) 
 Perceived Risk/uncertainty of payment (low or high) 
This resulted in a typology of 16 possible types shown in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2 P4P Typology 
Type  Who received 
the incentive 
Type of 
incentive 
Size of 
incentive 
Perceived risk of not 
earning the incentive 
(RISK) 
1 Groups   Fines  Large  Low  
2 Groups  Bonuses Large Low  
3 Groups  Fines  Small  Low  
4 Groups  Bonuses Small Low  
5 Groups  Fines  Large  High  
6 Groups  Bonuses  Large  High  
7 Individuals  Fines  Large  Low  
8 Individuals  Bonuses Large Low  
9 Groups  Bonuses  Small  High 
10 Groups  Fines  Small  High 
11 Individuals  Fines  Small  Low  
12 Individuals  Bonuses Small Low  
13 Individuals Fines  Small  High  
14 Individuals  Bonuses  Large  High  
15 Individuals  Bonuses  Small  High 
16 Individuals  Fines  Large  High 
3.2.5. Piloting the typology  
The next stage of developing a typology was to test it to assess its functionality. A 
typology is good and functional if it meets a set of pre-defined criteria of (1) relevance: 
all the core components considered, (2) manageability: not cumbersome with only a few 
types, (3) ease of use: to be sure all types of P4P programmes can be categorized easily, 
(4) mutual exclusivity: this requires that there be only one type for each P4P 
programme, and (5) Comprehensiveness: whether all the empirical P4P programmes be 
categorized (Bailey, 1994, Elman, 2005, Tiryakian, 1968). 
Some of these criteria such as relevance have been demonstrated through the process of 
developing the typology, which involved careful and thorough consideration of relevant 
theories and literature applicable to design variables of P4P. Similarly, the 
manageability criterion has been achieved through reduction of the typology to a few 
types to facilitate its use in analyses (as described in the previous section). Other 
criterion such as ease of use was demonstrated by volunteers who used the typology to 
categorise P4P schemes in health care (evidence of this is presented in chapter 4).  
In this section I tested the typology to assess whether categories were mutually 
exclusive (only one type for each P4P scheme) and if all identified empirical P4P 
schemes could be categorised (comprehensiveness). To do this, I applied the typology 
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to P4P studies that were included in a randomly selected review (Eijkenaar, 2012) from 
the set of previously identified reviews in chapter two. Data were extracted from the 
identified studies in a standardised way using a uniform template (see Table 3.4) to 
obtain information on design features from each study, such as who receives the 
incentive, size of incentive, performance measures, domain of performance measured, 
timing of payment etc. I identified 14 P4P schemes from the selected review. 
I was able to identify the relevant design features and categorise 6 out of 14 P4P 
schemes identified from the review. This was because some of the P4P schemes did not 
fit in any category because certain combinations of the design variables that were 
initially not considered were used. There were two specific examples: (1) schemes that 
combined the use of fines and bonuses and (2) schemes that paid incentives to 
individuals as well as groups or schemes that individuals benefited from the group 
payments. 
I also found that it was difficult to categorize large schemes that incentivised for 
multiple activities or quality measures that include both processed and outcomes. This is 
because judging whether the perceived risk of not earning the incentive is ‘low’ or 
‘high’ is dependent on whether three design variables, which include whether quality 
measures are within the clinicians’ control or not: processes are considered more within 
the control of clinicians compared to outcomes. Having a combination of both processes 
and outcomes was not considered earlier on in the process of developing the typology. 
An example was the quality and outcomes framework (UK), where large incentives 
(total bonuses of up to 40% of clinicians’ salary) are paid to hospitals (groups) on an 
annual basis (long time lag) for a range of indicators spanning across process and 
intermediate outcome measures (management and treatment of hypertension and 
diabetes, reduction of cholesterol and blood pressure, and patient experience) 
(Eijkenaar, 2012). Following these issues, I therefore set out to refine the typology 
further, as illustrated in the next section. 
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3.3. Results (refining, retesting, and labelling the typology) 
3.3.1. Refining the typology  
To refine the typology to ensure its functionality, I defined stricter criteria for the design 
variables in the typology, a method suggested by Bailey (1994). This method of creating 
new variables for the newly identified design blends was chosen because it retains the 
size of the typology, as opposed to the method of expanding the typology to 
accommodate the newly identified design variables (which makes it less manageable) 
(Bailey, 1975; Bailey, 1994). 
As illustrated in Table 3.3, the criteria for judgement of fines (under the variable kind of 
incentive) was redefined and expanded to include presence or absence of bonuses in the 
same scheme (may or may not have bonuses). The criteria for bonuses remained strictly 
just the opportunity to earn bonuses (and no penalty or fine of any kind). This follows 
the rationale that individuals are still likely to maintain their loss aversion attitude as 
long as there is an element of fine or penalty and whether there is the potential to earn 
bonuses or not is not likely to deter the risk averse behaviour. Instead, a potential to 
earn bonuses in an incentive scheme where fines are implemented is likely to further 
boost behaviour change. 
I also redefined the criteria for categorization of payment of incentives under groups to 
include instances where individuals may or may not benefit from the group payments 
(see Table 3.3). This is because when incentives are paid to groups as opposed to 
individual clinicians, one of the ways a good management system could motivate 
behaviour change is to provide individuals an opportunity to earn from the incentives 
received by the group (among other things such as increased supervision and stricter 
guidelines, as argued in section 3.2.2.1). 
Second, in order to address the problem of difficulty in deciding whether the domain of 
performance measured is mostly within the clinicians control or not (since a few P4P 
schemes tend to use a mixture of processes and outcomes), I set a rule to make such 
decisions based on the measures that are predominant. For example, P4P schemes with 
four outcome measures and 20 process measures will be categorized as mostly under the 
clinicians’ control, since there are more processes than outcomes, as opposed to ten 
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outcome measures and two process measures, which will be categorised as mostly out 
of the clinicians’ control (in section 3.2.4.2). In addition, in the unlikely case where 
there are equal number of processes and outcomes, the outcome measures are likely to 
outweigh the process measures.  
Table 3.3 Criteria for categorisation of design variables in the P4P typology 
Who received the incentive (Did Individuals or Groups receive the incentive)? 
Criteria for judging 
Individuals 
 If the incentives are paid directly to individual health 
workers/clinicians/doctors only 
 If individual health worker/clinician/doctor’s income is 
supplemented as a result of the incentive (e.g. reflected in the 
rise of personal income) only 
Criteria for judging 
Groups (including 
schemes where 
individuals and 
groups are paid 
bonuses) 
If the incentive is paid to a group or an organization in which individual 
clinicians may or may not benefit from the incentive directly  
Groups include any of the following  
 Hospital  
 Clinical team 
 General physician (GP) practice 
 NGO 
 Levels of government  
 Faith based organizations 
Type of incentive (Was the incentive in the form of Fines or Bonuses)? 
Criteria for judging 
Fines 
If the incentive is negative in the form of reduction in expected 
payments, penalty, punishment etc. 
In some cases, bonuses may or may not be paid as well 
Criteria for judging 
Bonuses 
If incentive is in the form of increase in payments, bonus, gifts etc. 
with NO fines levied 
Size (Was the size of the incentive small or large)? 
Criteria for judging 
Small 
If the incentive in the P4P programme is smaller than 5% of any one 
of the following: 
 Salary of individual clinician/health worker/doctor  
 Anticipated payments (to the health facility/hospital/clinical 
team) such as budgets (total budget or budget for the 
particular intervention in question), fee for service (FFS) and 
capitation  
Criteria for judging 
Large 
If the incentive in the P4P programme is 5% and above of any one of 
the following: 
 Salary of individual clinician/health worker/doctor  
 Anticipated payments (to the health facility/hospital/clinical 
team) such as budgets (total budget or budget for the 
particular intervention in question), fee for service (FFS) and 
capitation 
Timing of payment after achieving targets (time lag): was it short or long? 
Criteria for judging 
short 
If incentive payment (or penalty) is received not more than 4 months 
after measurement and confirmation of performance  
Criteria for judging 
long 
If incentive payment (or penalty) is received more than 4 months 
after measurement and confirmation of performance  
Domain of performance measured (Was the domain of performance measure within 
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clinicians control or out of clinicians’ control)? 
Criteria for judging 
within clinicians 
control 
If incentive payments to health service providers are mostly/only 
based on processes and structures e.g. number of children 
immunized, routine measurement of blood pressure of patients every 
month, number of referrals made, rate of cancer screening 
Criteria for judging out 
of clinicians control 
If incentive payments to health service providers depend on 
achieving a change in health outcomes e.g. reduction in mortality 
rates from a specific disease, blood pressure reduction, patient 
experience etc. 
Performance measure (payment scale) Absolute or relative measure? 
Criteria for judging 
Absolute measure  
If incentive is paid (fine levied) to the health service provider that 
based on their performance, not relative to how other health 
providers perform.  
For example,  
 Improvement in performance typically improvement from 
some baseline measure, using performance score/ 
performance points achieved 
 Achieving performance at/above a predetermined target 
 e.g. incentive paid per patient immunized, or 70% 
improvement from baseline 
Criteria for judging 
Relative measure 
If incentive payment is based on the performance of health service 
providers, relative to that of other providers. 
For example, 
 If bonuses are paid for to health service providers in a 
specific performance rank e.g. the providers above the top 
quartile of performance. 
 And/or 
 If fines are levied on health service providers in certain ranks 
usually the bottom ranks e.g. the providers below the lower 
quartile of performance 
Risk: High risk or low risk? (based on judgements from Performance measure, Time lag, 
and Domain of performance measure 
Criteria for judging 
High risk 
If the P4P programme has 2 or more of the following features 
 If incentive payment (or penalty) is made after 4 months 
after measurement and confirmation of performance 
(long time lag) 
 If the domain of performance measure was mostly out of 
clinicians control 
 If the perofmance measure (payment scale) is a relative 
measure 
Criteria for judging 
Low risk 
If the P4P programme has 2 or more of the following features 
 If incentive payment (or penalty) is made before or at 4 
months after measurement and confirmation of performance 
(short time lag)  
 If the domain of performance measure was mostly within 
the clinicians control  
 If the performance measure (payment scale) is an absolute 
measure 
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3.3.2. Retesting the typology  
After further refining the typology, I then retested the typology on the same P4P 
schemes identified from the review of Eijkenaar (2012) and on all descriptions of P4P 
schemes from evaluated studies identified from the review in chapter two (detailed 
results of these are shown in Appendix B4). In Table 3.4, I present the results from 
applying the typology to 14 P4P schemes identified from the review by Eijkenaar 
(2012).  
In total, I used the typology to categorise 58 out of 73 P4P schemes (identified from 
previous searches in chapter two) into mutually exclusive types. The reason the rest of 
the schemes could not be categorised was that one or more of the design variables of 
P4P was not reported in sufficient detail (e.g. the Clalit scheme in Israel: Table 3.4).  
The least reported design variable was size of incentive. Studies often used vague terms 
such as ‘modest’ or ‘small’, without providing absolute amounts or sizes relative to the 
usual clinician income or hospital budget.  
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Table 3.4 Results of applying the typology to P4P schemes identified from the review by Eijkenaar et al. (2012) 
P4P schemes Who receives 
the incentive 
Type of 
incentive 
Size of incentive Time lag Performance 
measured 
Domain measured Risk  Type  
Advancing quality (AQ) 
UK 
Groups Bonuses  Small  2/3months lag Relative  Mostly within Physicians 
control (2 final outcomes and 
26 processes) 
High  8 
Clalit 
Israel 
 
Groups  Bonuses  Dependent on 
budget savings 
Annually  Absolute  Mostly within Physicians 
control (10 processes and 8 
intermediate outcomes) 
Low   
Clinical Practice 
Improvement Pay  
(CPIP) 
Australia, Queensland 
Groups  Bonuses  Large  Semi-annually, 3 
month lag 
Absolute  Within physicians control (12 
structures and 7 processes) 
Low  2 
ERGOV     
Germany  
Groups  Fines  Depend on other 
hospitals 
4 month lag Relative  Not completely within the 
physicians control (Final 
outcome) 
High   
MACCABI    
 Israel 
Groups  Bonuses  Size not reported Annually  Absolute  Mostly within Physicians 
control (12 processes and 5 
intermediate outcomes) 
Low  6 
National Health 
Insurance P4P (NHI-
P4P) 
Taiwan  
Groups Bonuses  Large  Monthly and 
annually  
Absolute and 
relative measures 
12 structures, 3 final 
outcomes, and 2 intermediate 
outcomes 
High  6 
Primary care P4P (PC-
P4P)  
Netherlands 
Primary Care 
Groups   Bonuses  Large  Annually  Relative  Within physicians control (31 
processes) 
High  4 
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P4P schemes Who receives 
the incentive 
Type of 
incentive 
Size of incentive Time lag Performance 
measured 
Domain measured Risk  Type  
Renewal Models 
(PCRM) 
Canada Ontario 
Groups  Bonuses  Small  Annually  Absolute  Within physicians control (12 
processes) 
Low  2 
Physician Integrated 
Network (PIN) 
Canada Manitoba 
Groups  Bonuses  Maximum 
payment 
unknown 
Immediately after 
performance 
measure 
Absolute  Within physicians control 
(only processes) 
Low  2 
Practice Incentive 
Programme (PIP) 
Australia 
Groups  Bonuses  Size not reported 
relative to 
income 
Quarterly, semi-
annually and 
annually  
Absolute  Within physicians control 
(only structures and 
processes) 
Low   
Performance 
management 
Programme (PMP)                       
New Zealand 
Groups  Bonuses  Small  Semi-annually and 
annually  
Absolute  Within physicians control (8 
processes) 
Low  4 
Programme of quality 
Improvement (PQI) 
Argentina  
Groups  Bonuses  Large  Annually  Absolute  Mostly within physicians 
control (16 processes, 7 
structures and 3 outcomes) 
Low   2 
Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (QOF) UK 
Groups  Bonuses  Large  Annually  Absolute  Mostly within physicians 
control (85% processes) 
Low  2 
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Following the categorisation of the P4P schemes identified from the reviews in chapter 
two, I found that descriptions of the schemes in evaluation studies of these schemes 
were often unsummarised and unstructured. This made it difficult to identify the design 
variables in the P4P scheme being evaluated. One of the few studies that summarised 
design variables of the evaluated scheme in such a way that could help readers use the 
typology more effectively was by Kirschner et al. (2013) illustrated in Table 3.5.   
Table 3.5 Summary of design features presented in the P4P evaluation study by 
Kirschner et al. (2013) 
Performance measurement 
 Clinical care: diabetes (n = 9 indicators), COPD (n = 5 indicators), asthma (n = 4 
indicators), cardiovascular risk management (n = 9 indicators), influenza vaccination 
(n = 2 indicators), cervical cancer screening (n = 1 indicator) 
 Practice management: infrastructure (n = 7 items), team (n = 8 items), information (n = 
3 items), quality and safety (n = 4 items) 
 Patient experience: experience with GP (n = 16 items) and organization of care (n = 11 
items) 
 
Appraisal 
 A benchmark with relative standards was set at the 25th percentile of group performance 
 For the appraisal, there was a series of tiered thresholds (seven levels) 
 Practices received feedback in the short term (4 months after data collection) 
 Valuing the quality level as well as the improvement of performance, weighing these 
levels as 3:1 
Reimbursement 
 A bonus of 5–10% of the practice income, not linked to the usual reimbursement 
 Bonus was paid in money and not in objects or services 
 Bonus to spend freely 
 
3.3.3. Labeling the types on the P4P typology (preparing the typology for use in 
exploring heterogeneity) 
Having demonstrated that the typology can be used to categorise several P4P schemes 
reported in the literature in health care, the next logical step was to use the typology in 
analysis to explore heterogeneity (as discussed in chapter two). For example, knowledge 
harnessed from theory suggests that incentives offered to groups, use of fines, payment 
of large incentives, and incentives that fall under ‘low risk’ have a higher chance of 
success as opposed to incentives offered to individuals, small incentives, and high-risk 
incentives. Thus, P4P schemes characterised with features that are likely to improve the 
chance of success or performance. 
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A way to make the P4P typology useful in exploring the heterogeneity between 
evaluation results is to label the types in the typology (Bailey, 1994). This involves 
using informed characteristics of the dimensions to assign labels (Kluge, 2000). One of 
the defining rules of labelling types in a typology is that one is allowed to label in such 
a way that is suited to the analysis one wants to carry out (Bailey, 1994, Kluge, 2000). 
 In this case, the main interest was to use the types to explore heterogeneity in P4P, 
which was needed to make better sense of the evidence (finding out what works and 
what does not). For this to be effective and to produce meaningful results with a certain 
level of confidence, the dimensions of the design features must vary sufficiently (Kluge, 
2000). After using the typology to categorise evaluated P4P schemes identified from 
literature, I found that only four out 73 schemes used fines. For this reason, the design 
variable of type of incentive was excluded from the labelling process. This does not 
alter the original typology. Instead, it meant that in the analyses where I use the 
typology to explore heterogeneity (chapter 5), whether or not the incentives were fines 
or bonuses were not considered.  
Therefore, to label the types in the P4P typology I considered three design features:  
 Who receives the incentives: groups or individuals 
 Size of incentive: small or large  
 Perceived risk of not earning the incentive: high or low  
 
As illustrated in Table 3.6, P4P schemes with all three design features were labeled as 
‘type A’ (higher chance of success); P4P schemes with two out of the three design 
features were labeled as ‘type B’ (medium chance of success); and P4P schemes with 
one or none of the listed design features were labeled as ‘type C’ (low chance of 
success). These labels are the units of analyses (categories) used to systematically 
explore heterogeneous results of P4P in chapter five.   
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Table 3.6 Labelling the types in the P4P typology 
Type  Who 
received the 
incentive 
*Type of 
incentive 
 
Size of 
incentive 
Perceived risk 
of not earning 
the incentive 
(RISK) 
Labels 
a- high chance of 
success 
b-medium chance 
of success 
c- low chance of 
success 
1 Groups   Fines  Large  Low  A 
2 Groups  Bonuses Large Low  A 
3 Groups  Fines  Small  Low  B 
4 Groups  Bonuses Small Low  B 
5 Groups  Fines  Large  High  B 
6 Groups  Bonuses  Large  High  B 
7 Individuals  Fines  Large  Low  B 
8 Individuals  Bonuses Large Low  B 
9 Groups  Bonuses  Small  High C 
10 Groups  Fines  Small  High C 
11 Individuals  Fines  Small  Low  C 
12 Individuals  Bonuses Small Low  C 
13 Individuals Fines  Small  High  C 
14 Individuals  Bonuses  Large  High  C 
15 Individuals  Bonuses  Small  High C 
16 Individuals  Fines  Large  High C 
*excluded from the labelling process 
 
3.4. Discussion  
I developed a theoretical typology by merging and consolidating theories with designs 
variables potentially relevant to P4P to create a framework to help explore and possibly 
explain heterogeneous results of evaluations of P4P. The final typology consists of four 
key design variables namely: who receives the incentives, type of incentives, size of 
incentives, and perceived risk of not earning the incentive (a condensed variable 
consisting three design features: performance measure, time lag between the 
measurement of performance and payment of the incentive, and the domain of 
performance measured).  
This P4P typology is helpful in clarifying the similarities and differences among the 
types of P4P schemes found in the literature. It is also helpful in categorizing the P4P 
schemes based on the design features. Without a typology or a similar framework to 
compare types, there remains the confusion and difficulty in exploring emerging 
literature surrounding P4P schemes in health care. 
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Adoption of this typology would also be helpful in facilitating effective communication 
between people who design P4P interventions, P4P implementers or adopters and P4P 
evaluators. It could also help provide structured information to P4P designers and 
developers, so that they understand the possible results of their design choices and 
possibly help guide their thinking towards design choices that might work in their 
context.  
  
Yet another important use of this typology is to aid in interpreting the heterogeneous 
results of the evaluated P4P schemes and particularly, as a framework for the analysis of 
various theories relevant to the design of P4P schemes in health care. In order words, if 
what theory says about these design features is true to an extent, then we should be able 
to see significant association between these design choices and effectiveness. I explore 
these using empirical cases in literature in chapter five, where with the help of the 
typology, I explore how different designs variables and groups of variables (types) 
influence the impact of P4P in health care, while holding other factors constant.  
 
Though this typology proves its potential usefulness in the description, categorisation 
and synthesis of evidence of P4P schemes, it is only a first attempt. It should be further 
tested and developed as more of these P4P schemes and their evaluations emerge to 
ensure its relevance. For example, design variables not included in this typology might 
be relevant in the near future and added on in a more extensive typology. Though 
adding more design variables to the current typology might make it a cumbersome 
framework to be used for analyses and exploration heterogeneity, a more extensive 
typology could be still be useful to describe current and future P4P schemes (a reporting 
template).  
 
Finally, this typology of P4P design features provides only one element of the 
understanding of the variations in the effects of P4P.  As noted and discussed in chapter 
two, other factors are likely to have a bearing on the impact of P4P as well (Kirschner et 
al., 2013, Canavan and Swai, 2008, Van Herck et al., 2010, Ssengooba et al., 2012). 
These include:  
 The context in which the P4P scheme is implemented (health systems, increased 
funding, and complexity) 
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 How well the programme is being piloted: use of baseline measurement, setting 
of targets, degree of preliminary work done 
 Rigour of evaluation (absence or presence of control groups) 
 Clinical area of intervention. (Eichler and Levine, 2009, Ssengooba et al., 2012)  
 
Some of these factors are considered and explored in subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
An example is the rigour of evaluation: evaluated programmes with inadequate control 
groups are likely to appear as effective compared to schemes evaluated with good 
control groups as a result of confounding factors (as demonstrated and discussed in 
chapter two). Therefore, in chapter five where I use the typology to explore 
heterogeneous results of P4P, the evaluation designs of the schemes were taken into 
consideration in the analyses.  
 
In addition, as discussed earlier, unlike design variables, the contextual and 
implementation factors are harder to compare across different P4P because they are 
usually setting specific and non-generalizable i.e. contextual and implementation factors 
influencing effects of P4P in a LMIC is likely to be a non-issue in developing countries 
(e.g. distrust in the payment system). Usually, in-depth qualitative studies are usually 
required to capture this knowledge. Therefore, this was my focus in the second part of 
this thesis (chapter six-nine), where I explored the influence of contextual and 
implementation factors on the effectiveness of a Nigerian P4P scheme (a LMIC case 
study), to inform and make recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the 
scheme when implemented on a large scale across the nation.  
Limitations of development and use of this typology 
There were three main limitations. 
First, to find a suitable trade-off between the typology being manageable and 
maintaining relevance, some of the design variables explored and discussed (such as 
method of payment and kind of incentive) were not included in the typology (used later 
in this research to explore heterogeneity). Thus the typology was not exhaustive, 
meaning that potentially important design variables might have been lost. Nonetheless, 
this typology can provide a foundation towards standardised categorizations of current 
P4P designs in literature, since it is the first typology of its kind to be developed. The 
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most important thing however, is that P4P designers and evaluators need to consider all 
discussed design variables in designing or evaluating these schemes, whether they are 
included in the typology or not. 
 
Second, in order to have well rounded and practical categories, equal weights were 
assigned to the design variables included in the typology. This is a potential limitation 
because their relative importance is likely to vary i.e. size might be a lot more important 
in influencing P4P effects than who receives the incentive. I attempt to address this 
issue in chapter five, where I systematically and statistically explore the relative 
importance of the design variables in empirical cases (theory testing: one of the many 
functions of the typology).  
 
The final limitation was the problem of poor reporting of evaluated P4P schemes. Some 
studies were incompletely reported with important design features or choices absent 
from the evaluations, despite the potential association between design features and 
effectiveness of the schemes. This meant that some P4P schemes could not be 
categorised. There is the need for a uniform way of reporting design variables of P4P 
schemes in evaluation studies if one is to be able to make sense of the evidence. The 
developed typology offers a way to improve upon this area, as it provides a standard 
and informed way to help describe P4P schemes.  
 
Strengths of the process of developing this typology 
There were two major strength of this study. First, I applied the typology and 
successfully categorised a number of P4P studies into mutually exclusive categories, 
which demonstrates that the typology is robust, has face validity, and that is potentially 
useful as a framework to systematically explore heterogeneity in P4P.  
The second strength of this typology is that it was well informed through rigorous 
exploration of relevant theories and literature. Furthermore, the typology demonstrates 
strong content validity in that the process of development of the typology was 
transparent and decisions made were adequately justified and relevant to empirical cases 
in literature. In addition, to improve the credibility of the typology as a potential tool to 
categorise and describe P4P schemes in health care, measures of reliability, concurrent 
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validity, and pilot testing of the typology by other users are demonstrated in the chapter 
four. 
 
3.5. What this chapter adds 
The aim of this chapter was to explore and harness theories and literature in order to 
develop an informed framework (typology) to categorise P4P schemes based on their 
design features so that heterogeneity can be explored in a systematic way to make sense 
of the current evidence of P4P (exploring what works or what does not, and why). This 
typology builds on previous work of other researchers who have reviewed and 
described design features  (using empirical literature) by adding on theoretical 
perspectives to explain and predict behaviours depending on design choices, and using 
this knowledge to create a practical framework (Stockwell, 2010, Eijkenaar, 2013). 
This P4P typology provides an important first step towards making synthesis of 
evidence easier by providing a quick and efficient way to categorise P4P schemes in an 
informed way in order to explore heterogeneity in the evaluations of P4P. In addition, 
the typology could help P4P developers’ structure and inform design choices, and to 
establish a common language (reporting template) in which P4P designers, reviewers, 
implementers and policy makers can clearly specify the content of P4P designs in a 
standardised way so that other people can see what exactly is being done.  
Given the potential usefulness of the typology in description, categorisation, and 
synthesis of evidence of P4P in health care, in the next chapter, using volunteer health 
service researchers, I assess the reliably and validity of the P4P typology, after which it 
is put up for critique and use in the public domain. The typology was then used to 
explore and explain heterogeneous results of P4P schemes in chapter five.  
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Chapter 4 Assessing the reliability of the 
Typology as a tool to categorise P4P schemes  
4.1. Introduction  
In previous chapters, I reviewed and appraised the available evidence surrounding the 
effectiveness of the use of P4P in healthcare, which highlighted the heterogeneity 
between the schemes and difficulty in interpretation of results and evidence synthesis.   
Following that, I developed a typology as a framework for categorising P4P schemes in 
healthcare based on their design features, as a means to explore heterogeneity and 
establish a common language in which the contents of P4P schemes can be clearly 
specified. The typology consists of four items: who receives the incentives, the type of 
incentive, the size of incentive, and the perceived risk of not earning the incentive. 
Given the potential importance of the typology in categorising P4P schemes in 
healthcare and its potential to be a common language to describe P4P designs, it is 
essential to test whether this typology is easy to use, reliable, and valid as a 
categorisation tool for incentive schemes.  
Reliability 
A tool is reliable if it measures something in a reproducible and consistent fashion in the 
different conditions, in which it is likely to be used (Atkinson and Nevill, 1998, Streiner 
and Norman, 1989).   
There are a variety of ways to estimate reliability. They include internal consistency 
reliability, test-retest reliability, and inter-rater reliability. The kind of reliability testing 
conducted on a tool is often dependent on the type of tool, its potential users, and 
conditions in which it is likely to be used (Charter and Feldt, 2002). Briefly outlined in 
subsequent paragraphs are some types of reliability tests.  
Internal consistency reliability tests the consistency, with which the items on the tool 
measure the same thing, and the test-retest reliability is often conducted on tools or 
instruments used on individuals (as subjects) e.g. surveys, interview tools, and 
diagnostic tests (Trochim, 2006; Feder, 2008; Bowling and Ebrahim, 2005). Since all 
items on the P4P typology (tool of interest) assess different things, and the typology is 
Chapter 4: Assessing the reliability of the Typology as a tool to categorise P4P schemes  
93 
 
not designed for use on humans or diagnostic tests. Therefore, the internal consistency 
and test-retest reliability tests are not of relevance. 
Inter-rater reliability on the other hand, assesses the degree to which the measuring 
instrument or tool produces similar results when used by different raters (users). In 
other words, it is the degree, to which the tool users/raters give consistent results for 
similar populations (Bowling and Ebrahim, 2005, Trochim, 2006b). The inter-rater 
reliability test is particularly useful to assess the reliability of tools in which there is the 
possibility of subjective judgements on items on the tool among users/raters e.g. 
categorisation tools (Feder, 2008). 
For the developed P4P typology, I am particularly interested in how similarly the tool 
users/raters (health science researchers) will categorize P4P schemes. Therefore the 
appropriate reliability test of interest (in this study) is the inter-rater reliability test. 
There is a need for inter-rater reliability testing of the typology in order to assess and 
enhance consistency in its application, which will in turn support the uptake and use of 
the typology as a P4P categorization tool.  
 
Validity 
It is also important to assess the validity of the typology as a categorisation tool. 
Generally, a tool is considered valid when it measures or quantifies what is intended to 
measure (Streiner and Norman, 1989). A valid tool does what it is designed to do. There 
are different forms of evidence of validity of a tool or instrument. These include content 
validity, criterion-related validity, and construct validity. 
Content Validity focuses on the theoretical or conceptual basis of a tool (Potvin, 2007). 
This is often demonstrated or established through a detailed description of the steps 
used to develop the instrument, which could include; review of literature and related 
theories, conducting focus groups or interviews, and expert consensus, depending on the 
type of tool developed (Trochim, 2006a). Content validity of the P4P typology has been 
demonstrated in the previous chapter (three) through a detailed description of the steps 
taken to develop the tool, which included review and analysis of literature and theory. 
Criterion-related Validity: there are two types of criterion-related validity (concurrent 
and predictive validity) (Miller and Salkind, 2002).  
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 Concurrent validity is a measure of how well the results obtained from the tool 
in question correlates with a previously validated measure or a trusted criterion 
(Trochim, 2006a). The users of the tool might have high agreement, but in the 
wrong direction (wrong results). Therefore, concurrent validity is particularly 
important to the P4P typology because it is useful to know if the users of the 
typology are using it correctly. However, since this is a new typology and the 
first in literature, the concurrent validity could not be assessed due to lack of a 
previously validated measure (or gold standard). 
 Predictive validity refers to the extent to which a tool can predict an outcome in 
the future (Miller and Salkind, 2002). In the case of the developed typology, I 
am interested in assessing whether theory can rightly predict the influence of 
design features on the impact of incentive schemes. In other words, will the 
‘types’ in the typology, predict to an extent the degree of impact of incentive 
schemes. This type of validity is extremely important if the typology is being 
proposed as a predictive tool, which I explore in detail in the next chapter (5)
5
 
among other things.   
 
Construct Validity centres on how well the tool measures the construct that is supposed 
to measure (Potvin, 2007). In other words, is it measuring what it is supposed to 
measure?  Construct validity is demonstrated by comparing the tool to another test that 
measures a similar construct and it is mostly relevant to measurement tools (Miller and 
Salkind, 2002). Therefore, the evidence for construct validity is not applicable to this 
typology, since it is being proposed as a categorization tool.  
Some evidence of validity, such as content validity, has been demonstrated in the 
previous chapter, while evidence of validity such as the construct validity is not relevant 
for the developed typology. Predictive validity will be explored in the subsequent 
chapter, leaving only the need to demonstrate evidence for concurrent validity for the 
P4P typology in this chapter.  
The aim of this chapter is to assess the inter-rater reliability and ease of use of the 
typology as a categorisation for P4P schemes in health care. The subsequent sections of 
the chapter describe the methods, results, and discussion of the findings. 
                                                          
5
 In chapter 5, I employ statistical analyses to explore the relationship of each item on the tool with 
empirical outcomes of incentive schemes.  
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4.2. Methods 
In summary, testing the inter-rater reliability and ease of use of the typology as a P4P 
categorisation tool involved having several raters/users apply the P4P typology to a 
sample of P4P studies identified from the review in chapter two. To assess inter-rater 
reliability, a statistical test that estimates agreement between the raters was used 
(McHugh, 2012). The inter-rater reliability and validity of all four items on the typology 
was assessed. This is the preferred method because it made it easier to identify sources 
of disagreement or confusion with the use of the typology (Lobbestael et al., 2011, 
Hartling et al., 2012, MacDermid et al., 2005, Oremus et al., 2012) 
Finally, to assess the ease of use of the typology, a simple questionnaire was completed 
by the users, which incorporated understanding, ease of use, and time taken to apply the 
tool, and feedback/suggestions (Stewardson et al., 2013, Kastner et al., 2010). 
In the following sections, I describe in detail the methods used to conduct this study, 
and the rationale for the methods chosen. This includes outlines of statistical tests for 
estimating inter-rater reliability and concurrent validity, sample size (number of raters 
and number of items rated), and selection of raters. 
4.2.1. Statistical test for estimating inter rater reliability (kappa)  
Cohen’s kappa (or a variation of Cohen’s kappa) is often used to estimate inter-rater 
reliability in categorisation tools in healthcare (Lobbestael et al., 2011, Hartling et al., 
2012, MacDermid et al., 2005, Oremus et al., 2012) (see appendix C1 for a summary of 
similar studies consulted). Other commonly used statistical measures or indexes used in 
estimating inter-rater reliability include percentage of absolute agreement and intra-
class correlation coefficient (ICC) (Ubersax, 2010).  
Percentage absolute agreement is an index of inter-rater reliability in which the absolute 
percentage agreement between rater pairs is calculated. For example, for an item in a 
tool, if the raters agree six out of ten times, the tool/test has a 60% inter-rater reliability 
rate (Feder, 2008). ICC on the other hand is the fraction of the total variance within data 
that is explained by variance between two raters (Osborne, 2008).  
Researchers have argued that kappa is preferred over percentage of absolute agreement 
and ICC because the latter does not take into account chance agreement or the 
agreement due to the raters guessing (McHugh, 2012, Cohen, 1960, Feder, 2008). In 
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addition, ICC might be a poor reflection of the amount of agreement between raters, 
resulting in extreme over or under estimation of the true magnitude of rater agreement. 
ICC is also very specific to the population sample and not directly comparable across 
population (McHugh, 2012, Osborne, 2008), making kappa the preferred option. 
The kappa statistic gives a numerical rating of the degree to which two raters agree 
based on the difference between how much agreement is actually present, (“observed” 
agreement) and how much agreement would be expected by chance alone (“expected” 
agreement). The formula for calculating kappa=(Observed agreement – agreement 
expected by chance)/(100% – agreement expected by chance) (Viera and Garrett, 2005).  
The kappa statistic varies between -1.00 and +1.00. A kappa value of +1.00 indicates a 
perfect agreement between raters and 0.00 kappa value indicates that the raters 
agreement is indistinguishable that expected by chance (Cohen, 1960). The Cohen’s 
kappa is specific for estimating agreement between rater pairs and is not applicable for 
estimating agreement between multiple raters. Fleiss in 1971, however, developed an 
extension of the Cohen’s kappa, which is known as Fleiss kappa that is commonly used 
to estimate agreement (inter- rater reliability) between more than two (multiple) raters 
(Fleiss, 1971, Ubersax, 2010). 
 
Even though kappa is commonly used, it has its drawbacks. For instance, Ubersax 
(2010) argues that kappa does not really correct for chance agreement, because chance 
agreement is only relevant under the conditions when raters are independent. The author 
further argues that raters are not independent as long as they are rating the same cases. 
Therefore, the claim that kappa corrects for chance agreement is questionable
6
. Mchugh 
(2012) and Gwet (2002) further suggest that kappa estimates may be low even though 
there are high levels of agreement between raters and individual ratings are accurate, 
when the prevalence of an outcome is too low or too high, which can lead to high rate of 
agreement due to chance alone. When the probability of chance agreement is high, the 
estimated kappa is low because kappa values decrease as the probability of chance 
agreement increases among raters (see Figure 4.2.3) (McGinn et al., 2005). 
                                                          
6 Ubersax argues that for kappa to adjust for chance agreement effectively requires and explicit model of how chance 
affects the decision of the raters. Kappa statistic does not do this; the claim of kappa adjusting for chance agreement 
follows the hypothesis that raters guess when not completely certain which is not very realistic. 
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Despite these draw backs, it is still often advised to use kappa because it definitely can 
verify that agreement between raters exceeds chance levels, having an advantage over 
percent absolute agreement and intra-class correlation (Ubersax, 2010, Cohen, 1960). 
This makes kappa the most appropriate test statistic in this study to assess the agreement 
between raters in order to estimate inter-rater reliability of the P4P typology. 
4.2.1.1. Interpreting the kappa statistic (what level of agreement is 
‘good’/acceptable?) 
How large kappa values should be to indicate good or an acceptable level of agreement 
between raters is the subject of debate. There are three common guidelines used to 
interpret kappa values (Altman, 1991, Landis and Koch, 1977, Fleiss, 1973) as shown in 
Table 4.1. The interpretations of kappa seen in table 4.1 are based on the value 
judgment of the authors. Kappa values are interpreted relative to the degree of chance 
agreement between raters. This is illustrated graphically Figure 4.1. This figure shows 
kappa values for two categories, ‘yes’ and ‘no’ by probability of a ‘yes’ and probability 
observer will be correct. The verbal categories of Landis and Koch are used for this 
example. 
Table 4.1 Guidelines for interpreting kappa 
Landis and Koch, 1977 Altman, 1991 Fleiss, 1973 
Kappa            Interpretation  
0.81 – 1.00           excellent 
0.61 – 0.80         substantial 
0.41 – 0.60           moderate 
0.21 – 0.40           fair 
0.00 – 0.20           slight 
  < 0.00                   poor 
Kappa              Interpretation  
0.81 – 1.00            very good 
0.61 – 0.80             good 
0.41 – 0.60             moderate 
0.21 – 0.40              fair 
< 0.20                       poor 
Kappa           Interpretation  
0.75 – 1.00         very good 
0.41 – 0.75       fair to good 
< 0.40                   poor 
 
Figure 4.1 shows that kappa is maximum when the probability of a true 'yes' is 0.5 (this 
is also when chance agreement equals 0.5). As this probability gets closer to zero or to 
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one (as chance agreement increases), the value of kappa reduces. This is an illustration 
of the high agreement, low kappa problem (see section 4.2.2.).  
 
Figure 4.1 Predicted kappa for two categories, ‘yes’ and ‘no’, by probability of a 
‘yes’ and probability observer will be correct (Source: Bland, 2008) 
The lines represent the degree to which kappa corrects for chance agreement at various 
kappa values (tells you how much of the possible agreement is over and above chance). 
For example the line that represents 99% chance correct is interpreted as having kappa 
value of 0.8 (and above) which means that the observed agreement between the raters 
(with a kappa value of 0.8 and above) are 99% beyond chance or 99% of the agreement 
between raters are beyond/over chance or there is a 0.01 probability that agreement 
between raters is by chance (McGinn et al., 2005, Bland, 2008).  
In most published studies assessing the inter-rater reliability of tools using the kappa 
statistic, the reason a particular guideline chosen to inform the choice of what kappa 
value represents good or acceptable agreement is unclear (Sim and Wright, 2005, 
Oremus et al., 2012, Lobbestael et al., 2011, MacDermid et al., 2005). McHugh, 2012 
suggested that the available guidelines for interpreting kappa might be too lenient, as 
very low kappa values might be acceptable. For example, using the guideline by Altman 
(1991) and Landis and Koch (1977), kappa values as low as 0.41 are considered 
moderate level of agreement. However, since it is implied that kappa values are likely to 
be low despite high agreement between raters (Gwet, 2002, Ubersax, 2010), one might 
argue that using a lenient interpretation of kappa is justified. 
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Furthermore, studies suggest that choosing the acceptable level of agreement in order to 
consider a tool reliable depends on the clinical relevance of the tool or test (McHugh, 
2012, McGinn et al., 2005). For example, one could argue that the kappa value deemed 
acceptable for clinical diagnostic tools for rare outcomes/diseases should be more 
lenient than for categorization tools. This takes into consideration that kappa values 
might still be low even though there is a good level of agreement between raters, which 
might minimize mishaps (or false negatives) in the clinical diagnosis of rare 
outcomes/diseases.    
For the purpose of estimating the reliability of the P4P typology as a categorization tool 
in my research, the minimum acceptable level of kappa for each item on the typology 
was set at 0.6, which means that agreement observed between raters are 90% (and 
above) beyond chance or that the probability that agreement is by chance is ≤0.1. This 
decision is in line with the guideline for interpreting kappa values suggested by Altman 
(1991). This represents a suitable trade-off between having too many misclassifications 
of P4P schemes (making it an unreliable tool to classify P4P to aid exploration of 
heterogeneity) and adjusting for the possibility of having a low kappa value despite high 
agreement between raters (which avoids loss of a good and useful tool). 
Having justified the use of kappa to assess inter-rater reliability and how to interpret the 
results, I move on to describe the sample size requirements in terms of (1) the number 
of items (in this case, reports or descriptions of P4P schemes) to be rated and (2) the 
number of raters needed.  
4.2.2. Number of reports of P4P schemes  
Literature concerning the number of subjects (P4P studies in this case) needed when 
estimating inter-rater reliability is quite scarce and only a few researchers have 
suggested a way to go about it. Most published studies testing the inter-rater reliability 
of tools in health care often use convenience samples, with no rationale for sample size 
(Hartling et al., 2012, Lobbestael et al., 2011, Oremus et al., 2012, MacDermid et al., 
2005). 
A few researchers suggest that choosing the sample size should be based on the 
probability of detecting a statistically significant kappa (the difference between the 
overall and chance agreement Pa-Pe) with a confidence interval of a desired width (or an 
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estimated relative error) (Sim and Wright, 2005, Gwet, 2010). A guide was proposed by 
Gwet (2010) to calculate sample size needed (see Table 4.2).  However, the difference 
between the two agreement (overall and chance) probabilities is generally not known at 
the design stage. Gwet (2010) proposed a rule of thumb to assume the best case scenario 
that chance-agreement probability is zero, and use an anticipated value for Pa in place 
of Pa-Pe in Table 4.2 to obtain the absolute minimum sample size one should use. For 
example, if one anticipates that the raters will agree about 40% of the time, then one 
would use a sample size of 156 or 69 or 39, depending on the error margin chosen.  
Table 4.2 Number of P4P reports needed to estimate Cohen's kappa 
 
 
Even though this method proposed by Gwet is for rater pairs, (it is not stated whether it 
applies to multiple raters). One might argue that if it can be applied, then the number of 
reports of P4P needed will reduce, because increasing the number of raters might 
increase statistical power.  However, since there is no evidence to support this, it is safe 
to retain the number of studies estimated for rater pairs, as this will increase statistical 
power. 
 
Relative Error 
20% 30% 40% 
0.1 2,500 1,111 625 
0.2 625 278 156 
0.3 278 123 69 
0.4 156 69 39 
0.5 100 44 25 
0.6 69 31 17 
0.7 51 23 13 
0.8 39 17 10 
0.9 31 14 8 
1.0 25 11 6 
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The method proposed by Gwet (2010) to estimate the adequate sample size requires the 
researcher to guess the value of kappa or agreement expected from the raters. However, 
since I have justified and specified what will be the minimum acceptable level of 
reliability of the developed P4P typology (kappa = 0.6), this was considered my 
‘guess/estimation’. This involved choosing a guessed kappa value and margin of error 
in which the lowest margin is 0.6 (see table 4.2): the possible kappa values and their 
percentage relative errors were 0.8 (20%), 0.9 (20-30%), and 1.0 (20-40%), highlighted 
in Table 4.2. It was however very unlikely that there will be perfect agreement between 
raters. Therefore, a kappa value of 0.9 (30% relative error) was selected based on a 
trade-off between precision and a reasonable number of P4P reports to avoiding 
burdening the raters. This meant the raters had to apply the typology on a minimum of 
14 P4P reports (see table 4.2).  
4.2.2.1. Selecting P4P studies to be rated 
I selected 17 evaluations of P4P containing descriptions or reports of the designs of the 
P4P from a pool of previously identified evaluated studies in the literature review 
(chapter 2) of this thesis. Evaluations were chosen because other papers describing P4P 
schemes were usually large documents or web pages which were quite difficult to 
collate, and might have been overly ambitious to ask volunteer raters to categorize such. 
The selection of the evaluated P4P studies was not random due to the issue of 
incomplete reporting identified and discussed in the previous chapter. Instead, I selected 
studies that completely reported all the necessary design features to maximise the 
efficiency of the reliability test.  
4.2.3. Number of raters  
The literature concerning the number of raters required to investigate inter-rater 
reliability is mixed and limited. Some have suggested that inter-rater reliability can be 
investigated with two or more raters and that the number of raters does not affect the 
reliability (Ling, 2007; Saal, et al, 1980). Hallgren also suggests that inter-rater 
reliability is not affected by number of raters, instead it is more likely to be affected by 
having better raters and better guidelines (Hallgren, 2012). Walter and colleagues 
propose that using more than two raters could help improve statistical power (Walter et 
al., 1998) but this is still yet to be explored.  
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After consulting with a statistician (Professor Martin Bland) at the Department of 
Health Science-University of York, I decided to employ a sample of 15 raters (health 
science researchers with different research experience and expertise) based on the 
rationale of trying to replicate a real life scenario, which makes the results more 
generalizable.  We concluded that 5 independent ratings for each of the 17 studies was a 
reasonable number, which was still within the range of minimum number of studies 
determined in the previous section. This means each rater will have up to 6 P4P studies 
to categorize. 
4.2.4. Recruiting the raters (and ethics approval) 
The Research Governance Committee of the Department of Health Science-University 
of York approved this study (see Appendix C2 for evidence of ethics approval). 
The main rater population approached were health science graduate research students at 
the University of York. This was a convenience sample chosen due to limited time and 
resources. Apart from the population being easy to reach/access, it was also based on 
the rationale that it would be easier and more efficient to train those who are already at 
the University of York. I also approached health services researchers from the Nigerian 
Federal Ministry of Health. 
The volunteer raters at the Department of Health Science, University of York were 
approached by an email (forwarded to the postgraduate students) by the health science 
postgraduate administrator (the other volunteer raters at the Nigerian Federal Ministry 
of Health were also contacted via email sent by me). The contents of the email included 
an information sheet explaining the research, and what is required of them should they 
choose to volunteer (see Appendix C3-C5 for a copy of the email, information sheet, 
and consent forms). The interested volunteers then contacted me via email.  
In total, 12 participants agreed to be volunteer raters (nine postgraduate students from 
the University of York and three health service researchers from the Nigerian Federal 
Ministry of Health). This number of raters was short of three the pre-specified sample 
size of 15 raters. Therefore, in order to maintain the five independent ratings per study 
(see section 4.2.3), each rater was given between six to eight papers to rate. 
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4.2.5. Rater training  
Inter-rater reliability studies on categorisation tools in healthcare often use raters that 
have some basic knowledge relevant to the tool (being tested) and even provide more 
training for the use of the guidelines/tool before inter-rater reliability is estimated (Sim 
and Wright, 2005, Oremus et al., 2012, Lobbestael et al., 2011, MacDermid et al., 
2005). This is because the raters are likely to have different backgrounds and 
experience, which might affect agreement between the raters. The more heterogeneous 
the raters are, the less they are likely to agree (Graham et al., 2012). Rater agreement is 
affected by a number of other things, which include comprehensiveness and clarity of 
instructions in tool guideline, rater competence, errors in rater judgement, and rater bias 
(Berkman et al., 2013, Barclay and Harland, 1995, Myford and Wolfe, 2009, Hoyt and 
Kerns, 1999).  
Inter-rater reliability is also affected by the complexity of the sample (e.g. P4P studies 
to categorize in the case of the typology). An example is the study by Berkman et al. 
(2013) examining inter-rater reliability of applying guidance for grading strength of 
evidence in systematic reviews, which found that inter-rater reliability of grading 
strength of evidence varied with the complexity of the evidence in systematic reviews. 
There was very good agreement between raters when the systematic reviews were 
straightforward but poor agreements when the raters had to use their subjective 
judgement to insinuate what the authors did. This issue is especially relevant to my 
research area because P4P studies are often poorly reported (ambiguous and sometimes 
incompletely reported). Therefore, one of the ways to improve rater agreement was to 
adopt a simpler and more straightforward complete reporting approach in evaluated P4P 
studies (a good approach would be to report the characteristics of the P4P program 
following the items in the typology, as described in the guideline).
 
This however, could 
not be implemented in this study but was noted for future reference on reporting of P4P 
evaluations.  
Other ways rater agreement might be improved is by improving the clarity and 
instruction on the tool guideline and training (extensive: exposing them to a variety of 
possible scenarios) of the raters (Woehr and Huffcutt, 1994, Cash et al., 2012, Gorman 
and Rentsch, 2009). Rater training gives the opportunity to improve on guidelines for 
use of the tool, as this will be informed by questions and feedback from the training 
session. Therefore, I developed a training manual to train the volunteer raters. The 
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method of development of the training manual, pilot testing the tool, and training 
sessions are discussed in the next section.  
4.2.5.1. Training manual  
I developed clear and concise decision rules (with examples where needed) to 
accompany the guidance for applying the tool to the P4P schemes as shown in 
Appendix C6. This was done by building upon and adding relevant examples to the 
decision rules developed for the typology in chapter three. This was then followed by 
the development of a training manual, which was based on the guidelines and decision 
rules for use of the typology. The training manual was considered to be instructive and 
comprehensive, with examples and relevant problem solving exercises.  
4.2.5.2. Pilot testing  
I tested the P4P typology on a subset of the raters (two Health Science PhD students), 
training them using the training manual and guidelines for use of the typology. The 
training for each researcher took about 40 minutes after which I asked them to apply the 
typology on six papers evaluating incentive schemes in healthcare. I gave them three 
weeks to complete the task and I estimated kappa for each item on the typology, using 
the STATA statistical package (version 12). Kappa for each item is shown in Table 4.3.  
Table 4.3 Kappa values for each item on the typology (pilot test) 
Item 1(who receives the 
incentive: individuals or 
groups) 
Item 2 (type of 
incentive: fines or 
bonuses) 
Item 3 (size of 
incentive: small 
or large) 
Item 4 (perceived risk of 
not earning the incentive: 
low or high) 
1  1 0.714 0.667 
 
Kappa values indicate perfect agreement (kappa=1) between the raters for the first two 
items: who receives the incentive and type of incentive. Kappa value for size of 
incentive was 0.714 and kappa value for perceived risk was 0.667 indicating good 
agreement between raters. 
In table 4.4, I present the results of applying the typology to the six evaluation studies 
by the two raters to better understand their sources of disagreement. Generally, the 
raters found the typology easy to use, but they disagreed on two occasions and they 
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indicated on one occasion that there was not enough information in the paper to make a 
decision.  
Table 4.4 Ratings for individual studies by two raters 
Study  Who received the 
incentive? 
Type of incentive Size of incentive Perceived risk of 
not earning the 
incentive 
Rater 1 Rater 2 Rater 1 Rater 2 Rater 1 Rater 2 Rater 
1 
Rater 2 
Jha et al. 
(2012) 
Groups  Groups  Fines   Fines Small  Small  High  High  
Ashworth 
et al. 
(2004) 
Groups  Groups  Bonuses  Bonuses  Small  Small  High  Low  
Basinga  
et al. 
(2011) 
Groups  Groups  Bonuses  Bonuses  Unclear  Unclear  Low  Low  
Cattaneo 
et al. 
(2001) 
Groups Groups  Fines  Fines  Small  Small High  High  
Harries et 
al. (2005) 
Individu
als  
Individu
als  
Bonuses  Bonuses  Large  Large  Low  Low  
Kirschner
et al. 
(2013) 
Groups  Groups  Bonuses  Bonuses Small  Large  High  High  
 
The first disagreement between the rater was in the ‘perceived risk of not earning the 
incentive’ category of the Ashworth paper. Both raters agreed that the timing of 
payment after measurement of performance was long, and that the domain of 
performance was within the clinicians’ control, the raters disagreed on the performance 
measure (absolute or relative). The source of disagreement was traced to rater1 being 
confused with the text in the paper that was used to aid the judgement: “The average 
reward per general practitioner (GP) was calculated by dividing the total sum spent on 
incentive scheme payments in each primary care organisations (PCO) by the number of 
GP principals in that PCO”. Rater 1 misunderstood how to judge the performance 
measure.  
The second source of disagreement between the raters was in the category of size of the 
incentive in the rated paper: while ‘rater 2’ provided the right text that aided in making 
the decision (correct rating), ‘rater 1’ admitted to being carried away with words and did 
not read the whole paper before making a judgement.  
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The review of the sources of disagreements provided a number of recommendations to 
improve understanding and use of the typology: 
 Clearer decision rules to judge when category is unclear 
 Providing an easier template to fill the ratings 
 Clear progression and clear distinction between the items on the typology. 
 
I then applied these suggestions to the guideline and training manual for easier 
understanding. For example, I rearranged the items on the guideline and training manual 
in order of complexity. I also numbered each item on the tool for easier comprehension. 
Corrections were made to the guideline based on this pilot test as illustrated in Table 4.5 
(updated guideline after pilot, see Appendix C6 for the original guideline). The 
corrections included clearer decision rules. In addition, I added examples to illustrate 
possible sources of confusion (when rating) in the training manual. I also stressed the 
importance of reading the papers thoroughly and taking time to do the task. 
Table 4.5 Guidelines for use of the P4P typology 
ITEM 1: Who received the incentive? Did Individuals or Groups receive the incentive? 
Criteria for 
judging 
Individuals 
 If the incentives are paid directly to individual health 
workers/clinicians/doctors only 
 If individual health worker/clinician/doctor’s income is 
supplemented as a result of the incentive (e.g. reflected in the rise 
of personal income) only 
Criteria for 
judging Groups 
(including 
schemes where 
individuals and 
groups are paid 
bonuses) 
If the incentive is paid to a group or an organization in which individual 
clinicians may or may not benefit from the incentive directly  
Groups include any of the following  
 Hospital  
 Clinical team 
 General physician (GP) practice 
 NGO 
 Levels of government  
 Faith based organizations 
ITEM 2: Type of incentive Was the incentive in the form of Fines or Bonuses? 
Criteria for 
judging Fines 
If the incentive is negative in the form of reduction in expected payments, 
penalty, punishment etc. In some cases, bonuses may or may not be paid. 
Criteria for 
judging Bonuses 
If incentive is in the form of increase in payments, bonus, gifts etc. with 
NO fines levied 
ITEM 3: Size of the incentive Was the size of the incentive small or large? 
Criteria for If the incentive in the P4P programme is smaller than 5% of any one of the 
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judging Small following: 
 Salary of individual clinician/health worker/doctor  
 Anticipated payments (to the health facility/hospital/clinical team) 
such as budgets (total budget or budget for the particular 
intervention in question), fee for service (FFS) and capitation  
Criteria for 
judging Large 
If the incentive in the P4P programme is 5% and above of any one of the 
following: 
 Salary of individual clinician/health worker/doctor  
 Anticipated payments (to the health facility/hospital/clinical team) 
such as budgets (total budget or budget for the particular 
intervention in question), fee for service (FFS) and capitation 
ITEM 4: Perceived Risk of not earning the incentive: High risk or low risk? (based on: 
Timing of payment after achieving targets (time lag), Domain of performance measure, 
and Performance measure (payment scale) 
Criteria for 
judging High risk 
If the P4P programme has 2 or more of the following features 
 If incentive payment (or penalty) is made after 4 months after 
measurement and confirmation of performance (long time lag) 
 If the domain of performance measure was mostly out of 
clinicians control 
 If the perofmance measure (payment scale) is a relative measure 
Criteria for 
judging Low risk 
If the P4P programme has 2 or more of the following features 
 If incentive payment (or penalty) is made before or at 4 months 
after measurement and confirmation of performance (short time 
lag)  
 If the domain of performance measure was mostly within the 
clinicians’ control  
 If the performance measure (payment scale) is an absolute 
measure 
 
Note: It is possible that in some cases, you might still be able to judge 
the risk of the programme if one feature is missing/unclear. For 
example, if the time lag for payment is short and the domain of 
performance measure was mostly within the clinicians’ control. We 
can judge from this information that the risk is low even when there is 
little or no information about the performance measure 
Timing of payment after achieving targets (time lag): was it short or long? 
Criteria for 
judging short 
If incentive payment (or penalty) is received not more than 4 months after 
measurement and confirmation of performance  
Criteria for 
judging long 
If incentive payment (or penalty) is received more than 4 months after 
measurement and confirmation of performance  
Domain of performance measured Was the domain of performance measured within 
clinicians’ control or out of clinicians’ control? 
Criteria for 
judging within 
clinicians control 
If incentive payments to health service providers are mostly/only based on 
processes and structures e.g. number of children immunized, routine 
measurement of blood pressure of patients every month, number of 
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referrals made, rate of cancer screening 
Criteria for 
judging out of 
clinicians control 
 
  
If incentive payments to health service providers depend on achieving a 
change in health outcomes e.g. reduction in mortality rates from a specific 
disease, blood pressure reduction, patient experience etc. 
Note: sometimes, incentive programmes contain a mixture of processes 
and outcomes. However, one category out of the two is usually 
predominant. For example a programme with 6 process measures and 
2 outcome measures. You will have to judge what category it falls into 
by deciding which category is predominant and for this example, the 
incentive programme falls within the clinicians control because the 
process measures are predominantly more than the outcome measures. 
Also, beware of the titles do not be carried away. For example, some 
authors report ‘main outcomes of their study’ make sure you read 
what this includes and it should not be confused with health outcomes. 
Performance measure (payment scale) Absolute or relative measure? 
Criteria for 
judging Absolute 
measure  
If incentive is paid (fine levied) to the health service provider that based on 
their performance, not relative to how other health providers perform.  
For example,  
 Improvement in performance typically improvement from some 
baseline measure, using performance score/ performance points 
achieved 
 Achieving performance at/above a predetermined target 
 e.g. incentive paid per patient immunized, or 70% improvement 
from baseline 
Criteria for 
judging Relative 
measure 
If incentive payment is based on the performance of health service 
providers, relative to that of other providers. 
For example, 
 If bonuses are paid for to health service providers in a specific 
performance rank e.g. the providers above the top quartile of 
performance. 
 And/or 
 If fines are levied on health service providers in certain ranks 
usually the bottom ranks e.g. the providers below the lower 
quartile of performance 
 
4.2.5.3. Training sessions  
I set up a convenient time and place for the volunteer raters to be trained on how to use 
the typology to categorize P4P schemes (The raters that were not in York were trained 
over Skype using the same training manual). 
Volunteer raters were asked to sign a consent form before the training session to 
demonstrate that their participation was entirely voluntary and they understood the 
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research. After which they were trained in an interactive training session and there were 
opportunities for questions and feedback. The training sessions lasted an average of one 
hour. 
After the training, the volunteer raters were given six to eight academic papers (see 
Appendix C7 for full reference of studies used for this study), which described P4P 
schemes form different countries and were asked to apply the typology to each scheme.  
The raters were asked to rate the studies independently. This was important because 
agreement between raters might be influenced by each other when they rate together 
(Swingler, 2001, Deﬂoor and Schoonhoven, 2004). The raters were also asked to report 
the estimated time taken to apply the typology to each study and ease of use/difficulty 
level in understanding and using the typology by use of a simple questionnaire with 
three options of: easy, moderately difficult, and difficult.  
The raters were given a uniform template to report the results of applying the typology 
to the papers. They were asked to report what portions of the paper helped them make 
their decision and how they came about the decision, which made it easier to identify 
sources of disagreements between raters (see Appendix C8 for a sample reporting 
template). I also collected information about the raters’ qualifications, background, 
research expertise, years of experience, and their knowledge of incentive schemes in 
healthcare (see Appendix C9 for questionnaire used).  
The volunteers were given a maximum of three weeks to complete this task, after which 
they were given a token of a £10 gift voucher as a thank you for their time upon 
completion of the task. Training all the volunteer raters and completion of the task by 
all rater lasted about two months. 
The inter-rater reliability of each item on the typology was then estimated using the 
Fleiss’ kappa. All analysis was done on STATA version 12. 
 
4.3. Results  
4.3.1. Rater characteristics  
In total, 12 volunteer raters contacted me to express their interest in the study and were 
subsequently involved in the study. This number was three raters below the number I 
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wanted, to have a constant six rating for each of the 17 P4P studies. Therefore, I 
adjusted the number of studies given to the raters from five to six studies per rater.  The 
rater population consisted of five PhD students, four Master’s students, and three health 
service researchers (with a Master’s degree being their highest qualification). Four of 
the raters had between zero to one year of research experience, seven raters had between 
two to four years of research experience, and one rater had over five years of research 
experience. Three of the raters had knowledge and experience of P4P schemes in 
healthcare.  
4.3.2. Ease of use of the P4P typology 
All the raters reported that the tool was easy to use. On average, the raters reported the 
time taken to apply the typology on one paper was an average of 20 minutes (See 
Appendix C 10). Furthermore, the raters seemed to understand the tool, which was 
reflected in their descriptions of how they applied the tool to each P4P study (see table 
4.6 for an illustration from a rater). This suggests that the raters had applied the 
typology effectively, following the guideline for its use.  
Table 4.6 An example of disagreement between raters 
Study  Who 
receives 
the 
incentive: 
individuals 
or groups 
Type of 
incentive: 
fines or 
bonuses 
Size of 
incentive: 
small or 
large 
Time lag: short or long Perceived 
risk of not 
earning the 
incentive: 
high or low 
risk 
Domain of measurement: 
within clinicians control or 
out of clinicians control 
Performance measure: 
absolute or relative measure 
Kirschner 
et al., 
2013 
 
 
GROUPS 
 
‘A 
practice 
with a 
quality 
score in 
the lowest 
group did 
not receive 
a bonus’ 
 
 
 
 
 
BONUSES 
 
‘A bonus 
was chosen 
instead of 
a possible 
more 
effective 
withhold’ 
LARGE 
 
‘A bonus 
of 5–10% 
of the 
practice 
income’ 
Short -  
the payment was realized in 
relatively short time, 
4 months after the data 
collection 
Low risk 
 
The P4P 
scheme had 2 
‘low risk’ 
design 
features: 
short time 
lag and 
domain of 
performance 
within the 
clinicians 
control  
 
  
‘For clinical care, the process 
indicators were incentivised’ 
Process measures- 
Within the clinicians control 
Relative 
A practice with a quality score 
in the lowest group did not 
receive a bonus’. 
‘…relative instead of 
absolute thresholds were 
chosen although these might 
provoke uncertainty and 
complexity that can negatively 
influence the effectiveness of a 
P4P programme 
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4.3.3. Inter-rater reliability (kappa) of each item on the P4P typology 
Kappa was estimated for each of the four items on the typology, shown in Table 4.7. 
The second column shows the kappa statistics, the third column shows the Z (test) 
statistics
7
, and the fourth column shows the associated p-value. 
Table 4.7 Kappa results for each item on the P4P typology 
Items on the typology Kappa Z  Prob>Z 
Item 1(who receives the incentive: individuals or groups) 0.95      12.40       0.00 
Item 2 (type of incentive: fines or bonuses) 0.91      11.92       0.00 
Item 3 (size of incentive: small or large) 0.72  9.33       0.00 
Item 4 (perceived risk of not earning the incentive: low or high) 0.71        9.20       0.00 
 
Kappa value for item 1 (who receives the incentive: individuals or groups) was 0.95, 
kappa for item 2 (type of incentive: fines or bonuses) was 0.91, both of which were 
considered almost perfect agreement between the raters. Kappa values for item 3 (size 
of incentive: small or large) and 4 (perceived risk of not earning the incentive: low or 
high) were 0.72 and 0.71 respectively, which were still considered good agreement 
among the raters. However, compared to the first two items, the kappa values indicate 
more sources of disagreements between the raters. 
4.3.4. Sources of disagreement  
Sources of disagreements between the raters were random and not specific to any 
particular rater. The source of disagreement for the first two items on the typology 
appeared to be as a result of human mistake. On the other hand, sources of disagreement 
in the third and fourth item (size of incentive and perceived risk of not earning the 
incentive) reflected differences in the subjective judgement between the raters. I 
illustrate in Table 4.8, an example of raters’ responses to judging the size of incentive in 
a P4P study, which according to the typology guideline should be considered small if 
less than 5% of usual salary or budget and large if 5% or more than usual salary or 
budget. 
 
                                                          
7
 The test statistic testing the hypothesis that agreement (kappa) is beyond chance 
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Table 4.8 An example of source of disagreement between raters 
Raters Quote/extract from study (An et al. 
2008) used by rater 
Raters response and 
judgment  
Rater 1 ‘Clinics that referred 50 smokers 
would receive a $5000 performance 
bonus. Clinics would also receive $25 
for each referral beyond the initial 50’ 
“It is unclear because size was 
not reported relative to budget 
or salary. I consider it small 
in my judgment” 
 
Rater 2 ‘Clinics that referred 50 smokers 
would receive a $5000 performance 
bonus. Clinics would also receive $25 
for each referral beyond the initial 50’ 
“The study does not specify 
what percentage of the clinics 
budget the $5000 represents 
but I think it has the potential 
of being a large incentive”.  
 
Item 4 (‘risk’) consist of three design features (timing of payment, domain of 
performance, and performance measure), therefore, there is higher likelihood of 
disagreement between the raters because differences in judgement of just one of the 
design features led to different categorisations regarding the fourth item. Table 4.9 on 
the next page illustrates an example of sources of disagreement on item 4 (risk): both 
raters agreed on categories of domain of performance and performance measure, but 
one of the raters was unclear about the timing of payment and had indicated that he/she 
judged subjectively (the typology states that timing of payment should be considered 
short if payment is made anytime within four months of measurement of performance, 
while if payment is made after four months, it should be considered long). The lack of 
clarity as pointed out by the raters is suggestive of vagueness or lack of structure in 
reporting design features in the P4P papers.   
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Table 4.9 Sources of disagreement on judging item 4 ('risk') (Werner et al. 2011) 
Rater 
1 
Time lag: short or long Perceived 
risk of not 
earning 
the 
incentive: 
high or 
low risk 
Domain of measurement: within the clinicians control or out of clinicians 
control 
Performance measure: absolute or relative measure 
Unclear: The study does not specify the time lag between performance 
measure confirmation and payouts. It might have been a short time lag 
Low risk 
 
Processes (within clinicians control); For two of the three clinical conditions 
we studied, Medicare’s composite measures are based exclusively on process 
measures.  
Partially relative; Two additional payment incentives were introduced in the 
fourth year (fiscal year 2007). Hospitals that attained a target performance 
level (defined as median performance two years previously) received an 
incentive. In addition, of the hospitals attaining that level, those that were in 
the top 20 percent in terms of improvement received another incentive. 
Rater 
2 
Long time lag: The first two years of the demonstration project (fiscal years 
2004 and 2005), financial bonuses were distributed to the top 20 percent of 
hospitals.  
High risk  
Processes (within clinicians control): Participating hospitals received higher 
payments for treating medicare patients with certain condition- acute 
myocardial infarction, heart failure, pneumonia, coronary artery bypass graft 
and knee and hip replacements. 
Relative: Two additional payment incentives were introduced in the fourth 
year (fiscal year 2007). Hospitals that attained a target performance level 
(defined as median performance two years previously) received an incentive. 
In addition, of the hospitals attaining that level, those that were in the top 20 
percent in terms of improvement received another incentive 
 
4.4. Discussion 
This study assessed the inter-rater reliability and ease of use of what may be the first 
tool to categorise P4P schemes in health care, which is one of the strengths of this 
study.  As a result, however, there were no studies to compare the findings. 
 
Overall, all four items on the typology demonstrated good inter-rater reliability (kappa 
values were above the pre-set acceptable value of 0.6). This implies that if the typology 
is adopted as a P4P categorisation tool, misclassifications of P4P schemes will be 
minimised, which otherwise would have given wrong ideas, making the typology a 
futile tool to explore heterogeneity in P4P to aid evidence synthesis.  
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The results suggest that the raters found the typology was quick and easy to use. This, 
in addition to the training, and clear and concise guidelines, could have contributed to 
the good agreement between the raters. 
The kappa value of item 3 (size of incentive K=0.72) and item 4 (perceived risk of not 
earning the incentive K=0.71) on the typology was moderately lower than that of item 
1 (who receives the incentive K=0.95) and item 2 (type of incentive K=0.91). This 
might have been because item 1 (who receives the incentives: individuals or groups) 
and item 2 (type of incentive: fines or bonuses) were typically reported more clearly in 
the studies, and were easy to identify compared to item 3 (size of incentive) and item 4 
(perceived risk of not earning the incentive).  
In addition, whilst the findings demonstrated that the raters were clear on how to use 
the tool and applied it effectively to descriptions of P4P in the selected studies, the 
raters’ interpretations of the authors’ descriptions varied due to vague descriptions of 
the concerned categories in the scheme. Furthermore rater agreement might also have 
been reduced in item 4 (perceived risk of not earning the incentive: low or high) 
because it involved judgement of three design features (timing of payment, domain of 
performance, and performance measure) to decide whether the perceived risk of not 
earning the incentive is low or high, which means disagreement in one of the three 
design features often led to disagreement in categorisation of item 4. 
The findings further show that the sources of disagreement were likely to be not 
inherent to the typology, as the findings that the disagreements between raters were 
random. Arguably, there might be better agreement with more experienced raters 
conversant with P4P in healthcare. However, this was not explored in this study, as the 
sample size was restricted to health science research students and early researchers. 
 
The ease of use of the typology and the inter-rater reliability of the third and fourth 
item can be greatly improved with clearer and better reporting of P4P designs in 
evaluation studies. The size of incentive is often reported in absolute terms (e.g. £500); 
and there is often no way to make comparisons with usual earnings of the clinician. For 
example, an annual incentive of £500 to a clinician earning less than £5000 per year is 
likely to be considered as large (above 5% of salary) as opposed to a clinical earning 
£20,000 annually.  In the same way, the findings suggest that vague and unstructured 
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reporting of some design features in the evaluation studies made it difficult for the 
raters to use the typology. To effectively categorise P4P schemes using this typology, 
P4P description in evaluation studies needs to be clearer and more structured, which 
can be achieved by using the typology to describe the design features of these schemes.  
Limitations  
A limitation of this study is that most of the raters were students at the same University, 
department, with similar research background or expertise, which might have an 
influence on reliability. The more similar the rater population is, the more they are 
likely to agree. Though if the typology is adopted, these are the same sort of people who 
are likely to be applying the tool. 
Another limitation was that the papers assigned to the raters were not randomly 
selected, which was due to the problem of poor, vague, and incomplete reporting of 
descriptions and evaluations of incentive schemes in healthcare. Instead, the papers 
assigned to the raters were selected based on how well described/how completely 
described the incentive schemes were. This was unlikely to reflect a real life situation 
where poorly reported papers exist. Inter-rater reliability might have been lower if the 
papers were randomly selected to include poorly reported and well-reported papers. 
 
4.5. What this chapter adds 
This developed typology demonstrated preliminary evidence of reliability when used by 
health service researchers to categorise P4P schemes in health care. The raters also 
appeared to understand the typology and found it quick and easy to use. The findings of 
this study suggests that the typology is ready for use by other researchers, as a simple 
and effective tool to categorise well reported P4P schemes in health care, which will 
improve evidence synthesis and aid interpretation of results of incentive schemes in 
health care. In the next chapter, I use the typology to explore heterogeneity and 
synthesise evidence on how much influence the four items on the typology (who 
receives the incentive, type of incentive, size of incentive, and perceived risk of not 
earning the incentive) have on the effectiveness of evaluated P4P schemes. 
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Chapter 5 Exploring the heterogeneity of the 
results of evaluations of P4P in health care 
 
5.0. Introduction 
The findings from the review of literature (chapter two) showed the difficulty in 
synthesising evidence of the effectiveness of P4P schemes in healthcare, which is due to 
heterogeneity between the results of evaluation of these schemes. This might be 
explained by variation in design features, contexts, implementation factors, and 
evaluation design between the schemes. Some researchers have considered some of 
these variations in these schemes through narrative summaries, with subjective and 
inconclusive findings (Van Herck et al., 2010, Eijkenaar, 2012). There are however no 
studies that explore heterogeneity in a structured, quantitative, and systematic way.  
In chapter two, I considered some ways to explore heterogeneity in P4P schemes, such 
as subgroup analyses (a form of meta-analyses for a subset of studies) and meta-
regression (an extension of subgroup analyses that quantifies the relationship between 
the size of effect of the interventions and the categories or characteristics of the studies 
using weighted regression based technique, thus allowing multiple characteristics to be 
investigated simultaneously) (Higgins and Green, 2011, Engels et al., 2000). These 
analyses often require a reliable, structured, and informed framework, which is lacking 
in P4P literature.  
In chapter three I developed a framework (P4P typology) based on some design features 
of P4P schemes (who receives the incentive, type of incentive, size of incentive, and 
perceived risk of not earning the incentive), to describe, categorise, and help think about 
P4P schemes targeted at health service providers. After demonstrating the reliability and 
potential of the P4P typology as a P4P categorisation tool in chapter four, I then used 
the typology to categorize evaluated P4P schemes into three theoretical ‘types’ or 
categories: type A (high chance of effectiveness) B (medium chance of effectiveness) 
and C (low chance of effectiveness), based on knowledge harnessed from theoretical 
literature. In this chapter, I describe and present the results of how I used this P4P 
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typology to explore heterogeneity in the results of P4P evaluations in a quantitative and 
scientific way. 
5.1. Aims and objectives 
The aim of this study was to systematically explore heterogeneity in P4P schemes in 
healthcare using the developed typology.  
The objectives were:  
 To explore the relationship between the effectiveness of P4P schemes and the 
design features included in the typology.  
 To investigate whether certain ‘types’ of P4P schemes result in better 
performance  
5.2. Methods 
Meta-regression analyses and multilevel logistic regression analyses were performed to 
explore heterogeneity in results of evaluations of P4P schemes. This involved 
identification of relevant studies and data extraction, model specification, and 
sensitivity analyses, which are described in the following sections.  
5.2.1. Identification of studies and data extraction  
I selected evaluated P4P schemes in healthcare from primary studies identified from the 
literature review in chapter two, following the same inclusion and exclusion criteria 
applied in chapter two. In total, 96 evaluation studies were included in this study (see 
Figure 2.1). 
As in chapter 2, data were extracted in a standardized way. A uniform template was 
used for all studies. In addition to the outcomes and effect sizes extracted in chapter 2 
(see Appendix  D1), information was extracted from each study using the new typology 
on design features (who receives the incentive, type of incentive, size of incentive, 
performance measures, timing of payment, and domain of performance measured), 
evaluation design (whether there was an adequate control group or not), and country. I 
also extracted information on sample size and raw numbers of events, from studies that 
reported them (see Appendix D4).  
5.2.1.1. Data features  
There were two notable data features. First, the measures of effect extracted were 
reported in different forms, which included: odds ratio (19%), percentage points (15%), 
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mean differences (13%), and percentages (45%). These estimates had to be converted to 
a standardised measure so they could be included in the analyses. This required 
additional data such as absolute differences (percentages or numbers), sample size, 
standard deviations or standard errors or variance (Borenstein et al., 2009). I discuss this 
in detail in the subsequent section.  
Second, some of the P4P schemes incentivised a wide range of activities or outcomes, 
which sometimes were evaluated by more than one study (some of which presented 
results for more than one incentivised outcome). For example there were four 
evaluations of the USA premier P4P programme (Jha et al., 2012, Werner et al., 2013, 
Lindenauer et al., 2007, Glickman et al., 2007), assessing over 15 different outcomes 
including hospital mortality (for conditions such as pneumonia and acute myocardial 
infection), prescribing conduct, and smoking cessation interventions. A few of the 
evaluation studies reported a composite measure of all outcomes considered in the 
study. For example, the evaluation by Lindenauer et al. (2007) assessing 14 outcome 
measures on prescribing conduct and appropiate care of heart disease and pnemonia, 
also provided  a composite outcome measure for all 14 outcomes. However, many just 
reported each outcome separately. This resulted in a non-uniform multilevel/clustered 
structure to the data, which needed to be taken into account in my analysis (see Figure 
5.1).
 
Figure 5.1 Illustration of the multilevel structure of the data 
In total, I extracted information on effect sizes of 270 outcomes from 96 evaluation 
studies, which were from 68 P4P schemes (see Appendix D1). Six P4P schemes were 
evaluated by more than one study, ranging from two to 22 studies per P4P scheme 
P4P scheme 
(A) 
evaluation 
study (1) 
outcome 1 
  
outcome 2 
evaluation 
study (2) 
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(Table 5.1). The number of outcomes per P4P scheme evaluation ranged from one to 77 
(see Figure 5.2).  
Table 5.1 Distribution of multiple evaluations OF P4P schemes 
P4P schemes evaluated by more than one study  Number of evaluations  
Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF), UK  22  
Premier, USA 4 
California P4P, USA 2  
Hudson P4P, USA 2 
Payment incentive programme, Australia  2  
National Health Insurance P4P, Taiwan 5  
 
 
Figure 5.2 Distribution of number of outcomes per P4P evaluations 
In the next section, I describe the regression models employed in this study and discuss 
the consequences of the data features: multiple formats of estimate of effect and 
multilevel data (multiple outcomes within schemes), and how I addressed them.  
5.2.2. Regression models  
I used a meta-regression and multilevel logistic regression model to explore 
heterogeneity in results of P4P evaluations. The following sections lay out the rationales 
for the selection of the models and exact steps taken to perform both analyses, which 
included specification of variables.  
5.2.2.1. Meta-regression 
Meta regression was performed in STATA 12 using the ‘metareg’ command by Roger 
Hardboard (originally written by Steven Sharp in 1998). This command performs 
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random-effects regression using aggregate level data. This extends the variance-
weighted least squares regression by estimating an extra additive component of 
variance, which requires specification of the standard errors within each study (Harbord 
and Higgins, 2008). The regression coefficient obtained describes how the outcome 
variable (in this case P4P effect estimates: standardized mean difference) changes with a 
change in explanatory variables (P4P design features) (Borenstein et al., 2009, Morton 
et al., 2004).  
Meta-regression is similar to a simple regression model (e.g. ordinary least square 
regression). The meta-regression however, was a more robust choice for two reasons. 
First, it is a weighted regression where larger studies (with smaller standard errors) have 
more influence than smaller studies, as meta-regression estimates appropriate weights to 
the studies using the precision of their respective effect estimate (Borenstein et al., 
2009). Second, meta-regression considers the residual heterogeneity among intervention 
effects not modeled by the explanatory variables, using the random-effects meta-
regression model (Thompson and Sharp, 1999). 
The data features highlighted in the previous section (multiple effect estimates measure 
and multiple outcomes per evaluation study) were taken into consideration in the meta-
regression analyses. I explain how I dealt with these issues in the sections below. 
Converting effect estimates to a standardised measure (multiple effect estimates 
measure) 
 I converted different formats of effect estimates to a standardized measure in order to 
be able to include as many studies as possible in the analysis. Using formulae from 
Borenstein et al. (2009), I converted the different formats of effect estimates (e.g. odds 
ratio and percentage points) to standardized mean difference (a standardized measure), 
with associated standard errors (SE) (see Table 5.2). 
Unfortunately, in this study out of 96 primary studies identified to be included in the 
analysis, only 36 studies reported enough information to compute the standardized 
mean difference, unavoidably resulting in loss of information
8
 (see Appendix D3 for list 
of included studies). I considered avoiding this loss of information by fitting a separate 
meta-regression model for each reported format of the outcome effect. However, each 
                                                          
8
 Authors were not contacted due to time constraints  
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model would have had insufficient number of studies (small sample size<10 studies) to 
confidently carry out the desired exploratory analyses (Borenstein et al., 2009) (see 
section 5.2.1.1.). In addition, even if this were possible, the results would have been 
difficult to merge and interpret as a whole. 
Table 5.2 Formulae used in converting effect estimates to standardised mean 
difference 
 
Formulae obtained from Bland (2000) and Borenstein et.al. (2008) 
 
Standardised mean difference (𝑑) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ×
√3
𝜋
 
                               Variance of converted odds ratio (Vd)= VLogOddsRatio X (3 ÷π
2
) 
 
Where π is the mathematical constant (approximately 3.14159), VLogOddsRatio is log of the 
variance of the odds ratio. 
                                  Standardised mean difference (d) =
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑆𝐷)
  
 
Where SD = √N * (95% upper limit confidence interval (CI) - 95% lower limit CI) 
                                                                       3.92 
 
Variance of standardised mean difference (Vd) =SE
 2 
 
Standard error (SE)= (95% upper limit confidence interval (CI) - 95% lower limit CI) 
                                                                       3.92 
 
Another approach used to address the problem of loss of information and still 
statistically explore the data was to convert the effect estimates of all the studies to 
binary data (e.g. was P4P effective or not), which was analysed using a logistic 
regression model. This eliminated the problem of differences in effect estimate 
measures, and allowed incorporation of all (96) relevant P4P evaluation studies. 
However, because effect sizes were not needed to transform the outcomes to binary, the 
magnitude of the effect size was lost (there was no differentiation between evaluations 
with large or small effect estimates). Therefore, the results from this analysis were 
interpreted in light of this limitation (Spitznagel, 2008, Greene and Hilbe, 2008). I 
examined the extent to which the results from both analyses were similar to increase 
confidence in the findings (this logistic regression analyses is described in section 
5.2.2.2).  
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Adjusting for multiple outcomes within evaluation studies 
Second, it was necessary to account for the clustered nature of the data (multiple 
outcomes within a study) in the meta-regression, because if unaccounted for, it might 
lead to incorrect estimates of the standard errors, and so, the precision of the summary 
of effect (Snijders and Bosker, 2012, Borenstein et al., 2009). The clustering observed 
in this dataset means that the outcome variables within each cluster at each level 
(outcomes within studies or outcome within programmes) might be dependent or 
correlated with one another and likely to have similar results (Luke, 2004). Correlations 
between the outcomes in these studies are likely for a number of reasons. Outcomes 
measured from the same population of clinicians, outcomes evaluated using the same 
study design, and outcomes focused on the same clinical area or domain of 
performance, are all likely to be correlated because the outcomes are not independent of 
one another. Therefore, ignoring the clustering nature of the data (treating each outcome 
as independent) is likely to underestimate the standard errors associated with the 
coefficients because sample size or amount of independent information is exaggerated 
(as the analysis assumes that each observation is independent of one another), which 
results to misleading conclusions (Van den Noortgate et al., 2005, Snijders and Bosker, 
2012).  
There were a number of ways to deal with this. The first way considered was to select 
only one outcome per P4P scheme. However, this would have resulted in a substantial 
loss of information. The second way considered was to compute a summary measure for 
each P4P evaluation study with multiple outcomes, which takes into account the 
correlation among the outcomes (Borenstein et al., 2009).  To do this, I used formulae 
shown in Table 5.3 to calculate the summary effect and its associated variance to 
estimate its standard error for multiple outcomes within each study (see Appendix D4 
and D5). 
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Table 5.3 Formulae for computing summary effect of multiple outcomes within 
scheme  
Formulae from Borenstein et al. (2009) 
 Summary effect for two outcomes in a study ∑𝑌 =
1
2
(𝑌1 + 𝑌2) 
Or 
 Summary effect for more the two outcomes in a study ?̅?  =
1
𝑚
∑ 𝑌𝑗𝑚𝑗  
 
Where Y1, Y2 etc. are effect sizes from different outcomes, m=number of studies and Yj= 
sum of the effect sizes in the study. 
 Variance for mean of combined outcomes within a study= VY * Variance inflation 
factor (VIF) 
 
 Vy = 
1
𝑀
v (1+ (m-1) r) 
 
 VIF= 1+(m-1)r 
Where m= number of outcomes, V= sum of all the variances of the combined outcomes, 
and r = the correlation coefficient that describes the extent to which the outcomes in the 
study co-vary. 
 
The problem, however, with using the formulae in Table 5.3 was that the correlation (r) 
between the outcomes were not reported in these studies, and so there was no data on 
the likely degree of clustering. Therefore, I had to make assumptions on plausible 
correlations between multiple outcomes (within P4P schemes) based on their 
similarities, as suggested by Borenstein et al. (2009). For instance, P4P schemes with 
multiple outcomes within the same clinical area (e.g. diabetes related outcomes such as 
LDL tests and HbA1c outcomes) are likely to be more highly correlated, compared to 
outcomes (within the same P4P scheme) in different clinical areas (e.g. childhood 
vaccinations and reduction in blood pressure). A correlation of one (perfect correlation) 
or zero (outcomes are completely independent) is unrealistic and unlikely in this case 
because multiple outcomes within P4P studies are likely to be correlated to a certain 
degree i.e. same programme, same method of evaluation, same population etc. (as 
discussed in earlier in section 5.2.2).  Therefore, I assumed that 0.5 was a plausible 
correlation between multiple outcomes in a P4P scheme. The assumption of correlation 
of 0.5 was based on taking a conservative position of a midway value between zero and 
one. However, based on the argument that correlations between outcomes within a 
scheme are likely to be higher if they were around the same clinical area (e.g. diabetes 
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outcomes such as eye tests, and hba1c levels), I assumed a higher correlation of 0.75 for 
such outcomes.  
Since the correlation values used in the above estimations were assumptions, I 
conducted a sensitivity analysis to see the extent to which results obtained varied for 
lower values of correlation of 0.5 for multiple outcomes in similar clinical areas and 
0.25 for multiple outcomes in different clinical areas within the P4P scheme, as shown 
in Table 5.4 (see Appendix D4 for summary measures).  
Table 5.4 Correlation (r) values used in the estimation of a summary measure of 
effect for multiple outcomes within P4P schemes 
Multiple outcomes within a P4P 
scheme 
Main analysis Sensitivity analysis 
Outcomes around a similar 
clinical area (e.g. LDL tests and 
HbA1c) 
0.75 0.5 
Outcomes around different 
clinical areas (e.g. immunizations 
and blood pressure reduction) 
                    0.5 0.25 
 
5.2.2.2. Logistic regression model (multilevel)  
A logistic regression analysis was performed using the outcomes transformed to 
whether P4P was effective or not (as discussed in the previous section). The logistic 
regression model allows exploration of relationship between this binary outcome 
variable and explanatory variables (P4P design features) (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000, 
Kleinbaum and Klein, 2010). It was however, still necessary to consider the multilevel 
nature of the data, because results from an ordinary logistic regression does not take into 
account the effects of clustering (Hox, 2010).  
The way I dealt with the clustering/multilevel nature of the data was to specify a mixed 
effects multilevel logistic regression model using the ‘Xtmelogit’ command on STATA 
12, which analyses clustered data (balanced or unbalanced)
9
 by accounting for intra-
                                                          
9
 Unbalanced multilevel data like the one in this study is where the clustering is not equal e.g., there are 
some P4P schemes with just one evaluation study (with one outcome), whereas there are other P4P 
schemes with multiple evaluation and multiple outcomes. 
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class correlation (by correcting standard errors) and correcting denominator degrees for 
number of clusters (giving an estimate of the variability caused by each level of cluster) 
(Gelman, 2006). The mixed effects multilevel model consists of fixed effect and random 
effect elements. The fixed effect part of the model presents estimates that are interpreted 
similarly to a logistic regression (with robust standard errors) and the random effects 
part of the model accounts for the clustering effect or the amount of unexplained 
variation at each level (Snijders and Bosker, 2012, Hox, 2010).   
The multilevel logistic regression model was the most robust method of dealing with a 
three-level data compared to other methods, such as aggregation (which combines the 
outcomes at lower levels of the data to eliminate the multilevel structure and estimation 
of clustered robust standard errors), which produces less biased standard errors 
associated with regression estimates by inflating the standard errors (Snijders and 
Bosker, 2012). This is because it is often difficult to create a decision rule for 
aggregation of binary outcome variables, aggregation also leads to loss of statistical 
power due to loss of information and diminished sample size. Estimation of clustered 
robust standard errors is mostly useful for two-level data and may lead to misleading 
conclusions in three level data such as the one in this study (Stata Library, 2014, 
Moerbeek, 2004, Van den Noortgate et al., 2005). In the next section, I describe how I 
determined whether P4P was effective or not based on the effect estimates. 
Outcome variable specification for logistic regression model 
Extracted data of effects estimates revealed four main categories: statistically 
significant
10
 positive effect, statistically non-significant positive effect, statistically 
significant negative effect, and statistically non-significant negative effect. Outcomes 
that had statistically significant positive effect were classified under outcomes that P4P 
were seen as effective, and outcomes that had either statistically significant negative 
effect or no statistically significant difference between intervention and control group 
were considered as outcomes that P4P were not effective (see Table 5.5). However, 
failure to find a statistically significant difference (or positive effect) between the 
intervention and control group might not necessarily mean there was no effect, because 
there might have been a small sample size (low power) to detect a statistically 
significant effect (Borenstein et al., 2009). Therefore, in order to examine how my 
                                                          
10
 Statistically significant here means that probability of the event happening by chance is less than 0.05 
or 5%. 
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decision of outcome variable specification affects the results and conclusions, I 
performed another analysis in which outcomes with non-statistically significant positive 
effect were also considered as outcomes where P4P was effective, in addition to 
outcomes with statistically significant positive effects.  
Table 5.5 Outcome variable specification for multilevel logistic regression model 
Outcome 
variable  
P4P was effective P4P was not effective 
Effect of P4P Statistically significant 
positive effect  
 Statistically non-significant positive 
outcomes* 
 Statistically significant negative 
outcomes 
 Statistically non-significant negative 
outcomes 
*considered as effective in a sensitivity analyses 
 
5.2.3. Model specification 
In this section, I summarise the statistical models used to explore heterogeneity in the 
results of evaluations of P4P schemes. This includes outline of the outcome and 
explanatory variables in each model, and variants of the models.  
As discussed in previous sections, two models: meta-regression (model A) and 
multilevel logistic regression (model B) were considered. The outcome variable for 
model A was effect estimates (in the form of standardised mean difference) and the 
outcome variable for model B was binary (whether P4P was effective or not). 
5.2.3.1. Explanatory variables for Meta regression and multilevel logistic regression 
models 
In both models, two sets of explanatory (categorical) variables were considered. The 
first sets of explanatory variables (variant 1) are three design features included on the 
P4P typology namely: who receives the incentives (individuals or groups), size of 
incentive (large or small), and perceived risk of not earning the incentive (‘risk’: low or 
high). The second sets of explanatory variables (variant 2) are the ‘types’ of P4P from 
the typology developed in chapter three. There are three types, namely type A, type B, 
and type C, which depict the prospects of the effectiveness of P4P schemes. Theory 
suggests that paying groups instead of individuals, paying large incentives instead of 
small, and low risk schemes instead of high risk ones are likely to yield better results in 
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incentive schemes. Following this rationale, I categorised schemes that had all three 
features present (payment to groups, large incentive size, and low risk incentive) as type 
A (labelled as P4P schemes with high chances of effectiveness); if two of these features 
were present, the schemes were categorised as type B (P4P schemes with medium 
chance of effectiveness); if one or less than one of the design features was present, the 
incentive scheme was categorised as type C (P4P schemes with low chance of 
effectiveness). In addition, to the above-specified explanatory variables, I generated an 
additional exploratory variable (whether there was an adequate control group or not), 
which was included in both models as an adjuster to reflect the rigour of evaluation (see 
Table 5.6 for all variables).  This follows the argument put forward and explored in 
chapter two that evaluations of incentive schemes with inadequate control groups are 
likely to over-estimate the effect of the incentive scheme.  
5.2.4. Statistical analyses  
Two sets of analyses were performed in each model. First, a univariate analyses for each 
explanatory variable and second, a multivariate analyses with each set of explanatory 
variables in the model simultaneously (see Table 5.6). Multivariate analyses were 
performed because they present a more robust approach to exploring the data, when it is 
expected that more than one explanatory variable will influence the outcomes of the 
schemes simultaneously. In addition, multivariate models allowed the exploration of 
relationships between the explanatory variables (Flom, 2014, Hair et al., 2006). 
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Table 5.6 Summary of statistical models 
 Model A (meta-regression) 
 
Outcome variable: effect estimate 
(standardised mean difference) 
Model B (multilevel logistic 
regression) 
 
Outcome variable: Binary (whether 
P4P is effective or not) 
Variant 1 
Univariate and 
multivariate 
analyses 
performed 
Explanatory Variables  
Who receives the 
incentive 
Groups  *Individual  
Size of incentive Large *Small  
Perceived risk Low  *High  
Evaluation design  No control group (before 
and after studies) 
*Adequate control group 
(quasi-experimental and 
RCTs) 
Variant 2 
Univariate and 
multivariate 
analyses 
performed 
Explanatory variables  
Type of P4P 
scheme 
Type A 
High chance of 
effectiveness 
Type B 
Medium chance of 
effectiveness 
*Type C 
Low chance 
of 
effectiveness 
Evaluation 
design  
No control group 
(before and after 
studies) 
*Adequate control group 
(quasi-experimental and 
RCTs) 
 
*reference category is the group to which the other categories are compared. So, if the estimate of regression in model A for a 
univariate analyses of who receives the incentive is 4.5, it means than P4P schemes in which groups are paid the incentive are 4.5 
times likely to be effective compared to P4P schemes that pay incentives to individuals. 
 
5.2.4.1. Model modifications  
There were three slight modifications in the analyses described in Table 5.6. First, in the 
multivariate analyses of model A (variant 1), 40 studies were required to confidently 
perform meta-regression analyses on four explanatory variables (following the sample 
size rule of thumb of 10 studies per explanatory variable) (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 
2000). However, there were only 36 studies included in this model and inclusion of 
evaluation design as an adjuster might have resulted in unrealistic conclusions 
(Borenstein et al., 2009). Therefore, in order to have meaningful estimates from the 
analyses, I excluded the evaluation design as an adjuster in model the multivariate 
analyses of model A (variant 1). Though, the variable was still explored in the 
univariate analysis of variant 1 and both analyses in Model A (variant 2). Also, a 
sensitivity analysis that would exclude P4P evaluations without an adequate control 
group from the model was considered, but was faced with the same problem of 
inadequate sample size because out of the 36 studies, 10 had no control group, leaving 
the sample size less than the desired number required per explanatory variable.   
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Second, as seen in Table 5.6, each explanatory variable is a dichotomous variable. 
Though, for two of these variables: size of incentive and evaluation design, I originally 
wanted to explore three categories each: 
 Size of incentive: small (<5% of clinician salary), medium (5-10% of clinician 
salary), and large  (>10% of clinician salary), 
 Evaluation design: before and after studies with no control group, quasi-
experimental studies (controlled trials, interrupted time series, pre-post designs 
with control groups), and RCTs. 
However, this was not done because of inadequate sample size (96 studies), following 
the guideline of 20 studies per dichotomous explanatory variable. A sample size of over 
120 studies would have been required to detect reasonable size effect with reasonable 
power in multilevel regression models (Harrell, 2010).  So, in all the analyses, the 
medium sized incentives were categorised as large and the RCTs and quasi-
experimental studies were grouped together, thereby making both variables 
dichotomous as seen in table 5.5. I however explored the frequency distribution of the 
effects of P4P in the original three categories in the two variables (results of which are 
shown in section 5.3.1). 
Third, non-dichotomous variables were not allowed in meta-regression (model A). Type 
A and type B schemes were merged to form one variable, which was compared to type 
C schemes in the analyses.  
 
5.3. Results  
This section presents the results of the statistical analyses, first in the form of a 
descriptive summary and then statistical outputs from the regression models (univariate 
and multivariate) used to explore the heterogeneity.  
5.3.1. Descriptive statistics   
The descriptive statistics presented in this section describe the distribution of the 
variables in relation to the outcome variable (of whether P4P was effective or not, as 
specified in the multilevel logistic regression model (see section 5.2.2.2). 
There were 270 outcomes (from 96 studies) across different areas of health care, which 
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included cancer screening, tuberculosis screening, curative care, disease management, 
patient satisfaction, smoking cessation advice, hospital mortality, vaccinations, diabetes 
management, cost containment, change in use of prescription budget, and utilization of 
health services etc. These outcomes were from 68 incentive programmes, which had 
different scopes and sizes, and were implemented in different countries and contexts 
(ownership and funding), with varying levels of complexity. 
Illustrated in Table 5.7 are the results from descriptive analysis, which shows that the 
majority (70%) of the identified outcomes were statistically significantly positive. A 
majority of these significantly positive outcomes also had favourable design features 
(according to theory): payment made to groups (81.7%), large and medium size 
incentives (60.2% and 23.8%), and ‘low’ perceived risk of not earning the incentive 
(78.2%). In addition, a majority of the positive outcomes were categorised as type A 
(57.3%) and type B (27.5%), which were more likely to have statistically significant 
positive outcomes compared to type C (15.2%). In the same way, a majority of the 
statistically significantly positive outcomes were from studies that had either an 
adequate control group (77.5%) or a randomised controlled trial (16.2%), which 
supports the argument that lack of good control groups might be partly responsible for 
the effectiveness observed in some of these schemes. 
 These results mirror theoretical arguments from chapter four, that certain design 
features are associated with the impact of the scheme. These findings are, however, are 
not definite. The next section presents more robust evidence of relationships and 
measures of association between the outcome variables and the explanatory variables 
from the regression analyses. 
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Table 5.7 Characteristics of included studies 
 Recipient of 
incentive  
Size of incentive  Risk  Evaluation design  Type     
Indivi
duals 
Groups  
 
Small  Mediu
m  
Large  
 
Low  
 
High No 
contro
l 
Quasi-
experim
ental  
RCT A B C 
Outcomes with 
statistically significant 
positive effect (N=190) 
 n (%)                                    
33      
(17.3) 
156   
(81.7) 
29   
(16) 
43 
(23.8) 
109 
(60.2) 
147  
(78.2)  
41   
(21.8) 
93 
(48.9) 
86         
(45.3) 
11  
(5.8) 
102 
(57.3) 
49 
(27.5) 
27  
(15.2) 
Other outcomes               
(N=80)  
 no statistically 
significant effect 
 statistically significant 
negative effect 
 negative effect 
n (%) 
12         
(15) 
68        
(85) 
21    
(27) 
12 
(15.4) 
45 
(57.6) 
 79 
(75.2) 
   26 
(24.8) 
5     
(6.3) 
62         
(77.5) 
13 
(16.2) 
37 
(47.5) 
26 
(33.3) 
15 
(19.2) 
Total  number of 
outcomes (270)  
n (%) 
45      
(16.7) 
224   
(83.3) 
50 
(19.3) 
55 
(21.2) 
154 
(59.5) 
226 
(77.1) 
67 
(22.9) 
98 
(36.3) 
148        
(55.2) 
24 
(8.5) 
139 
(54.8) 
75 
(29) 
42 
(16.2) 
*type A-schemes with high chance of success, type B-schemes with medium chance of success, type C- schemes with low chance of success  *number of studies= 96  
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5.3.2. Meta-regression  
Table 5.8 shows the coefficients (standardized mean difference) obtained from the 
meta-regression model. The third column shows the coefficients for each of the 
dependent variables put in the model individually (univariate model), while the fourth 
column shows results of all the dependent variables put in the model simultaneously 
(multivariate model).  
 
Table 5.8 Meta-regression coefficients for Model A (Outcome variable: P4P effect 
estimate) 
 Explanatory variables 
(Number of studies=36) 
 
SMD 
(univariate 
model) 
(95% CI)  
SMD 
(Multivariate 
model) (95% CI) 
Variant 1 
(First set of 
explanatory 
variable) 
Who receives the incentive: 
payment to groups compared 
to payment to individuals 
0.002 (-0.186, 
0.190) P= 0.981 
-0.009 (-0.201, 
0.182) P= 0.922 
Size of incentive: large 
incentive compared to small 
incentive  
0.101 (-0.068, 
0.270) P=0.222 
0.116 (-0.077, 
0.309) P=0.229 
Perceived risk of not earning 
the incentive (Risk): low risk 
compared to high risk 
0.009 (-0.146, 
0.163) P=0.910 
0.002 (-0.205, 
0.138) P= 0.693 
Variant 2 
(Second set 
of 
explanatory 
variables) 
Type: type A and B (with 
high/medium chance of 
effectiveness) compared to 
Type C (with low chance of 
effectiveness) 
0.103  (-0.197, 
0.121) P=0.222 
 
 
0.098 (-0.077, 
0.270) P=0.263 
 
Evaluation: -
0.019 (-0.179, 
0.142) P=0.815 
-0.038 (-0.197, 
0.121) 
 P=0.629 
 
Table 5.8 shows that in the univariate and multivariate model, the standardized mean 
difference (SMD) for the variable ‘who receives the incentive’ were 0.002 (-0.186, 
0.190) and -0.009 (-0.201, 0.182) respectively. In the same way, the SMD for the 
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perceived risk of not earning the incentive (Risk) in both models were 0.009 [-0.146, 
0.163] and 0.002[-0.205, 0.138] respectively. These estimates (all of which were not 
statistically significant, P= 0.69-0.98) were very small and insignificant in magnitude, 
following guidelines for interpreting these estimates by Cohen (1988). Therefore, it is 
safe to say that there was no evidence in the meta-regression model that who receives 
the incentive or the risk of incentive predicts the outcome variable (estimate of effect of 
P4P).  
On the other hand, the regression coefficients from the univariate and multivariate meta-
regression models for the variable ‘size of incentive’ were 0.101 (-0.068, 0.270) 
P=0.222 and 0.116 (-0.077, 0.309) P=0.229 respectively. Similarly, the coefficients for 
the variable ‘type’ for both univariate and multivariate meta-regression model were 
0.103 (-0.197, 0.121) P=0.222 and 0.098 (-0.077, 0.270) P=0.263 respectively. Though 
these estimates were small in magnitude and not statistically significant (using the 5% 
significance cut-off), the magnitudes of effect were considerably higher (with lower p-
values) compared to the variables ‘who receives the incentive’ and perceived risk of not 
earning the incentive. In addition, the small sample size may have led to low power to 
detect a statistically significant estimate. Therefore, with a considerable degree of 
uncertainty (p-value: 0.222), one can assume that the positive estimates suggest that 
payment of large sized incentive (above 5% of clinicians salary) and (or) P4P schemes 
that were classified as type A or B
11
 (with high/medium chance of effectiveness) might 
bring about a bigger effect size than P4P schemes paying small incentives and (or) 
classified as type C schemes (with low chance of effectiveness).  
5.3.3. Multilevel logistic regression results  
This section illustrates results from the logistic regression shown in Table 5.9. A test of 
the full model multilevel logistic regression against an ordinary logistic regression 
model (likelihood ratio test) was statistically significant (LR test: Chi2 (2) 24.43 
prob>chi2= 0.0000), which indicates that the multilevel model was a better fit to the 
data than the ordinary logistic regression model.  
 
 
                                                          
11 Type A and B has 2 or more of the following design features: payment to groups, payment of large size incentive, and low 
perceived risk of not earning the incentive, whereas type C has one or less of the design features. 
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Table 5.9 Regression coefficients for multilevel logistic regression (Model B) 
 Explanatory variables 
(Number of studies=96) 
Odds Ratio   
(univariate 
model) (95% 
CI)  
Odds Ratio   
multivariate 
model)  (95% 
CI) 
Variant 1 
(First set of 
explanatory 
variable) 
 
Who receives the incentive: 
payment to individuals 
compared to payment to 
groups 
1.32  (0.32- 
5.54) 
P=0.703 
2.01 (0.62-6.56) 
P=0.369 
Size of incentive: large 
incentive compared to small 
incentive  
4.33  (1.02- 
18.31) 
P=0.047 
3.38 (1.07-10.64) 
P=0.037 
Perceived risk of not earning 
the incentive (Risk): low risk 
compared to high risk 
2.90 (0.78-
10.83) 
P=0.113 
0.61 (0.22-1.75) 
P=0.369 
Evaluation design: No 
adequate control group 
compared to RCTs or quasi-
experimental studies 
23.34 (6.28-
86.73) 
P<0.0001 
24.16 (6.31-
92.78) 
P<0.0001 
Variant 2 
(Second set 
of 
explanatory 
variables) 
Type: type A and B (with 
high/medium chance of 
effectiveness) compared to 
Type C (with low chance of 
effectiveness) 
 3.04 (1.04- 
11.76) 
P=0.042 
1.81 (0.63-4.14) 
P=0.225 
Evaluation: 18.49 
(4.94-69.19) 
p<0.0001 
 *Coding for this variable was inverted, making payment to individuals the reference group to aid interpretation 
of odds ratio (easier to interpret OR >1).  
 An Odds ratio (OR)  of >1 indicates the other group has a higher probability of being successful compared to the 
reference group 
 See Appendix D7 multifactorial model  
 
In Table 5.9, the regression coefficients in the logistic regression model are presented as 
odds ratio (OR), which is interpreted as If OR (X) >1, the odds of the having a 
statistically significant positive outcome is X times more than the reference group. Size 
of incentive (univariate model) shows the OR to be 4.33 (95% CI: 1.02- 18.31) 
P=0.047, meaning that the odds of having a significant positive outcome in P4P 
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schemes that paid large incentives was 4.33 times than schemes were small incentives 
were paid. In the same way, in the univariate model the OR for the variable ‘Risk’ was 
2.90 (95%CI: 0.78-10.83), which means that the odds of having a statistically 
significant positive outcome in P4P schemes in which the perceived risk of not earning 
the incentive was low was 2.9 times than P4P schemes where perceived risk of 
incentive is high. Similarly, the OR of the evaluation design was 23.34 (95%CI: 6.28-
86.73), meaning studies with no control groups were 23.34 times more likely to have a 
significant positive outcome compared to studies with an adequate control group (such 
as RCTs and quasi-experimental studies). Likewise, the OR of ‘type of scheme’ in the 
univariate logistic regression model was 3.04 (95%CI: 1.04- 11.76) P=0.042 means that 
the odds of type A and B incentive schemes (labelled high and medium chance of 
effectiveness) was 3.04 times more than type C incentives (labelled low chance of 
effectiveness). 
Table 5.10 Random effects parameters of the multilevel logistic regression model 
Random-effects 
parameters 
Estimate  Standard 
error 
95% CI 
P4P scheme   sd(_cons) 3.51e-08 0.62 0.00-0.00 
P4P study sd(_cons) 1.83 0.45 1.12-2.96 
sd(_cons): standard deviation at each level 
The results presented in Table 5.10 show the random effects parameters of the 
multilevel logistic regression model, which gives an indication of variation that is 
unaccounted for in the model through the standard deviations at each level. At the 
programme level, there appears to be no evidence of unexplained variation, but there is 
some evidence of some unexplained variation at the study level. A standard deviation of 
1.83 at the study level indicates that outcomes in an evaluated P4P study which is one 
standard deviation above the mean have odds of being effective 6.2 times higher than 
comparable outcomes in an average evaluated P4P study [exp (1.83) = 6.20].  
5.3.4. Sensitivity analyses 
Two major assumptions were made in this study. The first one was regarding decisions 
about selecting plausible correlation sizes to estimate a summary measure and variance 
for multiple outcomes within evaluations of P4P (see section 5.2.2.1). A correlation size 
of 0.75 was chosen for multiple outcomes in the same clinical area, while 0.5 was 
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selected for multiple outcomes in different clinical areas. I then performed the same 
analysis using calculations of slightly lower correlation values of 0.5 for multiple 
outcomes in the same clinical area, and 0.25 for multiple outcomes in different clinical 
areas. The results presented in Table 5.11, show the estimates of regression did not 
differ, though the 95% confidence intervals differed slightly, but did not lead to 
different conclusions (compared to those shown in Table 5.8). 
 
Table 5.11 Results for change in correlation values to account for multiple 
outcomes within schemes in the meta-regression model 
 Explanatory variables 
(Number of studies=36) 
SMD 
(univariate 
model) 
[95% CI]  
SMD 
(Multivariate 
model) [95% CI]  
Variant 1 
(First set of 
explanatory 
variable) 
Who receives the incentive: 
payment to groups compared to 
payment to individuals 
0.002 (-0.184, 
0.193) P= 
0.989 
-0.009 (-0.200, 
0.184) P= 0.925 
Size of incentive: large incentive 
compared to small incentive  
0.101 (-0.064, 
0.272) P=0.220 
0.116 (-0.077, 
0.309) P=0.229 
Perceived risk of not earning the 
incentive (Risk): low risk 
compared to high risk 
0.009 (-0.146, 
0.163) P=0.930 
0.002 (-0.202, 
0.139) P= 0.693 
Variant 2 
(Second set of 
explanatory 
variables) 
Type: type A and B (with 
high/medium chance of 
effectiveness) compared to Type 
C (with low chance of 
effectiveness) 
0.102  (-0.199, 
0.122) P=0.224 
0.099 (-0.074, 
0.276) P=0.288 
 
Evaluation: -0.020 
(-0.173, 0.142) 
P=0.834 
Outcome variable: P4P effect estimate (standardized mean difference) 
The second assumption was regarding the multilevel logistic regression model (model 
B), where I had to convert the outcome variable (estimate of effects) to a binary variable 
(whether P4P was effective of not). I classified outcomes that had statistically 
significant positive estimates as effective, while others (effect estimates that were 
statistically non-significant positive, statistically significant negative, and statistically 
non-significant negative) were classified as not effective. However, because failure to 
find a statistical significance estimate does not always mean the intervention is not 
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effective, as it might be due to low power (small sample size), I repeated the analysis, 
and this time classifying outcomes with statistically non-significant positive effects 
were classified as effective. The findings from the sensitivity analysis presented in 
Table 5.12 shows that there were no material changes to the results of the original 
model (compared to those shown in Table 5.9). 
 
Table 5.12 Results for change in categorisation of Binary outcomes in the 
multilevel logistic regression model 
 Explanatory variables 
(Number of studies=96)  
OR   
(univariate 
model) (95% 
CI)  
OR   
multivariate 
model)  (95% 
CI) 
Variant 1 
(First set of 
explanatory 
variable) 
 
Who receives the incentive: payment 
to groups compared to payment to 
individuals 
1.25  (0.31- 
5.89) 
P=0.756 
1.98 (0.72-
6.88) 
P=0.350 
Size of incentive: large incentive 
compared to small incentive  
4.24  (1.02- 
17.66) 
P=0.049 
3.36 (1.09-
10.88) 
P=0.039 
Perceived risk of not earning the 
incentive (Risk): low risk compared 
to high risk 
2.95 (0.78-9.86) 
P=0.113 
0.68 (0.22-
1.94) 
P=0.369 
Evaluation design: No adequate 
control group compared to RCTs or 
quasi-experimental studies 
23.22 (6.28-
85.73) 
P<0.0001 
24.09 (6.31-
90.76) 
P<0.0001 
Variant 2 
(Second set 
of 
explanatory 
variables) 
Type: type A and B (with 
high/medium chance of 
effectiveness) compared to Type C 
(with low chance of effectiveness) 
 3.01 (1.04- 
11.22) 
P=0.042 
1.9` (0.76-
4.87) 
P=0.229 
 
Evaluation: 
18.49 (4.43-
68.22) 
P<0.0001 
Outcome variable: P4P effect estimate (standardized mean difference) 
 
            Chapter 5: Exploring the heterogeneity of the results of evaluations of P4P in health care 
138 
 
5.4. Discussion  
This study presents results of an exploration of heterogeneity between incentive 
schemes in healthcare, showing how design features influence effectiveness of these 
schemes. The results show that there was evidence that some of the design features 
explored appeared to be significant predictors of the results of P4P (whether it was 
effective or not). In particular, the size of incentive appeared to be the most significant 
predictor (OR= 4.33 95%CI 1.02, 18.31). Furthermore, the findings suggest that P4P 
schemes evaluated without adequate control groups were likely to appear more effective 
compared to schemes evaluated with adequate controls. Finally, P4P schemes classified 
as type A or B using the developed typology (from chapter three) were more likely to be 
effective compared to type C schemes. 
In this section, first I outline the limitations and strengths of the study, after which I 
discuss the results of the study further. 
Study limitations 
This study had three main limitations. First, due to poor quality of reporting of details 
(of effect estimates, study sample sizes, and standard errors) in the evaluated P4P 
studies, 60 out of 96 studies were excluded from the meta-regression model, which led 
to loss of information. This problem was somewhat mitigated by adapting the outcomes 
variables of all 96 studies to binary (whether or not there was a statistically significant 
positive effect), thus allowing inclusion of all evaluated P4P studies in a multilevel 
logistic regression model. The problem with this, however, was that unlike the meta-
regression model, the logistic regression model does not take into consideration each 
study’s sample size (each is treated as a data point of equal weight), which is likely to 
affect precision of estimates. While this could have been accounted for by adjusting for 
the sample size in the multilevel model, this was difficult due to poorly reported studies. 
In addition, there is often the problem of selective reporting (of statistically significant 
effects) in evaluation studies multiple outcomes (Saini et al., 2014), which further 
creates uncertainty around the findings. However, since both the meta-regression and 
the multilevel regression analyses revealed similar trends, some confidence can be 
placed in the findings.  
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Second, the limited sample size combined with inclusion of multiple covariates 
(explanatory variables) simultaneously in the analyses could have led to low power to 
detect small effect sizes and the failure to find a statistically significant estimate (type 2 
error) especially in the meta-regression models (Borenstein et al., 2009). While 
researchers generally agree on this problem, there is no consensus on how to deal with 
it. Borenstein et al. (2009) suggest that failure to obtain a statistically significant effect 
for a covariate should never be interpreted as evidence that there is no relationship 
between the covariate and the effect size. Therefore, in this study, interpretation of 
results or measures of association between the covariates and effect size were 
interpreted with caution (as a trade-off between statistical significance and magnitude of 
effect), not following the usual simplistic approach of a 5% statistical significance cut 
off, as a p-value greater than 0.05 might mean that there was not a enough power to 
detect a statistically significant relationship, as opposed to no relationship between the 
covariates and the effect size.  
Third, it might have been worthwhile to explore the individual effects of the design 
features (timing of payment, domain of performance, and performance measure) that 
made up the compressed variable (‘risk’) in the typology. Nonetheless, these design 
features were considered to be captured to a certain extent in the quantitative 
exploration of the variable ‘risk’ in this study.   
Fourth, studies with poor methodological quality or poor evaluation designs were not 
excluded from the statistical analyses due to the limited number of studies. I however, 
included the method of evaluation design in the regression models, which adjusts to 
some extent for the possible bias, caused by lack of adequate control groups. 
 
Strengths  
This study had three major strengths. The first strength of this study is that it is the first 
study to systematically and statistically explore heterogeneity in P4P schemes in 
healthcare. 
Second, this study improves on previous narrative reviews because it gives insight to 
previously unexplored areas such as the proposed relative importance of these design 
features, and testing the predictive validity of the novel typology tool for categorising 
incentive schemes in healthcare.  
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Third, heterogeneity was explored using two methods of regression (meta-regression, 
and logistic regression), which presents a more robust way of exploring heterogeneity in 
the dataset.  
Therefore, the findings of this study, which are discussed in the following paragraphs, 
represent an advance in understanding some of the factors (design features) that 
influence the impact of P4P schemes. 
The findings of this study build on previous evidence in four major ways. 
First, there was evidence (weak) that some of the design features explored appeared to 
be significant predictors of whether P4P was effective in the multilevel logistic 
regression model (larger sample). Though in the meta-regression model, there was no 
statistically significant evidence of relationship between the effect estimates and the 
explanatory variables. This was likely as a result of low power due to small sample size 
(36), as discussed earlier. In addition, because the overall effect of P4P was small, the 
interactions/relationships between the outcome variable and the explanatory variables in 
the meta-regression are much smaller, which require large sample sizes to detect it.  
The odds of the P4P schemes with large incentives (>5%) having a significant positive 
outcome was 4.33 (1.02- 18.31) P=0.042 and the odds of the P4P schemes with low 
perceived risk of not earning the incentive having a significant positive outcome was 
2.90 (0.78-10.83) P=0.113 (not statistically significant at the 5% level). 
These findings regarding the ‘perceived risk of not earning the incentive’ are consistent 
with results from the review of reviews by Eijkenaar (2013), that found that incentive 
schemes were reported as more effective where there was the ‘perceived risk of not 
earning the incentive was low’, which were characterised by the following design 
features: smaller time lag between verification of performance and incentive payment, 
absolute measures compared to relative measure, and process domains of performance 
compared to outcome domains. However, evidence from reviews regarding the 
influence size of incentive was inconclusive, even though a few primary studies had 
reported a dose-response kind of relationship of the size of incentive with the impact of 
the scheme (Van Herck et al., 2010, Eijkenaar et al., 2013).   
On the other hand, the variable ‘who receives the incentive’ did not appear to have any 
association with the outcome variable of whether P4P was effective or not: OR= 1.32 
            Chapter 5: Exploring the heterogeneity of the results of evaluations of P4P in health care 
141 
 
(0.32- 5.54) P=0.703. This contradicts theory, which predicts that paying groups the 
incentive could bring about better performance than paying individuals because 
organisations are capable of promoting behaviour change in employees through a wide 
range of strategies e.g. better structures, improved supervision, enacting stricter 
guidelines and policies etc. (Stewart, 1998). A possible reason that the design feature 
‘who receives the incentive’ did not predict the outcome variable might be because in 
most P4P schemes where incentives were paid to groups, individual clinicians 
benefitted as well. So, it might be difficult to distinguish the singular effect to payment 
to groups alone and payment to individuals alone. This reflects the conclusions from 
two narrative reviews, which found that incentives aimed at the individual provider 
level and/or team level generally reported positive results compared to very large groups 
(Van Herck et al., 2010, Eijkenaar et al., 2013).  
An interesting observation was that some of the results in the univariate model were 
significantly different to the multivariate model, which is often an indication that some 
the variables are related (Hair et al., 2006, Flom, 2014). For example, in Table 5.9, the 
OR of the variable ‘who receives the incentive’ increases in the multivariate model, 
while the p-value reduces, which suggests that this variable is not closely related to the 
others in the model. On the other hand, the OR of the ‘size on incentive’ (p-value 
decreased) and the ‘perceived risk of not earning the incentive’ (p-value increased) 
decrease in the multivariate model, which suggest that these two variables might be 
closely related and their effects on the outcome variable are not independent of one 
another.  
 The relationship between the size of incentive and the perceived risk of not earning the 
incentive is logical. It is possible that large incentive sizes might offset the perceived 
risk of not earning the incentive. For example in situations where the incentive sizes are 
large (> 10% of salaries or usual budget), clinicians are likely more willing to take on a 
higher risk to earn the incentive. In other words, even though the perceived risk of not 
incentives might be high, the promise of a very large reward might still be enough to 
drive behaviour change. Furthermore, the perceived risk of not earning the incentive is 
likely not only affected by the design features (timing of payment, domain of 
performance, and performance measure), but also by context. For example, the 
perceived risk of not earning the incentive is likely to be much higher in contexts where 
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there does exist distrust in the payment system. Hence, the relative weight of the 
‘perceived risk of not earning the incentive’ might not be fully captured in this variable.  
The second major finding was that in all three design features explored, the size of 
incentive had the highest magnitude of effect in both models, which suggests that the 
size of the incentive may be one of the most important design features to consider for 
the effectiveness of P4P. The findings suggest that P4P schemes paying incentive of 5% 
and above of (clinician’s salary or hospital/group budget) are likely to be more effective 
compared to schemes paying small incentives of less than 5% of usual salary or budget. 
These findings reflect evidence from studies, which suggests that payment of incentive 
of 5% and above (of usual salary) results in a more effective P4P scheme (Chen et al., 
2011, Pope, 2011). Furthermore, theoretical literature suggests that large incentives 
might drive higher performance because of its potential to supplement clinician income 
and help reach what is known as the target income (Desquins et al., 2009, Evans, 1974) 
i.e. the larger the size of incentive, the higher the potential of reaching their target 
income, and the more the clinicians are willing to change behaviour and or improve 
performance. However, careful attention needs to be paid to the size of incentive 
because increasing size of incentive or paying large amounts might not necessarily bring 
about change in behaviour if the clinicians are already close or at their desired ‘target 
income’ (Desquins et al., 2009, Evans, 1974). Therefore, it might be worthwhile to 
explore the average target income of clinicians’ participating in P4P schemes on a case-
by-case basis, in order to explore the required/adequate size of incentive to motivate 
behaviour change and improve performance, while maximising returns.  
 
The third major finding in this study is that P4P schemes evaluated without an adequate 
control group appeared more likely to a positive or greater effect (OR=24.16 95%CI 
6.31, 92.78). The findings are in line with the body of literature that suggests that 
interventions evaluated with inadequate control groups (no RCT or no quasi-
experimental studies) are likely to over-estimate effect of incentive schemes in 
healthcare (Ireland et al., 2011, Shadish et al., 2002, Tilling et al., 2005). RCTs and 
quasi-experimental studies are likely to provide less biased estimates of the effect of 
interventions compared to studies with no adequate control groups. This is because 
adequate controls reduce biases due for example to additional funds or other quality 
improvement strategies (in the P4P context), which makes it difficult to disentangle the 
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effects of P4P. Studies with adequate control groups on the other hand, are able 
minimise the risk of bias, and the effect is often singularly as result of the intervention 
(Booth and Tannock, 2014, Higgins and Green, 2011).  
 Another factor surrounding evaluation of the incentives schemes that might influence 
the outcomes of the schemes, which was not explored in this study is the length of 
follow up. For example, the USA premier programme evaluated after two years of 
implementation demonstrated some positive results, while the same programme 
evaluated after five years demonstrated no significant positive impact when compared 
to non-incentive control groups (Jha et al., 2012, Lindenauer et al., 2007). These 
findings demonstrates the need for more rigorous evaluations, at different time points of 
incentive schemes in healthcare in order to have a clearer idea on the impact of the 
scheme on clinical effectiveness and sustainability of effect, and possibly, what happens 
after removal of the incentive. 
The fourth main finding in this study is that there was evidence that P4P schemes 
classified as type A or B using the developed typology (from chapter three) were more 
likely to be effective compared to type C schemes [OR= 3.04 (1.04- 11.76) P=0.042]. 
This suggests that the developed typology is useful in helping to explain sources of 
variation in outcome of the P4P schemes, and thus, could be a useful tool in predicting 
the outcomes of P4P schemes.  
The findings from this chapter that type A and B schemes (high/medium chance of 
effectiveness) were likely to be more effective than type C schemes (low chance of 
effectiveness) are consistent with the findings from theoretical exploration in chapter 
four. Type A and B schemes have two or three of the following features: incentives are 
paid to groups, large size of incentive, and low perceived risk of not earning the 
incentives, while type C schemes have one or less than one of the ‘desired’ design 
features i.e. payment is made to individuals as opposed to groups, small incentives as 
opposed to large, and perceived risk of not earning the incentive is high as opposed to 
low.  
Whist it is possible that the reason type A and B schemes appear to be more effective 
than type C schemes might be largely due to the effect of the large size of incentive (as 
it appeared to be the most significant predictor), these findings are in line with theory. 
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According to theory, paying incentives to groups instead of individuals is likely to lead 
to a more effective scheme because groups (or organizations) are probably able to set up 
good management structures to induce behaviour change (Trisolini, 2011). In the same 
way, large size of incentive will be more effective in improving performance compared 
to small incentive size because clinicians are more likely to change behaviour to achieve 
larger sizes of incentive because of the need to earn a desired income (Desquins et al., 
2009, Evans, 1974).  Finally, theory suggests that incentive schemes in healthcare are 
likely to work better if ‘perceived risk of not earning the incentive is low’. I.e. if two or 
more of the following features are present in the scheme: absolute performance measure 
instead of relative performance measure, short time lag between measurement of 
performance and payment of incentive, and domain of performance within the clinicians 
control (processes) instead of outside the clinicians control (outcomes).  
P4P schemes with minimal time lags between meeting the target and receipt of the 
incentive are more likely to show a higher positive behavioural response, because 
individuals are likely to do things that will bring about immediate rewards instead of 
reward in a years’ time, as individuals tend to place more value on incentives received 
soon after the behavioural change compared to the incentives received in the future 
(also known as pure time reference) (Price, 1993, Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992).  In the 
same way, improvements in processes are often seen as more easily achievable or at 
least under the control of the healthcare organization or clinician, compared with the 
health outcome measures, which are influenced by a variety of other factors less under 
the control of the health services. Therefore, outcome measures are likely to appear less 
effective than process measures, because even though the healthcare professional 
changes behaviour, it might not necessarily reflect in the final outcomes, as the patient 
usually needs to change behaviour as well to obtain the desired final outcome. For 
example, schemes incentivising clinicians for patient smoking cessation are less likely 
to be successful compared to schemes incentivising smoking cessation advice to 
patients because in the first scenario, the clinicians are aware that even if they provide 
the necessary smoking cessation advise, counselling and appropriate help to quit 
smoking to patients, it is mostly still up to the patient to quit smoking and it is likely 
that all their ‘hard work’ will not be recognised and rewarded. Therefore, it might not be 
worth the effort. Similarly, relative performance measures create greater uncertainty for 
individuals because their achievement depends on how well others do. Hence they may 
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be less motivated to invest to improve performance compared to absolute performance 
measures that are not dependent on how others perform. 
Other sources of variation in P4P schemes 
Exploration of three key design variables of P4P suggests that (1) size of incentive has 
the highest influence the results of P4P and (2) P4P schemes with combination of 
certain design features (such as payment of large incentive, payment of incentive to 
groups, and low risk of not earning the incentive) increases the schemes chances of 
effectiveness.  However, it is important to note that even a genuine difference between 
categories is not necessarily due to the essence of their classification (Borenstein et al., 
2009). This might be explained by some variation that was unaccounted for at the study 
level (variation other than design features of P4P that influences results) in the 
multilevel logistic regression model (as the findings suggest).  Study parameters such as 
setting, area of care, and target population of the health service(s) in question might 
influence the results of P4P. For example, an evaluation of a P4P scheme with outcomes 
relating to the management of asthma (mostly affecting children) and diabetes (mostly 
affecting middle age and the elderly) management might produce different results 
because they affect different populations. Furthermore, researchers hypothesize that a 
combination of design features, contexts, and implementation factors are all likely to 
influence the impact of P4P schemes. It is possible that P4P schemes with design 
features that increase the chance of effectiveness are likely to be well planned and 
implemented, which in turn means that it is possible that in most of the schemes where 
design features are favourable, the contextual and implementation factors are likely 
favourable as well. However, this might not necessarily be the case. For example, the 
‘risk of not earning the incentive’ (characterised in the P4P typology by certain design 
features such as timing of payment, domain of performance, and performance measure) 
might not have been fully captured by these design features, as other factors that might 
be context or implementation related could also influence the recipients risk of not 
earning the incentive (e.g. clinicians working in settings where there is low trust in the 
payment system might have higher level of risk or uncertainty associated with earning 
incentive, even if the design features suggest otherwise). Other examples of contextual 
and implementation factors that could P4P schemes include length of programme, 
clinician awareness of the incentive programme, hospital/health facility preparedness, 
healthcare system, provider/patient characteristics, dimension of care (prevention or 
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treatment or disease management), ownership of the scheme, communication within the 
programme, and degree of clinician inclusion in planning and implementing the 
incentive scheme (Eijkenaar et al., 2013, Van Herck et al., 2010, Stockwell, 2010, 
Pierce et al., 2007, Ssengooba et al., 2012). 
It is important that these contextual and implementation factors are investigated on a 
case-by-case basis because what might be a contextual issue in one country might not 
be an issue in another. 
 
5.5. What this chapter adds  
Emerging literature suggest that variation in design features of P4P might explain 
heterogeneous evaluation results and that certain design features might contribute to 
success of failure of P4P schemes. A few researchers have attempted to explore this 
narratively, with subjective and inconclusive results of what works and what does not 
(Stockwell, 2010, Eijkenaar, 2013). This study presents the first systematic and 
quantitative exploration of heterogeneity in P4P schemes in healthcare (using the 
theoretical typology developed in chapter three); the findings of which represent early 
strides towards the understanding of how design features influence the impact of P4P 
schemes. The findings suggest that P4P schemes with a combination of certain design 
features are likely to be more successful than others. These design features include 
payment of large incentive (>5% of salary or usual budget), payment of incentive to 
‘groups’ (hospitals, clinical groups etc., where individual clinicians may benefit from 
the incentive), and payment of incentive in which the risk is perceived as low from the 
perspective of the recipient (meaning the recipients think are likely to get the incentive 
if they change their behaviour). This study also suggests the potential usefulness of the 
P4P typology in predicting outcomes, in addition to it being a tool to help categorise 
and think about incentive schemes in healthcare. These findings are valuable in 
informing design choices for developing and implementing incentive schemes in 
different contexts, as P4P scheme developers in health care can pay careful attention to 
designing schemes using the typology as a guide for choosing suitable design features 
that are likely to enhance effectiveness. Though there is the need to produce more 
rigorous and better reporting of evaluations of upcoming P4P schemes to aid further test 
the hypothesis of design choices affecting the impact if the scheme. In addition, there is 
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the need to explore other sources of variation in P4P such as contextual and 
implementation that may influence P4P results, which serve as the basis for the second 
part of this thesis (where I explore the influence of contextual and implementation 
factors on a P4P scheme in Nigeria). 
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Chapter 6 The Nigerian Health System 
6.0. Introduction  
In the first part of this thesis, I examined the effectiveness of P4P schemes to improve 
quality of health care by way of a narrative review and a meta-analysis. Evidence from 
the literature review on the impact of incentive schemes were mixed and emerging 
literature suggested that effectiveness was linked with the design features of the scheme, 
contexts, and implementation. The pooled estimate of the meta-analysis revealed that 
the incentive schemes in health care has a statistically significant small positive effect 
on improving quality of health care, with substantial heterogeneity between the pooled 
studies. 
 
I progressed by exploring this heterogeneity by investigating the influence of design 
features on the effectiveness of the schemes. First, I developed and tested a theoretical 
typology to categorise P4P schemes based on their design features. After demonstrating 
the reliability of the P4P typology, I then used regression models to explore to 
investigate the influence of P4P design features on the impact or effectiveness of the 
P4P schemes (with the help of the P4P typology). This exploratory analyses revealed 
that while certain ‘types’ (characterised by payment to groups, payment of large 
incentive sizes, and low risk of earning the incentive) of P4P schemes are likely to have 
better chances of effectiveness, there remains still heterogeneity which might be 
explained by other factors related to context and implementation. These factors were not 
captured in the typology because they are often setting specific and acquiring 
knowledge about such factors often requires preliminary qualitative work that is often 
not carried out or reported in evaluated P4P schemes. 
 
In this part of the thesis, I explore the influence of contextual and implementation 
factors on the impact of a new P4P scheme in Nigeria. This was introduced in 2011 as a 
strategy to improve maternal and child health outcomes by incentivising health service 
providers to improve quality and increase utilisation of basic maternal and child health 
service in primary health care facilities. It was implemented in three out of 36 States: 
Ondo, Nassarawa, and Adamawa.  
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The choice of this case study was driven by a rationale to contribute and improve a 
newly introduced P4P scheme (in its early stages of implementation) in a low and 
middle-income country (LMIC), where the evidence base of P4P is sparse. As a result, 
the main focus of the study was to harness the findings of my research to improve the 
effectiveness of the scheme (a formative evaluation) (Øvretveit, 1998).  
 
This part of the thesis is comprised of four chapters. Chapters 6 and 7 focus on the 
strategic and operational context of the P4P scheme in Nigeria, both of which are 
important for the providing the background to the formative evaluation of the scheme. 
Chapter 8 focuses on the rationale and methods employed to conduct the formative 
evaluation. Finally, chapter 9 presents and discusses the findings of the study, considers 
the strengths and weakness of the study, and draws out the implications for policy and 
research of P4P in Nigeria.  
 
In this chapter, I provide an overview of the Nigerian health system. I describe the 
extent of the issues in the health system, such as poor maternal and child health 
indicators, poor quality of healthcare, low utilisation of care, and significant health 
inequalities. I then, move on to discuss previous health reforms implemented to tackle 
the health care issues and their impact on maternal and child health outcomes (drawing 
out core underlying challenges of the health system). Finally, I discuss the introduction 
of P4P to the Nigerian health system and consider how this approach attempts to 
address the health system challenges. This chapter is largely informed by government 
documents, country reports, and project documents from international organisations 
such as The World Bank and the World Health Organisation (WHO)
12
.     
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 Data from these organisations often supplements the lack of reliable data in the government bodies in 
Nigeria. 
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6.1. Country overview and organization of the Nigerian healthcare 
system  
Nigeria has a population of almost 169 million, with a growth rate of 6.5%, fertility rate 
of 5.13 children born per woman, with 68% of the population living on less than $1.25 
per day in 2012 (The World Bank, 2013). Nigeria has three tiers of government (the 
Federal, State, and Local Governments) consisting of 36 States (and the Federal Capital 
Territory), which has 774 local government areas (LGA) (National Bureau of Statistics, 
2011). These three tiers of government share the responsibilities of providing public 
health services in Nigeria (see Figure 6.1).  
The Federal Government handles health affairs through the Federal Ministry of Health 
(FMOH), which is funded by 50% of the total annual country budget allocated to health 
expenditures. The FMOH is responsible for health policy reforms, provision of 
technical support to the health system as a whole, and the provision of health services 
through 71 tertiary and teaching hospitals across the nation (Scott-Emuakpor, 2010, 
Abimbola et al., 2012).  
The State Government through the State Ministry of Health (SMOH) is responsible for 
providing health services through the State hospitals, which is funded by 25% of the 
total annual country budget allocated to health expenditures. These State hospitals 
include general and specialist hospitals, which are responsible for treatment and 
management of complicated diseases. The SMOH also provides technical support to the 
next level of government which is the local government area(s) within each State 
(Abimbola et al., 2012, WHO, 2013, National Bureau of Statistics, 2011). 
The Local Government Areas (LGAs) through the primary healthcare department are 
responsible for primary healthcare (PHC) services, which is funded by 25% of the total 
annual country budget allocated to health expenditures (Abimbola et al., 2012, WHO, 
2013, National Bureau of Statistics, 2011). The PHC facilities serve as the first point of 
contact for basic healthcare services, preventive care, community health hygiene, and 
sanitation. There are 22,000 PHC facilities in Nigeria within 5 km of 71% of most 
households,  (Abimbola et al., 2012, Abdulraheem et al., 2012) , which reflect a uniform 
and sufficient distribution according to the World Health Organisation (WHO, 2013). 
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Figure 6.1 Structure and function(s) of the Nigerian healthcare system 
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6.2. Health system challenges  
The Nigerian health care system is characterised by poor health outcomes especially in 
the areas of maternal and child health , despite evidence of cost effective interventions 
(Abimbola et al., 2012). There are also significant inequalities between urban and rural 
areas. In addition, public health facilities are underutilised and the quality of health 
services delivered is poor. I discuss the challenges below.  
6.2.1. Health status overview (child and maternal health) 
Over one million children (under five) die annually in Nigeria (second highest in the 
world after India), a mortality of 130 per 1000 live births. In addition Nigeria has the 
fifth highest maternal mortality rate (630 per 100,000 live births) in the world (The 
World Bank, 2013).  About 70% of the causes of under-five deaths and maternal deaths 
are preventable and/or easily treatable (Hogan et al., 2014, Ebeigbe, 2013, Khan et al., 
2006). These include conditions such as pneumonia, diarrhoea, malaria, measles, 
HIV/AIDS, pre-term birth, birth asphyxia, and infections for child deaths; and 
conditions such as anaemia, HIV, ectopic pregnancies, haemorrhage, sepsis, abortions, 
obstructed labour, and hypertensive disorders for maternal deaths (see Figure 6.2). 
Studies have shown that access to antenatal care (ANC), skilled birth attendant (SBA), 
and postnatal care (PNC) can reduce maternal and neonatal mortality by up to 60% 
(Smaill and Hofmeyr, 2002, Hogan et al., 2014, Duley et al., 2003, Yakoob and Bhutta, 
2011). Similarly, access to basic health care for treatments of ailments such as malaria, 
diarrhoea, and access to vaccines can reduce child deaths by up to 80% (Jones et al., 
2003, Bhutta et al., 2003, Eisele et al., 2012). 
In the Nigerian health system, the PHC facilities are responsible for providing services 
to treat a majority of the causes of maternal and child deaths. These PHC facilities are 
uniformly distributed across Nigeria (WHO, 2013). However, there has been no 
decrease in maternal or child deaths (Abimbola et al., 2012, Abdulraheem et al., 2012). 
This might be as a result of low utilisation and (or) poor quality of health services in the 
Nigerian PHC facilities, which are discussed in the next sections.  
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Figure 6.2 Sources of maternal and child deaths in Nigeria (Hogan et al., 2014). 
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6.2.2. Distribution of utilisation of maternal and child health services in Nigeria   
Evidence from Demographic and Health Surveys from 1990-2008 indicate that there 
was only a limited increase over time in the use of maternal and child health services. 
Figure 6.3 shows that since 2003, there have been modest improvements in childhood 
immunizations and treatment of pneumonia, whilst use of other services such as 
diarrhoeal disease treatment, antenatal care, and skilled birth attendance has slightly 
declined (National Population Commission, 2009, National Bureau of Statistics, 2011, 
Nigeria count down to 2015, 2012).  
 
About two thirds of the children aged 12-23 months had received BCG (tuberculosis 
vaccine) by 12 months, but only 43% received the recommended three doses of DPT 
(diphtheria and pertussis (whooping cough) and tetanus toxoid). About 46% received 
the third dose of polio vaccine, 49% coverage for measles and 40% coverage for the 
yellow fever vaccine was achieved. This suggests that about half of the population of 
who require these maternal and child health services receive them. Furthermore, 
evidence from the National Bureau of Statistics showed that around 58% of women 
(aged between 15-49 years) with a live birth(s) received ANC at least once by a skilled 
personnel and 39% of pregnant women (aged 15-49 years) births were attended by 
skilled personnel.  
 
In the subsequent sections, I consider some of the reasons for low utilisation of maternal 
and public health services, such as health inequalities, cost of health care, and quality of 
health services.  
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Figure 6.3 Utilisation of maternal and child health services in Nigeria (Source: 
Nigeria countdown to 2015, 2012) 
 
 
                                                                                                     Chapter 6: The Nigerian Health System 
156 
 
6.2.3. Health inequalities  
The country level statistics presented in the previous section hide variations in health 
outcomes and indicators in Nigeria. There are significant disparities in health outcomes 
between rural and urban, despite similarities in government expenditure in healthcare 
(National Bureau of Statistics, 2011, Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2010). For example, 
under-five mortality in rural areas exceeds 180 per 1,000, while it is less than 110 per 
1,000 in urban areas (see Figure 6.4). Also, the infant mortality rate in urban areas is 68 
per 1000 births compared to 110 per 1000 in the rural areas (National Bureau of 
Statistics, 2011). In the same way, utilization of maternal and child health services are 
often lower in rural areas where the poorest of Nigerians reside (National Bureau of 
Statistics, 2011). 
  
Figure 6.4 Inequalities in health outcomes and health service utilisation (National 
Bureau of Statistics, 2011) 
 
Health service researchers have argued that the poor and unequal utilisation of the 
maternal and child health services in Nigeria stems from two key factors: cost of health 
care and perceived quality of care by the public (Gustafsson-Wright and van der Gaag, 
2008, Fapohunda and Orobaton, 2014, Abdulraheem et al., 2012), which I now discuss. 
6.2.4. Cost of health care  
Nigeria’s budget for healthcare in 2010 was around 6% of the total annual budget of the 
country, which amounted to approximately US $5 per capita government expenditure 
on health (compared to a total of US $60 per capita expenditure on health). This 
government expenditure on health falls short of the World Health Organization’s 
recommendation of 15 percent or (US $14 per capita government expenditure on health) 
for developing countries (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2010, Xu et al., 2010). 
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Furthermore, due to the decentralized nature of the health care system in Nigeria (see 
section 6.1), PHC (catering to about 70% of the population) is allocated less than 1.5% 
of the total country budget, most of which goes towards payment of salaries of the 
health workers in the PHC facilities (Abimbola et al., 2012, National Bureau of 
Statistics, 2011). Consequently, over 80% of healthcare expenditure (mostly going 
towards the purchase of drugs and payment of government set service fees) in Nigeria 
comes from out-of-pocket spending. This means individuals or households have to pay 
for health care/services, which is often a limiting factor especially for the poor or rural 
dwellers in accessing and utilising basic health services, (Riman and Akpan, 2012, 
Emmanuel et al., 2013, Abdulraheem et al., 2012, Lawanson et al., 2012). 
6.2.5. Current state of maternal and child health services (quality of healthcare)  
Most of the PHC facilities in Nigeria lack basic equipment, essential drugs, and proper 
infrastructure, due to insufficient funding, and lack of strategic planning and allocation 
of resources (Abdulraheem et al., 2012). While the Federal and State health institutions 
tend to have good drug and equipment supply, the reverse is often the case in the PHC 
facilities (Abimbola et al., 2012).  
About half of the PHC facilities in Nigeria have less than half of the essential drugs (to 
treat diarrhoea, malaria, anaemia, sepsis etc.), as defined by the WHO. The PHCs also 
lack basic equipment such as weighing scales, centrifuges, laboratory equipment, and 
stethoscopes (Akinwale, 2010, Abdulraheem et al., 2012). In addition, most of the 
health facilities lack basic infrastructure such as running water, ‘flush toilets’ and 
adequate beds (Akinwale, 2010). This is because there are often barely any funds left 
after payment of salaries of the health workers(Akinwale, 2010, Abdulraheem et al., 
2012). 
Furthermore, health workers assigned to these PHC facilities are often poorly motivated 
due to delays in low salary payments (sometimes lasting for months), exacerbated by 
the poor state of the PHC facilities (Akinwale, 2010, Akinyemi and Atilola, 2013). This 
in turn leads to high health worker absenteeism at the PHC facilities (despite a 
minimum of three trained health workers including nurses, skilled birth attendants, 
community health workers, and lab technicians attached to each PHC) (NPHCDA, 
2012). Most health workers engage in other activities to supplement their income, 
which includes selling essential drugs at high prices to the patients (to make a profit), so 
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making it unaffordable for most users (Akwataghibe et al., 2013). Consequently, the 
combination of perceived low quality of healthcare by the users and the ‘high’ cost of 
health care contributes to the poor utilisation of the PHC facilities (Emmanuel et al., 
2013). In addition, some patients rely on ‘traditional healers’ or quacks who sell 
counterfeit drugs (cheaper than the original brands) (Garuba et al., 2009, Akinyandenu, 
2013).  
Having described the main causes of poor utilisation of care and poor maternal and 
child health outcomes, I now summarise and discuss the health reforms that have been 
adopted in recent years (before the introduction of P4P in 2011) to improve the health 
outcomes. 
 
6.3 Past Health Reforms  
The FMOH has implemented several healthcare reforms since 2000 to attempt to 
improve maternal and child health outcomes. This aimed to meet the health related 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of two-thirds reduction in under-five mortality 
rate and three-quarters reduction of maternal mortality ratio by 2015. These reforms 
include the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), National Immunization 
Coverage Scheme (NICS), Midwives Service Scheme (MSS), and most recently the 
Nigerian P4P scheme in 2009 (Welcome, 2011, Wagstaff et al., 2006, Haddon, 2013, 
Uneke et al., 2013). In this section, I summarise these reforms, highlighting their 
objectives and the approaches implemented to improve utilisation of basic maternal and 
child health services.  
6.3.1. National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) 
The NHIS was set up in 1999 operating as public-private partnership with the aim of 
providing accessible, affordable and quality healthcare for all Nigerians (National 
Health Insurance Scheme, 2012). The main approach of the NHIS is to bear some of the 
financial risk of incurring healthcare expenses, thereby reducing the cost of healthcare 
(service and drug fees) in a bid to improve equitable access to health services (National 
Health Insurance Scheme, 2012, Oyekale and Eluwa, 2009). 
The NHIS is funded primarily by contributions from members of the scheme based on 
their income. For those employed formally, premiums are up to 15% of an individual’s 
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basic salary (the employer contributes 10% and 5% comes from the employee), which 
covers their spouse and up to four children. Members of the NHIS employed informally 
(mostly in the rural areas) pay a monthly flat rate payment not related to income, which 
is meant to cover basic health care (Ilesanmi et al., 2014, Oyekale and Eluwa, 2009). 
However, only 3% of the Nigerian population was insured in 2012, most of whom were 
formally employed individuals residing in urban areas. This suggests that the scheme 
did not reach the poor and those in rural areas where health outcomes are the worst, due 
to low willingness to pay premiums as a result of the poverty levels in most households 
(Oyekale and Eluwa, 2009, Ilesanmi et al., 2014, Ebeigbe, 2013, National Health 
Insurance Scheme, 2012). This suggests that to improve the uptake of NHIS among the 
poor and rural dwellers, a pro-poor approach is needed. An example of this approach is 
the National Health Insurance Scheme implemented by the Rwanda Government in 
2000, in which the government identified and paid premiums for the poorest who could 
not afford it. This resulted in 97% coverage by 2010 and a tripled increase in health 
service utilizations (Dhillon et al., 2012, Nyandekwe et al., 2014).  
6.3.2. National Immunization Coverage Scheme (NICS) 
The NICS was launched in 2001 to improve child health outcomes. The goal of the 
NICS was to reduce the occurrence of the deadly diseases (e.g. tuberculosis, 
poliomyelitis, diphtheria, whopping cough, tetanus, and measles) through an increase in 
routine immunisation coverage and the provision of vaccines and supplies (Abanida, 
2012, The Complete Laws of Nigeria, 1997).  
The NICS is a simple input based financing scheme where the FMOH supports the 
SMOH and the LGAs in their immunization services by supplying them with vaccines, 
needles, syringes, cold chain equipment and other logistics required for routine 
immunizations (Abanida, 2012). Since the scheme was introduced, routine 
immunization of children increased from about 40% in 2001 to 68% in 2010. 
6.3.3. Midwives Service Scheme (MSS) 
The National Primary Health Care Development Agency (NPHCDA) under the 2009 
Appropriation Act implemented the midwives service scheme (MSS) in 2009, which 
was specifically aimed at increasing coverage of Skilled Birth Attendance (SBA) in 
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rural areas to reduce maternal, new-born and child mortality (Abimbola et al., 2012, 
Federal Government of Nigeria, 2011). 
 
The MSS is a collaborative effort between the three tiers of government in Nigeria, 
which provided monetary incentives for midwives willing to relocate to rural health 
facilities. Usual monthly salaries (average of $350) of midwives mobilised to 
selected facilities were supplemented with $100 by the State government and an 
addition $150 by the federal government (Abimbola et al., 2012, Federal 
Government of Nigeria, 2011). 
 
The PHC facilities were selected using rigorous criteria, which included hard-to-
reach areas or among underserved populations, availability of potable water supply 
and basic minimum equipment and laboratory diagnostic facilities for maternal and 
child health conditions (Abimbola et al., 2012, Federal Government of Nigeria, 
2011). 
 
As of July 2010, 2,622 midwives had been deployed to 652 PHCs in rural areas. 
Preliminary results (outcomes in 2010 compared to previous year) show some increase 
in maternal health services such as family planning visits, pregnant women with new 
ANC visits and those with at least four ANC visits, facility-based deliveries, and the 
number of women receiving two or more doses of tetanus vaccine (see Figure 6.5).  
 
ANC: antenatal 
care                      
TT: tetanus 
vaccines                    
FP: family 
planning 
                                     
 
 
              
Figure 6.5 Change in utilisation of maternal health services (Abimbola et al., 2012) 
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There has also been an overall corresponding reduction in maternal and neonatal deaths 
in the MSS health facilities from 2009 to 2010. Maternal mortality rate (MMR) in 2010 
was 572 compared to 789 per 100,000 live births for the same period in 2009 and 
neonatal mortality rate (NMR) in the same period in 2010 was 9.3 per 1,000 compared 
to 10.97 per 1,000 live births for the same period in 2009 (see figure 6.6). 
                            
NE: north east, NW: northwest, NC: north central, SS: south south, SE: south east, SW: south west 
Figure 6.6 Change in Maternal mortality rates (MMR) and Neonatal mortality 
rates (NMR) (Abimbola et al., 2012) 
However, the overall decreases in maternal and neonatal deaths were not uniform across 
the six regions in Nigeria as seen in Figure 6.6. The MMR  actually increased in the 
North East and South East region, while NMR increased in all except two regions 
(North central and South-South) that showed dramatic reduction when compared to the 
previous year. The lack of improvement in MMR and/or NMR in specific zones may 
have been due to an increase in the proportion of high-risk deliveries in the midwives 
service scheme (MSS) PHC facilities (Abimbola et al., 2012). Findings from process 
evaluation of the MSS suggest that the overall limited improvements of utilisation of 
care and decrease in maternal and child deaths was mainly due to the persistent 
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challenge of inadequate government spending at the PHC facilities (see section 6.2.5). 
This often resulted in lack of essential drugs and lifesaving equipment  like antibiotics 
for sepsis treatment and vacuum extractor for obstructed labour (Okoli et al., 2012, 
Abimbola et al., 2012).  
6.4. Evidence of the impact of past health reforms on maternal and 
child health outcomes  
There are no published formal evaluations of the above mentioned these reforms apart 
from the interim evaluation of the MSS described earlier. This is because of the weak 
monitoring and evaluation capacity in Nigeria (Igbokwe-Ibeto, 2012, Society for 
monitoring and evaluation Nigeria, 2012). The impact of the reforms is therefore 
assessed by the progress of meeting the MDG targets of reduction of maternal mortality 
ratio by three-quarters and reduction of child mortality by two-thirds by 2015 (Wagstaff 
et al., 2006, Nigeria count down to 2015, 2012). 
Overall, child mortality (under-five) has reduced from 213 deaths per 1,000 live births 
in 1990 to 143 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2010. Maternal deaths have also decreased 
from 1100 deaths per 100,000 live births in 1990 to 630 deaths per 100,000 live births 
in 2010 (see Figure 6.7) (Nigeria count down to 2015, 2012).  
 
Figure 6.7 Reduction of Child and Maternal mortality rates in Nigeria (Nigeria 
count down to 2015, 2012) 
There has been a gradual reduction in maternal and child deaths over the years in 
Nigeria. However, the rate of decline to meet the MDG targets is small compared to 
other African countries such as Rwanda (see Figure 6.8) where under 5 morality rates is 
very close to meeting the MDG target of reduction by two-thirds (from 151 to 55 per 
1000 births), and maternal morality ratio has decreased from 1400 to 320 per live births 
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(past the MDG targets) (see figure 6.8).  The improvements in maternal and child health 
outcomes in Rwanda might be attributable to the pro-poor approach that has been taken 
by the government to insure over 90% of the population, and other quality improvement 
strategies such as P4P in order to strengthen its health system and ensure access to basic 
maternal and child health services (Dhillon et al., 2012, Basinga et al., 2011). 
 
 
Figure 6.8 Reduction in child and maternal mortality rates in Rwanda 
 
6.5. Failure of past health reforms to meet MDG health targets in 
Nigeria 
In the preceding sections, I have identified some of the reasons why these reforms have 
not sufficiently increased utilisation of health care and health outcomes to correspond 
closely to the MDG targets. These include inadequate government spending on primary 
health care, low willingness to pay insurance premiums especially by the poor and rural 
dwellers, poor quality of healthcare (lack of infrastructure and equipment), and low 
health worker motivation. However, central to the persisting challenges in the Nigerian 
health system are core underlying factors that these reforms have failed to effectively 
address such as misappropriation of funds, poor governance, and lack of transparency 
and accountability (Welcome, 2011, Haddon, 2013, Uneke et al., 2013), which I now 
outline. 
6.5.1. Misappropriation of funds (lack of transparency) in the Nigerian health 
system 
The problem of insufficient government spending on healthcare identified in preceding 
sections is made worse by misappropriation of funds and resource leakage. In 2008 
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Nigeria was ranked 121 out of 180 countries on the corruption perception index 
(Transparency International, 2008). In addition, there is substantial evidence that 
suggests that the annual health budgets drawn do not correlate with actual health 
expenditures (Nair, 2012, Mohammed, 2013, NPHCDA, 2012, Umukoro, 2012, Eno, 
2010). This corruption takes on different forms in the health system, such as 
overpayments for supplies (ignoring competitive bidding) and payment of salaries to 
‘ghost’ health workers (non-existent individuals put on the payroll in PHC facilities) 
(McCoy et al., 2008, Health Systems, 2012, Umukoro, 2012). Thus, reducing healthcare 
funding, translating into drug and equipment shortages, poor infrastructure, and delayed 
salary payments to health workers at primary health care facilities.  
6.5.2. Poor governance and Lack of accountability  
The issue of poor governance and lack of accountability in the health system is one of 
the disadvantages of the decentralized nature of the health care system in Nigeria. 
Whilst there are clear responsibilities between the different levels of government in the 
health system, there is often duplication of roles and responsibilities. This leads to 
weaknesses in coordination, performance tracking, supervision, and monitoring, 
generally resulting in poor performance in the healthcare services delivery (Khemani, 
2004, Abimbola et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, there are no formal mechanisms by which health service users in the 
community can hold the providers (PHC facilities) accountable for provision and access 
of quality health services. There is also lack of accountability on expenditure and or 
performance of the PHCs to the Local government (Lawanson et al., 2012, Partnerships 
for Transforming Health Systems, 2009). The consequences of this at the PHC facilities 
include poor record keeping and poor transmission of information through the health 
systems leading to poor allocation of resources and lack of feedback to the PHC 
facilities (from the Local and State Government, service users) (Partnerships for 
Transforming Health Systems, 2009, NPHCDA, 2012). 
As a result of the multiple underlying challenges outlined, researchers and policy 
makers have argued that in order to accelerate the improvements of health outcomes, 
there is a need for a multifaceted pro-poor approach that has the potential of addressing 
the core persisting problems in the Nigerian health care system (Ilesanmi et al., 2014, 
Oyekale and Eluwa, 2009, Okoli et al., 2012, Ebeigbe, 2013). This led to the 
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introduction of P4P in Nigeria (NPHCDA, 2012, Nair, 2011). In the next section, I 
summarise the main P4P scheme, the focus of this research (a detailed description 
follows in chapter seven). I also outline how it aims to address the underlying 
challenges of the Nigerian health system using a multifaceted approach.  
 
6.6. P4P as a strategy to improve the Nigerian healthcare system 
There have been a few P4P schemes introduced to the Nigerian health system 
(NPHCDA, 2012). In this thesis I focus on ‘The Nigerian P4P Scheme’, which is a large 
scale scheme implemented by a FMOH Parastatal: National Primary Health Care 
Development Agency (NPHCDA). 
 
I initially considered focusing on a different P4P scheme implemented by an 
international non-governmental organisation: ‘Save The Children’. This P4P scheme 
also aimed to improve uptake of maternal and child health services by incentivising 
health service providers in Nigeria. However, due to terrorist attacks in States (Katsina, 
Kano, Kaduna, and Zamfara) where the scheme was being implemented, the project was 
put on hold. Hence the focus of this research shifted to the Nigerian P4P scheme, which 
was implemented in three States (Ondo, Nasarawa, and Adamawa). It was considered 
that since both schemes were similar, and implemented in similar contexts, lessons 
learnt from this research could be applied to the ‘Save The Children’ P4P scheme if 
implementation resumes. 
 
The Nigerian P4P scheme was introduced as a pilot scheme that incentivises health 
facilities in rural areas (pro-poor approach) in three selected States in Nigeria for 
verified health services (output based) and quality structures such as hygiene and 
general management. The Nigerian P4P scheme was implemented in December 2011 
(to continue until 2018) (NPHCDA, 2012). 
 
The proposal for the introduction of P4P in Nigeria was led by a senior health specialist 
in 2009 at The World Bank funded by a loan of 150 million US dollars. This represents 
an influx of additional funds (to a previously underfunded sector), with up to 100 
million USD going towards payment of incentives in PHC facilities in the three selected 
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States over a period of six years, while the remainder of the funds go towards technical 
support and incentives to LGAs and SMOH (NPHCDA, 2012, Nair, 2011).  
 
The World Bank’s rationale for the introduction of this P4P scheme in the Nigerian 
context was twofold. First, the agency theory that offers the use of incentives as one of 
the strategies to align the interests of both the principal (purchaser of health care: 
NPHCDA) and the agent (healthcare provider: PHC facilities) (described in detail in 
chapter one). Second, the evidence of the effectiveness of P4P schemes in improving 
quality and utilisation of maternal and child health services in similar LMICs such as 
Rwanda and Tanzania (Nair, 2012, NPHCDA, 2012).  However, as demonstrated in the 
review of reviews in chapter two, the evidence of effectiveness of P4P schemes in 
different countries is mixed (including Rwanda and Tanzania), and it is likely dependent 
on designs (size of incentive, who receives the incentive etc.), contexts (implications of 
which are discussed in the next chapter), and evaluation design (Van Herck et al., 2010, 
Witter et al., 2012, Canavan et al., 2008). In addition, P4P could also have unintended 
consequences, such as falsification of records and neglect of incentivised activities 
(Gravelle et al., 2008, Doran et al., 2011). Therefore, the implementation of P4P in 
Nigeria should be with careful consideration. It is important to note that whilst P4P has 
the potential to improve quality of care, it needs to be implemented using optimal 
design features and contextual conditions and evaluated with adequate control groups.  
 
Outlined below are the means by which the incentives could be used to align the 
interests of the PHC facilities (health service providers) and that of the NPHCDA 
(purchaser). This would address the underlying core challenges that limit utilisation and 
quality of maternal and child health services at PHC facilities.  
 Increased funding/influx of new funds, which could reduce cost of health care 
through subsidised user fees and drug fees using part of the incentives earned for 
health services provided (pay for service). 
 Increased health worker motivation through monthly bonuses to supplement 
salaries, leading to reduction in health worker absenteeism at duty posts.  
 Improvement in quality of health services delivered: the PHC facilities have 
immediate direct access to the incentives earned, thereby increasing resources to 
purchase essential drugs, equipment, and improve infrastructure, as opposed to 
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usual government funding that may be embezzled before reaching the PHC 
facilities.  
 Improvement in proper allocation and management of resources, achieved 
through the autonomy given to the PHC facilities in utilising the incentives 
earned (the Local or State Government have no control on how the incentives 
are used, this would be determined by the health facility manager). This should 
reduce corruption/embezzlement and allow the funds to be used in ways that the 
health facility managers see fit to improve the quality of health services (e.g. 
purchase of TV sets or provision of alternative power supply to ensure proper 
running of the health facilities).   
 Strengthening accountability, transparency, and good governance 
simultaneously, through incentives paid to the LGA and SMOH for independent 
verification of health services delivered and reported by the PHC for incentive 
payment. This would curtail falsification of data (corruption associated with 
P4P). Verification of spending and audit trails at the PHC facilities and monthly 
supervision and monitoring of the quality of care provided by the PHC facilities 
(through community validation of facility performance and feedback) would 
strengthen accountability. 
 
6.7. Summary  
In this chapter, I have described the elements of the Nigerian health system, the 
challenges, previous health reforms, and the context surrounding the introduction of the 
Nigerian P4P scheme. I have also outlined the potential of the P4P scheme to address 
the core challenges that previous reforms have not been effective at addressing. 
However, P4P or the use of incentives to improve quality and efficiency of healthcare is 
not a panacea, as evidence from previous chapters suggests a range of impact from no 
effect to very effective schemes. Furthermore, findings from previous chapters suggests 
that important to the effectiveness of P4P schemes are design choices, contexts and 
implementation. In the next chapter, I describe and review the design features of the 
Nigerian P4P scheme on the PHC operational level. I also review and discuss the 
preliminary results of the P4P scheme taking into account context and implementation, 
before going on to carry out a formative evaluation to explore the influence of context 
and implementation on P4P.
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Chapter 7 Overview of the Nigerian P4P Scheme 
In the previous chapter, I have explained the P4P scheme in the Nigerian health system 
was developed to improve the quality and utilisation of basic health services. The 
rationale for using the P4P approach is to motivate the health workers either by 
supplementing their income through bonuses, and or using the incentive to improve 
infrastructure, drugs, and equipment, if targets are achieved. 
In this chapter, I describe the design, implementation, and preliminary findings of the 
Nigerian P4P scheme. 
This chapter is largely informed by project documents (implementation manual and 
reports) and informal interviews with some of the scheme implementers and designers 
at the World bank and NPHCDA.  
 
I commence by describing the aim of the scheme and the implementation context, 
detailing: phases of the programme, funding, and the project sites. I then describe the 
design features using the typology developed in chapter three. Finally, I conclude the 
chapter by reviewing the preliminary results of the incentive scheme.  
The incentive scheme described in this chapter is referred to as the Nigerian P4P 
scheme throughout the thesis. 
7.1 Aim of the Nigerian P4P scheme 
The main aim of the Nigerian P4P scheme is to increase the delivery and utilisation of 
high impact maternal and child health services and to improve the quality of primary 
care at selected health facilities in the participating States (NPHCDA, 2012). 
7.2. Phases of the Nigerian P4P Scheme  
The P4P programme spans across eight years (July 2010- June 2018), and consists of 
three phases: pre-implementation, pre-pilot, and pilot (Nair, 2011). 
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7.2.1. Pre-Implementation phase 
The pre-implementation phase from July 2010 to November 2011 included the 
evolution of the programme from conception to first implementation. In this stage, 
public health specialists from the World Bank proposed the design and implementation 
of the P4P scheme to gain approval for funding from the World Bank.  
The designers proposed the scheme be implemented in primary health care (PHC) 
facilities in three out of the thirty-six States, representing three out of the six geo-
political zones in Nigeria. The States were Adamawa, Ondo and Nassarawa (see Figure 
7.1). These States were chosen based on the broad principles of the Country Partnership 
Strategy (CPS), which include strong governance capability and commitment, greater 
health needs (priority), willingness to use P4P approaches, geo-political representation, 
and filling gaps in donor support (i.e. targeting States where international donor support 
is minimal) (Nair, 2011). The scheme designers also proposed that three States (Ogun, 
Benue, and Taraba) serve as controls for evaluation purposes (see Figure 7.1) (Nair, 
2012). The evaluation design is described in section 7.2.3. 
 
Figure 7.1 Geographical Map of Nigeria indicating the three P4P and control 
States 
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The programme design was informed primarily by lessons learnt from similar projects 
implemented in similar countries by the World Bank. Some of the lessons learnt and 
reflected in this P4P scheme included: 
 A strong capacity building and technical assistance component is necessary for 
successful implementation of the programme, since it is a new approach in the 
Nigerian healthcare system.  
 Engagement of the Ministry of Health (MOH) at the Federal and State levels is 
essential for programme ownership and coordination.  
 Stringent monitoring of results and evaluation, which is essential to ensure 
progress towards the aim of the programme (Nair, 2011, NPHCDA, 2012). 
7.2.2. Pre-pilot phase  
The pre-pilot phase was an experimental phase in which the P4P scheme was rolled out 
on a small scale in the selected States after the approval of the project by The World 
Bank. The pre-pilot spanned 36 months (from December 2011 to July 2014) and was 
implemented in PHC facilities in one Local Government Area (LGA) in each of the 
States:  Adamawa State (Fufore, population: 240,160); Nassarawa State (Wamba, 
population: 90,454); and Ondo State (Ondo East, 85,323) (see Figure 7.2) (Nair, 2012). 
 
Figure 7.2 Nigerian P4P pre-pilot implementation design 
The LGAs for the pre-pilot in Adamawa and Nassarawa were selected at random. In 
Ondo State, the selection of LGA was politically influenced. The State ‘policy makers’ 
argued that the worst LGA (in terms of health indicators and services) should be chosen 
Pre-pilot (3LGAs) 
Ondo East LGA, Ondo 
State  
Wamba LGA, 
Nasarawa State. 
Furfore LGA, 
Adamawa State 
Adamawa 
State: 21 
LGAs 
Ondo State: 
18 LGAs 
Nasarawa 
State: 13 
LGAs 
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(with a rationale that such a LGA will benefit from the pre-pilot) (Nair, 2012). This 
decision is an example of potential issues the scheme evaluators might face regarding 
the level of control the State government has over the P4P scheme. However, it has the 
potential of providing very valuable lessons on context and implementation of the P4P 
schemes through exploration and comparisons with the randomly selected LGAs in the 
other States.  
 
The pre-pilots were conducted to inform the implementation of the pilot. This included 
assessing risk, building capacity, building State specific models of P4P mechanisms, 
setting up suitable systems, and conducting a formative evaluation (which is the focus 
of the second part of this thesis). The NPHCDA collected baseline and monthly data 
relevant to the incentivised services in the all the health facilities in each LGA 
throughout the pre-pilot phase to monitor preliminary progress (NPHCDA, 2012).  
 
Figure 7.3 Timeline of the Nigerian P4P scheme 
 
7.2.3. Pilot phase of the Nigerian P4P 
The pilot phase commenced in July 2014 and will last until 2018. In this phase, the 
implementation of the scheme has been extended from PHCs in one LGA (in each 
participating State) to PHCs in all LGAs (in each participating State) after lessons on 
feasibility, capacity, context, and implementation had been learnt (NPHCDA, 2012). 
The findings of the second part of this thesis informed this phase by making 
recommendations informing design, implementation, and context towards a more 
effective programme.  
Pre 
implementation 
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2011-June 
2013) 
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etc.  
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7.2.3.1. Planned evaluation for the Pilot phase of the Nigerian P4P in 2018 
The effectiveness of the Nigerian P4P programme in 2018 will be assessed using a 
randomised three-armed trial. The LGAs in each State were randomly assigned to P4P 
or decentralized facility financing (DFF) (providing similar levels of funds but not 
based on performance). Health facilities in both groups (P4P and DFF) are then 
compared to heath facilities in non-P4P control States (carefully matched in terms of 
health and socioeconomic indicators: see Figure 7.1) where there is a ‘do nothing 
approach’ or conducting business as usual (NPHCDA, 2012).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4 Impact evaluation design of the Nigerian P4P pilot (Source: NPHCDA, 
2012) 
 
7.3. Approval to conduct research on the Nigerian P4P pre-pilot 
The World Bank and NPHCDA granted me approval to conduct research on the pre-
pilot in December 2012 after about a year of correspondence, which was facilitated by 
my supervisor (Professor Trevor Sheldon) and a member of my Thesis Advisory Panel 
(Professor Alan Maynard). The approval was granted on the premise that the findings of 
my research would provide recommendations to inform and improve the 
implementation of the Nigerian P4P scheme in addition to lending some of my research 
skills to the project while in Nigeria to collect data. 
I was then integrated with the rest of the team of researchers and specialists working on 
the project. For my data collection (a total of about six months), I was based in the 
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health financing unit of the NPHCDA, which gave me the opportunity to be actively 
involved in the project through verification exercises, workshops, sites visits, 
stakeholder meetings, and informal interviews with key Senior Health Specialists at The 
World Bank such as the head P4P scheme designer, the P4P project manager, and some 
of the P4P project supervisors. This opportunity to familiarise with and immerse myself 
in the project improved my understanding and allowed me to make useful observation 
which partly informed the area of enquiry in my research. This is discussed in detail in 
section 7.5 where I review the preliminary results of the pre-pilot. In the next section, I 
review the design features of the Nigerian P4P scheme. 
7.4. Design Features of the Nigerian P4P scheme  
I now describe the design features of the Nigerian P4P scheme using the P4P typology 
developed in chapter three of this thesis. The design of the Nigerian P4P scheme 
described in this section is informed by the project implementation manual (NPHCDA, 
2012). 
7.4.1. Who receives the incentives? (And timing of payment)  
Incentives are paid to the health facility on a quarterly basis. However, the scheme 
implementers recommend that up to 50% of the incentives earned can be used as 
bonuses to the health workers (on a monthly basis) and the other 50% for operational 
cost (maintenance, repair, drugs, consumables, outreach and other quality enhancement 
measures). Autonomy is given to the health facility on how they allocate and utilise the 
money (decided by the health facility manager). 
7.4.2. Type of incentives: Fines or Bonuses  
The Nigerian P4P scheme pays only bonuses (uncoupled from usual salaries) for the 
achievement of targets. Arguably, theory suggests that fines might be a better incentive 
to change behaviour, as individuals are usually loss averse (as discussed in chapter 3). 
However, fines might be more difficult to implement, especially in contexts 
characterised by frequent industrial actions due to delay in salary payment (sometimes 
up to 6 months), such as Nigeria (Akinyemi and Atilola, 2013). As a result, part of the 
rationale behind payment of bonuses is that they would serve as a source of motivation 
for the health workers to do their jobs while they wait for their salaries to be paid. 
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7.4.3. Performance measure and domain of performance  
This section is discussed in two parts, considering that both the health facility and 
individual health workers have potential to earn incentives. First, I describe how the 
health facility earns the incentive (what they have to do and what is measured) and 
second, I describe what domain of performance is measured for the individual health 
workers to earn bonuses.  
7.4.3.1. Domain of performance for Health facilities 
The PHC facilities are rewarded with cash based on the quantity and quality of certain 
health services they provide (absolute measures). Thus, the incentive is fixed based on 
each health facility’s performance, and in no way dependent on how other health 
facilities perform. The two areas in which the health facilities are assessed in order to 
earn incentives are made up of structures and process, which to a certain extent are 
within the control of the health workers. There are twenty quantity incentivised health 
services, collectively known as the minimum package activities (MPAs) (see Table 7.1) 
and 12 quality indicators ranging from availability of essential drugs (to treat minor 
ailments)
 
to health facility hygiene standards as outlined in Table 7.2 (see Appendix E1 
and E2 for a detailed summary of all the indicators). 
Table 7.1 Incentivised health services 
Minimum Package Activities (MPAs) incentivised at the PHC facilities  
1. New outpatient consultation 
2. New outpatient consultation of an indigent patient 
3. Minor Surgery  
4. Referred patient arrived at the General Hospital  
5. Completely Vaccinated Child  
6. Growth monitoring visit Child  
7. 2 - 5 Tetanus Vaccination of Pregnant Woman  
8. Postnatal consultation  
9. First ANC consultation before four months pregnancy  
10. ANC standard visit (2-4)  
11. Second dose of Sulfadoxine Pyrimethamine (SP) provided to a pregnant woman  
12. Normal delivery  
13. Family Planning (FP): total of new and existing users of modern FP methods  
14. FP: implants and Intrauterine device (IUDs)  
15. Voluntary Testing and Counselling (VCT)/ Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission 
(PMTCT) test  
16. PMTCT: HIV+ mothers and children born to are treated according to protocol  
17. Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STDs) treated  
18. New Alcohol and acid fast bacilli (AAFB) + Pulmonary Tuberculosis (PTB) patient  
19. PTB patient completed treatment and cured  
20. Insecticide Treated Nets (ITN) Distributed  
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Table 7.2 Incentivised quality indicators 
No Service Points Weight_% 
1 General Management 11 4.4% 
2 Business Plan 9 3.6% 
3 Finance 10 4.0% 
4 Indigent Committee 7 2.8% 
5 Hygiene 25 10.0% 
6 OPD (Outpatient department) 34 13.7% 
7 Family Planning 22 8.8% 
8 Laboratory 10 4.0% 
9 Inpatient Wards 10 4.0% 
10 Essential Drugs Management 20 8.0% 
11 Tracer Drugs 30 12.0% 
12 Maternity 21 8.4% 
 
The quantity and quality of health services provided are recorded by the health facilities 
and submitted on a monthly basis to the NPHCDA. They are then verified on a 
quarterly basis by representatives from the SMOH and LGAs, which are then, counter 
verified by independent consultants hired by the NPHCDA on a quarterly basis.  
The quality measures are verified by inspections done by the consultants, while the 
verification of the MPAs (quantity measures) involves members of the community. 
Consultants train members (about five) of the community to go into the community and 
ask randomly selected individuals from the health facility records (about 10-15 for each 
health service) if they have received the services recorded by the health facility. The 
results verified are then calculated as follows: (number verified/sample size asked)*unit 
price of health service. For example, if the health facility reports that they had 100 
obstetric deliveries in the last quarter and out of the 10 randomly selected individuals 
from the records asked if they delivered in the facility, only 9 confirmed that they 
delivered in the facility, then the amount verified for which incentives to be paid is 
calculated thus: (9/10)*100= 90 deliveries. Verification is done to detect falsification of 
reports, which is not uncommon in incentive schemes (Gravelle et al., 2008, Van Herck 
et al., 2010). The penalty for evidence of falsification (e.g. substantial discrepancies) in 
the Nigerian P4P scheme is termination of the P4P contracts of such facilities. 
7.4.3.2. Domain of performance for Health workers 
The size of bonuses earned by individuals is based on an assessment (carried out by the 
health facility manager) using five weighted criteria: professional awareness, team 
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spirit, technical competency, willingness and aptitude for personal development, and 
availability at work (see Table 7.3). For example, a health worker who arrived 
frequently late will score two points (25% of eight points) in the domain of timeliness, 
part of the professional awareness criteria. 
While all five criteria used to assess performance to allocate bonuses to the individual 
health workers are important, and might contribute partly to the performance of the 
health facility (e.g. coming to work every day, will most likely translate to seeing more 
patients). It is important to note there is an apparent disconnect between what the health 
workers are required to do to increase quantity and quality of health services (for the 
health facility to earn the incentive) and what the health workers are required to do to 
earn bonuses (out of that earned by the health facility). This might create an issue about 
whether or not health workers’ contribution to the health facilities performance is 
adequately measured. For example certain core components in which health workers 
increase utilisation of health care are not adequately reflected in the individual 
assessment form, such as health promotion and outreach (Abdulraheem et al., 2012, 
Roodenbeke et al., 2011).  
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Table 7.3 Individual evaluation tool for health workers in the Nigerian P4P scheme 
 25% 50% 100% 
Criteria 1: Professional awareness (total of 20 points)  
Timeliness (8 points) Arrived frequently late  
(at the least four times past month)  
Arrived sometimes late  
(1 to 3 times per month)  
Was always on time  
Availability (8 points) Has been frequently absent from his/her 
service without any clear motive  
(at the least four times past month)  
Has been a few times absent 
from his service without clear 
motive  
(1 to 3 times per month)  
Was never absent from his/her service 
without known and valid motive  
Uniform (4 points) Did not wear a uniform during working 
hours (even once per month)  
Neglected uniform (dirty or torn 
or not ironed)  
Uniform always worn and proper 
(washed ; ironed and not torn)  
Criteria 2: Team spirit (total of 30 points) 
Interpersonal Relationship (8 points) Frequently in conflict with colleagues 
(reported more than once to his/her 
superior during the past month)  
Sometimes in conflict with 
colleagues (reported once to 
his/her superior)  
Never in conflict with colleagues  
Collaborative spirit (8 points)  Frequently refused to assist colleagues 
when asked  
(more than once per month)  
Sometimes refused to assist 
colleagues  
(even once)  
Never refused to assist colleagues  
Dedication (8 points) Frequently left work unfinished without 
somebody taking over under the 
argument that official working hours 
were up  
(more than 3 times past month)  
Sometimes left work unfinished 
without somebody taking over 
using the argument that official 
working hours were up  
(1 to 3 times per month)  
Never left work unfinished without 
somebody taking over  
Initiative (6 points) Has never done any additional work  Has always awaited a command 
from higher up to carry out 
additional work  
Has at least once done additional work 
without supervisor asking him/her to 
do so  
Criteria 3: Technical Competency and flexibility during work (total of 40 points) 
Organization (10 points) Never has a daily work schedule 
(assessed during internal work 
supervision)  
Not always has a daily work 
schedule (at least once during 
internal supervision)  
Always has a daily work schedule  
Quality of work (14 points) Never adheres to specific work related Not always adheres to work Always adheres to specific work 
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 25% 50% 100% 
norms and standards  
(assessed during internal supervision)  
related norms and standards  
(found at least once during 
internal supervision)  
related norms and standards  
Quantity of work (16 points) Never finishes his/her daily work based 
on his/her own daily work schedule 
(assessed during internal supervision)  
Not always finishes his/her work 
based on his/her own daily work 
schedule  
(found at least once during 
internal supervision)  
Always finishes his/her work 
according to his/her daily work 
schedule  
Criteria 4: Willingness and aptitude for personal development (total of 10 points) 
Takes into account advice and 
recommendations from previous internal 
and external supervisory visits  
Never takes care of such 
recommendations (concluded during 
internal and external supervisory visits)  
Not always takes care of such 
recommendations  (if this 
happens once or more)  
Always takes into account 
recommendations of internal and 
external supervisory visits  
Total 100 points 
Criteria 5: Participation to Results and the Past Monthly Performance Score 
Participation to Results and the past month’s performance score 
(quantity and quality) through presence during working days during 
the past month, not taking into account reasons for absence such as 
vacation, leave, sickness, absence through disciplinary action, formal 
trainings etc. 
Percentage of days performed = 
(P) 
Number of official working days 
= (N) 
Number of days actually worked 
= (n) 
P = (n/N) * 100 
Final result of Individual performance (X) = total points from criteria 1-4 * P% (criteria 5) 
Bonus earned= ‘X’% * Bonus originally due. 
Sample calculation of bonus due to health worker in a health facility (with 4 other health workers) that earned 250,000 naira in the past quarter 
The first step is to divide the incentive the health facility earned into two, as only half of it can be used as bonuses to the staff:  
250,000/2= 125,000 naira the other 125,000 naira goes towards the improvement of the health facility. 
The second step is to divide the bonuses by the total number of health workers: 125,000/ 5 health workers= 25,000 naira per health worker per quarter, translating to 
6,500naira (25,000/4) per month (bonus originally due). 
The third step is to multiply the bonus originally due by the final result of Individual performance (X %). If ‘X’= 70, then bonus due to that health worker= (70/100) 
*6500= 4, 375 for that month 
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7.4.4. Size of incentives and payment mechanism 
Like most incentive programmes, the size of the incentive is not calculated or reported 
relative to the health facility’s usual income/budget or in the case of the individual 
health worker, size reported relative to usual salaries. This is understandable in the 
Nigerian context, as these PHC facilities do not have assigned budgets. The health 
system funding operates in such a way that money is not allocated to the health 
facilities, rather an elaborate process of procurement is used to obtain what is needed in 
the health facility from the LGA (which would either be approved or not depending on 
available funds).   
The potential size of incentive that can be earned by the health facility is however 
described in absolute terms. Each of the incentivised service carries a unit price (see 
Appendix E3 for unit prices of all the health services) e.g. normal delivery in the facility 
= 1000 Naira (so if there were 90 deliveries in the past quarter, the health facilities 
would expect to get 90,000 Naira for that service). This is calculated for each of the 
incentivised activities and quality indicators and summed to estimate the total amount of 
money expected by the health facility. However, the maximum size of incentive that can 
be earned per quarter in each State is capped at 150 Naira ($1) per capita (Adamawa 
LGA Fufore: 240,160, Nassarawa LGA Wamba: 90,454, Ondo: 85,323). Meaning at the 
end of each quarter, on the average, each P4P facility has the potential to earn a 
maximum of $16,000 in in Fufore LGA (240,160/15 health facilities); in $8200 in 
Wamba LGA (90,454/11 health facilities); and $8500 in Ondo East LGA (85,323/10 
health facilities).  
7.4.5. Review of design features of the Nigerian P4P scheme 
The design features of the Nigerian P4P schemes summarised indicates that it falls into 
a ‘type A’ category of incentive schemes using the P4P typology developed and tested 
in previous chapters.  Evidence from theory (chapter three) and empirical findings 
(chapter five) suggests that these type A schemes (characterised by large, quarterly, 
monetary incentives, paid to groups for health services and domains of quality within 
the health workers control) are likely to be more effective than schemes characterised 
with other design choices such as payment of small sized incentives paid on a yearly 
basis, dependent on how others perform (relative measure) for domains of performance 
out of the clinicians control (e.g. mortality reduction) (see Table 7.4). 
                                                                                   Chapter 7: Overview of the Nigerian P4P scheme 
180 
 
Table 7.4 Key design features in the Nigerian P4P scheme 
Core design features Category: ‘Type A’  
Who receives the 
incentives 
Incentive paid to Groups (health facilities) but individual health 
workers have the opportunity to earn part of it as bonuses 
Type of incentive Bonuses  
Type of payment Monetary (cash) 
Size of incentive Large (up to 100% of performance budget can be earned) 
Payment mechanism Absolute targets (pay per increase in incentivised activity or quality 
measure e.g. availability of drugs at the health facility) 
Performance measure Absolute measure (pay per activity) 
Domain of performance 
measured 
Within clinicians control (Processes e.g. health service delivery such 
as ANC and hygiene/cleanliness of the health facility) 
Timing of payment Quarterly: health facility, Monthly: health workers 
 
I have explored and discussed in detail, the influence of design features on effectiveness 
of P4P in previous chapters, which I now summarise in the context of Nigerian P4P 
scheme.  
First, paying health facilities the incentive could be advantageous because the health 
facility managers might be able to effect a higher behaviour change in individual health 
workers and performance in health facilities by implementing good management 
structures such as supervision, resource management, and motivating health workers 
(Trisolini, 2011). Similarly, the large size incentive that the health facilities could 
potentially earn in the Nigerian P4P scheme represents an influx of new funds, which if 
used effectively, could go a long way in improving problems such as lack of drugs or 
infrastructure and manpower to improve health service delivery (Abdulraheem et al., 
2012, Akinwale, 2010). The large size of incentive also has the potential to supplement 
the salaries of the health workers, which will be particularly beneficial in the Nigerian 
context because it has the potential to help the health workers focus on the health 
facility (thus improving health service delivery), rather than supplementing their income 
in other ways that take their attention away from the health facility (Abdulraheem et al., 
2012). Lastly, in the Nigerian P4P scheme, quarterly payments for health services under 
the control of the health workers might be translated by the health workers as 
guaranteed incentive or lower uncertainty of earning the incentive (all things being 
equal), as opposed to design features, such as yearly payments that are dependent on 
ranks (based on the performance of others) for outcomes such as mortality. This might 
be translated as ‘unguaranteed incentive (higher uncertainty of not earning the 
incentive) even if they improve performance or change behaviour. Therefore, the health 
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workers participating in the Nigerian P4P scheme are more likely to change behaviour 
in a situation where they view the incentive as more certain because individuals are 
generally risk averse and would rather invest their time and resources in other activities 
that give them a higher guarantee of returns on their efforts (Arrow, 1965). However, 
the uncertainty in earning the incentive might also be affected by contextual factors 
such as trust in the payment system, which I discuss in the next chapter. 
 
In summary, the Nigerian P4P scheme demonstrates the potential to be effective based 
on its design features (based on findings from the typology and statistical exploration in 
chapter 3 and 5). However, as resonated throughout this thesis, variables other than 
design of the scheme, such as contextual and implementation factors might also 
influence the effectiveness of these schemes. Therefore, the main focus of the formative 
evaluation of the Nigerian P4P scheme was exploration of the influence of contextual 
and implementation factors. In the next section, I review and discuss the preliminary 
results of the Nigerian P4P pre-pilot, before moving on to explore contextual and 
implementation factors in the Nigerian P4P pre-pilot in subsequent chapters. 
7.5. Early findings of the Nigerian P4P scheme 
In this section, I describe how I estimated the effect of the P4P scheme (change in 
utilisation of health services) in the health facilities where the pre-pilots were being 
implemented. The aim of this was to provide a rich detail to enable the exploration of 
contextual and implementation factors in the Nigerian P4P scheme. 
7.5.1. Method of estimating change in utilisation of health services  
I calculated the change/difference (from December 2011 to December 2012) in 
utilisation of maternal and child health services in each health facility in all three pre-
pilot LGAs using monthly performance data collected and made available by the 
NPHCDA on the P4P website https://nphcda.thenewtechs.com/data.html). The analysis 
was done using SPSS statistical package (version 19).  The maternal and child health 
incentivised services were tetanus vaccination for pregnant women, postnatal care 
(PNC), antenatal care (ANC), malaria treatment for children and pregnant women  
(Sulfadoxine Pyrimethamine: SP), voluntary counselling and testing (VCT), normal 
delivery at the health facility, Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission of HIV 
(PMTCHIV), and complete childhood immunisations. 
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This method (before and after) used to estimate the impact of the pre-pilot after one year 
was the only feasible approach due to lack of reliable data on the incentivised services 
before the implementation of the pre-pilot, a long standing problem with the Nigerian 
health system (Uneke et al., 2010). This is likely to have introduced some bias because 
this method does not take into consideration confounders or the variability of the 
baseline data like other evaluation designs such as RCTs and quasi-experimental studies 
(Shadish et al., 2002, Stigler, 1997). For example, a previously high performing health 
facility with little improvements after one year would be indistinguishable from a 
previously low performer with little improvements. In the same way, improvements 
noted in certain health facilities might not necessarily be due to the introduction P4P 
because the health facility might have been steadily improving over the years.  
 
Whilst these are limitations of the analysis that could not be adequately addressed, it 
was considered to be acceptable for this research because the baseline data showed 
similar levels of performance in the health services in the health facilities in the three 
States (see appendix E4). In addition, the effect of P4P in the Nigerian pre-pilots was 
not the main focus of this research. Rather, the results were meant to provide richer 
detail to enable the exploration of contextual and implementation factors in the Nigerian 
P4P pre-pilot, which is the main focus of this part of my research. The next section 
presents the results of the data analysis of P4P from December 2011 to December 2012. 
7.5.2. Results  
There was an overall improvement in utilisation of most of the incentivised maternal 
and child health services in PHCs in the three States as shown in Figures 7.5-7.7). 
However, the difference/change in utilisation of maternal and child health services 
varied considerably between health facilities in each LGA. In Adamawa State (see 
Figure 7.5), Gurin health facility and Chigari health facility showed very good 
improvement compared to Karlahi health facility (the health services were on the 
average worse off after P4P) and St. Mary health facility (very little improvement in the 
health services. Similarly, in Nassarawa State (see Figure 7.6), performance improved 
considerably in Wamba health facility and Zali health facility compared to Yahsi 
Madaki and Kwarra health facilities. 
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Figure 7.5 Change in utilisation of incentivised maternal and child health services in Adamawa State (Fufore LGA)  from December 2011-December 2012 
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Figure 7.6 Change in utilisation of incentivised maternal and child health services in Nassarawa State (Wamba LGA) from December 2011-
December 2012 
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Figure 7.7 Change in utilisation of incentivised maternal and child health services in Ondo State (Ondo east LGA) from December 2011-
December 2012 
                                                                                   Chapter 7: Overview of the Nigerian P4P scheme 
186 
 
In the same way, the results varied between the three States. Most of the health services 
in each State showed improvement in coverage/utilisation, ranging from small/modest 
to significant changes. On the average, Adamawa State showed the best improvement, 
followed by Nassarawa and then Ondo state as seen in Figure 7.8.  
 
Figure 7.8 Mean change in coverage of maternal and child health services from 
December 2011 to December 2012 in Adamawa, Nassarawa, and Ondo States 
 
7.6. Discussion of the early results of the Nigerian P4P scheme  
The preliminary results show that despite similar design features and method by which 
performance has been measured across all three States, change in performance varied 
considerably across States and across the health facilities within the LGAs. This 
suggests that other sources of variation beyond design features, such as contextual and 
implementation factors might explain the results. 
Previous studies and literature suggests that there are a number of contextual and 
implementation factors, which could lead to heterogeneous results of incentive scheme. 
These include uncertainty in earning the incentive, management of the scheme, health 
worker awareness and understanding of the scheme, communication (flow of 
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information), infrastructure (equipment/readiness to meet targets), staff skill mix, 
patient characteristics, and the health care system (Kirschner et al., 2013, Canavan and 
Swai, 2008, Van Herck et al., 2010, Ssengooba et al., 2012).  
In the Nigerian P4P scheme, contextual factors such as staff skill mix, patient 
characteristics, and characteristics of health care system are unlikely to explain results 
because, the degree to which they vary in the chosen sites for the implementation of the 
P4P scheme was minimal. The three sites had similar structure of organisation and 
funding of the healthcare system (as described in chapter six) i.e. decentralised health 
system. In the same way, the three sites chosen for the pre-pilots were all rural Local 
Government Areas (LGA), which have similar patient characteristics, catering to the 
same primary health care needs, and a similar skill mix in all the health facilities 
comprised mostly of community health workers (CHEWs) and nurses (NPHCDA, 
2012). 
 
Through preliminary visits to the research sites and informal conversations about the 
P4P scheme with some scheme implementers and health workers (see section 7.3), and 
exploration of literature, I was able to identify potential contextual and implementation 
factors that could have influenced the outcome of the Nigerian P4P pre-pilot. This 
informed the area of enquiry/research questions for the formative evaluation. The 
potential factors identified were delay in incentive payment, communication between 
the scheme implementers and the health workers, and scepticism in the measurement of 
individual performance (all of which are likely to create uncertainty in the health 
workers regarding earning the incentive). I also identified factors such as management 
of the scheme (at the health facility level), health worker awareness and understanding 
of the scheme, and infrastructure as factors with potential to explain or help interpret the 
results of the Nigerian P4P pre-pilot. I now discuss how these factors might influence 
the results of the schemes (supported by relevant literature), thus providing a rationale 
for exploring these factors in the Nigerian context in subsequent chapters. 
7.6.1. Risk (uncertainty of earning the incentive)  
Arrow (1965) argued that individuals are generally risk averse, meaning that they are 
less ready to accept an uncertain contract or agreement rather than another contract with 
a more certain consequence. In the case of incentive schemes, this means that the extent 
to which an incentive results in behaviour change is likely to be affected by the degree 
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to which the clinicians are confident they will receive the incentive if they change their 
behaviour or improve performance.   
The element of perceived ‘risk” or uncertainty of earning the incentive spans across 
both design features and contextual and implementation factors. I have analysed and 
discussed in detail in chapter 3 and 5, the design elements associated with perceived risk 
of not earning the incentive. I argued that recipients of the incentives have a low 
perceived risk when incentive schemes are characterised with certain design features, 
which include:  
 Short time lag between measurement of performance and receipt of incentive, as 
opposed to long time lags (between five months and one year) 
 The use of absolute instead of relative performance measures (and so not 
dependent on how others perform) 
 The use of process and structural domains of performance, which are more 
under the providers control, rather than clinical or health outcomes.  
In this discussion, I focus on contextual and implementation factors (rather than P4P 
design factors) that might contribute to the uncertainty or risk of not earning the 
incentive. 
I identified three potential factors in the Nigerian P4P scheme that were likely to have 
affected trust in the payment system, thereby increasing the risk of not earning the 
incentive. They include delay in payment, communication, and individual performance 
measure used. 
Delay in promised payment has been shown to reduce health worker motivation and 
affect performance in some P4P schemes in implemented in developing countries like 
Uganda (Ssengooba et al., 2012). In the Nigerian context, there is existing distrust in the 
payment system brought on by delay in payment of salaries, lack of transparency, and 
poor governance (Hargreaves, 2002, Garuba et al., 2009, Okafor, 2009, Akinyemi and 
Atilola, 2013). As a result, some health workers are likely to interpret the delay in 
payment as deception or not getting paid what was promised, thereby reducing 
performance results. 
 In the same way, communication of the changes and the reasons for changes in the 
scheme (for example, reasons for delayed payment) between the stakeholders might be 
important in the Nigerian context because the likely distrust brought on by the delay in 
payment could be exacerbated by misinformation or speculation, which could lead to 
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poorer outcomes. On the other hand, effective communication has the potential to 
enhance transparency, which boosts the trust of the health workers in the payment of the 
incentive because behaviour of health workers are to less likely be affected in cases 
where a genuine reason for the delay in payment has been communicated effectively by 
the scheme implementers to the health workers.  
Similarly, the assessment upon which the sharing of bonuses to individual health 
workers (as described in Table 7.3), is based on elements such as clean uniforms, 
attendance, initiative etc. which are different from the services the health workers have 
to render in order for the health facility to earn the incentive. It is possible that some 
health workers might feel that the measure by which the bonuses are being shared to 
them does not adequately reflect the actual contribution to the health facilities 
performance. This in turn might lead to uncertainty in the amount of money expected by 
the health workers. For example, health workers who participate more in outreach and 
home visits, thereby drawing more patients to utilise the services at the health facility, 
might feel they deserve more bonuses than other health workers who do not participate 
in outreaches, but come to work every day, wearing clean uniforms etc. (and doing 
other things on the individual assessment tool upon which the bonuses are shared).  This 
ambiguity might affect performance results because such health workers might feel like 
they are not getting what is due them, and therefore, the behaviour change is not worth 
it.  
This aspect of ‘risk’ is particularly relevant in the Nigerian context because of the 
existing distrust of the health workers in the payment system, characterized by frequent 
union strikes (Hargreaves, 2002, Garuba et al., 2009, Okafor, 2009, Akinyemi and 
Atilola, 2013). Therefore, the health workers are more likely to be uncertain and these 
additional factors identified in the scheme are likely to further increase their level of 
uncertainty, which may have negative consequences on the results of the scheme. For 
instance, if health workers are doubtful about earning the incentive even though they 
improve performance, they are not likely to change. Rather, they might invest their time 
and efforts in other things likely to bring them returns on their investments such as 
doing additional jobs (farming, trading etc.) to supplement their income (Akwataghibe 
et al., 2013).  
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7.6.2. The role of health facility managers  
Proper management of the scheme at the health facility level has been shown to improve 
the outcomes of P4P schemes in some LMICs such as Tanzania (Canavan and Swai, 
2008). Managers of the scheme at each health facility might influence the impact of the 
Nigerian P4P scheme because they might handle the scheme differently, in terms of 
how the manager motivates the health workers and the strategies for improvement 
implemented (Bredenkamp et al., 2014). This might include different levels of 
supervision, and monitoring, transparency, communication etc. For example, health 
facilities where there is constant and appropriate supervision from the health facility 
manager are likely to produce better results compared to ones with minimal supervision. 
7.6.3. Health worker understanding the P4P scheme 
Hillman (1998) found that the failure of financial incentives to improve physicians 
compliance with cancer-screening guidelines in Medicaid health maintenance 
organization in the USA was associated with low level of awareness and understanding 
among the participating physicians. Young et al. (2007) also found a link between the 
impact of P4P and health worker awareness and understanding of the scheme in a 
number of P4P schemes in the USA. They found that low levels of understanding 
among clinicians about the way the programme works (the indicators used, payment 
mechanisms, use of the incentives, individual performance measures, and financial 
incentive payment specifics) were linked to the negative impacts observed in the P4P 
programme. This suggests that when health workers understand the P4P scheme, they 
are more likely to change behaviour to improve performance.  
A number of factors might affect the level of understanding of the Nigerian P4P 
scheme. These include level and effectiveness of training for the scheme, technical 
support/assistant, qualifications, literacy levels, and personal interest (NPHCDA, 2012). 
Differences in these factors might affect the way they understand the scheme, which 
might in turn influence the degree of behaviour change or performance, leading to 
heterogeneous results. If some health workers lack adequate understanding about the 
terms and conditions of the scheme, such as the potential incentives to be earned, it is 
possible the incentives might not reach or have any impact on them. This might reduce 
the effectiveness of the scheme because the individual health workers might not put as 
much effort into changing behaviour the way they would if they were fully 
knowledgeable about the P4P scheme.  
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7.6.4. Infrastructure (readiness to implement the P4P programme) 
Studies that have examined the attitudes and perceptions of healthcare professionals 
towards P4P schemes found that some healthcare professionals felt that their clinics 
lacked the infrastructure that was needed to provide the level of quality required, which 
reduced the impact of P4P in these practices (Locke and Srinivasan, 2008, McDonald 
and Roland, 2009, Kaczorowski et al., 2011, Canavan and Swai, 2008). 
 
The potential influence of infrastructure on the outcomes of the P4P scheme in Nigeria 
is very important, because one of the main issues weakening the health system is lack of 
appropriate infrastructure (Akinwale, 2010). Health facilities in the Nigerian P4P 
schemes have different infrastructure and equipment because of the influence of the 
different State governments and international donors. For instance, in Ondo State, the 
State government provides free drugs for maternal and child health related cases, which 
is not the case in Adamawa and Nassarawa State. In the same way, the distribution of 
equipment by donors is not controlled and unbalanced in the health facilities 
(NPHCDA, 2012).  
Specifically, if these infrastructural differences are related to the health services and 
quality indicators incentivised by the Nigerian P4P scheme, it is likely that it will result 
in differences in performance results. For example, for an incentivised health service, 
such as childhood immunisations, health facilities that lack fridges or power supply to 
maintain the cold chain storage of the vaccines are likely to have low performance 
results compared to health facilities with appropriate infrastructure.  
 
7.7. What this chapter adds (rationale for exploration of contextual 
and implementation factors in the Nigerian P4P scheme) 
The importance of contextual and implementation factors in P4P schemes have been 
hypothesized and proposed in this chapter. These factors were considered to be relevant 
to the Nigerian context and may help explain the varied results of the Nigerian P4P 
scheme. The potential factors identified were uncertainty in payment of the incentive 
and attainment of target, administration and management of the scheme, health worker 
awareness, and infrastructure.  
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These factors are likely to affect attitude or behaviour of the health workers in the pre-
pilot sites in different ways. This in turn may explain or help interpret the preliminary 
results, thereby providing valuable insight on appropriate contexts and better 
implementation strategies for better performance results.  There is however no 
systematic evidence of the influence of these factors in the Nigerian context because the 
scheme is among the first of its kind to be introduced to Nigerian healthcare system. 
There are a few studies exploring some contextual and implementation factors in 
incentive schemes in developed countries (Locke and Srinivasan, 2008, McDonald and 
Roland, 2009, Kaczorowski et al., 2011, Stockwell, 2010), but research in this area is 
sparse in LMICs, with only two identified studies exploring this area in Tanzania and 
Uganda  (Canavan and Swai, 2008, Ssengooba et al., 2012). 
A study to investigate the effect of these contextual and implementation in the Nigerian 
P4P scheme, will contribute to this area in three main ways.  
 The findings will help interpret the variations in preliminary results of the 
Nigerian P4P pre-pilot. 
 Findings from the study will inform implementation and provide 
recommendations for scaling up of the Nigerian P4P pilot across the whole 
country. 
 The study will enrich the database of evidence of the influence of 
implementation and contextual factors in incentive schemes especially in low 
and middle-income settings. 
In the subsequent chapters, I empirically explore and investigate in detail, how these 
factors influence the early results of the Nigerian P4P pre-pilot, providing vital 
recommendations to the scheme implementers based on the findings. 
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Chapter 8 Methods of the formative evaluation of 
the Nigerian P4P scheme 
The second part of the thesis focuses on evaluating a P4P scheme in a low and middle-
income country (LMIC), using Nigerian as a case study. In chapter six, I described the 
context of the P4P scheme (Nigerian P4P scheme). In chapter seven, I described the 
design of the Nigerian P4P scheme and reviewed its preliminary results. The results 
showed considerable variation between the three States (Adamawa, Nassarawa, and 
Ondo) and also between the health facilities within States, despite the implementation 
sites having the same design features. This was followed by an exploration of literature 
(informed by observation) of other relevant factors beyond design features, such as 
contextual and implementation factors that may influence the outcomes of P4P scheme 
and explain the variation in results. The key potentially relevant factors considered 
were: (1) Uncertainty in earning the incentive in terms of delay in payment, 
communication, and the assessment tool; (2) Health worker understanding of the P4P 
scheme; (3) The role of health facility managers in the scheme; and (4) The role of 
infrastructure in the P4P scheme. These factors are likely to elicit different views and 
experiences in health workers in health facilities participating in the pre-pilot, which 
may affect their attitude or behaviour. Thereby providing a rationale to explore the 
views and experiences of the health workers to capture the influence of contextual and 
implementation factors on the Nigerian P4P pre-pilot. This represents a formative 
evaluation, which takes place before or during the implementation of an intervention 
with the aim of improving the intervention’s performance. I.e. it is focused on trying to 
understand which factors influence the effectiveness of the intervention (Øvretveit, 
1998). 
In this chapter, I describe the aims and objectives of the research. I also describe and 
justify the methods used to explore the views and experiences of health workers 
participating in the Nigerian P4P scheme. This included the study design and setting, 
details of data collection and analysis, and methods of demonstrating rigour in the 
research.  
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8.1. Aims and objectives 
This aim of this study was to investigate the influence of contextual and implementation 
factors with a view to interpret the results of the Nigerian P4P pre-pilot and to inform 
the development on the scheme.  
Objectives  
1. To investigate the views and experiences of health workers participating in the 
Nigerian P4P scheme on: 
 Uncertainty in earning the incentive in terms of: delay in payment, 
communication, and the assessment tool. 
 Understanding of the P4P scheme. 
 The role of health facility managers in the scheme.  
 The role of infrastructure in the P4P scheme. 
2. To examine whether and how these responses vary within and across professional 
roles, health facilities, and States. 
8.2. Study design: a qualitative approach  
This was a cross-sectional qualitative study of health workers in the Nigerian P4P pre-
pilot scheme. The approach was influenced by a pragmatic paradigm, which guided my 
methods about gaining the knowledge to answer my research questions, as well as 
conducting and reporting the research (Creswell, 2009). The pragmatic paradigm was 
best suited to this research because unlike others such as postpositivisim or 
constructivism, it is not aligned to a particular philosophical approach. Rather, the 
pragmatic paradigm allows exploration of research questions by whatever methods are 
most appropriate or “what works” where there can be singular or multiple realities. In 
addition, it focuses on exploration of problem oriented research questions in real life 
situations, which corresponds with the aim of this research (Creswell and Plano Clark, 
2011).  
I chose a qualitative approach to answer the research questions in this study for two 
main reasons. First, qualitative approaches can explore areas of human behaviours, 
beliefs, attitudes, and experiences, which cannot directly be answered or explored by 
quantitative approaches (Britten, 1995, Creswell, 1998). Unlike quantitative approaches 
such as surveys, using a qualitative approach takes an in-depth approach to the 
exploration of theories or topics, conveying an intensity and richness in detail to 
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understand the topic of interest more thoroughly (Carter and Henderson, 2005). A 
qualitative approach thus enabled me to gather rich and detailed data concerning the 
views and experiences of the health workers in the Nigerian P4P scheme on contextual 
and implementation factors that might affect the outcomes of the scheme.  
Second, a qualitative approach has been useful in similar studies to investigate the 
influence of contextual and implementation factors on P4P schemes. A formative 
evaluation of a P4P scheme in Tanzania conducted by Canavan and Swai (2008) 
employed a combination of in-depth interviews, observation, and focus group 
discussions to provide policy recommendations on design, context and implementation.  
Ssengooba et al. (2012) also used a combination of qualitative approaches (observation 
and in-depth interviews) to explore why a large-scale P4P scheme in Uganda was not 
effective. Finally, Felt-Lisk et al. (2007) employed the use of in-depth interviews to 
explore and compare the views of physicians on the implementation of P4P schemes in 
California and England. Thus, a further advantage of using a qualitative approach is to 
facilitate comparison of the findings with these studies.  
8.3. Method of data collection (semi-structured face to face interviews) 
Semi structured interviews were used to collect the data. This approach presents three 
key strengths. First, this method allows researcher to directly intervene in the interview 
process (Carter and Henderson, 2005, Bowling, 2014b). For example, in situations 
where the participant does not understand or has difficulty answering a question or 
provides only a brief response, the interviewer can prompt or probe to encourage the 
participant to consider the question further and to talk at length or expand on areas, 
which they feel they are important. Common prompts include “is there any other thing 
you would like to add” and “can you tell me more about that” (Bowling, 2014b). 
Second, the flexibility in semi-structured interviews gives room for emergent themes or 
topics to be captured during the interview process, as the researcher can adjust the 
interview questions or use prompts to explore emergent themes as the interview 
proceeds (Carter and Henderson, 2005, Bowling, 2014b). Finally, semi-structured 
interviews allow consistency. The researcher can ask participants the same broad 
questions on a particular issue or area (Carter and Henderson, 2005), which provides 
reliable comparable data to adress the research question.  
                                  Chapter 8: Methods of the formative evaluation of the Nigerian P4P scheme 
196 
 
Other ways of gathering data using a qualitative approach were considered for this 
study. They include observation, document analysis, focus groups, and unstructured in-
depth interviews (see Appendix F1) (Barbour, 2013).   
Observation was impractical for this doctoral thesis because of the large amount of time 
and resources required to collect and analyse data across different health facilities in all 
three States (Gobo, 2011, Creswell, 1998). In addition, whilst observation can provide 
richly detailed data, it is difficult to observe ‘why’ participants do what they do or feel 
how they feel (reasons for their attitudes or behaviours), especially if it is inherent to the 
participants (Kawulich, 2005). Similarly, document analysis was not employed in this 
study because there were no publicly available documents relevant to the research 
questions. This is a new area of inquiry in the Nigerian context and it was possible to 
engage the key participants directly, which is regarded as a superior method of 
collecting data (Bowling, 2014b).  
The limitation of focus group discussions is the issue of maintaining confidentiality and 
anonymity within the group, as participants might be hesitant in expressing their views 
(Carter and Henderson, 2005, Bowling, 2014b, Barbour, 2013). Hence, it was not a 
suitable method for exploring sensitive areas in this study, such as uncertainty in 
payment and role of management, both of which may involve corruption and 
transparency issues.  Furthermore, focus group discussions can be dominated by the 
voice or one of two participants, and unlikely to achieve the ‘in-depthness’ obtained 
from interviews (Finch and Lewis, 2004, Bowling, 2014b).  
Finally, unstructured interviews were not appropriate in this study because I had 
specific and focused areas of enquiry (Bowling, 2014b). Data produced from 
unstructured interviews, whilst richly detailed is often non-comparable to other 
participants (Carter and Henderson, 2005, Bowling, 2014b), which was needed to 
achieve the objectives of this study.  
8.4. Ethics approval  
Ethics approval was sought and obtained from The Research Governance Committee of 
the Department of Health Science-University of York (see Appendix F2). The study 
was governed by the principles of informed voluntary consent, confidentiality, and 
anonymity (see Appendix F3 and F4 for information sheet and consent forms). Potential 
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participants (health workers) were provided with information to make sure that they 
understood the research. They were also assured of confidentiality and anonymity if 
they were to be interviewed. Finally, participants who expressed interest in being a part 
of the research (to be interviewed) provided voluntary written consent. 
8.5. Data collection  
Semi structured face-to-face interviews were undertaken from June to October 2013 
(two years after the start of the implementation of the Nigerian P4P pre-scheme). In this 
section, I describe and justify the approaches used to investigate and explore the views 
and experiences of the health workers participating in the Nigerian P4P scheme. 
8.5.1. Developing the interview questions 
According to Erlandson et al. (1993), the key to obtaining rich reliable data from 
interviews is by asking ‘good’ questions that reflect the research question(s), which are 
often informed by preliminary observation of the context and relevant literature. Good 
interview questions according to Creswell (1998),  should be well-informed, non-
leading, and unambiguous. The following paragraphs describe the process and features 
of the interview questions and how they were developed to ensure the credibility of this 
study. 
First, I conducted preliminary visits to the research sites and I had informal 
conversations about the P4P scheme with some stakeholders (scheme implementers and 
health workers), which helped me to develop an understanding of the context and areas 
of interest. This allowed me to focus my research questions, by helping to identify 
likely relevant issues and topics (guided and supported by literature) in the Nigerian 
context (see chapter seven), which guided me in developing meaningful semi-structured 
questions. 
The areas/topics I set out to explore in this study were:  
 Uncertainty or risk of not earning the incentive (delay in payment, 
communication, and assessment tool) 
 Health worker understanding of the scheme 
 The role of the health facility manager in the P4P scheme 
 The role of infrastructure 
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I then developed questions within each topic, asking about the participants’ views and 
experiences. I ensured that these interview questions were focused and asked in a 
neutral or non-leading manner, which increased credibility of the study by ensuring that 
my personal opinions about the topics were not expressed (Creswell, 1998). For 
example, questions regarding the measurement tool were phrased as “what are your 
thoughts about the measurement tool”? As opposed to “do you think the measurement 
tool is bad”? 
I also made sure the questions were not ambiguous by having just one idea per question 
and using simple language for easier understanding, which helped the participants 
understand the questions, thereby producing more reliable and credible data (Britten, 
1995). 
Finally, because these were questions for semi structured interviews, I had a number of 
probes and prompts to be used in cases where participants give shallow/brief responses 
to questions where I particularly wanted rich detail or when following up on a response. 
Some of the probes I used included:  
 Could you give me some examples… 
 Why do you feel that….  
 You mentioned earlier that… could you please tell me more about that. 
Examples of prompts in the interview questions included: 
 Q: What has your experience been with the delay in payment? 
 Prompt: has that affected the performance of the facility at all? 
8.5.2. Piloting the interview questions  
Following the development of the interview schedule, I piloted it on five health workers 
(a subset of the population of interest) in Wamba health facility in Wamba LGA, 
Nassarawa State to further refine the interview questions, look out for emergent themes  
(ideas that come from looking at the data) to inform questions, and to improve my 
interviewing skills. Table 8.1 presents the interview questions piloted. I ended the 
questions in each area/topic by asking the participants if they would like to add anything 
else before moving on to the next question.  
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Table 8.1 Preliminary interview questions for health workers in the Nigerian P4P 
pre-pilot 
Topic Interview questions 
Uncertainty and risk of not 
earning the incentive 
 I’ve heard that payments have been delayed in the 
past; can you please share your experiences with the 
delay in payments of incentives.  
 Are explanations for the delays in payments 
communicated to you? 
 Now, let us move on to talk about how individual 
performance is measured for payment of bonuses. 
What are your thoughts about the way the bonuses are 
shared to the health workers?  
Health worker understanding 
of the scheme 
 I would like get an idea of your understanding of the 
scheme; can you please tell me how this scheme 
works in this health facility? 
The role of the health facility 
manager in the P4P scheme 
 Can you tell me about some of the approaches that 
have been used in this health facility to improve 
performance? 
 How is the incentive earned used in this health 
facility]? 
 [For the health facility manager]: How do you decide 
how to utilise the incentives earned?  
The role of infrastructure  Have you faced any infrastructural challenges in 
delivering the health services required to earn the 
incentive? 
 If yes, what are they? 
 
Conducting the pilot interviews helped me to familiarise myself with the interview 
schedule, which allowed the interview subsequently to feel more natural in the other 
sites, helping the participants feel more comfortable and hopefully encourage honest 
answers (Shenton, 2004). In addition, the pilot interviews were transcribed verbatim and 
were reviewed by my supervisor (Professor Trevor Sheldon) and Dr Cath Jackson 
(member of my Thesis Advisory Panel) who has extensive experience with interviews.  
Based on lessons learnt from the pilot interviews and expert scrutiny, I made a number 
of changes to subsequent interviews, which are outlined below.  
 I used a simpler information sheet different from the one approved by the ethical 
committee. It contained all the relevant information but with less technical terms 
(see Appendix F5 for amended information sheets and evidence of ethics 
approval for the changes made). The original information sheet was still 
submitted to the NPHCDA and PHC director at the LGA, but the simpler 
version were given to the health workers. 
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 Interviewing style: I became more comfortable with long silences and avoided 
jumping too quickly from one topic to another.  
 I added more prompts and edited the interview questions to follow a coherent 
structure, with related question grouped together to ensure a smooth flow of the 
interview process (see Appendix F6 for amended interview questions). 
 I reframed several sensitive questions after I noticed participants’ discomfort in 
answering, perhaps because they did not want to be perceived in a negative light.  
For example, a question regarding the effect of the delay in payment was 
originally framed as “does the delay in payment affect you?” and the answers 
from all the participants in the pilot was that it does not affect them. However, 
after I rephrased the question as “does the delay in payment affect the health 
workers?” there were more open and detailed responses (see Appendix F6 for 
amended interview questions). 
 Finally, the pilot interview gave me an insight to potential additional emergent 
themes to explore what motivated the health workers to improve performance. 
Based on this, in the subsequent interviews, I asked participants to share their 
views and experiences on factors that motivated or demotivated them (see 
Appendix F6).  
8.6. Setting  
The Nigerian P4P pre-pilot was implemented in one Local Government Area (LGA) 
each of the three States: Fufore LGA in Adamawa State, Wamba LGA in Nassarawa 
State, and Ondo East LGA in Ondo State. There were 15 health facilities in Fufore 
LGA, with an average of six health workers in each centre; 11 health facilities in 
Wamba LGA with an average of five health workers in each centre, and ten health 
facilities in Ondo East LGA with an average of four health workers in each health 
facility (see Figure 8.1). The health workers in each health facility in each LGA had a 
mix of a health facility manager, nurses and community health extension workers 
(CHEWs). The study population was approximately 36 health facilities and 175 health 
workers, from the three LGAs of the three States (see Appendix F7 for detailed 
characteristics of the health facilities).  
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Figure 8.1 Overview of the Nigerian P4P pre-pilot 
8.6.1. Sample size  
Qualitative research unlike some quantitative methods has no strict rules as to the 
correct sample because one is not making statistical inferences about estimates 
(Bowling, 2014b). Researchers have suggested different sample sizes for different 
qualitative approaches. Morse (1994) suggested: 30 -50 interviews for an ethnographic 
approach, 30-50 for grounded theory approach and at least a sample size of 5 for a 
phenomenological approach. Creswell (1998) suggested 20-30 interviews for grounded 
theory approach and 5-25 for a phenomenology approach. Guest and his colleagues 
(2006) suggested that 15 is the smallest sample size acceptable for all forms of 
qualitative research. Alder (2012) suggested graduate students should aim for a sample 
size of loosely around 30 because it is a medium sized subject pool which permeates 
beyond a very small sample size without the problem of endless data gathering with 
limited time.  
Others determine sample size by saturation, which according to Ritchie et al. (2003) is 
the point of diminishing return to the qualitative sample when an increase in sample size 
does not necessarily lead to more information. However, one usually does not know the 
number of interviews it will take to reach saturation, and it might require a large sample 
size that exceeds the researchers’ resources (Mason, 2010). Therefore it was an 
impractical approach for this study. 
Having established that there are no clear-cut rules to appropriate sample size, Baker 
and Edwards (2012) suggest that the decisions about sample size should be made with a 
Total study population=36 health facilities 
and 175 health workers 
Fufore LGA, 
Adamawa State 
Health centres=15  
 90 health workers 
(average of 6 per 
facility) 
Wamba LGA, 
Nassarawa State 
Health centres=11  
55 health workers 
(average of 5 per 
facility) 
Ondo East LGA, 
Ondo State 
Health centres=10  
40 health workers 
(average of 4 per 
facility) 
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number of considerations: the resources available, the time frame of the study, and 
whether the sample is large enough to reflect the variation within the target population.  
Therefore, based on available resources and time frame of the study, I aimed to 
interview a sample of 30-45 participants with an approximately equal skill mix (health 
facility managers, nurses, and CHEWs), reflecting the variation within the target 
population.   
The sample size of 30-45 health workers represented an average of 10-15 participants in 
each LGA from the three States (Adamawa, Ondo, and Nassarawa) with an 
approximately equal mix of a maximum of five health facility managers, five nurses, 
and five CHEWs in each state.  However, I could only visit the two participating LGAs 
in two States (Ondo State and Nassarawa State). I could not visit the third State 
(Adamawa) due to terrorist attacks and safety issues. The sample size was therefore 
adjusted to 15-20 health workers per State to retain the overall sample size of 30-45 
participants.  
8.6.2. Sampling strategy  
This study considered one sampling strategy to select the health facilities of interest and 
the health workers from each of the selected health facilities. A ‘maximum variation’ 
type of purposive sampling was used to select the health facilities and health workers 
within each selected health facility.  This method of sampling allows the researcher to 
select units or cases that maximise diversity to aid exploration of variations (Palys and 
Fraser, 2008). With respect to health workers, it was considered that health workers 
across a range of qualifications might have different views and experiences (Palys and 
Fraser, 2008). For example, nurses might have different views or experiences with delay 
in payment compared to community health extension workers (CHEWs), which might 
affect their performance in different ways.  
 
Reports from the NPHCDA suggest that there were at least three health workers (the 
health facility manager, a nurse, and a CHEW) in each health facility (NPHCDA, 2012). 
Based on the assumption that all the health workers approached would be willing to 
participate in the research, I then estimated that I would need to interview health 
workers from at least five to six health facilities to achieve my target sample size of 15-
20 in each State. In order for the five to six selected health facilities to reflect maximum 
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variation in the performance/results of the P4P scheme, I aimed to select the two best 
performing, two worst performing, and two average performing health facilities (based 
on performance data presented in the previous chapter) in Wamba and Ondo East 
LGAs.   
8.6.3. Selecting the health facilities 
In order to purposively select the health facilities, I calculated the change in coverage of 
maternal and child health services (antenatal care, postnatal care, normal deliveries, 
VCT, tetanus vaccination, completed childhood immunization) from December 2011 to 
December 2012 for each health facility in each of the local government areas (outlined 
in chapter seven).  
I ranked each of the activities from the lowest to the highest, after which an aggregate of 
the ranks (numbers) were collected for each health facility. This was used to rank the 
health facilities in terms of absolute change in coverage of the selected activities (see 
Table 8.2) for ranks of the facilities for each State based on change in performance). 
 
Table 8.2 Ranks of the health facilities in each State 
Rank (according to 
performance) 
Nassarawa     
(Wamba LGA)  
Ondo              
(Ondo East LAG) 
Top performers  Wamba GH Bolorunduro GH 
Zalli  Fagbo 
Nakere Orisumbare 
Wamba Kolawole 
Average 
performers 
Wayo Matti Asatan 
Kwabe Epe 
Arum Chugbu Owena Bridge 
Mararaba Gongon  
Worst performers  Gwagi Oboto 
Kwarra Owena Tepo 
Yashi Madaki Italuworo  
(Selected health facilities in italics) 
 
As seen in Table 8.2, the top two performers in in Nassarawa State were Wamba GH 
and Zali. However, Zali health facility was inaccessible at the time of data collection 
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because of bad road networks combined with the bad weather (rainy season). Therefore, 
I substituted it with Nakare health facility (the next best performer).  In the same way, I 
could only visit one average performing health facility Arum Chugbu in Nassarawa 
because of the poor road networks. Finally, I chose Kwarra and Gwagi (instead of Yashi 
Madaki) as the two worst performers because Yashi Madaki was also inaccessible at the 
time of data collection. In total, I collected data from six health facilities in Nassarawa 
State: Wamba (pilot), Wamba GH, Nakare, Arum Chugbu, Gwagi, and Kwarra. The 
substitutions of some health facilities made in Nassarawa as a result of unforeseen 
consequences were considered to be acceptable, as they were still in the desired 
performance range, thus achieving the variation desired in the sample. 
 
In Ondo State, the health workers who were interviewed were selected from seven 
health facilities (see Table 8.2). The purposive (maximum variation) sampling method 
could not be strictly implemented for two reasons:  
 Fewer numbers of health workers per health facility compared to Nassarawa 
States 
 High levels of health worker absenteeism  
In order to maintain the maximum variation purposive sampling of the health facilities 
and to get close enough to the desired sample size (with a roughly equal mix of Health 
facility managers, nurses, and CHEWs), I interviewed health workers from seven health 
facilities: top two best performing health facilities (Bolorunduro and Fagbo), all three 
average performing health facilities ( Asatan, Epe, and Owena Bridge), and all three 
worst performing health facilities (Owena Tepo, Oboto, and Italuworo) (see Table 8.2).  
8.6.4. Identification and approaching potential participants  
I sought and was granted permission to visit and approach participants from the selected 
health facilities from the PHC director and the State Primary Health Care Development 
Agency (SPHCDA) in each LGA.  
I was introduced by a representative of PHC director in each of the LGAs to the 
manager at each health facility (otherwise known as the ‘in charge’) as an independent 
researcher from the University of York. The managers of each of the health facilities 
then introduced me to all the health workers after which I introduced my research, read 
out the contents of the information sheet (see Appendix F3 for information sheet) and 
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provided a copy for each person. Some of the health facilities had to be visited twice to 
introduce my research to all the members of staff, as they work in shifts. 
Appointment forms (see Appendix F8), and envelopes were distributed and left with the 
health workers for five days to allow sufficient time to think about if they wanted to 
participate in the research. Those who wished to be a part of the interview indicated this 
by picking an appropriate day and time for an interview in their appointment forms 
(with their names and telephone numbers) in a sealed envelope. Those who did not wish 
to participate were also instructed to leave the appointment form blank but also handed 
this back to me in a sealed envelope.  After all the health workers had handed in their 
appointment forms, I telephoned the interested participants to set up and confirm an 
interview.  
8.6.5. Interview sessions  
Data collection took place over six months: a month preliminary visit in March 2013 to 
observe the context, and interviews from June to October 2013.  
The interviews were conducted in English language and an interpreter was available.  
Participants were interviewed one-to-one in a private place that was free from 
distractions. This was chosen by the participant, usually an unoccupied room at the 
health facility, based on the premise that this familiarity may help the participants to 
relax, therefore resulting in productive interview (Shenton, 2004). 
The interviews began with me providing a summary of the research using the 
information sheet and ensuring the participant understood the research before 
progressing. I then read out the consent form to the participant, emphasising 
confidentiality, anonymity, and the right of the participant to withdraw from the study at 
any point, without an explanation. I also emphasised my status as an independent 
researcher, not affiliated with the P4P scheme implementers (The World Bank or the 
NPHCDA). Next, both the participant and I signed the consent forms (two copies: one 
kept by the participant and I kept the other copy). Assuring the participants of 
confidentiality, anonymity, and my status as an independent researcher is said to 
increase the likelihood of the participants’ honesty and openness about their 
experiences, views, and feelings (Krefting, 1991).To further try to encourage the 
participants to be honest, I stated that there were no right or wrong answers to the 
questions that would be asked.  
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To establish rapport, the first questions asked were general questions such as 
participants’ role and qualifications, and their general experience at the health facility, 
before moving on to the potentially more sensitive topics. Also, from time to time, 
during some of the interviews, I reflected back on what other participants had said 
(using them as probes) to gain a better understanding of their views and experiences. 
The interview sessions were audio recorded, with the permission of the participants. I 
also listened carefully, took notes and impressions of participants during and after the 
interviews (which were used in the data analyses in section 8.7). I used the interview 
questions as a checklist/topic guide. I also used probes and prompts in cases where the 
participants did not understand the question, needed further clarification, and to follow 
up from previous responses (to drill deeper). I was sensitive to cues, body languages, 
and silences, knowing when to wait or prompt. For example, in Ondo State, I sensed 
hesitation from one of the participants, after which I reminded her of the assurance of 
confidentiality and anonymity and the right to withdraw from the research at any time. 
The participant decided to withdraw from the study, which might have been beneficial 
to this study because a hesitant participant may give dishonest and biased 
data/contribution, thereby reducing the credibility of the study (Shenton, 2004). 
I then ended each interview by thanking the participant for their time and contribution. 
Each interview lasted an average of 50 minutes. The longest interview lasted about one 
hour 25 minutes and the shortest interview was about 30 minutes. 
 
8.7. Data Analysis 
To analyse the data generated from the semi-structured interview, I used the framework 
approach developed by Ritchie and Spencer (1994), which is an approach considered 
appropriate for health policy research, and for this study for a number of reasons. First, 
the matrix output proves an efficient way to organise, manage, and become familiar 
with the data, which is practical and feasible in this study to explore the variation in the 
views and experiences of the health workers interviewed (Gale et al., 2013, Ritchie and 
Spencer, 1994). Second, the framework approach is adaptable for both pre-set themes 
(inductive approaches), and emergent themes (deductive approaches) (Smith and Firth, 
2011), which was appropriate for this study in which emergent themes were anticipated. 
Third, in the framework analysis, the stages by which the results have been obtained 
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from the data are clear, visible and systematic, which enhances the rigour of the 
analytical processes of the study through an effective and transparent audit trail (Gale et 
al., 2013). Finally, framework analysis significantly facilitates comparison of data 
across the matrix (Gale et al., 2013), which was important in exploring and comparing 
the variations in views and experiences of the health workers to see if they explained the 
heterogeneous results of the Nigerian P4P pre-pilot.  
 
Other approaches to qualitative data analyses are often associated with a specific 
discipline, theoretical or philosophical ideas, which shape the process of analysis (Gale 
et al., 2013). Some examples are: Discourse analysis, which is associated with different 
aspects of language use in social interactions; Phenomenology, which involves 
experience and meaning; and Grounded theory that develops theory through data 
analysis (Strauss, 1987).  The Framework approach, however, is not associated with a 
particular philosophical or theoretical approach. Rather it is flexible tool that can be 
adapted for use in qualitative approaches with pre-set or emergent themes (Gale et al., 
2013). 
 
The framework approach is part of the family of data analysis approaches known as 
thematic analysis. This seeks to identify similarities and differences in qualitative data 
and explore relationships between themes in order to draw explanatory conclusions 
clustered around the theme (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003, Gale et al., 2013). The defining 
feature of framework analysis is the matrix output consisting of rows (cases: 
interviewee or groups of interviewees), columns (themes) and ‘cells’ of summarized 
data, which allows a comprehensive and robust analyses of the themes across the dataset 
(theme based approach), while maintaining the connection of the participants views to 
other aspects of the account (case based approach) (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994). The 
framework approach consists of five stages: Familiarization with data, Identification of 
thematic framework, Indexing/coding, Charting, and Mapping and interpretation 
(Ritchie and Spencer, 1994). The data were managed using Microsoft Word. I now 
describe the stages of analyses.  
8.7.1. Stage 1: Familiarization with the data  
Familiarization with the data involved transcription, immersion in the dataset, and 
preliminary interpretation of text to facilitate coding. In this stage, I transcribed 
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(verbatim) all 36 interviews which helped me familiarise myself with the data. I was 
able to remember almost each participant and revisit notes taken and impressions 
formed during the fieldwork as I transcribed each interview.  
 
After initial transcription, I read each transcript several times, further making notes and 
writing down impressions of possible emergent themes and/categories (see Figure 8.2 
for a sample of transcribed interview). Each transcript was then labelled and stored in a 
password-protected folder. 
8.7.2. Stage 2: Identification of the thematic framework 
The second step taken in the data analysis was to develop the thematic framework, 
which involved identifying and refining initial and emergent themes. This was carried 
out simultaneously with the third stage of analysis (indexing/coding), but for the sake of 
clarity, I first outline how I identified the thematic framework in this section, before 
explaining the process of indexing in the next section. 
 
 I started out with initial themes selected based on previous literature and evidence 
(from chapter seven), a deductive approach (Gale et al., 2013).  
The initial themes were: 
 Uncertainty of earning the incentive in terms of: delay in payment, incomplete 
payment, communication, and the assessment tool. 
 Health worker understanding of the P4P scheme. 
 Management and administration of the P4P scheme (the role of health facility 
managers) 
 The role of infrastructure in the P4P scheme 
 
After familiarising myself with the data, I looked to see if other themes (dominant and 
frequent pattern that was relevant to the research question) emerged from the data (an 
inductive approach to analysis) (Burnard et al., 2008). Using this combined approach of 
deductive and inductive analyses ensured that all the relevant experiences or views of 
the participants on the area of interest were analysed, producing findings that reflect the 
participants’ views and experiences and not mine (the researcher) (Mays and Pope, 
2000). 
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Figure 8.2 Sample of transcribed interview with initial impressions of categories
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Following the familiarisation with the data, an emergent theme centred on ‘motivation’, 
in which participants talked about other contextual and implementation factors (that 
influenced their performance in the scheme), some of which were not inherent to the 
P4P scheme. These factors included infrastructure, bad roads/mobility issues, and lack 
of manpower. Based on this, to avoid repetition in the findings, I incorporated the 
original initial theme ‘the role of infrastructure in the P4P scheme’ under this emergent 
theme, as it was one of the categories discussed by the participants under motivation.  
Therefore, the final thematic framework consisted of four themes (three initial themes 
and one emergent theme). 
8.7.3. Stage 3: Indexing (coding) 
Indexing/coding involved applying the thematic frame work to the data using labels or 
codes that correspond to different themes. In this stage, I reread the transcripts several 
times to develop textual codes or categories, which summarised the participants’ views 
within each theme while retaining links to original data (see Table 8.3). I also 
highlighted quotes in transcripts that illustrated the view or experience being described. 
 
These categories identified were refined several times to accommodate all the relevant 
data provided by the participants. The categories and themes were then used to form a 
‘coding index’ (see Table 8.4), which was applied to the whole dataset as a means of 
systematically organising the data in preparation for the next stage of analysis 
(charting).  
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Table 8.3 An example of development of categories for under Theme: motivation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cases Quotes from interview transcript  Category  
EY1 “We are actually being paid by P4P for the work done; as the 
governments do not pay us on time usually. Now because of the P4P, the 
staff can go into the hard to reach areas using the incentive; they are 
motivated to go on more outreaches to mobilize patients. We are also 
building a new structure to provide more wards in the health facility 
because the building that we are now is pretty small and we have just one 
admission ward.  
More money for us means more work done. Ideally, they health workers 
are supposed to be focused on their duties whether or not they are given 
P4P bonuses but the truth is that, this is not the case. It is not that they are 
not working, but the potential of earning bonuses as greatly improved 
their output and it has allowed health workers to work better. The bonuses 
sensitize them to do more being that they know that something is coming 
at the end of the day”.  
Bonuses 
(money)  
EX1 “Well, we let them realize that the bonuses are not our salary.  We do this 
work for altruistic purposes. If the government is not paying us, they will 
still pay you later on. The bonuses are minor. How much is the bonus 
compared to the salaries? If the bonuses stop, I think I will still continue 
because a foundation has been laid. I have realized that the more you see 
patients, the more you understand, and the more you have knowledge. 
Without seeing patients and practicing, you cannot progress.  
One health worker even told me that she has improved on her skills 
because we now attend to more patients and we can put our knowledge to 
work. We are very happy about that. That makes me happy even more 
than the money. I feel more exposed to many new cases. I now feel like I 
my doing my job. Even if the bonus goes away, the way we work now will 
be sustained. P4P can go, it is a programme. We have had many 
programmes before but I know that this one will have a longer lasting 
impact”. 
Knowledge  
NX1 “The environment is better for we the health workers to stay at our duty 
posts now. We are now enjoying the place; out of the money we got, we 
bought essentials like generator, fridge, some equipment, and TV. There is 
nothing that other health facilities are enjoying in the city that we don’t 
have. So we enjoy the place better now”. 
Equipment 
and Structural 
improvement  
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Table 8.4 Final coding index 
Themes  Subthemes  Categories/codes  
Uncertainty of 
earning the incentive  
Delay in payment  Delay in payment reduces motivation 
and or performance  
 Delay in payment reduces performance 
but not motivation 
Incomplete 
payment 
 Negative effect on performance  
 No effect on health facility performance  
Individual 
assessment tool 
 Assessment tool is fair and should not 
be changed  
 Assessment tool is fair but should be 
improved to further reflect individual 
contribution  
 Assessment tool is biased and should be 
improved to further reflect individual 
contribution  
Communication   Reasons for changes communicated 
through ‘hearsay’ 
 Reasons for changes not communicated 
effectively  
Health worker 
understanding of the 
P4P scheme 
  Good working knowledge of the 
programme  
 Aware of changes in the programme  
 Average working knowledge of the 
programme  
 Unaware about changes in the 
programme  
Management and 
administration of the 
P4P scheme (the role 
of health facility 
managers) 
  Hiring more staff  
 Gifts to patients  
 Outreaches and home visits  
 Equipment and structural improvement 
 Improved supervision  
 Health workers nicer and more 
welcoming to patients  
 Free/subsidized services and or drugs  
 Effective use of feedback  
 Feedback given but not implemented 
Motivation   Motivating 
factors improving 
performance 
 Bonuses (money)  
 Knowledge (education and experience)  
 Infrastructural improvement  
 Positive thoughts towards peer 
reporting   
Demotivating 
factors decreasing 
performance 
 Structural challenges (insufficient 
infrastructure to meet targets) 
 Competition from ‘quacks’ /other health 
facilities  
 Mobility (bad terrain/roads)  
 Man power 
 Negative thoughts towards peer 
reporting 
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8.7.4. Stage 4: Charting  
Charting involved grouping themes and subthemes, elaboration of themes, and 
comparisons of themes across the participants. After coding the data, I entered the 
summarised data into a framework matrix in order to easily look across the dataset to 
identify patterns and connections within and between the themes. The framework matrix 
combined both the theme based (looking down) and case based approach (looking 
across) for the whole dataset. Table 8.5 shows a sample of the framework matrix. Each 
row represents a participant (case), columns represent themes, and cells contain the 
summarised data (code) for each case within the corresponding theme or subtheme.  
8.7.5. Stage 5: Mapping and interpretation  
Mapping and interpretation involved searching for patterns and associations within the 
data, and linking the interpretation of the themes with literature to construct an 
explanation or meaning. In this final stage of analysis, I created descriptive and 
explanatory accounts of the data. The explanatory accounts began with reflection on the 
original data and on the previous analytical stages. This was to ensure the views and 
experiences of the health workers were accurately reflected, and to minimise 
misinterpretation of the data (Gale et al., 2013). I then identified patterns in the data 
through general comparisons of the individual participants and participants’ clusters: 
looking for related themes and searching for explanation/causality (with the help of 
existing knowledge). Specifically, I manipulated the framework matrix (produced from 
the subsequent section, Table 8.2) for each participants cluster to facilitate comparisons. 
The participants’ clusters explored were professional qualification (health facility 
managers, nurses, CHEWSs and JCHEWs), performance (top performers, average 
performers, and low performers), and States (Ondo and Nassarawa).   
In the final stages of the analysis, I used visual charts and maps to help illustrate and 
make sense of relationship between themes and categories (see Figure 8.3 and 8.4 for 
sample charts). The findings were then compared and contrasted with established 
literature and the theoretical perspectives relating to incentive schemes in health care to 
create a comprehensive explanatory account. 
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Table 8.5 A sample of the framework matrix 
Case  Uncertainty of 
earning the 
incentive (Theme) 
Delay in payment Health worker 
understanding of the 
P4P scheme 
Management and administration of the 
P4P scheme(role of the health facility 
manager) 
Moti
vatio
n  
Motivating factors 
improving performance Incomplete payment 
Individual assessment 
tool 
Demotivating factors 
decreasing performance 
Communication  
NX1a Delay in payment reduces motivation and or 
performance  
 Good working 
knowledge of 
the programme 
 Aware of 
changes in the 
programme 
 
 Free/subsidized services and or drugs  
 Changes in professionalism and 
manners 
 Equipment and structural 
improvement 
 Health workers nicer and more 
welcoming to patients 
 Effective use of feedback 
 Bonuses  
 Positive thoughts towards 
peer reporting Negative effect on health facility performance 
Assessment tool is biased and should be 
improved to further reflect individual 
contribution 
 Lack of man power 
 Competition 
Reasons for changes not communicated 
effectively 
NX1b
  
 
Delay in payment reduces motivation and or 
performance  
 Good working 
knowledge of 
the programme 
 Aware of 
changes in the 
programme 
 
 Equipment and structural 
improvement 
 Free/subsidized services and or drugs  
 Hiring more staff 
 Gifts to patients 
 Health workers nicer and more 
welcoming to patients 
 
 Bonuses  
 Knowledge  
 Positive thoughts towards 
peer reporting 
Negative effect on health facility performance 
Assessment tool is biased and should be 
improved to further reflect individual 
contribution 
 Lack of man power 
 Infrastructural challenges 
Reasons for changes not communicated 
effectively 
NX1c Delay in payment reduces motivation and or  Good working  Free/subsidized services and or drugs   Knowledge  
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Case  Uncertainty of 
earning the 
incentive (Theme) 
Delay in payment Health worker 
understanding of the 
P4P scheme 
Management and administration of the 
P4P scheme(role of the health facility 
manager) 
Moti
vatio
n  
Motivating factors 
improving performance Incomplete payment 
Individual assessment 
tool 
Demotivating factors 
decreasing performance 
Communication  
  performance  knowledge of 
the programme 
 Aware of 
changes in the 
programme 
 
 Hiring more staff 
 Gifts to patients 
 Outreaches and home visits 
 Equipment and structural 
improvement 
 Health workers nicer and more 
welcoming to patients 
 Effective use of feedback 
Negative effect on health facility performance 
Assessment tool is biased and should be 
improved to further reflect individual 
contribution 
 Lack of man power 
Reasons for changes not communicated 
effectively 
NX2a Delay in payment reduces performance but not 
motivation 
 Average 
working 
knowledge of 
the programme 
 Aware of 
changes in the 
programme 
 Equipment and structural changes 
 Health workers nicer and more 
welcoming to patients 
 Effective use of feedback 
 Positive thoughts towards 
peer reporting    
No effect on health facility performance 
Assessment tool is fine but should be improved 
to further reflect individual contribution 
Reasons for changes not communicated 
effectively 
NX2b Delay in payment reduces motivation and or 
performance  
 Average 
working 
knowledge of 
the programme 
 Aware of 
changes in the 
programme 
 Health workers nicer and more 
welcoming to patients 
 Effective use of feedback 
 Bonuses 
 Negative effect on health facility performance 
Assessment tool is fine but should be improved 
to further reflect individual contribution 
 Lack of man power 
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Figure 8.3 Sample chart of the relationship between general performance and 
contextual and implementation 
 
Figure 8.4 Sample chart illustrating the contextual and implementation factors 
linked to top performing health facilities 
 
8.8. Trustworthiness of the research  
The final section of this chapter describes the strategies I employed to ensure 
trustworthiness of the research. Trustworthiness refers to the methods employed in the 
research process to improve quality and rigour of the research, which is comparable to 
reliability and validity in quantitative studies (Shenton, 2004, Murphy et al., 1998).  
There is considerable debate associated with terminologies used in assessing the 
quality/rigour of qualitative research but the techniques suggested by researchers are 
similar. They include clarity of research questions, suitability of the qualitative enquiry 
top 
performers  
health workers 
motivated by 
knowledge and 
infastrucutre  
Health workers 
have good 
working 
knowledge of 
the PBF scheme 
health facility 
managers hire 
more staff  and 
give useful gifts 
to patients 
effective use of 
feedback 
health workers 
are nicer and 
more 
welcoming to 
patients  
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to the research questions, consideration of other plausible methods, transparency, 
reflexivity, detailed description and justification of methods and analysis, relevance 
(potential generalizability beyond groups or settings studies) (Murphy et al., 1998, 
Mays and Pope, 2000, Dixon-Woods et al., 2004, Lincon and Guba, 1985). 
In the subsequent subsections, I describe the techniques I employed to ensure the 
trustworthiness of this research under the four criteria proposed by Lincon and Guba 
(1985), the most common criteria for judging trustworthiness in health services 
research. They are credibility, dependability, conformability, and transferability.  
8.8.1. Credibility  
A credible study is one in which the findings are as close to reality as possible (Shenton, 
2004, Guba, 1981). Credibility is threatened by participants responding based on social 
desirability rather than social experience (Krefting, 1991). This can be improved by the 
researchers being familiar with context (prolonged engagement) and strategies to 
promote openness in participants (Seale and Silverman, 1997, Shenton, 2004). I also 
sought to achieve credibility in a number of other ways, namely adoption of established 
research methods, triangulation, negative/deviant case analysis (elements of the data 
that appear to contradict patterns or explanations that are emerging from data analysis), 
peer/expert scrutiny of the research, and consistency of findings with previous work 
(Shenton, 2004, Porter, 2007), as described in the following sections. 
Familiarisation with context and promoting open responses in participants 
I familiarized myself with the contexts where the data were to be collected, through 
preliminary observations and informal chats with potential participants and P4P scheme 
implementers (captured in chapter seven). This was useful in informing the research 
questions, shaping the interview questions, and gaining the trust of the potential 
participants, which can encourage open and honest, producing data close to reality of 
the respondent (Krefting, 1991, Shenton, 2004). Other tactics used to encourage open 
and honest responses (see section 8.6.1 and 8.6.5) were as follows. I sought to establish 
rapport during interview sessions, I interviewed the participants in places where they 
felt comfortable, I emphasised anonymity and confidentiality, and used iterative 
questioning in which I reframed questions in certain ways to help illicit more personal 
responses. 
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Established research method 
The adoption of well-established and justified research approach from literature and 
comparable studies in section 8.2, demonstrates credibility by reflecting the use of 
appropriate methods for answering the research question (Shenton, 2004, Porter, 2007). 
Triangulation 
Triangulation involves analyzing the research question from multiple perspectives, 
which enhances credibility if the findings from the different perspective arrive at the 
same conclusion (Rolfe, 2006). There are different types of triangulation methods, 
which include data, environmental, investigator, theory, and methodological (Shenton, 
2004). The methods of triangulation used in this study were data and methodological 
triangulation.  
Data triangulation uses one method (e.g. in-depth interviews) to collect information 
from different sources or groups of people and/or groups of people in different 
sites/places (Flick, 2014). In this study, I collected data from different groups of health 
workers in different health centers (see section 8.6.2) to compare multiple perspectives. 
Although Mays and Pope (2000) argue that data triangulation may not necessarily be a 
way to ‘validate’ findings or conclusion because the different groups might have 
opposing views and experiences. Either way, data triangulation ensures 
comprehensiveness in the data collection process (Mays and Pope, 2000).  
Methodological triangulation involves the use of other qualitative and/or quantitative 
methods to explore the same research question for consistency in the findings (Shenton, 
2004). This qualitative research was conducted to help make sense of the variation in 
the preliminary results of the Nigerian P4P pre-pilot. The qualitative findings (in 
chapter nine) explain and coincide with the preliminary evaluation results of the 
Nigerian P4P pre-pilot, which increases confidence in the findings. 
Environmental triangulation was not applicable because environment was not a 
potential influencing factor on data collection (Thurmond, 2001). Similarly, investigator 
and theory triangulation
 
 (which involves the use of several different investigators in the 
analysis process and multiple perspectives, usually professionals outside the field of 
study to interpret a single set of data) were not practical in this study because this study 
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is part of a doctoral thesis and there are large amounts of data/transcripts involved, 
which would have been time consuming (Flick, 2014).  
Deviant/negative cases  
I thoroughly examined the data generated from the interviews during analysis, which 
included identification and discussing cases that contradicted the dominant findings 
(deviant cases) in the findings of this study (chapter nine). Explanation of deviant cases 
enhances credibility by reflecting the thoroughness of the analysis, indicating the 
findings presented and discussed reflects those that are relevant to the research question, 
and not based on assumptions or preferences of the researcher (Krefting, 1991, Shenton, 
2004). 
Expert scrutiny of the study 
The rigour of this research was monitored and thoroughly scrutinised by my PhD 
supervisor and my Thesis Advisory Panel, consisting of my supervisor and two 
experienced health service researchers (including one with expert experience in 
qualitative research). Credibility was enhanced through their feedback and suggestions, 
which brought a fresh perspective to the study, pointing out issues in methodology and 
analysis, as discussed in section 8.5.2.  
Consistency of findings with previous research 
Krefting (1991) proposed that relating the findings of the study to previous research is 
also an important factor in enhancing credibility because the confidence in the findings 
is increased by the degree or level of consistency of the findings of the research with an 
established or existing body of knowledge. This might not be possible in situations 
where the research is a completely new area of enquiry. In addition, consistency with 
previous work may not necessarily reflect the credibility of the findings but reflect 
similar biases in the studies. Therefore, in this study, it was important to demonstrate 
the rigour of the research to increase confidence in the findings, before comparing it to 
previous research in the next chapter. 
8.8.2. Confirmability 
In a conventional sense, confirmability refers to the degree to which the findings of the 
research could be confirmed or corroborated by others (Shenton, 2004, Lincon and 
                                  Chapter 8: Methods of the formative evaluation of the Nigerian P4P scheme 
 220 
Guba, 1985). Researchers have, however, argued that the concept of confirmability is 
almost impossible to achieve in qualitative research, because the researcher brings a 
unique perspective to the research, and is part of the research process, through their 
assumptions, background, qualifications etc. (Mantzoukas, 2005, Ortlipp, 2008).  Miles 
and Huberman (1994) suggest that a key technique for confirmability is the extent to 
which the researcher states his or her own predispositions or assumptions and considers 
how this affects the research process (a process known as reflexivity). A reflexive study 
should include steps taken to ensure the findings of the research are the result of the 
experiences and ideas of the informants, rather than the characteristics and preferences 
of the researcher (Ortlipp, 2008, Meyrick, 2006, Mantzoukas, 2005). 
To establish confirmability, this study was conducted and reported reflexively. First, I 
acknowledged reasons and rationales underpinning decisions made and methods 
adopted (the reasons for favouring one approach over others) and I explained the 
strengths and weaknesses in the methods actually employed throughout the study. 
Second, I considered the strengths and limitations associated with my background, 
qualifications, and experience in the discussion of the findings in chapter nine.  
8.8.3. Dependability  
Dependability is concerned with the extent of the repeatability of  the process of the 
research (Miles and Huberman, 1994). A dependable study will, therefore, clearly 
document every step of the research in detail, describing the changes that occurred in 
settings and their potential effect on the research, thereby enabling a future researcher to 
repeat the work  (Shenton, 2004). In addition an in-depth transparent description of the 
research allows the reader to assess the extent to which robust research practices have 
been followed and to develop a thorough understanding of the methods and their 
effectiveness (Meyrick, 2006, Porter, 2007). 
In this study, I attempted to achieve dependability by:  
 Stating the aims and objectives of the study clearly in section 8.1. 
 Describing in detail the research design and its implementation, describing what 
was planned and executed (section 8.6). 
 Providing the operational detail of data gathering and what was done in the field 
including the changes that occurred (section 8.6.3 and 8.6.4). 
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 Presenting the study as a reflexive one (acknowledging how my background and 
experiences might have influenced the research, in chapter nine)  
8.8.4. Transferability  
Transferability in qualitative research refers to the degree to which the findings of the 
research can be applied or generalised to other contexts or settings with similar 
populations, parameters, and characteristics (Miles and Huberman, 1994). It has 
however been argued that the researcher conducting the study knows only the context of 
their research (not the one the reader wants to apply it to) and he or she cannot make 
transferability inferences, but that other researchers are able to relate or transfer the 
findings of the research to their contexts if it is similar to that described in the study 
(Firestone, 1993, Lincon and Guba, 1985). Therefore, transferability can be enhanced 
through a detailed description of the research context and assumptions central to the 
research, which helps the readers to determine how far they can be confident in 
transferring the findings to their own context (Shenton, 2004).  
Transferability in this study is enhanced by detailed description of the context of this 
study in the two previous chapters. In addition, the methods used are written up clearly, 
detailing the context in which the data were collected, data collection methods, length of 
data collection, time period over which data were collected, the number and description 
of sites and participants as seen in section 8.6. 
 
8.9. Summary 
In summary, in this chapter, I have provided details of the methods I used to explore 
health workers’ views and experiences on potentially relevant contextual and 
implementation factors in the Nigerian P4P scheme. I also focused on the strategies 
employed to increase the trustworthiness of the study, namely reflexivity, detailed 
description of methods and context, and deviant case analysis. In the next chapter, I 
report and discuss the findings, providing participants’ quotes from multiple 
perspectives and providing policy and research recommendations (based on the 
findings) to The World Bank and The NPHDCA on the Nigerian P4P scheme. 
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Chapter 9 Views and experiences of health 
workers in the Nigerian P4P scheme  
In this chapter, I present the views and experiences of 36 health workers from 14 health 
facilities who took part. I start by providing an overview of the participants. I then 
provide a comprehensive report of the findings, supported by participant quotes. 
Finally, I discuss the findings of the study, incorporating the strengths and weakness of 
the study and drawing out recommendations to improve the Nigerian P4P scheme and 
research in the field.  
9.1. Overview of Participants 
All 37 participants approached gave informed consent to be interviewed for the 
research. However, one participant in Ondo State dropped out 15 minutes into the 
interview. The data from this participant were not included in analysis, leaving a sample 
size of 36. The target sample size of 30-45 participants was therefore achieved.  
Table 9.1 presents the characteristics of the participants. In total, I interviewed 36 
participants from 14 health facilities (six in Nassarawa and eight in Ondo), comprising 
of 13 health facility managers (six in Nassarawa and seven in Ondo), eight nurses (six 
in Nassarawa and two in Ondo), ten CHEWs and lab technicians (six in Nassarawa and 
four in Ondo), and five Junior CHEWs (three in Nassarawa and two in Ondo).  
Table 9.1 Overview of participants 
Health worker 
qualification 
Top performers  Average 
performers  
Worst performers Total  
Ondo  Nassarawa Ondo Nassarawa  Ondo Nassarawa  
Health facility 
managers 
2 3 2 1 3 2 13 
Nurses  1 4 1 1 0 1 8 
Community health 
extension workers 
(CHEWs) and Lab 
technicians 
1 4 0 1 3 1 10 
Junior CHEWs 0 1 1 0 1 2 5 
Total  4 12 4 3 7 6 36  
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9.2. Findings 
I present the findings under each theme in two parts. First, to portray a full account of 
the participants, I present views and experiences of all participants on contextual and 
implementation factors that influence the outcomes of the Nigerian P4P scheme, which 
are supported by participant quotes. The selection of participant quotes
13
 was guided by 
a number of aims: giving a voice to all the participants while ensuring diversity across 
participant clusters. Some quotes were used to typify a theme while others were chosen 
because they provided a well-articulated point. In some cases, I present quite lengthy 
quotes to give a full understanding of the account and a richer context.  
 Second, I describe and use ‘frequency’ tables to illustrate the variation in views and 
experiences of ‘participant clusters’, which were purposively selected (see chapter 8) to 
facilitate comparison between participants to examine the extent to which they may 
possibly explain the variation in performance results in the Nigerian P4P pre-pilot. The 
groups compared were: health Facilities (worst performers vs. average vs. top), States 
(Ondo vs. Nassarawa), and health worker qualification (health facility managers vs. 
other ranks). 
While the use of numbers or frequencies may be considered to be controversial in 
qualitative research, some researchers have argued that the use of counts or display of 
numeric data is an important part of interpreting data because patterns and deviations 
from patterns emerge with greater clarity (Maxwell, 2010, Sandelowski, 2001). 
Therefore, I present a tabular description of the findings, focusing mostly on the 
variation. In describing the findings, I use terms such as ‘few’ (below 25%), ‘some’ (25-
50%), ‘many’ (51-75%), ‘most’ (above 75%) instead of the actual percentages, so as not 
to ‘over-count’ (a disadvantage of using numerical data in qualitative research), which 
can detract the reader from the primary focus of understanding the views and 
experiences of the participants (Maxwell, 2010, Sandelowski, 2001).   
The findings are presented under four (three pre-set and one emergent) themes: 
uncertainty of earning the incentive, health worker understanding of the P4P scheme, 
management and administration of the scheme (the role of health facility managers), 
and motivation. 
                                                          
13
 To avoid repetition, participant quotes are only presented in the first part of the findings, as they still 
apply to the second part of the findings. In cases where there was considerable variation in the 
responses between participant clusters, the quotes selected were chosen to reflect this. 
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9.2.1. Theme 1: Uncertainty of earning the incentive 
Most of the participants expressed distrust and uncertainty of earning the incentive, 
which was evident across four areas (subthemes), namely: delay in payment, incomplete 
payment, communication, and individual assessment tool. The first three subthemes 
were inter-connected and are discussed together in the following section. 
9.2.1.1. Subthemes:  Delay in payment, Incomplete payment, and Communication  
Most of the participants thought that delay in payment, incomplete payment, and 
ineffective communication (about reasons for delay in payment and other changes in the 
programme) triggered uncertainty and distrust in the P4P payment system, which had a 
negative impact on their behaviour and hindered potential improvements in the health 
facilities. This was mostly because planned improvement strategies that required funds, 
such as transportation to hard-to-reach areas or purchase of essential equipment were 
restricted due to delay in payment of the incentive and incomplete payment of the 
incentive. In the same way, most participants expressed that their motivation to keep up 
with the required quality and performance targets was reduced as a result of lack of 
communication about reasons for delay in payment or change in unit prices, as they felt 
they were being cheated for the money they worked for. Table 9.2 illustrates some 
examples of these views.  
An alternative (deviant) view offered by a small number of participants was that while 
the delay in payment reduced performance of the health facility, it did not affect their 
motivation because they felt that bonuses should not affect the way they did their jobs, 
some of whom had chosen that line of work for altruistic purposes. Similarly, regarding 
incomplete payment a few participants thought that it did not affect the health facility’s 
performance because they had saved from previous payments, which accommodated the 
subsequent reduction in payment. Finally, a few of the participants said they had 
received explanations for the changes in the programme, which turned out to be 
rumours and speculations (a result of ineffective communication). Table 9.2 presents 
examples of these alternative views. 
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Table 9.2 Health workers’ views and experiences with uncertainty of earning the 
incentive  
Dominant views 
Delay in payment  Incomplete payment  Communication  
EX1 (Health facility manager in a top 
performing facility in Ondo State) 
“When the payments were not 
forthcoming, initially the people were 
complaining but later, they were 
frustrated and were insinuating that 
maybe there are some sharp practices 
(corruption) going on somewhere, which 
is not impossible. So it is affecting trust 
and when the health workers don’t trust 
that they will get paid, they will be lax 
about carrying out their duties. The P4P 
programme needs to be implemented 
efficiently and consistently for maximum 
impact”. 
 
NY1 (Health facility manager in an 
average performing facility in 
Nassarawa State) 
 
“…They (health workers) started saying 
that I (the in-charge) have received the 
money and I have spent it instead of 
sharing it with them. But I told them no, 
it is not like that, keep working the 
money will come. But they said they will 
not work extra hard and not get the 
money. So they stopped working… and 
when they money finally came it was 
small and they were sad, saying look at 
what we could have gained. So it really 
affected us, you can see the fluctuation 
in the results because of that…” 
NY4 (JCHEW, average 
performing facility in 
Nassarawa State)  
“When we first started, the 
bonus was OK and the 
members of staff were happy. 
But they have reduced the 
money and now the staffs are 
complaining that they are 
being overworked and not 
getting what is due them”  
 
 
 
 
EZ1 (Health facility 
manager, low preforming 
facility in Ondo State)  
“Some health workers have 
started complaining that the 
work is too much and the 
money is not enough; they are 
not putting in as much effort 
as they used to before the 
money was reduced 
EX1 (Health facility 
manager, top performing 
facility in Ondo State) 
“The programme is a very 
good programme but if there 
is way it could be fine-tuned 
so that it would be much more 
efficiently run. There is need 
for more transparency and 
communication. The 
communication gap should be 
filled” 
 
 
NZ3(CHEW, worst 
performing health facility, 
Nassarawa State) 
“the lack of information 
affected some health workers 
because they thought they 
were being deceived because 
we didn’t get any information 
regarding the money, so it 
made people more relaxed, 
thereby affecting 
performance” 
 
Deviant/negative cases 
Delay in payment  Incomplete payment  Communication  
NZ3 (lab technician at a low 
performing health facility in 
Nassarawa State) 
“I have human sympathy and that is why 
I am doing this job. So not receiving the 
bonuses on time will not make me relent 
in my efforts; it doesn’t affect my 
motivation as long as I have the 
necessary kits. I can only speak for 
myself; I have that heart in which my 
primary aim is the welfare of the patient. 
I am not trying to praise or flatter 
myself”. The delay however affects other 
things such as buying of some test kits 
and other laboratory equipment, which 
reduces our performance here” 
 
NX1 (health facility 
manager, top performing 
facility in Nassarawa State) 
“The reduction in payment 
didn’t affect us here because 
we save some of the money, 
we do not spend everything at 
once, because we anticipate 
that things like this will 
happen, we are in Nigeria, it 
is just the way the system is. 
So we plan accordingly. In the 
end, when they reduced the 
money, we still had money 
saved up, so we worked with 
that”. 
EY2 (Nurse, average 
preforming health facility in 
Ondo State) 
“Our in charge said the 
people at the NPHCDA want 
to ‘spoil’ us with money that 
they are not supposed to give 
us that money and that is why 
we have not received out 
payment. But we know we are 
working extra hard and we 
deserve the money”. 
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9.2.1.2. Subtheme: Individual assessment tool 
The views and experiences of the participants regarding the subtheme: ‘individual 
assessment tool’ were more diverse in terms of its perceived influence on health worker 
behaviour in the P4P scheme. There were three distinct views.  
Some of the participants thought that it was a fair way of distributing the bonuses 
because all the criteria they were being judged on contributed to improving performance 
of the health facility. They also recognised that assessment by their individual 
contribution (e.g. number of deliveries they assisted with) might be unfair to some 
because they work shifts and some shifts might be beneficial. For example, there might 
be more opportunities to go on outreach and home visits patients during the day 
compared to night shifts. 
Other participants thought that whilst the method of assessment was good, it should be 
improved to include individual contribution to health facility earn the incentive. These 
health workers also thought that if the bonuses were shared based on their direct input 
(not captured in the assessment form) such as, the number of deliveries they take, home 
visits and outreaches; they would try harder because they would have the potential to 
earn more.  
Finally a few participants discussed that the way the bonuses was shared was unfair 
because health facility managers used ranks to share the bonuses, which did not 
recognise their own individual contribution in helping the health facility earn the 
incentive. This made them feel that the allocation of the bonuses was not performance 
based, thereby discouraging high performance of some health workers. 
Participant quotes on the views and experiences of the regarding the assessment tool are 
presented in Table 9.3. 
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Table 9.3 Health workers’ views and experiences regarding the individual 
assessment tool  
Assessment tool is fine 
and should not be 
changed 
Assessment tool is fine but should 
be improved to further reflect 
individual contribution 
Assessment tool (rank) is biased and 
should be improved to further 
reflect individual contribution 
EY1 (Health facility 
manager in an average 
performing facility in 
Ondo State) 
“I like the assessment 
form because flow of 
patients varies by the 
duty that you are. While 
it may benefit others, it 
wouldn’t be fair on 
some. The way I see it, 
the assessment form 
makes it fair”. 
 
 
NY1 (Nurse, top 
performing facility in 
Nassarawa State) 
“We work according to 
our qualification: e.g. 
I’m the only midwife 
here so I handle 
deliveries and I let the 
CHEW handle the 
outpatient department 
(OPD). So it is 
teamwork and all of us 
are doing our part. So, I 
don’t think it will be a 
good idea to share the 
bonuses based on our 
direct contribution 
because we have 
different skills and some 
things attract more 
money than others. For 
example, we receive 
more money for 
deliveries than for 
growth monitoring 
(OPD). Both are equally 
important health work 
and different people do 
it but to base the 
allocation of bonuses on 
that is unfair”. 
 
EX1 (Health facility manager, top 
performing facility in Ondo 
State) 
“…there was a time when the staff 
went for outreach for immunization 
and I divided the health workers 
into two to go to different wards 
(villages). At the end of the day, 
when they got back from the 
outreach, I reviewed the patients 
both groups have seen. It turned out 
that one group had seen a lot more 
patients than the other. Apparently 
the group with fewer patients had 
sat down in one place and didn’t 
really bother to move about. Then I 
told them that when the P4P money 
comes, this will be taken into 
consideration and I will not pay 
them as much as the other group. 
They were not happy with what I 
had told them but because they 
didn’t want their bonuses reduced, 
the next day they went back to that 
same ward and went to see a lot 
more patients. So if P4P includes 
outreach for basis of sharing bonus, 
I know the work will boost more…” 
 
EZ1 (Health facility manager, 
low performing health facility in 
Ondo State) 
“I think it will be better to assess 
performance based on the 
individuals direct input, because 
you will know that it is based on 
exactly the amount of work that you 
do that you are being paid for, 
which will make you want to work 
more. They (health workers) will be 
more focused, they will have a clear 
target on how much they want to 
earn and they will work to earn it. 
All the other items on the individual 
evaluation form are still important 
and we can share the money 
according to a combination of the 
two. Doing it this way will make the 
health workers do more work 
because they will be focused and 
will have a target” 
 
NX2 (Nurse, top performing health 
facility in Nassarawa State) 
“Somebody who is not doing any work 
in a higher rank will receive more 
money compared to me that is working 
in the maternity section and the labour 
room, on my feet most of the day 
working hard.  I receive less, just 
because I am in a lower rank, and you 
call that performance based? It is not. 
I would prefer if the bonuses were 
shared based on the work that I do 
(direct input) because that will mean it 
is performance based. For example, if 
I take 10 deliveries, I expect to be paid 
based on that because I have worked 
for it. I want something that will reflect 
how much work I have done but if the 
bonuses are shared by rank, it does not 
reflect the amount of work done 
because a lot of them in the higher 
ranks just seat in their offices, doing 
nothing” 
 
 
EX1 (Health facility manager, top 
performing facility in Ondo State) 
“You see, the individual evaluation 
form is quite vague, and to tell the 
truth, as the health facility manager, I 
don’t look at all the points, I just share 
the bonuses according to ranks when it 
comes. If the programme implementers 
can come up something like this: you 
have performed this in outreaches and 
you should be give this as bonus, it will 
be a great idea because it will 
encourage people to work harder and 
it is more transparent and it reflects 
what P4P Is about, because 
sometimes, a volunteer health worker 
does more work than a nurse on the 
same duty or even 2 nurses on the 
same duty and one does more work 
than the other and just because they 
are on the same rank, they get the 
same bonuses. The one who worked 
harder will be inclined not to work as 
hard in the coming quarter since the 
bonuses will still stay the same” 
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9.2.1.3. Variations between participant clusters (Theme: Uncertainty of earning the 
incentive) 
For this theme ‘uncertainty of earning the incentive’, comparisons between participant 
clusters revealed similar views and experiences across all subthemes (delay in payment, 
incomplete payment, individual assessment tool and communication) as seen in Table 
9.3. The only noticeable difference was between participants in Ondo state where most 
health workers thought that the incomplete payment had negative consequences 
compared to Nassarawa State where only some (about half of the participants) thought 
incomplete payment had negative consequences on the results of the scheme (as 
illustrated in the participant quotes presented in table 9.2). In addition, whilst there were 
diverse views about the subtheme: individual assessment tool, participant responses 
between participant clusters were fairly similar (See table 9.4). 
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Table 9.4 Comparison between participant clusters (Theme: Uncertainty of earning the incentive) 
Subthem
es  
Categories  States  Performance  Health workers  
Ondo 
n=14(%)  
Nassarawa 
n=22 (%) 
Top 
n=16 
(%) 
Average 
n=7 (%) 
Worst 
n=13(%) 
Health 
facility 
managers 
n=13 (%) 
Nurses 
n=8 (%) 
CHEWs and 
Lab 
technicians 
n=10 (%) 
JCHEWs 
n=5  
(%) 
Delay in 
payment  
Delay in payment reduces 
motivation and performance  
9 (64) 21 (95) 15 (94) 5(71) 10 (77) 9 (69) 7 (88) 9 (90) 5 (100) 
Delay in payment reduces 
performance but not motivation  
4 (28) 1 (5) 1 (6) 2 (29) 2 (15) 2 (17) 1 (12) 1 (10) 0 (0) 
Incomple
te 
payment  
No effect on health facility 
performance 
2 (14) 10 (48) 6 (38) 2 (29) 4 (31) 4 (31) 3 (30) 3 (30) 2 (40) 
Negative effect on health facility 
performance  
11 (79) 12 (52) 10 (62) 4 (57) 9 (69) 7 (54) 6 (60) 7 (70) 3 (60) 
Individu
al 
assessme
nt tool 
Assessment tool is fine and 
should not be changed 
6 (43) 10 (45) 7 (44) 3 (43) 6 (46) 3 (23) 2 (25) 7 (70) 4 (90) 
Assessment tool is fine but should 
be improved to further reflect 
individual contribution 
4 (29) 6 (27) 3 (19) 4 (57) 4 (31) 5 (38) 2 (25) 2 (20) 1 (10) 
Assessment tool (rank) is biased 
and should be improved to further 
reflect individual contribution 
1 (7) 4 (18) 5 (31) 0 (0) 3 (23) 3 (23) 1 (13) 1 (10) 0 (0) 
Commun
ication  
Reasons for change 
communicated through ‘hearsay’ 
2 (14) 1 (4) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (23) 0 (0) 1 (13) 1 (10) 1 (20) 
Reasons for changes not 
communicated effectively  
11 (79) 21 (96) 15 (94) 7 (100) 10 (77) 13 (100) 7 (87) 9 (90) 5 (80) 
Numbers (%) presented in each column for each category within themes (or sub-themes) are representative of participants within that cluster. Comparisons are made across rows for each category within 
themes (or sub-themes) to explore variation in responses within participant clusters: States, performance, and health workers 
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9.2.2. Theme 2: Health worker understanding of the P4P scheme 
The P4P programme was well understood by some participants and not by others. 
Similarly, some participants were aware of the changes in the programme and expected 
payment, while others were not. Participants who appeared to be more knowledgeable 
about the schemes often expressed a higher level of enthusiasm, motivation, and 
behaviour change compared to participants with poor understanding of the scheme. 
Specifically, the more knowledgeable participants thought that introduction of the P4P 
scheme provided them the opportunity to learn more about and improve on their jobs, 
thereby, providing them with the motivation to work harder. Participants’ quotes in 
Table 9.5 illustrate these views.  
Table 9.5 View and experiences regarding health worker understanding of the P4P 
scheme 
 Q: Tell me about the P4P programme? Q: So what has changed 
since the beginning of 
the programme? 
NX1 
(health 
facility 
manager, 
top 
preforming 
facility in 
Nassarawa 
state) 
 
 
“P4P is a good programme; we have the opportunity to 
earn money based on the number of services we render 
(lists out all the services and unit prices). The more we 
do, the more we get and we are given autonomy in the 
way we use the money. I feel P4P allows funds to get to 
where it is needed the most… we share 50% as bonus for 
the health workers, 25% for drugs and the other 25% for 
other things needed. The autonomy itself is something to 
us and we can decide ourselves what we need to do it” 
“…I have changed a lot 
since P4P, I manage the 
clients better, record 
keeping is better, we do 
exactly what needs to be 
done, and I have learnt a 
lot more because of the 
P4P programme….” 
 
EZ3 
(CHEW in 
a low 
performing 
facility in 
Ondo 
state) 
“.. hmm because of P4P, we have more drugs and we 
have renovated the health facility…. I know we get 
bonuses from the programme and it is from the World 
Bank, I’m not sure how the bonuses are shared, by 
seniority I think. All I know is that the in-charge brings 
money and gives me that this is from P4P. I do not know 
much about the programme all I know is that I get 
bonuses twice a year”. 
“I have not changed 
anything about myself. It 
is what I was doing before 
I am doing now, because I 
was doing the work 
before. It is my job 
whether there is P4P or 
not” 
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9.2.2.1. Variations between participant clusters: Health worker understanding of the 
P4P scheme 
The findings as illustrated in Table 9.6 reflect noticeable variation in the understanding 
and level of awareness of changes in the programme. About half of the participants in 
Nassarawa State had a good working knowledge of the programme compared to the few 
participants who had a good working knowledge of the programme in Ondo State. 
Similarly, many participants in the top performing facilities had a good working 
knowledge of the programme compared to the low performing facilities where there 
were very few health workers with a good working knowledge of the programme. In the 
same way, many of the health facility managers and nurses were aware of the changes 
in the scheme compared to participants with lower qualifications (CHEWS and 
JCHEWs).  
                          Chapter 9: Views and experiences of health workers in the Nigerian P4P scheme 
 232 
 
Table 9.6 Comparison between participant clusters (Theme: Health worker understanding of the P4P scheme) 
Subthemes  Categories  States  Performance  Health workers  
Ondo 
n=14 
(%) 
Nassarawa 
n=22  
(%) 
Top 
n=16 
(%) 
Average 
n=7 
(%) 
Worst 
n=13 
(%) 
Health facility 
managers 
n=13 (%) 
Nurses 
n=8  
(%) 
CHEWs and 
Lab technicians 
n=10 (%) 
JCHEWs 
n=5  
(%) 
Understanding  Good working 
knowledge of the 
programme 
2  
(14) 
10 (45) 9 (56) 0  
(0) 
3 (23) 6  
(46) 
1 (22) 4  
(40) 
1 
 (20) 
Average working 
knowledge of the 
programme  
12 
(86) 
12 (55) 8 (44) 6 (86) 10 (77) 7  
(54) 
7 (88) 6  
(60) 
4  
(80) 
Level of awareness 
of changes in the 
scheme  
Aware of expected 
payment 
5  
(36) 
15 (68) 11 
(69) 
4 (57) 5 (38) 10 (77) 6 (75) 4  
(40) 
0  
(0) 
Unaware of 
expected payment  
9  
(64) 
7  
(32) 
5 (31) 3 (43) 8 (62) 3  
(23) 
2 (25) 6  
(60) 
5 (100) 
Numbers (%) presented in each column for each category within themes (or sub-themes) are representative of participants within that cluster. Comparisons are made across rows 
for each category within themes (or sub-themes) to explore variation in responses within participant clusters: States, performance, and health workers.  
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9.2.3. Theme 3: Management and administration of the P4P scheme (role of the 
health facility manager) 
The participants expressed several views on and experiences of the influence of 
management and administration of the P4P scheme at their various facilities through 
diverse strategies the health facility manager had implemented to improve performance 
under the P4P scheme. These included practical gifts to patients, hiring additional staff, 
improved supervision, change in health workers attitude towards patients’, equipment 
and structural improvement, effective use of feedback, outreach, home visits, and free or 
subsidized drugs and health services. 
A few health facility managers gave gifts to patients (e.g. sanitary towels and soaps for 
pregnant women who deliver at the health facility), which they thought encouraged 
other patients to come to the health facility, thereby increasing utilisation of health 
services. Similarly a few health facility managers who hired additional staff said it had 
helped reduce the workload in the health facility, which led to a more efficient system 
and increased performance. In the same way, a few of the health workers thought that 
improved supervision played a role in improving performance because that meant that 
they could not inefficient, since the supervisory visits were usually impromptu. 
Some health workers thought that their changed attitude towards patients’ made the 
patients more comfortable in the health facility, which encouraged utilisation of health 
services. Some health workers thought that presence of equipment and structural 
improvement in the health facility brought about increased utilisation because the 
patients perceived ‘a higher quality of care’. Also, some health workers thought that 
performance feedback from consultants helped them to properly implement changes 
needed to improve performance.  Although a few participants had a contrary experience 
that they did not receive feedback or that they had difficulty in implementing changes to 
improve performance based on the feedback received.  
Finally, most health workers thought that increase in number of outreach and home 
visits led to increase in performance because they were now able to attend to patients in 
hard to reach areas of the community. In the same way, most of the health workers 
thought that the free or subsidized drugs and health services improved utilisation 
because members of the community could now afford healthcare (see Table 9.7 for 
participants’ quotes, some of which reflect more than one view or experience). 
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Table 9.7 Health workers’ views and experiences regarding Management and administration of the P4P scheme (role of the health facility manager) 
 Useful gifts to 
patients  
 Hiring 
additional staff 
 Improved 
attitude towards 
patients 
 Equipment and 
structural 
improvements 
 Free or subsidized drugs and 
health services  
 Improved supervision 
 Outreach and home visits  
 Effective use of feedback  
NX1 (health facility 
manage, top 
performing facility in 
Nassarawa State 
“…With P4P we 
understand that we have 
money to do what we need 
to do in the health facility, 
we have problem of 
manpower but we have 
subcontracted, this fat man 
writing something outside 
is one of the workers we 
hired using P4P money 
and we hired another 
attendant so that we can 
do the work more 
effectively… we also give 
small gifts such as sanitary 
towels and soap for the 
women who come to 
deliver at the health 
facility” 
 
EX1a (Health facility 
manager, top 
performing facility in 
Ondo State) 
“We started going for 
outreaches, we try as much 
as possible to shorten the 
waiting time, improve 
patient satisfaction, we have 
improved attitude towards 
the patients, and we also 
improved the outlook of the 
hospital and make our 
patients more comfortable, 
we have running water 
around all the time” 
 
NY3 (CHEW, average performing facility 
in Nassarawa State) 
“The supervision of this programme is the driving 
force for the change. The LGA, state and Federal 
government sends people to monitor and 
supervise us almost every week. So we must 
always be alert and working. We have also 
increased the mobilization of pregnant women; 
we campaign for ANC within our catchment area 
population. We reduced the cost of our drugs and 
now people can afford our treatments” 
 
EX1b (Health facility manager, top 
performing health facility in Ondo state) 
“Well the environment is better for the health 
workers to stay at their duty posts now. We are 
now enjoying the place. I used some of the money 
to buy essentials like generator, fridge, TV. There 
is nothing that other health facilities are enjoying 
in the city that we don’t have. So we enjoy the 
place better now and the health workers are 
motivated to come to work. I even employed a 
new health worker from the money earned from 
P4P” 
NZ1 (Health facility manager, low performing facility 
in Nassarawa State) 
“We have weekly meetings where I use the feedback form to 
discuss our past performance and how to improve on where we 
have performed low. For example, we saw that we got zero in 
waste management and HIV tests. So now we have started 
working on our incinerator and we have purchased some HIV 
kits now so we can improve our performance and earn more 
money” 
Deviant view on effective use of feedback  
EZ1 (Health facility manager, low performing facility 
in Ondo State) 
We receive the feedback form, we get zero in some areas and we 
know we have to improve but there are just some things we 
don’t know how to go about right now. For example, we do not 
get a lot of pregnant women coming to deliver in this facility, 
maybe because the building is small or because they just prefer 
to go to the private clinics. Even with the outreaches we do, they 
just won’t come, so I don’t know what else to do to improve that 
area”. 
 
NZ4 (JCHEW, low performing health facility in 
Nassarawa State) 
“I don’t get any feedback. I don’t know if the in-charge gets it 
and doesn’t share it with us” 
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9.2.3.1. Variation in participant clusters (Theme: Management and administration of 
the P4P scheme/role of the health facility manager) 
Findings as illustrated in Table 9.8 indicate that view that outreach, home visits, and 
free or subsidised drugs and health services improved health facility performance had 
similar patterns across the participant clusters. Other strategies cited by the participants, 
however, varied considerably across some participant clusters. These included improved 
health worker attitude towards patients, equipment and structural and effective use of 
feedback. Most of the participants who cited effective use of feedback were from 
Nassarawa State, while most of the participant who said they didn’t get or use their 
feedback were from low performing facilities in Ondo State. Similarly, most of the 
participants who thought or said that improvement in performance was due to their 
improved behaviour/attitude towards patients or and equipment and structural 
improvement were from top performing facilities or Nassarawa State.  Finally, 
improvement strategies such as hiring additional staff, giving useful gifts to patients, 
was less commonly used and specific only to participants in top performing facilities in 
Nassarawa State.  
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Table 9.8. Comparison between participant clusters (Theme: Management and administration of the P4P scheme/role of the health facility 
manager) 
 States  Performance  Health workers  
 Ondo 
n=14 
(%) 
Nassarawa 
n=22  
(%) 
Top 
n=16 
(%) 
Average 
n=7 
(%) 
Worst 
n=13 
(%) 
Health facility 
managers n=13 
(%) 
Nurses 
n=8  
(%) 
CHEWs and Lab 
technicians n=10 (%) 
JCHEWs 
n=5  
(%) 
Hiring more staff  1 (7) 3 (14) 4 (25) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (15) 2 (25) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Gifts to patients  0 (0) 6 (27) 5 (31) 1 (14) 0 (0) 2 (15) 2 (25) 2 (20) 0 (0) 
Outreach and home visits 10 (71) 15 (68) 10 (63) 6 (86) 9 (69) 10 (77) 5 (63) 5 (50) 5 (100) 
Equipment and structural 
improvement  
3 (20) 18 (82) 12 (75) 5 (71) 4 (31) 6 (46) 5 (63) 8 (80) 2 (40) 
Improved supervision  1 (7) 3 (14) 3 (19) 1 (14) 0 (0) 2 (15) 2 (25) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Health workers nicer and 
more welcoming to patients  
4 (29) 19 (86) 14 (88) 6 (86) 3 (23) 8 (61) 6 (75) 7 (70) 2 (40) 
Effective use of feedback 5 (36) 14 (67) 9 (56) 5 (71) 5 (38) 8 (62) 5 (63) 4 (40) 2 (40) 
Feedback given but not 
implemented 
5 (36) 1 (5) 1 (6) 0 (0) 5 (38) 2 (15) 0 (0) 1 (10) 3 (60) 
Free/subsidized services and 
or drugs  
11 (79) 20 (91) 13(81) 5 (71) 13 
(100) 
10 (78) 6 (75) 10 (100) 5 (100) 
Numbers (%) presented in each column for each category within themes (or sub-themes) are representative of participants within that cluster. Comparisons are made across rows for 
each category within themes (or sub-themes) to explore variation in responses within participant clusters: States, performance, and health workers.  
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9.2.4. Theme 4: Motivation 
The participants expressed their views and experiences about motivation within two 
sub-themes: sources of motivation to improve performance under the P4P programme 
and demotivating factors that reduced their performance.  
9.2.4.1. Subtheme: Motivating factors improving performance 
There were diverse views about the sources of motivation, which included bonuses, and 
knowledge and experience. Some participants felt that their main source of motivation 
was the knowledge and skills they had acquired due to exposure to new clinical cases 
since the introduction of the P4P scheme. Therefore, this encouraged them to want to 
see more patients and to improve the quality of health services they provide, as this 
would improve their skills and knowledge.  
A few participants also felt that the availability of drugs and equipment at the health 
facility improved the motivation. This was because prior to P4P, they felt that going to 
the health facility was futile since there were no drugs or equipment to treat or attend to 
patients (see Table 9.9 for participant quotes). 
Furthermore, most of the participants were positive towards peer reporting and thought 
that it would help improve performance. They suggested that if peer reporting was 
introduced to the scheme in the future, it would make them work harder because they 
would want to be the best performing facility, since other health facilities would be 
aware of their performance. That said, there were contrasting views from a few 
participants who thought that peer reporting might not necessarily bring about 
improvement in performance because it might promote unhealthy competition, as 
illustrated in Table 9.9.
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Table 9.9 Participant quotes on motivating factors improving performance 
Bonuses  Knowledge and experience  Availability of drugs and 
Infrastructural improvement 
Positive thoughts toward peer reporting  
EY1 (Health facility 
manager, average 
performing facility 
in Ondo State) 
“We really appreciate 
the money; we would do 
even a lot more if we 
get more money” 
 
NZ1 (Health facility 
manager, low 
performing facility 
in Nassarawa State) 
“The truth is that the 
bonuses encourage the 
staff a lot. When I start 
delegating duties to the 
health workers at first, 
they are a bit reluctant 
but once I tell them that 
their performance on 
the task will determine 
part of their bonus, you 
will see them putting 
their best into it” 
 
EX1 (Health facility manager, top 
performing facility in Ondo State) 
“One health worker told me that she has 
improved on her skills because we now attend 
to more patients and we can put our 
knowledge to work. We are very happy about 
that. That makes me happy even more than the 
money. I feel more exposed to many new 
cases. I now feel like I my doing my job” 
 
NX1(Health facility manager, top 
performing facility in Nassarawa State) 
 “…The bonus is minor because how much is 
it really relating to the salary? I feel a 
foundation has been laid because the more we 
see patients, the more we understand, the 
more we gain more knowledge, like before 
P4P, we sit down, no patients coming and we 
are not really practicing; we do not add to our 
knowledge (we don’t know anything) one of 
the health workers even told me that she now 
likes this health facility, that before she could 
not perform a certain procedure well but now 
she knows it well. So for us, the money is 
minimal, we feel more exposed to more cases 
and we are gaining more knowledge…” 
EY2 (Nurse, average 
performing facility in Ondo 
State) 
“A lot has changed, in the sense that 
before P4P, we were short of drugs 
and other equipment, but since P4P, 
the facility can afford to buy those 
things now. No shortage of drugs 
now. The patients are happy now that 
they can come and they will not hear 
some story about how we don’t have 
drugs in the health facility and this 
has caused a very rapid great change 
in the health workers. There has been 
a massive improvement in 
punctuality and coming to work.: 
before P4P, usually the health 
workers just tell themselves; if there 
are no drugs in the health facility, 
why bother come anyway and what 
are we coming here to do but now, 
they have no excuse for not coming to 
work” 
  
 
NX2 (Nurse, top performing 
facility in Nassarawa State) 
“The health workers are coming to 
work now because we have all the 
equipment and drugs we need that we 
didn’t have before P4P” 
NY3 (CHEW, average performing facility in Nassarawa 
State)  
“It will get us to improve. At least if we cannot be first, it will aim 
to be 2nd or third. It will really help us improve our services. Even 
if we are first, we will still improve so we do not come last” 
 
NX2 (Nurse, top performing health facility in Nassarawa 
State) 
“We will feel great if the results are published and it will motivate 
us and create healthy competition among the health facilities” 
Negative thoughts toward peer reporting 
EY1 (Health facility manager, average performing 
facility in Ondo State) 
“Hmmm, it might encourage sharing ideas within the different 
health facilities from strategies used, but there are some 
conditions or situations that cannot be applied to other health 
facilities. So there are bound to be differences in performance. For 
instance, this health facility is centrally located and if you look 
around, the people in the community can easily go to the city or 
nearest GH to get treatment, instead of coming here. They have 
closer options. Compared to when you visit other health facilities 
(hard to reach areas). The community basically have no choice but 
to go there” 
EX2 (Nurse, top performing facility in Ondo State) 
“I will liken that to competition. Because when there is 
competition, everyone will be striving to be first. I don’t think it 
will work because some might not care if they are first or not as 
long as they are still performing and still getting their money. So I 
cannot really say. I prefer the feedback we are getting to 
competition” 
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9.2.4.2. Subtheme: Demotivating factors decreasing performance   
Participants also had diverse opinions about challenges that demotivated them and 
decreased the performance of the health facility. These included mobility problems, 
inadequate manpower, competition, and insufficient infrastructure. Some participants 
expressed instances where the health workers could not go on home visits due to the 
poor road networks and lack of means of transportation, which often deterred their 
motivation and overall performance. In the same way, some participants shared 
experiences of when they had to turn patients away from the health facility due to 
inadequate infrastructure (see Table 9.10 for participant quotes).  
Table 9.10 Participants' views and experiences with demotivating factors 
decreasing performance 
Mobility  Man power  Competition  Infrastructural 
challenges 
EY1 (Health facility 
manager, average 
performing facility in 
Ondo State)  
“Our performance is really 
affected by the terrible 
roads which make 
transportation very difficult, 
so we can’t do many 
outreaches or home visits as 
much as we would like” 
 
EX1 (top preforming 
health facility in Ondo 
state)  
“The main challenge is 
transport. Even though we 
have two means of 
transportation (a bike and a 
tricycle) the roads are very 
bad.  We have to repair the 
motorbike every time it goes 
out. The terrain is bad. For 
instance, one of our patients 
wanted to deliver and before 
she could get to us, she 
delivered on the road” 
 
NX2 (Nurse, top 
preforming health 
facility in Nassarawa 
State)  
“I will say this is still 
caused by the problem 
of lack of manpower as 
the patients complain 
that we waste a lot of 
time before attending 
to them when they 
come for anc. This is 
simply because we 
don’t have enough 
health workers to 
juggle the duties” 
 
NY1 (Health facility 
manager, average 
performing facility in 
Nassarawa State) 
“The number of health 
workers here is not 
enough to be on 24 
hour duty, attending to 
patients, like the P4P 
wants us to do”. 
EZ4 (JCHEW, low 
performing health facility 
in Ondo State) 
“Some of the patients prefer 
to go to the ‘quacks’ we 
don’t know why, we’ve tried 
health promotion but some 
people just prefer their old 
ways” 
 
NZ1 (Health facility 
manager, low performing 
facility in Nassarawa 
State)  
“One of the major 
challenges we have is that 
the general hospital is just a 
mile away and the patients 
prefer to go there. When 
some patients come here 
they will tell me it is because 
they don’t have money and 
that is why they are here but 
once they have money, the 
go to the general hospital 
and this reduces the number 
of patients that make use of 
our services 
EZ1a (Health 
facility manager, 
low performing 
facility in Ondo 
State)  
“We don’t have some 
of the kits or reagents 
for some of the tests 
that P4P want us to 
do, which makes our 
performance low in 
those areas; so we 
are trying to save 
some money from 
past bonuses to buy 
some things and 
improve our 
performance” 
 
 
EZ1b(Health facility 
manager, low 
performing facility 
in Ondo State) 
“We have just two 
rooms in this place, 
so we can only attend 
to a few people at a 
time and we have to 
send people away 
when the ward is full; 
in the end it reduces 
the amount of 
bonuses we receive” 
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9.2.4.3. Variation between participant clusters (Theme: Motivation) 
The view that money and acquisition of knowledge was a motivating factor had a 
similar pattern across the participant clusters (see Table 9.11). On the other hand, the 
views and experiences of health workers on infrastructural improvement as an important 
source of motivation was less common among the participants and was mostly specific 
to a few participants in Ondo State. In addition, a number of participants mostly in 
Ondo State and in low performing health facilities cited structural challenges as a major 
source of demotivation, while lack of manpower was cited by participants mostly in 
Nassarawa State. This suggests a link between motivation and the role of the health 
facility manager in the scheme described in the previous section, where some health 
facility managers in Nassarawa State recognised the challenge of lack of manpower, and 
hired additional staff to help improve performance of the health facility. Whereas very 
few participants in Ondo State stated cited improved infrastructure, which appeared to 
be a major source of motivation for them. Other less common challenges such as 
competition had similar patterns across participant clusters, while mostly participants in 
Ondo State cited issues with mobility and bad roads.   
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Table 9.11 Comparison between participant clusters (Theme: Motivation)  
  States  Performance  Health workers  
  Ondo 
n=14 
(%) 
Nassarawa 
n=22  
(%) 
Top 
n=16 
(%) 
Average 
n=7 
(%) 
Worst 
n=13 
(%) 
Health facility 
managers 
n=13 (%) 
Nurses 
n=8  
(%) 
CHEWs and Lab 
technicians n=10 
(%) 
JCHEWs 
n=5  
(%) 
Motivating factors 
improving 
performance 
Bonuses (money)  6 (43) 10 (45) 8 (50) 3 (43) 5 (38) 7 (54) 2 (30) 4 (40) 3 (60) 
Knowledge (education 
and experience) 
6 (43) 10 (45) 8 (50) 3 (43) 2 (15) 8 (62) 0 (0) 3 (30) 2 (40) 
Availability of drugs 
and Infrastructural 
improvement  
4 (29) 1 (5) 1 (6) 2 (29) 2 (15) 4 (31) 1 (13) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Positive thoughts 
towards peer reporting 
3 (21) 16 (73) 10  
(63) 
4 (57) 5 (38) 6 (46) 4 (50) 7 (70) 2 (40) 
Demotivating 
factors decreasing 
performance  
Infrastructural 
challenges  
10 (71) 6 (27) 4 (25) 3 (43) 8 (62) 6 (46) 2 (30) 2 (20) 3 (60) 
Competition  3 (21) 2 (9) 1 (6) 3 (43) 2 (15) 3 (23) 0 (0) 1 (10) 1 (20) 
Mobility   7 (50) 3 (14) 4 (25) 4 (57) 3 (23) 5 (38) 1 (13) 3 (30) 1 (20) 
Man power  1 (7) 7 (32) 2 (13) 2 (29) 4 (31) 2 (15) 1 (13) 3 (30) 2 (40) 
Negative thoughts 
towards peer reporting 
2 (14) 1 (5) 1 (6) 2 (29) 0 (0) 2 (15) 1 (13) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Numbers (%) presented in each column for each category within themes (or sub-themes) are representative of participants within that cluster. Comparisons are made across rows for 
each category within themes (or sub-themes) to explore variation in responses within participant clusters: States, performance, and health workers.  
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9.3. Discussion  
The Nigerian P4P scheme was introduced in Nigeria to improve access and quality of 
health services (with a major focus on maternal and child health) in primary healthcare 
centres (PHC) in three States (Adamawa, Nassarawa, Ondo). First, as pre-pilots in 
PHCs in one local government are (LGA) each in the three states from December 2012- 
July 2014, after which the scheme was scaled up to cover all LGAs in each of the three 
States.   
This qualitative study aimed to explore the views and experiences of health workers on 
influence of contextual and implementation factors on the Nigerian P4P scheme and to 
consider the extent to which they explain the varied results of the pre-pilot (in the form 
of a formative evaluation). This is a relevant and significant research focus because 
previous literature has rarely considered the influence of contextual and implementation 
factors on the outcomes of incentive schemes especially in low and middle income 
countries (Van Herck et al., 2010). In addition, because the scheme is a relatively new 
approach in the Nigerian health system, a formative evaluation was critical to inform the 
scaling up of the P4P scheme for improved outcomes or effectiveness  
In this section, first, I discuss each theme contextualising them in literature and theory 
where relevant. I then discuss the strengths and limitations of the study, before 
highlighting the practical implications of my study and providing recommendations to 
the NPHCDA to improve the Nigerian P4P programme.  
9.3.1. Key findings  
There were four key themes that captured the views and experiences of health workers 
in the Nigerian P4P scheme on the influence of contextual and implementation factors 
on the scheme. They were uncertainty of earning the incentive, health worker 
understanding of the scheme, management and administration/role of the health facility 
manager, and motivation, I now discuss each in detail. 
Theme 1: Uncertainty of earning the incentive  
The findings of this study suggest that factors such as delay in payment, ineffective 
communication, incomplete incentive payment, and scepticism in the division of 
bonuses (individual assessment tool) generally led to distrust and uncertainty in 
payment, possibly leading to decreased health worker motivation and health facility 
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performance in the Nigerian P4P scheme. This research is the first to directly explore 
the influence of uncertainty in payment in P4P schemes in the Nigerian context. My 
findings are consistent with that of Stockwell (2010) who found that clinicians’ 
uncertainty in earning incentive constituted a risk to the effectiveness of the clinical 
practice improvement payment (CPIP) incentive programme in Australia. More 
recently, Ssengooba and colleagues (2012) found that one of the implementation factors 
that contributed to the failure of a World Bank funded incentive scheme in Uganda was 
delay in payment. 
The study findings are also consistent with economic theory that suggests that 
individuals are ‘risk averse’ i.e. they tend to go with a less risky alternative (Arrow, 
1965). In the Nigerian context, the delay in payment creates a longer time lag between 
measurement of performance and payment of incentives and some of the health workers 
appeared to feel that they were not guaranteed to receive their bonuses. Therefore, due 
to the associated ‘risk’ of not earning the incentive, the health workers talked about 
focusing their efforts on other things that were likely to bring immediate rewards as 
opposed to some promise of payment that they believed they were unlikely to get. 
The effect of the uncertainty in payment in reducing performance may have been 
expounded in the Nigerian P4P scheme because it lies within a context where 
transparency has not been a strong feature and corruption is widespread within the 
system (Hargreaves, 2002, Garuba et al., 2009, Okafor, 2009). In addition, delay in 
payment of the incentive translates to a lack of funding for most of the health facilities, 
which ultimately leads to reduction in performance or quality of health service delivery. 
For example, the health workers stated that the main reasons for improvement in quality 
of care and performance were structural changes, availability of drugs (Free/subsidized), 
availability of equipment, outreaches, and home visits; all of which require funds. These 
facilities do not receive any government budget or funding to run themselves 
(Welcome, 2011, Asuzu, 2005). Therefore, if the incentives are not being paid on time 
or the money promised is not paid, it consequently reduces health worker motivation 
and performance of the health facility, which was evident in the health workers’ 
accounts. 
These findings suggest that health workers in the Nigerian P4P pre-pilot were bothered 
by difficulties in accessing the incentive that they thought they were entitled to. These 
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findings however, did not seem to explain the variation in results of the Nigerian P4P 
pre-pilot, as the views and experiences of the different participant clusters were similar. 
It appeared that the distrust in the payment system and the uncertainty of not earning the 
incentive was a general characteristic across participants in the different States, 
facilities, and professional qualifications. This however, does not mean the level of 
uncertainty in payment is not an important contextual and implementation factor. 
Rather, the findings suggests that the Nigerian P4P pre-pilot generally might have been 
more effective if there was higher level of trust in the payment system or a higher 
degree of certainty in earning the incentive. Therefore, it is likely the P4P scheme would 
work better if the overall trust of the scheme was improved by minimising delay in 
payment of incentives, improving communication between the scheme implementers 
and the health workers, and reviewing the individual assessment tool used to measure 
individual performance and allocate bonuses to the health workers. 
Theme 2: Health worker understanding of the P4P scheme  
In exploring the levels of health worker awareness and understanding about the 
Nigerian P4P scheme, it appeared that some of the participants were more 
knowledgeable about the scheme than others. The findings also suggested that there was 
a link between health worker understanding and motivation. Health workers who 
understood the scheme appeared to be more highly motivated and were more willing to 
do more to improve performance compared to those with less understanding of the 
scheme. 
Patterns of variations in this theme emerged between participant clusters. The health 
workers in Ondo State and low performing health facilities who had a weaker 
understanding of the P4P scheme were not clear on how much they would receive as a 
facility at the end of the quarter (after verification of performance), how often to expect 
payment, and the basis of sharing performance bonus to individual health. This might 
partly explain the preliminary results of the scheme, which suggest that health facilities 
in Nassarawa State performed better than health facilities in Ondo State. It might also 
explain one of the factors that contributed to difference in performance between the top 
and worst performing facilities.   
Another important pattern emerging within this theme was that understanding of the 
P4P scheme varied by health workers’ qualifications. It is perhaps not surprising that 
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most of the health facility managers in the participating health facilities understood the 
scheme better because they are the ones being trained directly by the P4P consultants, 
and they in turn train health workers in their facilities. This suggests that the efficiency 
of training of the health workers may have varied across health facilities and that the 
efficiency of training of health facility managers possibly varied across States as well. 
So far, this study is the first to explore health worker understanding of a P4P scheme in 
a LMIC and in Nigeria in particular. However, the link between understanding of the 
scheme and motivation or performance is consistent with a recently conducted review 
by Eijkenaar (2013) who found that P4P schemes in which health service providers 
were not knowledgeable about the schemes were mostly ineffective. Similarly, other 
studies have found an association between clinician motivation and understanding on 
the incentive programme in USA and Australia (Young et al., 2005, Stockwell, 2010).  
An explanation of the link between understanding of the scheme and motivation might 
be because the health workers with better understanding of the programme also thought 
the P4P scheme reminded them of what they should be doing as health workers. In 
addition, these health workers also saw their participation in the P4P scheme as a 
platform for acquisition of knowledge (through quality guidelines provided by the 
scheme). The findings are consistent with the work of Leshabari et al. (2008) and 
Luoma et al. (2005), which both showed that acquisition of knowledge was an incentive 
to improve motivation in health workers in LMICs.    
In summary, based on the reflections on the findings, there is need to engage with key 
stakeholders such as the health facility managers and the P4P consultants in each State 
on how to improve understanding of the health workers of the P4P scheme in order to 
improve the effectiveness of the scheme. 
Theme 3: Management and administration of the P4P scheme (role of the health 
facility manager)  
The findings of this study suggest that the health facility managers had implemented 
various strategies to improve performance and quality of care. This included outreach, 
use of feedback, home visits, availability of at least one staff at the health facility at any 
point in time, and availability of drugs.  
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However, a pattern that emerged was the lack of use of feedback in the worst 
performing facilities in Ondo State, where some health workers had stated that despite 
receiving the performance feedback, they did not know how to improve on performance 
in the areas they were performing poorly in. A possible consequence of this is the 
reduction in performance reflected preliminary results partly due to ineffective use of 
performance feedback compared to other facilities. This is in line with the study by 
Ssengooba and colleagues (2012) who found that the discontinuation of the engagement 
of stakeholders in the discussion of feedback contributed to the failure of a P4P scheme 
implemented in Uganda, thus suggesting the importance of stakeholder discussion and 
technical assistance with strategies to improve performance.  
Another pattern emerging from the findings is that the health facility managers in top 
performing facilities in Nassarawa State had implemented unique strategies such as 
giving practical gifts to patients, structural improvements, and hiring additional staff, 
some of which the health workers had cited as sources of motivation. This might partly 
explain why these facilities performed better than others. For example, hiring additional 
staff helped to meet the increasing demand for health services, reduced waiting times 
for the clients thereby improving the quality of health services in that facility compared 
to low performing facilities. This also suggests that health facility managers in the top 
performing facilities had superior managerial skills superior knowledge/understanding 
of the scheme, because it appears they were able to recognise, prioritise and meet the 
needs of the health facility and motivate the health workers.  
I am not aware of other studies providing evidence that allows for comparison with my 
findings. However, it can be said that quality improvements is to a certain degree 
dependent on the skills or ability of the health facility manager (Ndizeye et al., 2014), 
and that whatever the strategies used to improve quality of care and performance are, 
managerial skills and explicit dialogue with the members of staff are important 
(Elovainio, 2010).  
Theme 4: Motivation   
The findings of this research suggest that motivation and performance of the health 
workers have increased as a result of the P4P scheme, by way of bonuses, availability of 
drugs and equipment, and the acquisition of skills and knowledge. These are consistent 
with a study exploring health worker motivation in a P4P scheme in Rwanda (Paul, 
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2009). Other studies on the general motivation of health workers in LMICs also support 
these findings (Luoma, 2005, Leshabari et al., 2008). 
The findings also show that most of the participants thought that the introduction of 
peer reporting would motivate them to work harder. Though peer reporting was not in 
practice in the Nigerian P4P scheme at the time of the study, it was of relevance because 
it is potentially relevant because as a ‘non-financial incentive, it is less costly and 
therefore has the potential of being more cost effective than P4P schemes. In addition, 
emerging literature suggests that peer reporting used in conjunction with financial 
incentives could be more effective in driving behaviour change than just financial 
incentives alone (Jha et al., 2012, Bridgewater et al., 2007, Luoma, 2005, Kolstad, 
2013).  
The findings suggest that a combination of incentives is responsible for health worker 
motivation. This provides evidence central to the debate on what motivates health 
workers in incentive schemes: whether financial (bonuses) or non-financial incentives. 
The findings are in line with those from the critical review by Henderson and Tulloch 
(2008) who argue the need for both financial and non-financial incentive to improve 
quality of care in LMICs. This is because a multifaceted incentive approach is needed in 
countries with weak health systems where poor motivation of health workers results 
from a combination of factors such as poor salaries, poor working conditions, 
inadequate infrastructure, and limited opportunity for career development or training.  
 
Another pattern emerging from the findings was that issues with mobility, lack of 
infrastructure, and lack of manpower were sources of demotivation for the health 
workers in both Nassarawa and Ondo States. However, health facilities in Nassarawa 
State performed on the average better than health facilities in Ondo State. This might be 
for a number of reasons. One is that some health facility managers in Nassarawa State 
appeared to take initiative and had swift response to the lack of manpower problem 
leading to hiring of additional staff, whereas infrastructural problems did not improve in 
Ondo State (as described earlier). The second reason is that mobility issues in Ondo 
State hindered patients from utilizing health services and possibly hindered health 
workers from getting to work, leading to decreased outputs. A third reason is that the 
challenges facing Ondo state were more costly to control than in Nassarawa State. For 
example, it seems relatively easy and cheap to hire additional staff compared to buying 
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a car or carrying out road repairs to improve on the mobility problems in Ondo State. 
Furthermore, at the time of the study, salaries of the health workers in Ondo State had 
not been paid for six months. Even though this was not directly related to the P4P 
scheme, it appeared to have affected the motivation of the health workers participating 
in scheme in Ondo State. The non-payment of salaries and costly nature of the mobility 
challenges in Ondo State, therefore, may have put the health facilities there at a 
disadvantage compared to those in Nassarawa State, leading to reduced performance 
outputs in Ondo State. 
 
Based on these findings, it appeared that some of the health facilities were not ready to 
meet the demands of the P4P scheme, which appeared to have led to decreased 
performance. This is similar to the findings of Locke and Srinivasan (2008) in 
osteopathic physicians practices in an incentive scheme in USA. Therefore, 
demonstrating that it is important that all the health facilities are ready to practice, 
report, and meet reimbursement requirements of the Nigerian P4P scheme. 
9.3.3. Strengths and limitations  
It is important that the key findings of my research be interpreted in light of the 
strengths and limitations of this study, I reflect on these now before highlighting the 
practical implications of my work. This study had four key strengths: novelty, rich 
detailed data, rigour, and utility, which I now discuss. 
This study is the first to explore the influence of contextual and implementation factors 
in the Nigerian P4P scheme. In addition, previous literature looking at other P4P 
schemes has rarely considered the influence of contextual and implementation factors in 
incentive schemes in low-middle income contexts (Van Herck et al., 2010, Eijkenaar, 
2012). Hence, my research makes an original and relevant contribution to this literature. 
Another key strength of this study lies in the extent, richness, and comprehensiveness of 
data, which has considerable significance in the applicability or transferability of the 
findings (Shenton, 2004). I have demonstrated this by providing detailed descriptions 
and extensive participant quotes from multiple perspectives (including deviant cases). I 
have also justified methods used and provided essential contextual information in 
interview data. However, I remain mindful that such quotes are constructs of the 
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research situation representing partial accounts located in specific interactions (Fontana 
and Frey, 2000).  
Another strength of this study is the steps I have taken to ensure the quality and rigour 
of the study. Throughout this study, I have provided evidence to demonstrate the rigour 
and trustworthiness of the study (see chapter 8). This included justification of the 
research topic and process of data generation and interpretation, comparing multiple 
data sources, and deviant case analysis. I have also provided detailed transparent 
description of both the data collection and analysis processes, while acknowledging the 
multiple ways data could have been collected and analysed. Furthermore, in the next 
section, I considered how my assumptions and background may have affected the 
research process and the steps taken to reduce the associated limitations. 
Finally, the findings have utility for the consumers (Alvesson, 2009). In section 9.4, I 
provide recommendations to the World Bank and NPHCDA to inform the 
implementation of the Nigerian P4P pilot scheme. I also demonstrate how the findings 
could contribute to planning and implementing incentive programmes in LMICs 
Limitations  
There were four main limitations in this study. First, my lack of experience in 
conducting a qualitative piece of work was a potential limiting factor. Experts however, 
supported this research; my interview skills, data collection and analyses were closely 
monitored and scrutinised. In addition, my background in and experience in public 
health (Master’s degree), piloting the interviews and my familiarity with the context 
interviews were strengths that perhaps made up for my lack of experience with 
conducting interviews.  
Second, my familiarity with the context demonstrated by my assumptions and pre-
conceived notions about the Nigerian health system such as corruption, distrust in 
payment system, and poor governance, partly influenced the direction of the research 
questions/hypotheses. In this study, however, these assumptions, hypotheses, and 
research questions were supported and verified by extensively by evidence from 
literature. I also made sure I took steps not to impose my ideas or thoughts on 
participants in the research. For instance, I asked neutral non-leading questions during 
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the interviews and I provided and included deviant cases and sought alternative 
explanations in the data analyses process (see chapter 8). 
Third, I was the only person who coded and analysed data, which some researchers have 
argued might be a limitation due to  my familiarity with or closeness to the data’ (Flick, 
2014). This was ameliorated somewhat, through expert scrutiny of the analysis process 
(my supervisor and other members of my Thesis Advisory Panel looked over segments 
of data and coding) (Krefting, 1991). Furthermore, Barbour (2001) argues that 
regardless of the number of coders or researchers analyzing the data, the most important 
thing is that a systematic process of data analysis presented transparently and in detail 
(which I did in chapter 8) .   
Finally, I was unable to go the third State (Adamawa) as originally planned due to 
terrorist attacks. Data from interview of health workers from this State might have 
provided further insight to answering the research question.  
9.4. Recommendations for the implementation of the Nigerian P4P 
pilot  
This research has contributed to the understanding of the influence of contextual and 
implementation factors in the Nigerian P4P scheme. It has also reinforced existing 
knowledge of the effects of some of these contextual factors in low and middle-income 
settings with weak health care systems. 
In this section, I consider the implications of the findings of this study for policy and 
practice, which I present in form of recommendations (which were fed-back to the 
NPHCDA) to inform the Nigerian P4P scheme, and to a lesser extent, other P4P 
schemes in low and middle income settings. I outline these recommendations below.  
A review of the payment mechanism (how individual health workers earn bonuses) 
One of the risks to the effectiveness of the scheme is the degree of the health workers’ 
trust in the payment mechanism. A continuation of problems with transparency, 
ineffective communication, and delayed access to the incentive may limit the impact of 
the scheme. A review of the process by which the health workers earn bonuses is 
required to improve the results of the scheme. The scheme implementers particularly 
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account and finance officers, P4P consultants
14
 in each State, and representatives of the 
health workers are significant stakeholders in this process and they should be engaged 
for advice. The following lists the primary points for review: 
 To make timely quarterly payments to the each health facility for delivery of 
services as agreed in the P4P contract. 
 To ensure clear communication strategies about changes and difficulties 
encountered in the scheme to stake holders, particularly to inform and keep the 
health workers up to date.  
 To ensure that the individual assessment tool (basis by which individual health 
workers earn bonuses) includes a criterion/a set of criteria that clearly captures 
actual contribution and direct input of the health worker in helping the facility 
earn money. For example a criterion on outreaches or home visits could be 
included.  
 To provide clear and short guidelines to encourage the use of the individual 
assessment tool instead of ranks to allocate bonuses to the health workers.  
 To move towards ‘true pay for performance’ (e.g. 50% change in utilisation 
from baseline) as opposed to pay for reporting.  
 
Develop a plan or guide to foster health worker literacy levels and understanding 
of the scheme  
This study suggests that health worker understanding and knowledge of the P4P scheme 
is important in improving the impact of the scheme. Furthermore understanding of the 
scheme by health facility managers appeared to be related to their ability to prioritise the 
needs of the health facility and health workers needed to improve performance. 
 It is, therefore, important that health workers’ understanding of the scheme be 
improved. P4P consultants in each state and health facility managers are important 
stakeholders in this process and should be engaged in planning. In order to improve 
health workers’ understanding of the scheme, the following actions were recommended: 
                                                          
14
 Consultants hired by the NPHCDA to provide technical assistance on the PBF scheme in each State 
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 To provide training and regular workshops for health workers and equip health 
facility managers with materials to inform the health workers on how the P4P 
scheme operates.  
 To help health facility managers improve their managerial skills, with a focus on 
setting priorities, and recognising and meeting the needs of the health facility or 
how to motivate the health workers (whether it is infrastructure or hiring 
additional staff).    
 
Effective use of feedback  
The findings from the views and experiences of the health workers suggested that 
feedback on performance was relevant to the effectiveness of the scheme. However, 
central to the use of feedback is ensuring the health workers utilise the feedback 
effectively. The recommendation to the NPHCDA on this area was: 
 To improve use of performance feedback possibly through discussion of ideas 
between P4P consultants and the health facility managers on how the health 
facilities can improve performance.  
Start-up resources 
The findings suggested that factors such as lack of proper equipment or infrastructure in 
some health facilities led to decreased performance in these facilities. To improve 
performance and the effectiveness of the Nigerian P4P scheme, health facilities should 
be equipped to provide the incentivised health services. While the scheme implementers 
have expressed their aversion in ‘input15’ funding, it might be important that the health 
facilities participating in the scheme have the start-up resources or equipment to 
effectively participate in the scheme i.e. levelling the playing field. Therefore, I 
recommended that: 
 One-off investments could be made in the poorer facilities by either the scheme 
implementers or the State governments, so as to bring the concerned health 
facilities to an acceptable standard for a more effective programme.  
                                                          
15
 E.g. buying equipment or improving infrastructure (see chapter 6) 
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9.5. Recommendations for research in P4P in Nigeria 
The literature in the field of P4P in LMICs is underdeveloped. This study was formative 
and has provided a solid foundation for a future programme of research in Nigeria. I 
highlight three important specific gaps in research, which require further investigation.  
First, in the previous section, I made practical suggestions on how the P4P scheme 
might be improved to make it more effective. This should also include formative and 
impact evaluations to ensure that the programme’s effectiveness and costs (cost 
effectiveness study) can continue to be assessed as the scheme evolves until its end in 
2018. Thus ensuring scarce resources are being maximised and contributing to the 
sparse evidence base in this area. 
Second, whilst there is considerable evidence supporting the choice of process 
indicators in the Nigerian P4P scheme, such as deliveries at the health facility, antenatal 
care, postnatal care, and child growth monitoring, it is important to explore whether the 
process measures will ultimately translate to better health outcomes (reduction in child 
and maternal mortality rates), as such research will contribute richly to the selection of 
incentivised indicators in the future.  
Finally, the findings from the study suggested that peer reporting of performance results 
might improve performance. However, this was not in practice in the scheme at the time 
this study was conducted. Peer reporting of performance results has been shown to be 
effective and possibly more cost effective than P4P in a few studies (Kolstad, 2013, 
Bridgewater et al., 2007). Literature regarding peer reporting is underdeveloped. 
Therefore, I recommended that peer reporting should be piloted in the Nigerian P4P 
scheme to explore its potential effect.  
 
9.6. What this chapter adds 
In the second part of this thesis, I have used a qualitative approach to explore the 
influence of contextual and implementation factors on the Nigerian P4P scheme, which 
has informed the development of recommendations for the Nigerian scheme designers 
and other similar low and middle-income contexts to inform and improve outcomes of 
P4P schemes. I also prepared a report for the NPHCDA (see Appendix G1 for executive 
summary) highlighting recommendations and changes needed for a more effective 
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scheme, some of which they since effected, such as minimising delays, effective 
communication, and piloting peer reporting.  
In the next chapter, the final chapter of this thesis, I discuss both parts of the thesis, 
considering not only the influence of contextual and implementation factors, but also 
the influence of design features on incentive schemes in health care. Particularly, I distil 
and synthesize the whole thesis in light of its aims and objectives, drawing out the 
implications of the thesis for policy, practice, and research.
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Chapter 10 Discussion and Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I revisit the background to the thesis, drawing out its aims and 
objectives. Then, I summarise the research conducted, my findings, and I outline how 
they relate to existing knowledge. Next I discuss strengths and limitations of the 
research. Finally, I discuss the relevance of the findings of the thesis for the P4P 
schemes in health care; providing recommendations for policy, practice, and future 
research. 
10.1. Background and significance of the thesis  
The use of incentives schemes to improve quality and efficiency of health care (often 
referred to as P4P or PBF) has gained popularity over the past few years. However, P4P 
schemes to some extent have been uncritically implemented, as effectiveness of these 
schemes has not been convincingly demonstrated (heterogeneous results) despite over a 
decade of experimenting with P4P.  
 
Researchers suggest that the effectiveness of P4P schemes is related to design features, 
contexts, and implementation, and that this may explain the heterogeneous results 
(Epstein, 2012, Van Herck et al., 2010). A few researchers have attempted to narratively 
review the literature, taking into consideration the design features, conclusions of which 
were mixed and subjective (Stockwell, 2010, Eijkenaar, 2013, Van Herck et al., 2010). 
A more sophisticated, quantitative, and systematic approach, which takes into account 
the design features, contexts, and implementation variables is needed to review this 
literature in order help make sense of the available evidence.   
 
P4P literature however, lacks a reliable and informed framework to help explore this 
heterogeneity, quantitatively and systematically, drawing on the range of economic 
theory on the relationship between behaviour change and incentive that could help guide 
this. In addition, there is limited knowledge about important aspects of how the impact 
of P4P may be affected by the context and method of implementation, which requires 
exploratory qualitative research. 
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Given that the interest in P4P is unlikely to diminish in the coming years especially in 
low and middle income countries (LMICs), it is important to try to make better sense of 
the evidence base and to clarify the features of the scheme which influence 
effectiveness. In this respect, insight is also necessary in how the implementation and 
contexts of P4P influences effectiveness of the schemes. Therefore, the aim of this 
thesis was to improve understanding and provide significant insight and 
recommendations in these areas. 
 
The objectives of this thesis (chapter one) were:  
1. To review the available evidence on P4P and identify the shortcoming of the 
evidence 
2. To develop a reliable framework to categorize P4P schemes in a systematic way 
to aid evidence synthesis 
3. To systematically and quantitatively explore what design features are critical to 
the effectiveness of P4P  
4. To explore the impact of design features, contexts, and implementation factors 
on effectiveness of the Nigerian P4P scheme 
 
The unique contributions (from each chapter) of this thesis are summarised in the next 
section. 
10.2. Summary of research and findings   
Objective 1: to review the available evidence on P4P and identify the shortcoming of 
the evidence was addressed in chapter two. A systematic search of five literature 
databases identified 15 relevant reviews analysing evidence of the effectiveness on 
incentive targeted at health service providers. The quality of the reviews ranged from 
moderate to good using the AMSTAR criteria. A narrative summary of the evidence of 
the effects of P4P was produced using the findings from the Identified reviews. 
Furthermore, 96 P4P primary studies evaluating 65 schemes from different countries 
were identified from these reviews (in addition to an updated review and other sources). 
The P4P schemes focused on different aspects of health care, including utilisation of 
care, smoking cessation, diabetes management, and reducing hospital mortality. 
However, only 36 of these P4P evaluations were included in the meta-analysis due to 
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insufficient information to convert the effect sizes to a standardised measure to allow 
pooling of the estimates, which used a range of measures of effect. 
A notable finding was that P4P was more effective in improving process measures such 
as cancer screening, immunisations, and smoking cessation advice, compared to 
outcomes such as hospital mortality or smoking quit rates (Hillman et al., 1998, Jha et 
al., 2012, Twardella and Brenner, 2007). Pooled effect estimate (standardised mean 
difference) of a subset of studies with process measures was 0.18 (95%CI 0.06, 0.31) 
compared with the pooled estimate of studies with outcome measures, which was 0.0 
(95%CI -0.01, 0.01). This might be because changes in outcomes are harder to achieve 
because it is less within the control of the clinician. This in turn might also be regarded 
by the clinician as a ‘risky’ investment, and therefore, would rather invest their time and 
resources in a less risky alternative where they are guaranteed desired outcomes. The 
review also revealed a lack of good evidence to draw valid conclusions on the cost-
effectiveness and sustainability of P4P schemes. Furthermore, there was ambiguity 
regarding the extent of attribution of improvements to P4P due to implementation of 
other quality improvement strategies alongside P4P and poor evaluation designs or lack 
of convincing control group in a good number of evaluations studies.  
 
Overall the findings from exploration of literature showed that the evidence on the 
effectiveness of P4P is mixed (with substantial statistical heterogeneity). Pooled 
estimates from the meta-analysis also showed that P4P might have a very modest effect 
on improving the quality of health care (0.15 95%CI 0.03, 0.25). However, this effect is 
likely to have been over-estimated because findings from further subgroup analyses 
suggest that RCT evaluations of P4P had a lower pooled effect estimate (0.08 95%CI 
0.01, 0.15) compared with quasi-experimental evaluations (0.14 95%CI -0.03, 0.31) and 
P4P evaluations without adequate controls (0.15 95%CI 0.09, 0.21). However, there 
was substantial heterogeneity between the pooled studies (I
2
=99.9%), which made it 
difficult to interpret the evidence. This demonstrated the need for a more sophisticated 
approach to generate evidence (exploration of the heterogeneity). 
 
Objective 2 to develop a reliable framework to categorize P4P schemes in a systematic 
way in order to explore heterogeneity (to aid evidence synthesis) was addressed in 
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chapters three and four. I identified and analysed relevant theoretical and empirical 
literature on the effect of incentives on behaviour, which indicated that several key 
design features might influence effectiveness. These include who receives the 
incentives, the type of incentive, the size of incentive, and the perceived risk of not 
earning the incentive. The analysis also indicated design choices that are likely to 
produce the desired effects: payment of incentives to groups or organisations as 
opposed to individuals; payment of large incentives (>5% of usual budget or salary) as 
opposed to small incentive (<5% of usual budget or salary); levying of fines as opposed 
to payment of bonuses; and a group of design features that constitute a lower risk or 
uncertainty (for the recipients) in earning the incentive (minimal time lags between 
patients, absolute performance measures as opposed to relative measures, and 
process/structural domains of performance as opposed to outcomes). These design 
features were then used to create a typology to systematically classify ‘types’ of 
schemes with similar design features. 
The P4P typology was piloted and then formally tested using 12 health science early-
stage researchers (who were trained to use the typology). This showed that the P4P 
typology was reliable (kappa>0.7 on all four items), and easy to use as a tool to 
categorise well-reported P4P schemes in healthcare based on their design features. 
However, in several evaluation studies, the descriptions of P4P designs were poor, 
incomplete, vague, and non-uniform. 
 
These findings suggest that the P4P typology is ready for use by other researchers as a 
novel and potentially reliable tool to categorise P4P schemes in health care in an 
informed way, which would help to explore heterogeneity and make sense of the 
available evidence of P4P. In addition, the typology could help P4P developers’ 
structure and inform their choice of design features. It could also be used to establish a 
common language (a reporting template) in which P4P designers, reviewers, and 
implementers can clearly specify the content of P4P designs in a standardised way and 
report them, so that reporting of these schemes can be clear, concise and uniform 
(allowing other people to see what is being done).  
 
Objective 3 to systematically and quantitatively explore what design features are 
critical to the effectiveness of P4P was addressed in chapter five.  I used the typology to 
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group the previously identified 96 published P4P evaluations into three coherent 
categories (type A, B, and C) based on their design features: payment of large incentive 
(>5% of salary or usual budget), payment of incentive to ‘groups’ (hospitals, clinical 
groups etc., where individual clinicians may benefit from the incentive), and low risk of 
earning the incentives (minimal time lags between measurement of performance and 
payment of incentives, absolute measures, and process domain of performance). Type A 
schemes (high chance of effectiveness) have all three design features present; type B 
schemes (medium chance of effectiveness) have two out of three of the design features; 
and type C (low chance of effectiveness) have one or less than one of the design 
features present. I then explored the influence of design features and these categories on 
the effectiveness of the schemes using meta-regression and multilevel logistic 
regression models on the evaluation studies of P4P identified in chapter two. This study 
presents the first systematic and quantitative exploration of heterogeneity in results of 
evaluations P4P schemes in healthcare (using the theoretical typology developed in 
chapter three).  
 
The findings from both statistical models were similar and they present early steps 
towards a better understanding of how design features influence the impact of P4P 
schemes from which several tentative conclusions were drawn. First, P4P schemes (type 
A and B) with two or more ‘adequate’ design choices were found to be more effective 
than ‘type C’ P4P schemes with less than two of the adequate design features (OR= 
3.04 95%CI 1.04,11.76). Another notable finding was that the size of incentive 
appeared to be the most important design feature influencing the effectiveness of P4P 
schemes, though very little work has been done regarding optimal size of incentive. 
Moreover, there is the risk of paying ‘too much’ for diminishing returns in terms of 
change in behaviour or consequent health outcomes, rendering P4P inefficient (Evans, 
1974). Lastly, it is noteworthy that P4P schemes with poor evaluation design (without 
adequate controls) appeared more effective than P4P schemes with adequate control 
groups (OR=24.16 95%CI 6.31, 92.78). Thus reinforcing the need to conduct more 
rigorous evaluations of upcoming P4P schemes to enlarge the database and strengthen 
the findings of this thesis.  
Robust conclusions on the influence of design features and effectiveness of P4P were 
not possible for three reasons. First, effectiveness of P4P schemes also likely depends 
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on contextual and implementation factors. For example, in contexts where corruption or 
lack of transparency is prevalent, recipients of the incentive are likely to have high 
levels of uncertainty in earning the incentive, which could translate in minimal 
behaviour change, despite having ‘adequate’ design features that reflect lower 
uncertainty in earning the incentive (minimal time lags between measurement of 
performance and payment of incentive, absolute measures, and process domains of 
performance). Second, the efficacy of certain theories (that informed the development 
of the typology) is context dependent. This aspect was, however not captured in 
typology. Therefore, the findings were interpreted in light of this. An example is 
organisational theory that proposes that payment of incentives to groups rather than 
individuals are more likely to bring desired effects because the organisations are capable 
of promoting behaviour change in employees through a wide range of strategies e.g. 
better structures, enacting stricter guidelines and policies etc. (Stewart, 1998). However, 
this is dependent on how well the organisation is managed. So paying incentives to the 
organisation as opposed to individuals is only likely to result in greater impact if it is 
well governed and managed. Third, there is difficulty in implementing certain design 
features such as fines in some contexts, even though theory suggests that it is likely to 
bring about a higher impact than payment of bonuses. As a result, fines are a rare design 
choice in P4P and this impeded the empirical exploration of its influence of P4P 
effectiveness.  
 
Objective 4 to explore the impact of design features, contexts, and implementation 
factors on effectiveness of the Nigerian P4P scheme was addressed in chapters six to 
nine. I conducted a formative evaluation to explore the influence of context and 
implementation on P4P in Nigeria in order to inform the implementation of P4P on a 
larger scale in Nigeria. I used a qualitative approach to explore present evidence on the 
influence of contextual and implementation factors on the Nigerian P4P scheme (a 
LMIC), which aimed to improve the quality and utilisation of maternal and child health 
services in rural areas. I reviewed the design features in light of the findings from the 
quantitative analyses (meta-regression and multilevel regression in chapter five) and an 
analysis of preliminary results of the Nigerian P4P scheme. I then conducted semi-
structured interviews of health workers participating in the scheme to explore their 
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views and experiences on the influence of contextual and implementation factors on the 
P4P scheme.  
 
The qualitative study of interview of health workers in the Nigerian P4P scheme 
(implemented in Ondo and Nassarawa States) suggests that several contextual and 
implementation factors influenced the scheme. This led to variation in improvements in 
quality and utilisation of incentivised health services. There were four key themes that 
captured the views and experiences of health workers: uncertainty of earning the 
incentive, health worker understanding of the P4P scheme, management and 
administration of the P4P scheme/role of the health facility manager, and motivation. 
The first key finding from this study was that uncertainty of earning the incentive 
(brought on by delay in payment, incomplete payment, doubt in the method of 
allocation of bonuses to individual health workers, and ineffective communication) 
decreased motivation of the health workers and/or performance of health facilities. 
Second, increased health worker understanding of the scheme appeared to be related to 
increased motivation, which could possibly explain some of the variation in 
performance between Ondo and Nassarawa States, between top performing and low 
performing health facilities, and between levels of qualifications. The third 
interconnected theme was that some health facility managers in top performing facilities 
or Nassarawa State appeared to have superior managerial skills, which was evident in 
the strategies they used to motivate the health workers and improve performance in their 
facilities, such as hiring additional staff and infrastructure improvement, which the 
participants thought led to improvement in performance reflected in the preliminary 
results. The fourth major finding was that other factors not inherent to the P4P scheme, 
such as issues with mobility and lack of infrastructure in Ondo State or lack of 
manpower in Nassarawa State were sources of demotivation for the health workers. 
However, some health facility managers in Nassarawa State took initiative and had a 
swift response to the lack of manpower problem leading to hiring of additional staff, 
whereas infrastructural problems did not improve in Ondo State. This could possibly 
explain why health facilities in Nassarawa State appeared to have performed better than 
those in Ondo State.  
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On the basis of this fieldwork, I made a series of recommendations to the Nigerian P4P 
scheme (see appendix G1), which are also relevant (to a lesser extent) to similar LMICs 
In summary, these were:  
 To make timely (quarterly) payments to the each health facility reflecting 
performance 
 To ensure clear communication strategies about changes and difficulties 
encountered in the scheme between stake holders (to ensure people understand 
the scheme and encourage effective communication) 
 To review the individual assessment tool to include a performance criterion that 
contributes to earning the incentive (e.g. outreach or home visits) 
 To move towards ‘true pay for performance’ (e.g. 50% change in utilisation 
from baseline) as opposed to pay per level of activity
16
 
 To develop a plan or guide to foster health worker literacy levels and 
understanding of the scheme  
 To consider the use of ‘start-up’ resources to ensure all the P4P health facilities 
have the basic infrastructure to provide the incentivised health services. 
 
I now summarise how the aim of the thesis was achieved through the objectives 
described in previous paragraphs. The aim of this thesis was to better understand 
important aspects of design, context, and implementation, and to consider their 
implications on the effectiveness P4P in health care.  
First I systematically demonstrated that certain design features (e.g. size of incentive 
and risk of not earning the incentive) influence the effectiveness of P4P schemes in 
improving quality of care. Generally, schemes with large size incentives (>5% of salary 
or budget) and low risk of not earning the incentive (smaller time lag of payment, 
absolute measures of performance, and process domains of performance) tend to be 
associated with higher estimates of effect.  
 
                                                          
16 Even though there might be risks associated with this such as gaming but measures such as verification 
and audit trails could be put in place to avoid or address it. 
 
                                                                           Chapter 10: Discussion and Conclusions                                                                                                    
 263 
These findings are consistent with theory explored and discussed in previous chapters. 
For example, theory suggests that large incentives might drive higher performance 
because of its potential to supplement clinician income and help reach what is known as 
the target income (Desquins et al., 2009, Evans, 1974) i.e. the larger the size of 
incentive, the higher the potential of reaching their target income, and the more the 
clinicians are willing to change behaviour and or improve performance. 
 
Following these findings from theoretical and statistical exploration of the influence of 
design features on the results of P4P, one would expect that generally speaking, a well-
designed P4P scheme has higher chances success compared to poorly designed 
schemes. However researchers have argued that apart from design features, context and 
implementation of P4P are likely to influence the effectiveness of P4P (Van Herck et 
al., 2010, Eijkenaar et al., 2013, Canavan et al., 2008, Toonen et al., 2009). This led me 
to conduct a formative evaluation on a P4P case study in Nigeria, to better understand 
how these factors influence P4P schemes, particularly in the Nigerian context.  
 
Early results of the Nigerian P4P scheme suggest that it was successful, in that there 
were measurable improvements in incentivised services. This was likely as a result of 
the optimal design features used in the scheme. For example large sized incentive 
(>10% of salary or budget), paid to groups (health centres where individual clinicians 
earned bonuses from), with low risk of not earning the incentive (quarterly payments: 
short time lags, process indicators: within clinicians control, and absolute performance 
measures). Theoretical and statistical findings discussed in earlier paragraphs (in detail 
in previous chapters) support and explain why these design features might have resulted 
in improvements in quality of care. There were however alternative explanations as to 
why P4P appeared to be effective in Nigeria in particular. These include increased 
motivation, improvement in transparency, record keeping, and accountability, which are 
core issues in the Nigerian health system that have led to the failure of past health 
reforms. For example, the bonuses earned were used in most health centres to buy 
equipment, drugs and improve infrastructure, and to supplement the salaries of the 
health workers. All of which most health workers participating in the P4P scheme 
thought improved their motivation, compared to before the P4P scheme when there was 
no incentive to come to work either because there were no necessary medications or 
equipment, in addition to the meagre salary payments. Improved motivation as a result 
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of the P4P scheme in turn led to reduced health worker absenteeism and improved 
attitudes towards patients.   
 
Overall the preliminary results of the Nigerian P4P scheme suggest that P4P improved 
quality of care. However, there was substantial variation in the results between the 
health centres/practices despite having similar ‘optimal design features’. This presented 
a good case study because the likely reasons for variation were factors other than design 
features e.g. contextual and implementation factors.  This helped to focus the research 
and explore more efficiently the influence of context and implementation on results of 
P4P schemes through a formative evaluation.  
  
Findings from the formative evaluation suggest that contextual and implementation 
factors are indeed important in the effectiveness of P4P schemes, whilst also drawing 
out the importance of such formative evaluations in other P4P schemes. In the Nigerian 
scheme in particular, factors such as high uncertainty of earning the incentive, poor 
health worker understanding of the scheme, and poor management of the scheme (at the 
health centre level) influenced the impact of the scheme, and limitations in these factors 
need to be addressed to improve the chances of success of the scheme in Nigeria.  
In the next section, I outline the strengths and weaknesses of the thesis before going on 
to discuss the implications of the findings on policy, practice, and research. 
 
10.3. Strengths and limitations  
This thesis makes original and significant contributions to this literature through the 
development and testing of a potentially reliable typology to aid evidence synthesis of 
effectiveness of P4P, systematic quantitative exploration of the influence of design 
features on the effectiveness of P4P schemes (using robust statistical techniques), and 
using semi-structured interviews to explore the role of context and implementation on 
P4P (ensuring rigour to improving the validity and reliability of the research). 
Furthermore, this thesis has produced policy recommendations for design and 
implementation of P4P in Nigeria. I highlighted the strengths and limitations associated 
with each element of research in the previous chapters of this thesis. In this section, I 
summarise the main limitations and discuss what could have been done differently. 
                                                                           Chapter 10: Discussion and Conclusions                                                                                                    
 265 
Most of the studies included in the literature review and quantitate analyses (meta-
analysis and regression models) were low quality studies (see chapters two and five). 
The findings of the analyses may have been strengthened by inclusion of only high 
quality RCT studies. This would have, however, resulted in too few studies to perform 
the analysis. I tried to compensate for this by either adjusting for evaluation designs or 
performing sensitivity analyses (as seen in chapter five). Furthermore, in order to bring 
all the studies together in one analysis, I converted the measures of effect to a 
standardised measure (standardised mean difference). However, only 36 could be 
included because of non-uniformity in reporting the effect sizes and inadequate 
information in most studies to convert the effect sizes to a standardised measure. The 
study authors could not be contacted to get the additional data needed due to time 
constraints. The findings and conclusions of the meta-regression (to explore the effect 
of design choices on effectiveness) would have been stronger (higher power to detect 
small effect sizes) if all 96 identified P4P evaluation studies were included in the 
analyses. To increase confidence in the findings, I tried to offset this limitation by 
adapting the effect size data to binary to accommodate all 96 studies in logistic 
regression model. The results of both models were similar, which increased confidence 
in the findings. 
 
Had there been more studies, it would have been worthwhile to unpack further the 
influence of the different quasi-experimental evaluation designs on the effectiveness of 
P4P schemes. Literature suggests that some quasi-experimental designs e.g. interrupted 
time series (ITS) designs are stronger than others e.g. cross sectional designs (Ramsay 
et al., 2003). For example, an ITS study by Serumaga et al. (2010), which assessed the 
impact of the UK QOF scheme on management and outcomes of hypertension found 
that improvements in hypertension management and outcomes were as a result of 
gradual improvements before the introduction of P4P and was not as a result of P4P. On 
the other hand, a retrospective cross sectional study by Ryan and Doran (2012), which 
assessed the impact of the QOF on hypertension management and outcomes concluded 
that the introduction of P4P improved treatment and management (Ryan and Doran, 
2012, Simpson et al., 2011). Whilst there appeared to be an improvement in 
hypertension management and outcomes in both studies after the introduction of the 
QOF, the ITS study examined pre-intervention as well as post intervention trends 
(which were similar), which gave it advantage over the cross-sectional study. This 
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indicates that further exploration of the influence of different quasi-experimental 
evaluation designs on the results of evaluations of P4P would be useful in informing 
appropriate choices for quasi-experimental designs in P4P schemes in cases where 
RCTs are not feasible. 
 
Regarding the P4P typology (chapter three), there was a trade-off between maximising 
its comprehensiveness and ensuring its manageability (ease of use). This led to 
exclusion of some potentially relevant design features from the typology (such as 
mechanism of payment: absolute or tiered targets and kind of incentive: monetary or 
non-monetary), and compression of some design variables in the typology (performance 
measure, timing of payment, and domain of performance measured were compressed to 
one category namely perceived risk of not earning the incentive ‘risk’). Despite the 
exclusion of these design features from the P4P typology, it is important that 
evaluations of P4P report these features as they might potentially have an influence on 
the effectiveness of P4P. A second limitation was that the design features in the 
typology were assigned equal weights even though their relative importance is likely to 
vary (as demonstrated in chapter five). These findings were however not strong enough 
to confidently assign practical weights to the design features of the typology. Also, 
since the influence of design features on a scheme’s effectiveness is likely to vary by 
the context in which the P4P is being implemented, it is probably better not to assign 
prior weights.  
 
A third limitation was that the raters used in testing the P4P typology were very similar 
(consisted mostly of Health Science Masters and PhD students), and they tested the P4P 
typology only on completely and well-reported P4P evaluations. Ideally, it would have 
been better to have a broader range of raters using the typology on randomly selected 
P4P papers to reflect a real life scenario. Therefore, the choice of raters and studies 
could have overestimated the reliability and ease of use of the P4P typology in 
categorising P4P schemes in healthcare because the more similar the raters are, the more 
they are likely to agree. As a result, the typology is being presented as a first step. It will 
have to be tested further as more rigorously and well-reported evaluations of P4P design 
emerge.  
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With respect to the formative evaluation aspect of this thesis (exploring the influence of 
contexts and implementation on the Nigerian P4P scheme), it would have been 
interesting to assess the impact of the Nigerian P4P scheme on health outcomes and its 
value for money. However, this was beyond the scope of this thesis. Furthermore, there 
were no reliable outcome and cost data for comparison or evaluative purposes at the 
time the study was conducted. There is however, a planned evaluation (by the scheme 
implementers) to assess the impact of the scheme on health outcomes at the end of 2018 
using an RCT design (NPHCDA, 2012). 
 
10.4. Implications for policy and practice 
As this thesis has demonstrated, the effectiveness of P4P requires consideration of 
several aspects, such as design choices, contexts, and implementation. Overall, 
expectations regarding the success of P4P schemes in healthcare should be moderate 
because effectiveness might have been overestimated in the literature. I highlight the 
implications of the findings of the thesis for designing, implementing and evaluating 
P4P in health care.   
 
This thesis has shown that better designed P4P schemes are more likely to be effective 
using the P4P typology. The implication of this is that all P4P scheme designers and 
implementers can use the P4P typology as a guide to help think about and justify their 
design choices to enhance effectiveness. Although, undoubtedly, extensive research still 
needs to be done in this area (see next section), the findings of this thesis represents 
early steps toward understanding design choices to produce desired effects.  
 
This thesis also demonstrates that evaluations of P4P schemes are poorly reported.  The 
features of the P4P in the evaluation studies need to be uniformly and thoroughly 
reported to facilitate external scrutiny and to provide possibilities for policymakers in 
other settings to learn from the results. Evaluation studies of P4P should give adequate 
description of design features such as who receives the incentives (individuals or 
groups), type of incentive (fines or bonuses), size of incentive relative to clinicians’ 
earnings (<5%: small, 5-10%: medium, >10% large), performance measure (absolute or 
relative), timing of payment (short or long time lag), domain of performance measured 
(structure, processes, outcomes), method of payment (coupled or uncoupled from usual 
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method of reimbursement), and mechanism of payment (absolute or tiered thresholds) . 
Once again, the P4P typology could serve as a standard reliable guideline that P4P 
evaluators can use to describe P4P designs in evaluation studies (see chapter 4 for 
reporting guideline).  
In addition to adequate reporting in evaluation studies, it is important that these studies 
should also be explicit in reporting other quality improvement strategies that were 
implemented with P4P and possibly find ways to address or adjust for it, so that the 
effect of P4P can be clearer in such contexts. This is because in evaluated P4P studies in 
literature, authors were not clear enough in reporting whether or not there were other 
quality improvement strategies implemented with P4P and in cases where it was 
reported, not enough is done to address or adjust for it. This is likely to have introduced 
biased and confounded the effect of P4P thereby making it difficult to make strong 
conclusions on the effect of the scheme. 
 
The findings of this thesis suggest the literature of P4P is populated with poorly 
evaluated P4P schemes, which likely overestimate the effectiveness of the schemes. P4P 
schemes need to be more rigorously assessed with robust evaluations (such as RCTs and 
robust quasi-experimental designs) in order to adequately capture the effects of P4P and 
improve the evidence base.  
 
The variation in results of the preliminary evaluation of the Nigerian the P4P scheme 
provided useful insight of what was going on within the scheme. P4P literature may 
benefit from evaluations of large P4P schemes that report effects of P4P on indicators 
for each participating health service provider, instead of just the average effect of P4P. 
This would provide some understanding on variation of results within the scheme that 
goes beyond design features, which could guide exploratory research in this area. 
 
P4P developers need to be sensitive to contextual and implementation factors. This is 
because whilst P4P in Nigeria was able to address some of the core issues (e.g. 
underfunding, transparency, and accountability) in the health centres where it was 
implemented; there were some poor implementation and contextual factors which 
limited its impact. Findings from my research showed that factors such as infrastructure, 
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understanding of the schemes, guarantee/certainty in earning the incentive, and level of 
managerial skills affected the effectiveness of a P4P case study in Nigeria. Throughout 
this thesis, I have been cautious about the generalizability of these particular findings to 
other contexts. Some of the findings have, however, been corroborated by other studies 
both in developed and developing countries: how diminished guarantee of payment of 
incentives reduces behaviour change of clinicians and effectives of P4P schemes in 
Australia and Uganda (Stockwell, 2010, Ssengooba et al., 2012); and how clinicians’ 
weak understanding of the scheme reduced the effectiveness of the P4P in USA and 
Australia (Young et al., 2007, Stockwell, 2010). The implication of this is that similar 
countries implementing P4P can learn lessons from these findings. Also, it is important 
that formative evaluations should be carried out for each P4P scheme to take into 
account the contexts and practicalities of implementation to enhance effectiveness of the 
P4P in the specific setting. This will also contribute to the evidence base in this area. 
Finally, it is important to note that while P4P schemes can produce modest 
improvements in quality of health care, it is not without the risk of negative 
consequences (Roland and Campbell, 2014). These include falsification of records and 
cherry picking (avoiding riskier patients), in addition to the limited evidence on cost 
effectiveness and sustainability (Gravelle et al., 2008, Jha et al., 2012, Emmert et al., 
2012). The implication of this for policy makers especially in developing countries is 
that P4P should not be treated as a panacea to improve quality of care. Instead, I stand 
in agreement with Maynard (2012) that P4P should proceed with caution and invest in 
in robust evaluations that identify both the costs and benefits of change.  
 
10.5. Recommendations for future research  
This thesis provided useful directions and first steps in understanding how P4P designs 
features and evaluation designs influence the effectiveness of P4P schemes in general. 
This thesis also provides useful insights on the influence of contextual and 
implementation factors on P4P in Nigeria. However, a number of limitations (presented 
in section 10.3 and previous chapters) hindered strong conclusions. These form the 
basis of some of the recommendations for future research. There were three main 
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implications for research: designs of P4P, evaluations of P4P, and implementation of 
P4P, which could further contribute to the understanding in these areas. 
 
There is the need for more quantitative and qualitative research specifically designed to 
explore influence of design features of the effectiveness P4P. This should include who 
to pay (groups or individuals), size of incentive, domain of performance (what to pay 
for: process, structures or outcomes), performance measure (absolute or relative 
measures), mechanism of payment (how to pay: payment on a sliding scale or absolute 
thresholds), and timing of payments. Particularly, it is important that the appropriate 
size of incentive (and how best to categorise this into whether small or large) should be 
explored, as this appeared to be the most important design feature form the findings but 
however, substantially lacking in empirical and theoretical evidence compared to the 
other design features (as demonstrated in chapter three and five).  
 
In addition, the meta-regression analyses could be performed with a larger sample 
size/number of studies (increased power) in the future, where there is more time and 
resources to contact the authors of such studies for additional data that were originally 
not or too poorly reported.  
 
As more rigorously evaluated P4P schemes emerge, it might be worthwhile to further 
explore the relationships between these P4P design features. For example, the findings 
in chapter 5 suggest that the size of incentive and the risk of not earning the incentive 
might be related (influencing each other). This will further contribute to the 
understanding of what combination of design features works in P4P. In addition, future 
quantitative exploration of heterogeneous results of P4P schemes should to take into 
consideration other study level characteristics such as risk of bias in order to produce 
higher a grade of evidence. This way, P4P in health care can be designed, evaluated, 
and reported with a bit more confidence. 
 
Instrumental to gaining more useful insight for adequate P4P designs is using 
new/emerging empirical evidence to facilitate evolution of the P4P typology. For 
example, items of the typology which have been compressed, such as ‘risk of not 
earning the incentive’ can be unpacked to explore the individualistic and undiluted 
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effect of the design features (time lag of payment, domain of performance, and 
performance measure) that were compressed to form that category. Another potential 
area for future research is further experimentation of the relative weights of the design 
features included in the typology, which can be possible with the availability of more 
rigorously evaluated P4P schemes. This way, the typology can be used to predict the 
outcomes of categorised P4P schemes with a higher level of certainty in the future.  
Second, as more evaluations of P4P emerge, it might be valuable to explore in detail 
effects of evaluation designs on the effectiveness of P4P schemes i.e. to unpack and 
compare how different quasi-experimental designs influence the evaluation results of 
P4P. The importance of evaluation design of P4P has been stressed throughout the 
thesis, and further insight is needed to inform the appropriate choice of quasi-
experimental designs in P4P schemes in cases where RCTs are not possible.  
Lastly, it is essential that new P4P schemes should first be pilot-tested before large-
scale implementation. This will allow exploration of the adequate contextual and 
implementation variables required for effectiveness. It will also allow for experimenting 
with various design options (e.g. different incentive sizes) and non-financial incentives 
such as peer reporting which thus far has shown promising results (Kolstad, 2013, 
Bridgewater et al., 2007). Such pilots would allow necessary changes to be made and 
valuable lessons learned to be implemented to ensure maximum effectiveness. In 
addition, P4P evaluation should assess the long-term impact on health outcomes and 
costs, which thus far has largely been ignored in literature, as failure to invest in these 
evaluations might result in wastage of scarce resources especially in LMICs. This is 
important because in order to maximise the efficiency of resources, the increased costs 
associated with management and organisation of P4P (alongside the incentives need to 
be justified by the improvements in health outcomes.  
 
10.6. Conclusion 
The originality of my contributions, and the breadth and scope of my approach has 
made a significant contribution to knowledge in this field. This started with the 
literature review in which I problematized the fragmented evidence, which led me to 
develop a reliable theoretically informed framework (P4P typology) to categorise P4P 
schemes and aid evidence synthesis. This typology was then used in the first (and to 
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date, the only) quantitative systematic exploration of the influence of design features 
(and their relative importance) of effectiveness of P4P. My formative evaluation of P4P 
in Nigeria showed the influence of context and implementation on P4P and useful 
recommendations for were made for the scaling up of the scheme in Nigeria.  
 
The findings of the thesis suggest that P4P schemes with particular design features are 
more likely to be effective. These include payment of incentives to groups rather than 
individuals; payment of large incentive (>5% of salary or budget) rather than small 
incentives (<5% of salary or budget); short time lag between measurement of 
performance and payment (<4months) rather than long time lags (<4months); 
processes/structures incentivised indicators (within clinicians’ control) rather than 
clinical outcomes; and absolute rather than relative performance measure. In addition, 
effects of P4P schemes evaluated without adequate control groups are likely to over-
estimate the effect of P4P. Finally, thesis presents evidence of the influence of 
contextual and implementation variables on the effectiveness of a P4P case study in 
Nigeria. 
 
In conclusion, P4P in health care should be implemented with caution and careful 
consideration of design choices, in addition to reporting P4P schemes using a more 
structured approach in evaluations. The developed P4P typology could be used to help 
think about and report the design features of these schemes in a systematic way. In 
addition, the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of P4P schemes need to be assessed 
using rigorous evaluation designs such as RCTs or well-conducted quasi-experimental 
designs to capture the true effect (and value for money) of P4P. Furthermore, valuable 
to informing implementation of large-scale P4P studies are preliminary qualitative 
studies to understand the influence of context and implementation on the effectiveness 
of P4P.
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Appendices  
Appendix A 
 
A1. Search strategy output for Cochrane database 
Database Cochrane   
Host http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/cochranelibrary/ 
Date of 
search 
January 2012-June 2014 last date searched: 26/6/14 
Years 
covered 
1990-2014 no date restrictions 
Search 
Strategy 
Key word search: Financial incentives, Pay for performance, Performance based 
financing 
There are 20 results from 8524 records for your search on 'financial incentive or pay for 
performance or performance based financing in Title, Abstract, Keywords in Cochrane 
Reviews' 
There are 12 results from 30299 records for your search on 'financial incentive or pay 
for performance or performance based financing in Title, Abstract, Keywords in Other 
Reviews' 
There are 3 results from 16096 records for your search on 'financial incentive or pay for 
performance or performance based financing in Title, Abstract, Keywords in Economic 
Evaluations' 
Language 
restrictions 
None  
Number of 
citations 
35 
 
Relevant 
reviews  
8: Huang et al., 2013, Gillam et al., 2012, Reda et al., 2012, Chaix-couturier et al., 
2012, Hamilton et al., 2013, Witter et al 2012, Scott et al 2011, Petersen et al 2006, 
 
 
A2. Search strategy output for PubMed database 
Database Medline 
Host http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez (Pubmed) 
Date of 
search 
January 2012-June 2014 last date searched: 26/6/14 
Years 
covered 
1990-June 2014 (no date restrictions) 
Search 
Strategy 
1. Search (((((((financial incentive*) OR performance based financing) OR 
pay for performance) OR paying for performance) OR incentive*) AND 
Review[ptyp] AND Humans[Mesh] AND English[lang])) AND health 
Language 
restrictions 
None  
Number of 
citations 
1453 
Relevant 
reviews  
12: Van Herck P et al 2010, de Bruin SR, et al 2011, Witter et al 2012, Scott et al 2011, 
Petersen et al 2006, Eijkenaar 2012, Christianson et al 2008, Reda et al., 2012, Hamilton 
et al., 2013, Houle et al., 2012, Gillam et al., 2012, Andrew D Oxman and Atle 
Fretheim, 2009 
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A3. Summary of identified reviews 
Reviews  Objectives  Search strategy and studies 
included 
Quality of included 
studies and 
evaluation design  
Results and limitations  Grade of 
evidence 
(Amstar 
score)  
Oxman and 
Fretheim, 
2009 
The authors undertook a 
critical appraisal of selected 
evaluations of incentive 
(PBF) schemes in the health 
sector in low and middle-
income countries (LMIC) 
Key informants were interviewed to 
identify literature relevant to the use 
of PBF in the health sector in 
LMIC, key examples, evaluations, 
and other key informants.  
13 studies were identified but only 
4 met their inclusion criteria (which 
was not explicitly stated in the 
paper) and were included in the 
review: two single country cases 
and two multi-country studies 
 
Quality of studies 
included in this review 
was not assessed. 
 
 
The authors found very limited evidence of 
PBF having a positive impact and it was 
impossible to disentangle the effects of 
financial incentives as one element of PBF. 
 
 
They concluded that when PBF schemes 
are used, they should be designed carefully, 
including the level at which they are 
targeted, the choice of targets and 
indicators, the type, and magnitude of 
incentives. 
In addition, PBF schemes should be 
monitored for possible unintended effects 
and evaluated using rigorous study designs 
4/11 
 
Canavan et 
al., 2008 
The authors  explored 
incentive based approaches 
adopted in developing 
countries over the past 
decade 
Search strategy was not described. 
5 programs from 5 countries 
(Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Rwanda, Burundi, Haiti, 
Afghanistan), from 8 studies  
 
Quality of included 
primary studies was 
not assessed. 
  
 
 
The authors found that PBF results showed 
remarkable improvements in health 
indicators (utilization, coverage and 
emergency referral) with associated 
enhanced quality of health provider 
performance.  
 
They also noted the ambiguity among 
researchers regarding the extent of 
3/11 
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Reviews  Objectives  Search strategy and studies 
included 
Quality of included 
studies and 
evaluation design  
Results and limitations  Grade of 
evidence 
(Amstar 
score)  
attribution of success, which calls for more 
rigorous evaluations of these programs.  
Chaix-
couturier et 
al., 2000 
The authors’ objectives were 
to identify all the types of 
financial incentives that 
have been provided to health 
care professionals and, when 
possible, to assess the effects 
of these incentives on the 
costs, process or outcomes 
of health care.  
 
6 databases were searched from 
January 1993 to May 1999 for 
English and French publications: 
MEDLINE, EMBASE, the Health 
Planning and Administration 
database, Pascal, International 
Pharmaceutical Abstracts, and the 
Cochrane Library. Additional 
papers were retrieved from the 
bibliographies of selected articles. 
It was stated that 89 papers were 
included in the review, whereas 
only 36 appeared to directly address 
the review question 
The quality of each 
study was assessed 
according to the 
criteria described by 
the Cochrane Effective 
Practice and 
Organization of Care 
Group, but the results 
were not reported in 
the review.  
The authors concluded that financial 
incentives could be used to reduce the use 
of health care resources, improve 
compliance with practice guidelines or 
achieve a general health target. It may be 
effective to use combinations of incentives, 
depending on the target set for a given 
health care programme. The authors 
however stated that few studies used the 
same methodology to assess the impact of 
the same incentive, thus limiting the 
external validity of their conclusions. 
6/11 
 
Christianson 
et al., 2008 
This paper reviews 
evaluations of recent pay 
for- performance initiatives 
instituted by health plans or 
by provider organizations in 
cooperation with health 
plans.  
 
The authors conducted electronic 
searches of MEDLINE, EMBASE, 
Cochrane Database of Systematic 
Reviews, Database of Reviews of 
Effects, Econlit, the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality, 
the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, and the 
Quality of included 
primary studies was 
not assessed in a 
standardized way. The 
authors however stated 
that most of the 
studies included in this 
review were low 
quality studies (no 
The review found that there were 
improvements in some quality measures, 
but it was not clear the degree of 
contribution of pay for performance to 
these improvements; the incentives 
typically were implemented in conjunction 
with other quality improvement efforts, or 
there was not a convincing comparison 
group.  
5/11 
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Reviews  Objectives  Search strategy and studies 
included 
Quality of included 
studies and 
evaluation design  
Results and limitations  Grade of 
evidence 
(Amstar 
score)  
World Health Organization.  
Nine studies were included in this 
review 
adequate control 
groups).  
 
 
 
de Bruin SR, 
et al., 2011  
This review assessed the 
effectiveness of P4P 
schemes used to stimulate 
delivery of chronic care 
through disease management 
with regards to quality and 
costs.  
  
Only one database was searched 
(PubMed).  
In addition to the electronic 
database search, relevant papers 
were identified through reference 
tracking and through a manual 
literature search on the internet 
from relevant websites, such as 
those of health insurers and 
Ministries of Health. 
 
Eight PBF schemes were identified 
6 in the USA, 1 in Germany and 1 
in Australia. Five of the P4P 
schemes were part of a larger 
scheme of interventions to improve 
quality of care, whereas the other 
three was implemented as 
‘standalone’ schemes. 
Primary studies were 
not assessed in a 
standardized way. 
Most studies showed positive effects of 
P4P on healthcare quality. However, there 
was only one database was searched, and 
no attempt to identify unpublished 
literature, important studies that might have 
influenced the conclusion might have been 
missed. 
 
They authors also found variation in 
incented entities and the basis for providing 
incentives. Information about motivation, 
certainty, size, frequency, and duration of 
the financial incentives was generally 
limited. 
6/11 
 
Eijkenaar, 
2012 
This review systematically 
compared pay for 
performance initiatives in 
The author searched Medline 
through PubMed and searched the 
Internet via Google and Google 
Since this was not an 
impact evaluation 
review per se, and 
The paper found variations in design and 
contextual factors between the identified 
programs. The author concluded that the 
6/11 
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Reviews  Objectives  Search strategy and studies 
included 
Quality of included 
studies and 
evaluation design  
Results and limitations  Grade of 
evidence 
(Amstar 
score)  
the USA to other countries 
in terms of specific design 
choices that might contribute 
to success of PBF programs. 
Scholar.  The authors also consulted 
country-specific experts and 
searched reference list for relevant 
studies.  
The author identified 13 programs 
initiated in 9 countries. Seven 
programs were regional while six 
have been implemented nationally.  
included studies were 
used to identify 
program descriptions, 
the quality of the 
studies was not 
assessed. 
designs of these schemes are likely to affect 
the effectiveness of the schemes. However, 
the designs of these schemes are lacking in 
several respects and might be as a result of 
the limited knowledge about “what works” 
in P4P. 
 
This study has several limitations: some 
relevant programs were not identified as a 
result of English language restriction in the 
search strategy, the study suffers from 
publication bias as some studies were 
specifically not included because sufficient 
information was not found on the programs. 
Gillam et al., 
2012 
The authors review the 
growing evidence for the 
impact of the framework on 
the quality of primary 
medical care (QOF) in the 
United Kingdom. 
The authors searched 3 databases: 
MEDLINE, EMBASE, and 
PsycINFO. They also searched the 
reference lists of published reviews 
and articles.  
Ninety-four studies were included 
in the review. 
 
Quality of primary 
studies were assessed 
using a modified 
Downs and Black 
rating scale for 
observational studies 
and a Critical 
Appraisal Skills 
Programme rating 
scale for qualitative 
studies. 
The authors however 
did not report the 
The authors found that: 
Quality of care for incentivized conditions 
during the first year of the framework 
improved at a faster rate than the pre-
intervention trend and subsequently 
returned to prior rates of improvement.  
There were modest cost-effective 
reductions in mortality and hospital 
admissions in some domains.  
Achievement for conditions outside the 
9/11 
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Reviews  Objectives  Search strategy and studies 
included 
Quality of included 
studies and 
evaluation design  
Results and limitations  Grade of 
evidence 
(Amstar 
score)  
quality assessment in 
this paper. 
 
framework was lower initially and has 
worsened in relative terms since inception.  
The person-centeredness of consultations 
and continuity were negatively affected.  
Patients’ satisfaction with continuity 
declined, with little change in other 
domains of patient experience. 
The conclusions of this study was limited 
by lack of adequate control groups 
Hamilton et 
al., 2013 
The authors set out to 
evaluate the effectiveness of 
providing financial 
incentives to healthcare 
professionals for smoking 
cessation activities. 
 
7 databases were searched till May 
2011: MEDLINE, EMBASE, 
PsycINFO, Cochrane Database of 
Systematic Reviews, DARE, 
Cochrane Central Register of 
Controlled Trials (CENTRAL) and 
Web of Science. The authors also 
searched to GreyNet International 
and Open Grey for grey literature. 
Reference lists of retrieved articles 
and relevant reviews were also 
checked 
Eighteen studies were included in 
the review: three RCTs and 15 
observational studies. 
Primary study quality 
was assessed using the 
Downs and Black 
guidelines for 
randomised and non-
randomised studies of 
healthcare 
interventions. Scores 
ranged from 1 (poor) 
to 4 (excellent). 
Included primary 
studies were 
considered to be mid-
The Authors found that financial incentives 
improved some process indicators such as 
recording smoking status, advice and 
referrals but not for outcome measures such 
as smoking quit rates. 
Studies of QOF program in the UK 
reported improvements in recording 
smoking status. One RCT also reported 
improvements in incentive clinics in the 
USA. 
Smoking advice or referral: QOF studies 
reported an increase in smoking advice. 
9/11 
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Reviews  Objectives  Search strategy and studies 
included 
Quality of included 
studies and 
evaluation design  
Results and limitations  Grade of 
evidence 
(Amstar 
score)  
range for quality 
 
The QOF studies should however be 
interpreted with caution because of the lack 
of adequate control groups 
Other studies reported mixed findings: two 
studies reported no differences for financial 
incentives and some studies reported 
improvements. 
Quit rates: Two studies reported no 
improvements in quit rates as a result of 
incentives and one study reported mixed 
effects for outcomes. 
The authors concluded that financial 
incentives appeared to improve recording 
of smoking status and increase provision of 
cessation advice and referrals to stop 
smoking services. There was however 
insufficient evidence to show that financial 
incentives led to reductions in smoking 
rates. 
Limitation: although this review is one of 
the well-conducted reviews, most data were 
retrieved from observational studies, which 
are prone to multiple biases. The authors 
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Reviews  Objectives  Search strategy and studies 
included 
Quality of included 
studies and 
evaluation design  
Results and limitations  Grade of 
evidence 
(Amstar 
score)  
noted that most studies did not account for 
secular changes during study periods (such 
as new guidelines for smoking cessation or 
recent fiscal policy or legislation) 
Houle et al., 
2012 
This review assessed the 
effect of Pay-for-
Performance remuneration, 
for individual health care 
practitioners, on the patient 
care outcomes. 
 
PubMed, EMBASE, The Cochrane 
Library, OpenSIGLE, the Canadian 
Evaluation Society's; Unpublished 
Literature Bank, and the Grey 
Literature Collection of the New 
York Academy of Medicine's 
Library were searched up to June 
2012. Reference lists were also 
manually searched. 
Thirty studies were included in the 
review. Four were RCTs, five were 
interrupted time series, three were 
controlled before-and-after studies, 
one was a non-randomized 
controlled study, 15 were 
uncontrolled before-and-after 
studies, and two were uncontrolled 
cohort studies. 
The primary studies 
included were 
assessed, according to 
the Cochrane risk of 
bias scale, which 
included criteria for 
allocation 
concealment, similar 
baseline 
characteristics, 
complete outcome 
reporting, and 
protection against 
contamination. 
The quality of the 
studies was generally 
low to moderate; only 
RCTs had comparable 
baseline 
characteristics and 
only one study had 
The authors, taking into consideration the 
limitations of the uncontrolled studies and 
the inability to draw reliable conclusions 
from them; concluded that Pay-for-
Performance modestly improved preventive 
activities, such as immunization rates, but 
there was little evidence that it was 
effective for other activities such as 
mammography referrals and cancer 
screening. 
 
 
 
10/11 
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Reviews  Objectives  Search strategy and studies 
included 
Quality of included 
studies and 
evaluation design  
Results and limitations  Grade of 
evidence 
(Amstar 
score)  
adequate patient 
allocation 
concealment (full 
results were reported). 
Huang et al., 
2013 
The authors’ objectives were 
to review and synthesize 
published evidence of pay-
for-performance (P4P) 
effects on management of 
diabetes. 
 
Four databases were searched: Ovid 
MEDLINE, EMbase, PubMed, The 
Cochrane Library (Issue 3, 2012 
 
12 interrupted time series studies, 7 
controlled before-after studies, and 
2 cross-sectional studies were 
included. Additionally, 12 studies 
were further included for 
quantitative analysis. 
The quality of 
included primary 
studies was assessed 
using Grading of 
Recommendations 
Assessment, 
Development, and 
Evaluation (GRADE) 
system. 
The authors reported 
that most studies 
included in the review 
were low quality 
studies. 
Results of meta-analysis showed that P4P 
produced generally positive effects in most 
indicators (e.g. patients with records of 
total cholesterol or blood pressure). 
However, these results were inconsistent. 
The percentage of patients with HbA1c ≤ 
7% or 53 mmol/mol showed a pooled odds 
ratio of 0.98 in patients, but a pooled mean 
difference of 19.71% in the physician 
groups. The odds ratios of receiving 
tests/reaching an outcome level were also 
diverse in patients (odds ratios ranged from 
0.98 to 3.32).  
The authors also found that process 
indicators had higher rates of improvement 
than outcome indicators. 
Limitations: the authors concluded that 
because of the low quality of included 
studies, the results of the review should be 
interpreted with caution.  
8/11 
Petersen et al., 
2006,  
This review assessed the 
effects of explicit financial 
incentives for improving 
The search was limited to studies 
written in English. 
The studies were 
assessed according to 
a published 
The authors found that of the 2 studies that 
evaluated financial incentives provided at 
the payment-system level, one found a 
7/11 
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performance on health care 
quality measures.  
 
 
 
Seventeen studies were included in 
the review: 9 randomized controlled 
trials, 4 controlled trials with 
before-and-after data and 4 cross-
sectional surveys. 
methodological 
quality checklist (by 
Downs and Black) and 
graded on a scale of 1 
(poor) to 4 (excellent).  
Six studies were 
assigned a quality 
grade of 3, six were 
assigned a grade of 2, 
and five were assigned 
a grade of 1. 
positive effect on access to care while the 
other found a negative effect on access to 
care for the sickest patients. 
Of the 9 studies that evaluated the use of 
financial incentives directed to provider 
groups, two reported improvements for all 
quality of care measures, five were 
classified as partial improvement studies, 
and two showed no effect of the 
intervention compared with the control 
group. 
Of the 6 studies that evaluated the effects of 
financial incentives at the physician level, 
two reported a positive effect of the 
intervention and three reported some 
positive effects (partial studies). 
The authors concluded that incentives at the 
physician, provider group and payment-
system levels have some positive effects, 
but further research is needed. This review 
was flawed because only one database was 
searched and the search was limited to 
English language papers, which suggests 
that relevant studies might have been 
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missed. Although an attempt was made to 
obtain unpublished data, publication bias 
was not assessed. Measures were taken to 
reduce the risk of bias in study selection. 
Reda et al., 
2009 
The primary objective of this 
review was to assess the 
impact of reducing the costs 
of providing or using 
smoking cessation treatment 
through healthcare financing 
interventions on abstinence 
from smoking.  
The authors searched the Cochrane 
Tobacco Addiction Group 
Specialized Register in April 2012.  
Eleven studies were included. 
Of the eleven included studies, six 
randomly assigned the individual 
participants to the treatment group 
and one or two control groups (and 
three randomly assigned medical 
practices The two other studies 
were controlled natural experiments 
with two and four different benefit 
groups, respectively. 
The quality of primary 
studies was assessed 
by The risk of bias of 
the included studies 
was assessed using 
criteria from the 
Cochrane 
Collaboration included 
in the Review Man- 
ager software. 
The Authors reported 
that most of the 
included studies had 
moderate to high risk 
of bias.  
 
The authors found there was no evidence of 
an effect on smoking cessation from the 
results of pooling two trials of financial 
incentives directed at healthcare providers 
(RR 1.16, CI 0.98 to 1.37, I² = 0%).  
 
Limitations: Only one database was 
searched and potentially important studies 
could have been missed. In addition, the 
two primary studies pooled together have 
relatively different incentive designs 
(heterogeneity) that were not accounted for. 
 
 
10/11 
 
Scott et al., 
2011  
This review assessed the 
effect of financial incentives 
on the quality of health care 
provided by primary care 
The authors searched the Cochrane 
Effective Practice and Organisation 
of Care (EPOC) Trials Register, 
Cochrane Central Register of 
Quality of included 
studies was assessed 
using the Epoc risk of 
bias guideline. The 
Six of the seven studies included in this 
review showed positive but modest effects 
on a minority of the measures of quality of 
care included in the study. 
9/11 
 
                                                                             
 284 
Reviews  Objectives  Search strategy and studies 
included 
Quality of included 
studies and 
evaluation design  
Results and limitations  Grade of 
evidence 
(Amstar 
score)  
physicians.  
 
Controlled Trials (CENTRAL) and 
Cochrane Database of Systematic 
Reviews (CDSR) (The Cochrane 
Library), MEDLINE, HealthSTAR, 
EMBASE, CINAHL, PsychLIT, 
and ECONLIT. Searches of 
Internet-based economics and 
health economics working paper 
collections were also conducted. 
Finally, studies were identified 
through the reference lists of 
retrieved articles, websites of key 
organisations, and from direct 
contact with key authors in the 
field.  
 
Articles were included if they were 
published from 2000 to August 
2009. 
Seven studies were included in this 
review.  
authors reported that 
there was high risk of 
bias (low quality) in 
most of the studies due 
to poor study designs  
 
The authors concluded that there is 
insufficient evidence to support or not 
support the use of financial incentives to 
improve the quality of primary health care. 
Implementation should proceed with 
caution and incentive schemes should be 
more carefully designed before 
implementation. In addition to basing 
incentive design more on theory, there is a 
large literature discussing experiences with 
these schemes that can be used to draw out 
a number of lessons that can be learned and 
that could be used to influence or modify 
the design of incentive schemes. 
Van Herck P 
et al., 2010,  
This review summarizes 
evidence, obtained from 
studies published between 
January 1990 and July 2009, 
concerning P4P effects, as 
well as evidence on the 
The authors looked at papers from 
1990- July 2009. They searched the 
following databases: Cochrane 
Library, EconLit, Embase, Medline, 
PsychINFO, and Web of Science. 
They also screened references, 
The vast majority of 
identified studies was 
not randomized (only 
nine were) and 
roughly 75 studies 
were either cross-
The authors concluded that P4P programs 
result in the full spectrum of possible 
effects for specific targets, from absent or 
negligible to strongly beneficial and that 
the effects of P4P interventions varied 
according to design choices and 
11/11 
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impact of design choices and 
contextual mediators on 
these effects.  
forward citation tracking, and 
expert consultation to identify 
studies.  
Studies that evaluated P4P effects 
in primary care or acute hospital 
care medicine were included.  
 
They included One hundred twenty-
eight evaluation studies  
 
sectional or employed 
a simple before-and- 
after design.  
characteristics of the context in which it 
was introduced. 
This study was however limited because 
they excluded studies based on quality and 
this may have produced an overly 
restrictive analysis.  
 
 
Witter et al., 
2012 
This review assessed the 
current evidence on the 
effects of pay for 
performance on the 
provision of health care and 
health outcomes in low and 
middle-income countries. 
The studies assessed a mix 
of both patients’ targeted 
incentives and incentives 
targeted at health care 
professionals.  
 
Over 15 databases were searched 
till June 2011. This includes: the 
Cochrane Effective Practice and 
Organisation of Care Group 
Specialised Register, CENTRAL, 
MEDLINE, Ovid, EMBASE, 
EconLit, the Social Sciences 
Citation Index, ISI Web of Science. 
They also searched the websites and 
online resources of numerous 
international agencies, 
organisations and universities to 
find relevant grey literature and 
contacted experts in the field.  
 
Nine studies were included in the 
The quality of 
included studies was 
assessed using the 
GRADE Working 
Group grades of 
evidence.  
The authors reported 
that almost all the 
studies identified had 
a high risk of bias. 
Sources of bias in the 
primary studies 
include non-random 
allocation of 
interventions, 
additional 
The authors concluded that the evidence 
base was too weak to draw general 
conclusions due to validity issues. 
Only one study out of the nine studies was 
considered to have low risk of bias, one had 
a moderate risk of bias and the remaining 
seven had a high risk of bias. 
The high and moderate quality study found 
mixed results: some indicators improved 
while there was no improvement in others. 
Two of the studies showed significant 
improvement for the intervention group, 
while two showed no significant difference.  
 
11/11 
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review. There was one randomized 
trial; six controlled before-after 
studies and two interrupted time 
series studies. 
funds/structures (other 
than the PBF schemes) 
that might have been 
responsible for the 
improvements seen, 
other confounders 
(e.g. contextual 
differences between 
intervention and non-
intervention groups), 
and lack of rigorous 
evaluations. 
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A6. Abstract of systematic review of economic evaluations of P4P 
BACKGROUND: Pay-for-performance (P4P) intents to stimulate both more effective and more efficient 
health care delivery. To date, evidence on whether P4P itself is an efficient method has not been 
systematically analyzed. 
OBJECTIVE:To identify and analyze the existing literature regarding economic evaluation of P4P. 
DATA SOURCES:English, German, Spanish, and Turkish language literature were searched in the 
following databases: Business Source Complete, the Cochrane Library, Econlit, ISI web of knowledge, 
Medline (via PubMed), and PsycInfo (January 2000-April 2010). 
STUDY SELECTION:Articles published in peer-reviewed journals and describing economic 
evaluations of P4P initiatives. Full economic evaluations, considering costs and consequences of the P4P 
intervention simultaneously, were the prime focus. Additionally, comparative partial evaluations were 
included if costs were described and the study allows for an assessment of consequences. Both 
experimental and observational studies were considered. 
RESULTS:In total, nine studies could be identified. Three studies could be regarded as full economic 
evaluations, and six studies were classified as partial economic evaluations. Based on the full economic 
evaluations, P4P efficiency could not be demonstrated. Partial economic evaluations showed mixed 
results, but several flaws limit their significance. Ranges of costs and consequences were typically 
narrow, and programs differed considerably in design. Methodological quality assessment showed scores 
between 32% and 65%. 
CONCLUSION:The results show that evidence on the efficiency of P4P is scarce and inconclusive. P4P 
efficiency could not be demonstrated. The small number and variability of included studies limit the 
strength of our conclusions. More research addressing P4P efficiency is needed. 
Additional material such as grades of included studies and detailed literature searches is available at: 
http://static-content.springer.com/esm/art%3A10.1007%2Fs10198-011-0329-
8/MediaObjects/10198_2011_329_MOESM1_ESM.pdf 
 
A7. Funnel plot for RCT evaluations of P4P 
 
 
 
 
A8. Funnel plot for quasi-experimental evaluations of P4P 
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A9. Funnel plot for evaluations of P4P with no control group 
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Appendix B 
B1. Search strategy output for economic theories to inform the P4P typology 
Database PubMed, PsycINFO, EconLit,   
Host http://ovidsp.tx.ovid.com/sp-3.13.1a/ovidweb.cgi 
Date of search January 2012-June 2014 last date searched: 26/6/14 
Years covered 1990-2014 no date restrictions 
Search Strategy You searched: 
((behavioural economics or behavioural theories or incentive theories or economic theories) and incentive).mp. [mp=hw, ab, ti, ct, sh, tn, ot, dm, mf, dv, kw, nm, 
kf, px, rx, an, ui, tc, id, tm] 
- Search terms used: 
 behavioural 
 behavioural economics 
 behavioural theories 
 economic 
 economic theories 
 economics 
 incentive 
 incentive theories 
 theories 
 
Language 
restrictions 
None  
Number of 
citations 
170 
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B2. Preliminary criteria for identified variable to be potentially included in the typology  
Core design 
features 
Variables  Description  
Who 
receives the 
incentives? 
 Individuals 
 Groups  
Individuals: incentive is paid to an individual health care provider e.g. physician 
Groups: incentive is paid to a group and individual clinicians might not benefit from the incentive directly e.g. hospital trust, 
clinical team, general physician (GP) practice, NGO, levels of government, faith based organizations 
Type of incentive  Bonus  
 Fines 
Bonus: incentive is in the form of increase in payments, bonus, gifts, peer recognition etc. 
Fines: negative incentives in the form of reduction in expected payments, penalty, punishment etc. 
Type of payment  Monetary 
 Non-monetary 
Monetary: incentive in form of money 
Non-monetary: incentives in the form of material things or tangible gifts 
Size of incentive  Large 
 Medium  
 Small  
Amount or magnitude of monetary or non-monetary reward or fine.  
Large: >10% 
Medium: 5-10% 
Small <5%  
of salary, budget, or anticipated payment 
 Payment 
mechanism 
 Absolute  
  Tiered thresholds 
Absolute: incentives are paid as a single payment for an absolute increase in performance for example, an 80 % increase in 
performance. 
Tiered thresholds: incentives are paid for a series of target thresholds to meet for example paying increasing incentives for 
achieving a 65%, an 80%, and a 90% performance threshold. 
Method of 
payment 
 
 Coupled  
 Decoupled 
 
Coupled: incentives paid are coupled with usual reimbursement e.g. an incentive in form of an increase in salary. 
Decoupled: incentives are paid separately from the usual reimbursement. 
Performance 
measure/payment 
scale 
 
 Absolute measure  
 Relative measure 
Absolute: incentive is paid for improvement in performance or behaviour change not dependent on other providers e.g. 
incentive paid per patient immunized 
Relative: incentive is paid for attaining a specific rank relative to other providers e.g. incentives paid to clinicians or hospitals 
in top 2 performing quartiles 
Domain of 
performance 
measured 
 Within clinicians 
control 
 Out of clinicians 
control 
Within clinicians control: incentive payments are based on process and structural outcomes e.g. number of children 
immunized, routine measurement of blood pressure of patients every month  
Out of clinicians control: payment of incentives to health providers for ultimate health outcomes e.g. reduction in mortality 
rates from a specific disease 
Time lag   Short  
 Long  
 
Short time lag: Immediately after measurement of performance: payment of incentives four months or less.  
Long time lag: Not immediately after measurement of performance: Payment of incentives more than 4months after 
measurement of performance 
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B3. Constructing P4P typology 
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B4. Application of the typology on identified P4P scheme  
Program  Perceived risk: high or low Incentive size: small 
or large 
Who receives the incentive: 
individuals or groups 
Fines or bonuses Type 
Advancing Quality  
United kingdom 
2008 
High risk 
 
Annually (long time lag) 
Mostly within Physicians control (2 final 
outcomes and 26 processes) 
Relative measure 
Small 
2-4% 
 
Group Fines and bonuses 8 
Clalit 
Israel 
1998 
 
 
Low risk  
 
Annually (long time lag)  
Mostly within Physicians control (10 
processes and 8 intermediate outcomes) 
Absolute measure 
Dependent on budget 
savings 
Groups Bonuses  
Clinical Practice 
Improvement Pay  (CPIP) 
Australia, Queensland 
(started 2008) 
Low risk  
 
Semi-annually (long time lag) 
Within physicians control (12 structures and 
7 processes) 
Absolute measure 
Large 
8-10% 
Group Bonuses 2 
MACCABI 
Israel  
2001 
High risk 
Annually (long time lag) 
Mostly within Physicians control (12 
processes and 5 intermediate outcomes) 
Relative measure  
Size not reported Group Bonus   
National Health Insurance 
P4P (NHI-P4P) 
Taiwan  
2004 
High risk  
 
Monthly and annually 
 12 structures, 3 final outcomes, and 2 
Large 
Up to 20% 
Individuals and groups Bonuses  6 
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Program  Perceived risk: high or low Incentive size: small 
or large 
Who receives the incentive: 
individuals or groups 
Fines or bonuses Type 
intermediate outcomes 
Absolute and relative measures 
Primary care P4P (PC-
P4P)  
Netherlands 
High risk  
Annually (long time lag) 
Within physicians control (31 processes) 
Relative measures 
Large 
8-10% 
Individual and groups  Bonuses  6 
Primary Care Renewal 
Models (PCRM) 
Canada Ontario 
Started 2007 
Low risk 
Annually  Within physicians control (12 
processes) 
Absolute measure   
Small 
2-4%  
Individual and groups  Bonuses  4 
Physician Integrated 
Network (PIN) 
Canada Manitoba 
2004 
 
Low risk  
Immediately after performance measure 
(short time lag) 
Within physicians control (only processes) 
Absolute 
large Groups  Bonuses 2 
Practice Incentive 
Program (PIP) 
Australia 1998 
 
 
Low risk  
Quarterly, semi-annually and annually , 
Within physicians control (only structures 
and processes) 
Absolute measure 
Size  not reported 
relative to income 
Group  Bonuses  
Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (QOF) 
Low risk  
Annually (long time lag) 
Mostly within physicians control (85% 
processes) 
Absolute measure  
Large 
Up to 30-40% 
Group  Bonuses 2 
Western New York 
Physician Incentive 
Program (WNY-PIP) 
USA 
Low risk  
Annually (long time lag) 
Mostly process: 6 Process and 3 outcomes 
Intermediate outcome 
Size of varied from 
$3,000 till $12,000 
large 
Individuals bonuses 10 
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Program  Perceived risk: high or low Incentive size: small 
or large 
Who receives the incentive: 
individuals or groups 
Fines or bonuses Type 
 
 
 
Absolute measure  
Kouides et al 1998 
Rochester, New York, 
USA 
Low risk 
 
Annually (long time lag) 
Process 
Absolute measure  
 
Size 
‘Modest’ for just one 
process? Small  
Group bonuses 4 
Ashworth et al 2004 
UK 2004 
Low risk  
Annually (long time lag) 
Process/structure 
Absolute measure  
 
up to £5000 per GP 
(large) 
Up to 5% 
Groups but money trickled 
down to individuals 
Bonuses  2 
Cattaneo et al 2001 
Italy 
 1998-1999 
Low risk  
Yearly (long time lag) 
Process 
Absolute measure  
Small 0.5% of annual 
revenue deducted 
Groups Fines  3 
Fair brother et al 1999 
New York 
12 months 
Low risk  
Annually (long time lag) Process 
Absolute measure  
 
Bonuses: $1000 (20% 
improvement from 
baseline); $2500 
(40% improvement); 
$5000 (80% up-to-
date) 
Large 
Individuals Bonuses 8 
Fairbrother et al 2001 
USA 
16 months 
Low risk 
One off payment after 16 months (long time 
lag) 
Process 
1000 (30% 
improvement from 
baseline); $2500 
(45% improvement); 
Individual Bonuses 8 
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Program  Perceived risk: high or low Incentive size: small 
or large 
Who receives the incentive: 
individuals or groups 
Fines or bonuses Type 
Absolute measure  
 
$5000 (80% up-to-
date); $7500 (90% 
up-to-date) 
Grady et al 1997 
USA 
 
Low risk  
Quarterly payments (short time lag) 
Process 
Absolute 
Measure  
Token 
Small? 
, i.e., $50 for a 50% 
referral rate.  
Small up to 1% 
Groups Bonuses 4 
Hillman et al 1998 
 
Low risk  
Every 6 months (long time lag) 
Process  
Absolute measure 
Large Up to 20% of 
capitation fees 
Individuals and groups Bonuses 2 
Larsen et al 2003 
 
Low risk  
Time lag not reported Process 
Absolute measure  
Small  
Size up to 1% of 
physicians 
compensation 
Individuals Bonuses 12 
Rooski et al 2003 
USA 
 
  
Low risk  
3 month time lag in payment 
Process 
Absolute measure 
 
 
Size: up to $10,000 
not reported relative 
to practice 
budget/income 
Most likely small. 
Groups  Bonuses 4 
Harries et al, 2005 
Malawi National 
Tuberculosis Control 
Programme 
(four year program/0 
Low risk  
 
6month (short time lag) 
process 
absolute measure  
 
 
Size: up to 100% of 
usual reimbursement 
 
Individual physicians Bonuses 8 
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Program  Perceived risk: high or low Incentive size: small 
or large 
Who receives the incentive: 
individuals or groups 
Fines or bonuses Type 
Chien et al 2012 
 
Hudson Health Plan's P4P 
program in 
 
New York  
USA 
Low risk 
Both process and outcomes 
Yearly 
 
Absolute 
300$ per patient a 
potential that is: most 
likely above 5% 
Second, the bonus 
amount was set well 
above typical levels 
and was substantial 
compared to office 
visit fees for a 
Medicaid population 
Groups  Bonuses 2 
Hillman et al., 1999 
 
 
USA 
Low risk 
Process 
Absolute and relative really 
Payment frequency: every 6 months 
 
Bonuses based on 
total compliance 
score for quality 
indicators; full and 
partial bonuses 
Average bonus, 
$2,000 (range, $772 
to $4682) 
 
Payments to provider groups Bonuses 4 
Christensen et al., 2000 
 
USA 
 
Low risk  
Timing of payment not reported  
Process 
Absolute measure  
$4 for cognitive 
services interventions 
(_6 min); $6 for _ 6 
min; cognitive 
services 
Provider group Bonuses  
Hillman et al., 1998 
 
USA 
Low risk 
Payment frequency: every 6 months (long 
time lag) 
Process  
Absolute measure  
Large  
Full and partial 
bonuses (20%; 10% 
of capitation); range 
of bonus per site, 
Provider group Bonuses 2 
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Program  Perceived risk: high or low Incentive size: small 
or large 
Who receives the incentive: 
individuals or groups 
Fines or bonuses Type 
 $570 to $1260 
 
Large: up to20% 
Thomas F. Gavagan, et al 
2010 
USA 
 
 
Low risk 
Annually (long time lag) 
Processes 
Absolute Measure 
 
 
Small The potential 
$4000 annual pay-out 
based on achieving 
quality 
targets represented 
approximately 3% to 
4% of a 
provider’s total salary 
Individual physicians Bonuses 12 
An LC et al 2008 
USA 
 
 
Low risk 
Annual (long time lag) 
Process 
Absolute measure 
5000$ onetime 
payment at the end of 
the programme 
Groups Bonuses 4 
Glickman et al2007 
USA 
CMS  
 
High risk  
Yearly (long time lag) 
Process and outcomes 
Relative  
Small 2%  Groups (hospitals)  Bonuses 7 
Levin et al 2006 
USA 
 
 
Low risk 
Paid monthly (short time lag) 
Process 
Relative measure 
Up to 20% of 
budget/salary 
Groups  Bonuses 2 
Mandel KE, Kotagal UR. 
2007 
Can’t tell: not enough information reported 
Process  
Large 
7% fee schedule 
increase 
Practices (groups) Bonuses  
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Program  Perceived risk: high or low Incentive size: small 
or large 
Who receives the incentive: 
individuals or groups 
Fines or bonuses Type 
Cincinnati  
USA 
Lindenauer, et al 2007 
CMS 
USA 
High risk 
Annual (long time lag) 
Processes  
Relative measure  
Up to 2% usual 
Medicare 
reimbursement  
Group  Bonuses 6 
Greenberg et al 2008 
 
Low risk  
Payment every three months (short time lag) 
Process 
Not enough 
informtion reported  
 
Individuals Bonuses  
Yao H et al 2008 
 
China  
 
 
Not enough information reported 
Process 
 
$31 694 on incentives 
to village doctors for 
providing DOT, $16 
011 on incentives for 
referring TB patients 
to county TB 
dispensaries and $15 
992 for  spreading TB 
knowledge in villages 
Doctors  
Individuals  
Bonuses  
Fagan et al, 2010 
 
 
Low risk  
 
Timing of payment not reported  
Process and structures 
Absolute  measure  
Large  
Up 20%  
Groups Bonuses 2 
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Program  Perceived risk: high or low Incentive size: small 
or large 
Who receives the incentive: 
individuals or groups 
Fines or bonuses Type 
Chien AT et al 2010 
 
USA 
 
 
  
Low risk  
Timing of payment not reported  
Process  
Absolute measure 
Can’t tell 
 a U.S.$200 bonus 
payment for each 
fully immunized 2-
year-old 
Individuals  Bonuses  
Jha et al 2012 
CMS 
 
High risk  
Yearly (long time lag) 
Process and outcomes 
Relative measure  
2% Groups 
hospitals 
Bonuses 7 
 
Lynch 1995 UK 
 
Low risk 
Annually  
Paid quarterly  
Absolute (tournament) it would between 
70% and 89%; rates below 70% do not 
qualify for these payments.  
 Paid to GP practices 
 
Groups  
Bonuses  
Sussman et al 2000  
Boston, Massachusetts 
USA 
Low risk   
Yearly (long time lag) 
Process 
Absolute measure  
Large Size: up to 
10% of salary 
 
Individuals  Bonuses 10 
Norton 1992  
 
 
Can’t tell  
Timing of payment not reported Outcomes  
Absolute measure  
$126 to $370 
 
Groups  Bonuses  
Shen, 2003  
 
Maine, USA 
 
Low risk  
Annual payment (long time lag) 
Process 
Absolute measure  
Not enough reported 
about size 
Groups  Bonuses  
Basinga et al, 2010 Low risk  
 
Large 22-38% of 
usual budget and 
Individuals and groups Bonuses 2 
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Program  Perceived risk: high or low Incentive size: small 
or large 
Who receives the incentive: 
individuals or groups 
Fines or bonuses Type 
 
Rwanda 
 
Monthly and quarterly payments (short time 
lag) 
Processes 
Absolute measure  
salary 
  Canavan A. and Swai G. 
(2008) 
Tanzania 
Low risk  
Payment every 6 months (long time lag) 
Processes 
Absolute measure 
Large 5-10% of 
hospital budget and 
clinicians salary  
Individuals and groups Bonuses 2 
Sulku, 2011 
Turkey 
 
Low risk 
Monthly payments (short time lag) 
Process and outcomes  
Absolute measure  
Large 
 
Up to 80% of budget 
and salary  
 
Individuals and groups Bonuses 2 
Vergeer and Chansa, 
2008. 
Zambia 
 
Low risk  
Absolute measure  
Quarterly payments (short time lag) 
Processes   
Up to 100% of salary  Individuals and groups Bonuses 2 
Ssengooba, 2012. 
 
Uganda  
 
Low risk  
6monthly payment (long time lag) 
Process 
Absolute measure  
Large up to 11% of 
hospital budget  
Groups  Bonuses 2 
Cutler  
 
USA (California P4P) 
High risk  
Annual payments (long time lag) 
Processes and intermediate outcomes 
Relative measure  
Large  
 
Up to 5% of budget  
Groups  Bonuses 6 
Gilmore et al 
 
Hawaii Medical Services 
Association  
High risk  
Annual  (long time lag) 
Relative 
Outcomes  
Large 
 
Up to 7% of salary  
Individuals  Bonuses 14 
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Program  Perceived risk: high or low Incentive size: small 
or large 
Who receives the incentive: 
individuals or groups 
Fines or bonuses Type 
Young et al High risk  
Annual (long time lag) 
Processes 
Relative measure  
Large 5% of 
physician fees was at 
risk 
Individuals Bonuses 14 
Twardella et al High risk  
Annual (long time line) 
Outcome  
Absolute measure 
Small  Individuals  Bonuses  
Li et al Ontario  Low risk  
Annual (long time lag) 
Processes  
Absolute measure  
Large: up to 10% of 
physician revenue  
Individuals  Bonuses 8 
Kouides 1993 Low risk  
Annual payment (long time lag) 
Processes  
Absolute 
Small  Individuals  Bonuses 12 
(India) 
ASHA/JSY 
Low risk 
Payment every three months 
Processes  
Absolute measure 
$4.94 to $34.58 
(small) 
health professionals (ASHA’s) 
(individuals) 
Bonus  12 
Haiti: RBF for NGO  Low risk  
Quarterly payments 
Processes  
Absolute measure 
Up to 15% of 
previous budget of 
NGO 
(large) 
NGOs: groups/institutions Bonus  2 
GAVI Incentives for 
national governments 
Low risk 
Time lag not clear 
Processes  
Absolute measure 
Up to 15% increased 
immunization 
funding 
(large) 
National government: 
institutions/groups 
Bonus  2 
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Appendix C 
C1. Summary of existing methods (from studies consulted) for assessing inter-rater reliability for 
categorization tools in health care 
 
I summarize the methods of investigating inter-rater reliability in the published studies by assessing the 
kind of tool or instrument been analysed, number of raters included in the study and rationale, how the 
raters were selected and why, number of subjects (sample size) that the tool is to be applied on, how the 
subjects were selected, what test statistic was used in computing the reliability, other statistical 
assumptions, and the software used in analysis. 
 
The first study I assessed is by Lobbestael and colleagues (2011), which examined the inter-rater reliability 
of the structured clinical interview for the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Axis, I 
(SCID I). This tool is known as the gold standard of semi-structured assessment instruments for clinical 
disorders and personality disorders.  In their inter-rater reliability analysis, they used two set of raters 
selected randomly; the first rater consisted of 16 individuals while the second set of raters consisted of 16 
individuals with varied levels of professional training. These raters were given the relevant training before 
using the tool. The raters were split into pairs and each pair assessed audiotaped interviews of 151 
randomly selected participants from a large research project. There was no rationale given by the authors 
for the number of raters or subjects included in the study. To compute the agreement of diagnosis between 
raters, kappa coefficients were calculated and used to assess agreement of categorical judgements of the 
SCID 1 and agreement was interpreted according to Fleiss (1981) kappa values lower than 0.40 was 
interpreted as poor, between 0.41 and 0.75 as fair, and above 0.75 as excellent agreement. The authors did 
not state the software used in computing kappa or other statistical assumptions made. 
 
The second study by Hartling and colleagues (2012) assessed the Inter-rater reliability of Quality 
Assessment Instruments (1) the Cochrane Risk of Bias (ROB) tool for randomized controlled trials (RCTs) 
and the Newcastle-Ottawa Scale (NOS) for cohort studies. The Cochrane ROB tool is used to assess the 
risk of bias in RCTs and the NOS tool is used to assess the risk of bias in cohort studies. In investigating 
the inter-rater reliability of the Cochrane ROB tool for RCTs, the authors randomly selected 154 RCTs 
(subjects) from 616 published trials previously examined for quality reporting.  Twelve raters that had 
experience with Evidence Based Practice Centres (EPC) work were specifically selected. To assess inter-
rater reliability, 124 RCTs from this sample between two raters using pairs of raters from 4 EPCs.  The 
authors further assessed the reliability agreement s across the rater pairs using a subset of 30 trials rated by 
9 raters split into pairs with one group having 3 raters. For the NOS tool for cohort studies, the authors 
identified completed meta-analyses of cohort studies through the EPC Programme and Medline. They 
considered a meta-analysis appropriate if it incorporated at least 10 studies, assessed a dichotomous 
outcome, and had substantial statistical heterogeneity. The final number of subjects was 131. In order to 
assess the inter-rater reliability the NOS for cohort studies, two raters each from 4 of the EPCs 
independently applied the NOS to 131 samples of cohort studies. The authors extracted data from each of 
the studies (trials and cohort) that might be related to judging the risk of bias which would help the raters 
use the tool. Inter-rater agreement was calculated for each domain and for overall quality assessment using 
weighted or unweighted Cohen’s kappa statistics, as appropriate and the reliability agreement across the 
rater pairs was calculated using the Fleiss Kappa and interpretation of the Kappa statistics based was on 
suggestions from Landis and Koch (1977). No rationale was given for the number of raters used or the 
number of subjects used. 
 
Another study by Oremus et al 2012 investigated inter-rater reliability between 5 pairs of inexperienced 
student raters for quality assessments using the Jadad Scale for randomised controlled trials and the 
Newcastle-Ottawa Scale (NOS) for observational studies. The raters were students taking McMaster 
Integrative Neuroscience Discovery and Study Programme courses. They received a training session on 
quality assessment and were randomly assigned into ﬁve pairs. Each of the students independently rated 
the quality of 13 to 20 articles and they number of articles they were given depended on the amount of time 
each rater could devote to the study. These articles were randomly distributed among the raters and were 
drawn from a pool of 78 papers examining cognitive impairment following electroconvulsive therapy to 
treat major depressive disorder. The investigators provided a standardised tabular spread sheet for student 
raters to use during quality assessment. Raters then independently rated their assigned articles to permit the 
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authors to examine inter-rater reliability. The authors measured inter-rater reliability for the Jadad and NOS 
questions using the kappa coefficient calculated for each question and the kappa values were interpreted as 
follows: >0.80 was very good, 0.61 to 0.80 was good, 0.41 to 0.60 was moderate, 0.21 to 0.40 was fair and 
<0.21 was poor based on Altman’s (1991) suggestions. All statistics were computed using SAS V.9.2 (The 
SAS Institute) with level of signiﬁcance <0.05. 
 
The fourth study I reviewed by MacDermid et al (2005) investigated the inter-rater reliability for the 
AGREE instrument for evaluating Clinical Practice Guidelines (CPG) pertaining to medical care. Three 
pairs of raters were randomly selected from a pool of 69 physical therapists willing to participate in the 
research that had varying level of experience with research and educational training but all of them had at 
least one post-graduate degree. Each rater independently rated a set of 6 (CPGs) from a randomly selected 
from a pool of 55 CPGs. The pool of CPGs were identified through an inventory that was created by the 
study authors from a series of systematic searches that included electronic databases, websites, contact of 
professional associations and guideline developers and the CPGs included in this study were the ones 
published within the last five years. The reliability between appraisers was determined for each question 
and each domain of the AGREE instrument using the Kappa coefficient. An unweighted and quadratic 
weighted kappa was calculated to indicate the agreement within pairs of raters on whether a CPG was 
appropriate for clinical utilization. Kappa values above 0.75 were considered to represent good, 0.40–0.75 
moderate and <0.40 poor reliability based on the suggestions by Fleiss (1986). The authors used the SPSS 
statistical software for Windows (Version 11.0; SPSS Inc., Chicago, Illinois) for all statistical analyses. P-
values of 0.05 or less were considered significant. 
 
The investigators in these studies (explored) did not explicitly give rationales for the number of raters or 
sample size although, for about three of the studies it appeared that the number of subjects assigned to the 
raters was a trade-off between the data/resources available and time that the raters could devote to the 
research. The raters were paired up randomly in all the studies but the total number of raters included in the 
studies ranged from 2 to about 20. Once again, the investigators gave no rationale for this. Although, it 
appeared that for some studies, it depended on the number of eligible people that are available, responded 
or willing to participate in the research and for some, the number of raters used also depended on if they 
were interested in some things other than just the inter-rater reliability coefficient such as the reliability of 
the agreement between the raters pairs. One of the studies assessed the reliability of agreement between 
rater pairs and the investigators computed the ‘Fleiss Kappa’ to investigate this. 
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C2. : Ethics approval for study of the inter-rater reliability of the P4P typology 
 
 
 
 
    
   
 
 
 
 
 
23 April 2014 
 
Department of  
Health Sciences 
 
c/o Department of Philosophy 
Heslington 
York YO10 5DD 
 
Telephone (01904) 433253 
Fax  (01904) 321383 
E-mail                smh12@york.ac.uk 
 
Dr Stephen Holland 
 
www.york.ac.uk/healthsciences 
 
 
 
Miss Y Ogundeji 
University of York 
Department of Health Sciences 
Heslington 
York 
YO10 5DD 
 
 
Dear Yewande 
 
The reliability of a typology tool for categorising descriptions of performance based financing (PBF) 
schemes 
 
Dear Yewande, 
 
Thank you for resubmitting your study to me for approval by Chair's Action.  I am writing to confirm that 
the study can now go ahead, but would point out two things: 
 
1) Thank you for the telephone call confirming that there will be no transfer of data between yourself, your 
supervisor and Professor Bland (and that you and Professor Bland will analyse the data together on your 
password-protected university computer). 
 
2) Regarding the following two parts of the consent form:  
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I understand that this research is not a formal part of my studies (I will receive compensation for time 
and effort upon completion on the ratings of 6 academic papers) 
I understand that the research has no effect on my studies or assessments(non-completion has no effect 
on my studies or assessments)  
 
I suggest that you combine the points about the research not being part of the participants' studies, and 
separate out the point about compensation: 
I understand that this research is not a formal part of my studies, that the research has no effect on my 
studies or assessments, and that withdrawal from the study would have no effect on my studies or 
assessment 
I understand that I will receive compensation for time and effort upon completion on the ratings of 6 
academic papers 
 
Good luck with the study and thank you, again, for your resubmission. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
Stephen Holland 
Chair: HSRGC 
 
cc.  Prof Trevor Sheldon 
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C3. Letter to potential raters participating in the inter-rater reliability study 
 
Hi, 
I am Yewande Ogundeji, a PhD student in the Department of Health Sciences. I am looking for health 
research volunteers to help test a tool I developed as part of my research on the impact of incentives on 
health service performance. I hope you can help with this.  
 
The tool is a typology that categorizes incentive programs in health care. I need to test whether the tool is 
easy to use and reliable; in other words, whether different potential users will come to the same conclusion. 
 
If you choose to participate, I will provide a short training (which might last up to one hour) and give you a 
comprehensive guideline for use of the tool. 
You will then need to read 6 research papers and use the tool to categorize the type of incentive scheme 
described in the paper.  
This is a desk-based exercise, which you can do in the comfort of your own home and in your own time. In 
addition, you get ample time (three weeks) to complete the task. 
 
As a thank you for your time, you will be given a token of a £10 iTunes/Amazon gift voucher when you 
complete the task. 
I would be grateful if you seriously consider participating in this.  
 
If you are interested in participating and/or would like to know more, please contact me on 
yo508@york.ac.uk 
 
Many thanks, 
Yewande 
 
 
  
                                                                             
 323 
C4. Participant Information Sheet for the P4P typology inter-rater reliability study 
 
The reliability of a typology tool for categorising descriptions of performance based financing (PBF) 
schemes 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
Title of Study: The reliability of a typology tool for categorising descriptions of performance based 
financing (PBF) schemes. 
I would like to invite you to take part in the above named study but before you decide, please read the 
following information.  
What is the purpose of this study? 
The use of incentives in health care has increasingly been adopted in many countries to improve the quality 
and efficiency of health care across different contexts and different clinical areas (Eldridge and Palmer, 
2009). 
The evidence base on what works, what does not and why is mixed. Schemes have different designs, 
contexts, and implementation factors which makes it difficult to synthesise the evidence. 
To help categorize these different schemes, I developed and piloted a typology. This typology could help 
group the different kinds of incentive schemes based on design features, which could make interpretation 
of evidence easier. The typology was constructed using a range of theory (from behavioural science and 
economics), concepts, and empirical evidence on how people respond to incentives. 
The typology consists of 4 items relevant to design features of PBF resulting16-type typology (the four 
items are: who receives the incentives, the type of incentives, the size of incentive, and the perceived risk 
of earning the incentive).  
I now wish to empirically test the inter-rater reliability of the instrument to see if different raters produce 
consistent results across conditions which it is likely to be used (PBF evaluations reported in academic 
literature) (Atkinson and Nevill, 1998, Streiner and Norman, 1989).  .   
Who is doing the study?  
I, Yewande Ogundeji will be the principal investigator in this study, which is being conducted as a part of 
my PhD thesis supervised by Trevor Sheldon (Professor of Health Services Research and Policy at York). 
Data from the study will be analysed by Martin Bland (Professor of Health Statistics, Department of Health 
Sciences-University of York) and me. 
Who is being asked to participate?  
The participants being recruited for this study are graduate research students from the University of York-
Health Sciences, used as a convenience sample. 
This population consists of participants with diverse qualifications, backgrounds, and research experience, 
all of which are important in assessing inter-rater reliability. This is because the versatility of the 
participants reflects (as close as possible) a real life scenario of potential users of the tools. 
Do I have to take part? 
Taking part in this research is entirely voluntary. Whether or not you decide to take part will not have any 
effect on your studies or assessments. 
If you choose to participate, you will receive a token (10 GBP gift voucher) of gratitude upon completion 
on the ratings of 6 academic papers. 
If you decide to participate, you will be asked to sign a consent form to show that your participation is 
voluntary and has no effect on your studies or assessment i.e. it is not a formal part of your studies. 
What will be involved if I take part in this study? 
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If you decide to participate in this study, after you have signed a consent form, you will be trained on how 
to use the typology using the training manual developed. The training manual is based on the guideline 
developed for use of the typology. The estimated time for training session is between 45 minutes to 1 hour. 
The training session will be instructive and comprehensive with examples and relevant problem solving 
exercises. It will also be an interactive training session and there will be opportunities for questions and 
feedback. 
After the training, the volunteer raters/participants will be given 6 academic papers which describe PBF 
schemes from different countries and asked to apply the typology to each scheme to judge what category it 
falls under. This task is a desk-based exercise that can be done at any suitable location convenient for the 
participant (you will be given three weeks to finish the task and you will also be asked to report the 
estimated time taken to apply the typology to each study).  
The estimated time to rate one academic paper is 30-45 minutes. 
What are the advantages/benefits and disadvantages/risks of taking part? 
Some of the advantages of taking part in this study includes: research experience, some knowledge of PBF 
schemes. In addition, upon completion of the task, £10 gift voucher as a thank you for your time. There are 
no risks involved in taking part in this research. 
Can I withdraw from the study at any time?  
If you decide to participate, you can still withdraw from the study at any stage of the research (before 
training, after training, after you have received the studies to be rated). In addition, you do not have to give 
a reason for withdrawing. 
Will the information obtained in the study be confidential? or Will the information I give be kept 
confidential? 
I, the principal investigator in this study will be in control of and act as custodian for data 
generated/collected by the study. 
I will collect information such as: qualifications, years of research experience, and background. However, 
no identifiable information such as names of raters will be collected; therefore, all ratings are completely 
anonymized and no ratings can/will be traced down to any individual rater (participant) 
Data will be stored in their original form (categorized studies by the raters, qualifications, years of research 
experience, and background) for up to 5 years on password protected University computers. 
Data generated by this study will be analyzed on a university desktop by both Professor Martin bland and 
me. 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
Results of the research will be made available through peer reviewed journals, conferences, and my PhD 
thesis 
Who has reviewed this study? 
Research Governance Committee- Department of Health Sciences, University of York 
Who do I contact in the event of a complaint? 
Trevor Sheldon (supervisor): trevor.sheldon@york.ac.uk 
 
If you agree to take part, would like more information or have any questions or concerns about the study 
please contact Yewande Kofoworola Ogundeji (PhD Student): yo508@york.ac.uk 
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C5. Participant consent form for the P4P typology inter-rater reliability study 
 
 
 
Title of Study: The reliability of a typology tool for categorizing descriptions of performance based 
financing (PBF) schemes 
 
 
Please confirm agreement to 
the statements by putting 
your initials in  
the boxes below 
I have read the invitation email and understand it  
I have had the opportunity to ask questions and discuss this study  
I have received satisfactory answers to all of my questions  
I have received enough information about the study  
I understand what I am required to do in the study    
I understand my participation in the study is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw from the research 
1 At any time 
2 Without having to give a reason for withdrawing 
 
 
 
 
I understand that I will receive compensation for time and effort upon 
completion on the ratings of 6 academic papers 
 
I understand that this research is not a formal part of my studies, that the 
research has no effect on my studies or assessments, and that withdrawal from 
the study would have no effect on my studies or assessment 
 
I understand that any personal information I provide for the purpose of this 
research will be kept confidential, stored securely and only accessed by those 
carrying out the study. 
 
I agree to take part in this study  
Participant Signature …………………………………………………………                       Date  
Name of Participant   
 
Researcher Signature ………………………………………………………..                       Date  
 
Name of Researcher 
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C6. : Initial guideline for use of the P4P typology 
Size  
Was the size of the incentive small or large? 
Criteria for judging Small If the incentive in the PBF program is smaller than 5% of any one of the 
following: 
 Salary of individual clinician/health worker/doctor  
 Anticipated payments (to the health facility/hospital/clinical team) 
such as: budgets (total budget or budget for the particular 
intervention in question), fee for service (FFS) and capitation  
Criteria for judging Large If the incentive in the PBF program is 5% and above of any one of the 
following: 
 Salary of individual clinician/health worker/doctor  
 Anticipated payments (to the health facility/hospital/clinical team) 
such as: budgets (total budget or budget for the particular 
intervention in question), fee for service (FFS) and capitation 
Who received the incentive? 
Did Individuals or Groups receive the incentive? 
Criteria for judging 
Individuals 
 If the incentives are paid directly to individual health 
workers/clinicians/doctors 
 If individual health worker/clinician/doctor’s income is 
supplemented as a result of the incentive (e.g. reflected in the rise of 
personal income)  
 
Criteria for judging 
Groups (including 
schemes where 
individuals and groups 
are paid bonuses) 
If the incentive is paid to a group in which individual clinicians may or may 
not benefit from the incentive directly  
Groups include any of the following  
 Hospital trust 
 Clinical team 
 General physician (GP) practice 
 NGO 
 Levels of government  
 Faith based organizations 
 
Type of incentive 
Was the incentive in the form of Fines or Bonuses? 
Criteria for judging Fines If the incentive is negative in the form of reduction in expected payments, 
penalty, punishment etc. 
Criteria for judging 
Bonuses 
Bonus: incentive is in the form of increase in payments, bonus, gifts etc.  
Performance measure (payment scale) 
Absolute or relative measure? 
Criteria for judging 
Absolute measure  
If incentive is paid to the health service provider for any of the following  
OR 
If penalties/fines are levied on the health service provider for not reaching or 
achieving any of the following  
 Improvement in performance typically improvement from some 
baseline measure. e.g. incentive paid per patient immunized, 0r 70% 
improvement from baseline 
 Achieving  above a predetermined target 
 Achieving a proportionate part of predetermined target. 
 Achieving a predetermined target 
 Points achieved on the incentive domain(s) of performance  
 Composite performance score 
 
Criteria for judging 
Relative measure 
If incentive payment is based on ranked performance data among 
participating health service providers in such a way that earning bonuses or 
being fined is dependent on where the performance   health service provider 
ranks among other providers. 
 If bonuses are paid for to health service providers in a specific 
                                                                             
 327 
performance rank e.g. the providers in top quartile of performance. 
 If fines are levied on health service providers in certain ranks 
usually the bottom ranks e.g. the providers the last quartile of 
performance 
 If bonuses are paid to health service providers in top ranks and fines 
are levied on providers at the bottom of the performance ranks 
 
Domain of performance measured  
Was the domain of performance measure Mostly within clinicians’ control or Mostly out of 
clinicians’ control? 
Criteria for judging 
Mostly within clinicians 
control 
If incentive payments to health service providers are mostly/only based on 
process and structural outcomes e.g. number of children immunized, routine 
measurement of blood pressure of patients every month  
 
Criteria for judging 
Mostly out of clinicians 
control 
If  incentive payments to health service providers are mostly/only for 
ultimate health outcomes e.g. reduction in mortality rates from a specific 
disease, blood pressure reduction, patient experience etc. 
Time lag 
Before or at 4 months OR After 4months? 
Criteria for judging Before 
or at 4 months 
If incentive payment (or penalty) is made Immediately or not more than 4 
months after measurement and confirmation of performance  
Criteria for judging After 
4months 
If incentive payment (or penalty) is made after 4 months after measurement 
and confirmation of performance  
Risk 
High risk or low risk? (based on judgements from the dimensions of Performance measure, Time 
lag, and Domain of performance measure 
Criteria for judging High 
risk 
If the PBF program has 2 or more of the following features 
 If incentive payment (or penalty) is made after 4 months after 
measurement and confirmation of performance 
 If the domain of performance measure was mostly out of clinicians 
control 
 If the perofmance measure (payment scale) is a relative measure 
Criteria for judging Low 
risk 
If the PBF program has 2 or more of the following features 
 If incentive payment (or penalty) is made Immediately or not more 
than 4 months after measurement and confirmation of performance
  
 If the domain of performance measure was mostly within the 
clinicians control 
 If the performance measure (payment scale) is an absolute measure 
Note: Even though the categories within each dimension are dichotomous, it is possible that the PBF 
program could have both categories featured in the type of incentive and who receives the incentive 
category). For example, it is possible that a PBF program pays incentives to the hospital and the 
doctors/clinicians so both groups and individuals get the incentives. In this situation, it is judged as both 
individuals and groups. 
Criteria for judging ‘unclear’ in all the dimensions: Insufficient information to permit the judgement of       
category and/or if the design features are not described in sufficient detail. 
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C7. P4P studies used in testing the inter-rater reliability of the P4P typology  
 
1. An, L.C., et al., A randomized trial of a pay-for-performance program targeting clinician 
referral to a state tobacco quitline. Arch Intern Med, 2008. 168(18): p. 1993-9. 
2. Ashworth, M., et al., How are primary care organizations using financial incentives to 
influence prescribing? Journal of Public Health, 2004. 26(1): p. 48-51. 
3. Basinga, P., et al., Effect on maternal and child health services in Rwanda of payment to 
primary health-care providers for performance: an impact evaluation. The Lancet, 2011. 
377(9775): p. 1421-1428. 
4. Beaulieu, N.D. and D.R. Horrigan, Putting smart money to work for quality 
improvement. Health Serv Res, 2005. 40(5 Pt 1): p. 1318-34. 
5. Catteneo, A., B. Giulio, and S. Giorgio, Breasfeeding by objectives. European Journal of 
Public Health, 2001. 11: p. 397-401. 
6. Fairbrother, G., et al., The impact of physician bonuses, enhanced fees, and feedback on 
childhood immunization coverage rates. American Journal of Public Health, 1999. 89(2): 
p. 171-175. 
7. Fairbrother, G., Hanson, K.L., Butts, G.C., Friedman, S., Comparison of preventive care 
in medicaid managed care and medicaid fee for service in institutions and private 
practices Ambulatory Peadiatrics, 2001. 1: p. 294-301. 
8. Harries, A.D., et al., Performance-related allowances within the Malawi National 
Tuberculosis Control Programme. The International Journal of Tuberculosis and Lung 
Disease, 2005. 9(2): p. 138-144. 
9. Jha, A.K., et al., The Long-Term Effect of Premier Pay for Performance on Patient 
Outcomes. New England Journal of Medicine, 2012. 366(17): p. 1606-1615. 
10. Kirschner, K., et al., Assessment of a pay-for-performance program in primary care 
designed by target users. Fam Pract, 2013. 30(2): p. 161-71. 
11. Kouides, R.W., et al., Performance-based physician reimbursement and influenza 
immunization rates in the elderly. American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 1998. 
14(2): p. 89-95. 
12. Li, Y.H., et al., The effects of pay-for-performance on tuberculosis treatment in Taiwan. 
Health Policy Plan, 2010. 25(4): p. 334-41. 
13. Gavagan, T.F., et al., Effect of Financial Incentives on Improvement in Medical Quality 
Indicators for Primary Care. J Am Board Fam Med, 2010. 23: p. 622– 631. 
14. Roski, J., et al., The impact of financial incentives and a patient registry on preventive 
care quality: increasing provider adherence to evidence-based smoking cessation 
practice guidelines☆☆Surveys available upon request from corresponding author. Prev 
Med, 2003. 36(3): p. 291-299. 
15. Ssengooba, F., B. McPake, and N. Palmer, Why performance-based contracting failed in 
Uganda – An “open-box” evaluation of a complex health system intervention. Social 
Science & Medicine, 2012. 75(2): p. 377-383. 
16. Sutton, M., et al., Reduced mortality with hospital pay for performance in England. N 
Engl J Med, 2012. 367(19): p. 1821-8. 
17. Werner, R.M., R.T. Konetzka, and D. Polsky, The effect of pay-for-performance in 
nursing homes: evidence from state Medicaid programs. Health Serv Res, 2013. 48(4): p. 
1393-414. 
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C8. A sample rating template by volunteer users of the P4P typology 
Study 
author 
Who 
receives the 
incentive: 
individuals 
or groups 
Type of 
incentive: 
fines or 
bonuses 
Size of incentive: small or 
large 
Time lag: short or long Perceived risk of not earning 
the incentive: high or low risk Domain of measurement: within clinicians control or out of 
clinicians control 
Performance measure: absolute or relative measure 
An et al 
 
(Sample 
study) 
 
 Incentive 
dollars went 
into each 
clinic’s 
general 
Operating 
fund. There 
were no 
payments to 
individual 
administrato
rs, 
physicians, 
and staff as 
part of this 
project. 
 
GROUPs 
Incentive 
dollars 
went into 
each 
clinic’s 
general 
Operating 
fund. 
 
 
BONUSES 
 
 
Clinics that referred 50 
smokers would receive a 
$5000 performance bonus. 
Clinics would also receive 
$25 for each referral 
beyond the initial 50. 
 
 
UNCLEAR 
 
Because size was not 
reported relative to budget 
or salary. 
I would day SMALL using 
my judgment 
 
 
This project took place from September 1, 2005, through June 31, 
2006. Incentive payments 
were made to clinics in 1 lump sum at the end of the contract 
period 
(LONG) 
Low risk 
 
The primary outcome measure for this study was the percentage of the 
clinic’s smokers referred to telephone counselling. This was defined as 
the number of unique individuals referred divided by the estimated 
number of smokers seen in the clinic. 
 
PROCESS 
Within clinicians’ control 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota modified existing contracts 
with intervention clinics to provide incentives encouraging quit line 
referral. 
 
ABSOLUTE 
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Jha et al 
(your 
exercise 
study) 
Who 
receives the 
incentive: 
individuals 
or groups 
Type of 
incentive: 
fines or 
bonuses 
Size of incentive: small or 
large 
Time lag: short or long Perceived risk of not earning 
the incentive: high or low risk Domain of measurement: within the clinicians control or out of 
clinicians control 
Performance measure: absolute or relative measure 
Jha et al Incentive 
dollars went 
to the 
Medicare 
programs of 
all hospitals 
included in 
the study. 
There were 
no 
individual, 
administrato
rs, clinical 
and non-
clinical staff 
incentives.   
 
GROUPS 
Bonuses in 
Medicare 
payments 
to hospitals 
that 
performed 
in the top 
two deciles 
for the 
medical 
conditions 
to which 
the 
incentives 
were tied. 
A financial 
penalty 
starting in 
the fourth 
year of the 
program 
was placed 
on 
hospitals 
that under-
performed.  
1-2% for both bonuses and 
fines. Hospitals with more 
Medicare patients with the 
medical conditions tied to 
the incentive would 
receive higher bonuses in 
comparison to those with 
less Medicare patients with 
the conditions hence the 
size of incentive is 
dependent on the number 
of Medicare patients with 
the medical conditions 
assigned to the incentive 
serviced by the hospital. 
Also, later in the program, 
additional incentives were 
offered to hospitals that 
made substantial 
improvements in care. 
  
SMALL 
The study was carried out from the fourth quarter of 2003 through to 
the fourth quarter of 2009. Bonuses and financial penalty started in the 
fourth year of the program. 
LONG 
High risk 
The aim of the study was to assess the long term effects of the pay-for-
performance program (Premier Hospital Quality Incentive 
Demonstration) on mortality due to the medical conditions assigned 
incentives.  
 
OUT OF CLINICIANS CONTROL 
The bonuses were paid to health service providers in the top two 
deciles and the financial penalties were incurred by health service 
providers that underperformed.  
 
RELATIVE 
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 FINES 
Study 
author 
Who 
receives the 
incentive: 
individuals 
or groups 
Type of 
incentive: 
fines or 
bonuses 
Size of incentive: small or 
large 
Time lag: short or long Perceived risk of not earning 
the incentive: high or low risk Domain of measurement: within the clinicians control or out of 
clinicians control 
Performance measure: absolute or relative measure 
Ashwort
h et al. 
Incentive 
pounds went 
to GPs in 
Primary 
Care 
Organization
s(PCOs) 
 
INDIVIDU
ALS 
Incentive 
pounds 
went to 
GPs. 
 
 
BONUSES 
Incentives did not form 
part of the national pay 
formula for GPs so the 
additional money 
increased their salaries. 
The average bonus offered 
in year 2 was 1220 pounds. 
In my judgment, the 
incentive is LARGE.  
 
 
 
 
The paper mentioned that the incentives boosted the gross income of 
the GPs rewarded but did not state if it was awarded on a monthly or 
yearly basis  
 
UNCLEAR 
 
Low  
The aim of this study was to determine the relationship between 
financial incentives and prescribing behavior in PCOs.  
 
PROCESS 
Within clinicians’control 
The incentives paid depended on the attainment of a specified 
prescribing target.  
 
ABSOLUTE 
Study 
author 
Who 
receives the 
incentive: 
individuals 
or groups 
Type of 
incentive: 
fines or 
bonuses 
Size of incentive: small or 
large 
Time lag: short or long Perceived risk of not earning 
the incentive: high or low risk Domain of measurement: within the clinicians control or out of 
clinicians control 
Performance measure: absolute or relative measure 
Basinga 
et al. 
The 
incentive 
payments 
were paid to 
Incentive 
payments 
were made 
according 
The paper mentioned that 
services with the highest 
per-unit payments showed 
the most improvements 
Every 3 months, the facilities submitted quarterly requests for payment 
of incentives from the committee responsible for issuing payments. 
 
SHORT 
Low  
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the Primary 
Health Care 
facilities.  
 
GROUPS 
to  the 
facility’s 
ability to 
satisfy the 
quality 
criteria. 
Facilities 
that do not 
satisfy all 
the criteria 
have their 
payments 
reduced 
accordingl
y. 
 
BONUSES 
and alluded to the 
payments being 
substantial.  
 
LARGE  
The P4P scheme was initiated to assess the effect of financial 
incentives on use and delivery of quality maternal and child health care 
services. The services included institutional deliveries, antenatal visits, 
immunization etc. 
 
PROCESS 
Within clinicians’ control 
Incentives were paid to facilities based on their performance in 
delivery of health care services tied to the P4P scheme. 
 
ABSOLUTE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Study 
author 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Who 
receives the 
incentive: 
individuals 
or groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of 
incentive: 
fines or 
bonuses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Size of incentive: small or 
large 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time lag: short or long 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perceived risk of not earning 
the incentive: high or low risk Domain of measurement: within the clinicians control or out of 
clinicians control 
Performance measure: absolute or relative measure 
Cattaneo 
et al 
Local Health 
Authorities 
(LHAs) 
0.5% 
deduction 
of the 
The deducted amounts for 
the whole region amounts 
to about 1 billion LIT. 
The fine is placed on the annual revenues of their DRG of the LHAs.  
 
LONG 
Low  
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receive 
penalties for 
not 
complying 
with work 
plans and 
achieving 
targets for 
improving 
breastfeedin
g behavior  
 
GROUPS 
DRG 
(Disease 
Related 
Groups) 
annual 
revenues if 
they do not 
achieve 
work plans 
and 
targets.  
 
FINES 
 
SMALL 
 
Improvements in breastfeeding rates were attributed to 
objectives/processes combining policy changes and behaviours of 
health professionals.  
 
Within clinician’s control  
 
LHAs were penalized if they did not meet targets set for improvement 
in breastfeeding practices.  
 
ABSOLUTE 
Study 
author 
Who 
receives the 
incentive: 
individuals 
or groups 
Type of 
incentive: 
fines or 
bonuses 
Size of incentive: small or 
large 
Time lag: short or long Perceived risk of not earning 
the incentive: low or high  Domain of measurement: within the clinicians control or out of 
clinicians control 
Performance measure: absolute or relative measure 
Harries 
et al. 
Incentive 
payments 
are made to 
programme 
staff. 
 
INDIVIDU
ALS 
Incentives 
were paid 
to staff 
members 
that 
achieved 
the targets 
of the 
program. 
The 
amount 
depended 
on the 
All NTP staff depend on 
the $100 monthly 
remuneration from the 
local government. 
Incentive payments range 
from $1500 for 
programme Director to 
$250, the least, for 
laboratory supervisors. 
Therefore, the incentive is 
a significant boost to their 
incomes.  
 
The incentive payments were paid after self-assessment forms were 
submitted every 6 months.  
 
LONG 
Low  
The indicators for judging the effect of improved performances were 
centred on practices of the programme staff.  
 
Within clinicians’ control 
The incentives were paid based on improving performance of the 
programme staff in the control of TB.  
 
ABSOLUTE 
                                                                             
334 
 
number of 
targets 
met. 
 
BONUSES 
LARGE 
Study 
author 
Who 
receives the 
incentive: 
individuals 
or groups 
Type of 
incentive: 
fines or 
bonuses 
Size of incentive: small or 
large 
Time lag: short or long Perceived risk of not earning 
the incentive: low or high 
Domain of measurement: within the clinicians control or out of 
clinicians control 
Performance measure: absolute or relative measure 
Kirschne
r et al. 
The 
incentive 
payments go 
to the 
general 
practices 
(GPs) 
 
GROUPS 
Incentive 
payments 
went into 
each 
practice’s 
operating 
fund.  
 
BONUSES 
The incentives were given 
in relation to quality 
scores. The higher the 
score, the higher the 
incentive. It is between 5-
10% of the  practice’s 
income. 
 
LARGE 
Four months after submitting their quality assessment data, the 
practices are given their bonuses accordingly. 
 
SMALL 
Low  
The indicators measured in this study assess the quality of care offered 
by the general practices. Individual GPs were assessed using 
questionnaires on their clinical care practices, practice management 
and patience experience.  
Within clinician’s control 
 
Incentive payments were made to general practices using the quality 
scale used to assess improvements in delivering services.  
ABSOLUTE 
Study 
author 
Who 
receives the 
incentive: 
individuals 
or groups 
Type of 
incentive: 
fines or 
bonuses 
Size of incentive: small or 
large 
Time lag: short or long Perceived risk of not earning 
the incentive: low or high Domain of measurement: within the clinicians control or out of 
clinicians control 
Performance measure: absolute or relative measure 
Beaulieu 
and 
The 
physicians 
Incentive 
payments 
The incentive payment 
ranged from $3000 to 
Incentive payments were made on an annual basis to physicians who 
scored above the predetermined target on the composite performance 
Low  
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Horrigan receive the 
incentive 
payments.  
 
INDIVIDU
ALS 
are made 
in the form 
of a quality 
bonus to 
the 
physicians. 
 
BONUSES 
$12,000, depending on the 
composite score of the 
physician across the 
indicator practices. 
 
LARGE 
index. 
 
LONG 
6 process measures and 3 outcome measures were used for this study 
hence the process measures outweigh the outcome measures.  
 
Within clinicians’ control 
 
 
The study aimed to improve patient health by improving performance 
of the physicians in service delivery. Targets were set to be achieved if 
incentive was to be awarded.  
 
ABSOLUTE 
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C9. Questionnaire for information about participants of the P4P typology inter-rater 
reliability study 
 
1. Have you had any kind of training on incentive programs in health care (if yes, give 
details)? 
2. Have you had any experience with an incentive program in healthcare (if yes, give 
details)? 
3. What is your area of research expertise? 
4. How many years of research experience do you have? 
5. What is your Highest/present academic qualification? 
 
 
C10. Raters report of time and ease of use of the typology 
Rater  Average time spent per study  Difficulty level of using the 
typology: easy/moderately 
difficult/difficult 
1 25 Easy  
2 20 Easy 
3 20 Easy 
4 30 Easy 
5 25 Easy  
6 15 Easy  
7 20 Easy  
8 15 Easy  
9 20 Easy  
10 20 Easy  
11 20 Easy  
12 15 Easy  
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Types  (C: low, B: med, A: high); Effect  (+=Positive impact but not statistically significant, +** statistically significant positive effect , 0**=no statistically significant effect, -
** statistically significant negative effect) 
 
Appendix D 
 
D1: Extraction of information from evaluations of P4P schemes  
Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
Advancing 
Quality  
United 
kingdom 
2008 
High risk 
Annually 
(long time lag) 
Mostly within 
Physicians 
control (2 final 
outcomes and 
26 processes) 
Relative 
measure 
 
Small 
2-4% 
 
Group Bonuses  Sutton et al, 
2012 
 
Pre/post 
Compared with 
national average 
(difference in 
difference 
analysis) 
Outcomes/clinical/chroni
c care 
30 days in hospital 
mortality: combined 
(heart failure, 
pneumonia, acute 
myocardial infarction)  
General combined results: Risk-
adjusted, absolute mortality for the 
conditions included in the pay-for-
performance program decreased 
significantly, with an absolute 
reduction of 1.3 percentage points 
(95% confidence interval [CI], 0.4 to 
2.1; P = 0.006) significant impact  
C 
 
+** 
Outcome 30 days in 
hospital mortality for 
patients admitted for 
Pneumonia 
The largest reduction, for pneumonia, 
was significant (1.9 percentage points; 
95% CI, 0.9 to 3.0; P<0.001) 
significant impact (positive) 
+** 
Outcome 30 days in 
hospital mortality for 
patients admitted for 
myocardial infection 
non-significant reductions for acute 
myocardial infarction (0.6 percentage 
points; 95% CI, −0.4 to 1.7; P = 0.23)   
0** 
                                                                             
338 
Types  (C: low, B: med, A: high); Effect  (+=Positive impact but not statistically significant, +** statistically significant positive effect , 0**=no statistically significant effect, -
** statistically significant negative effect) 
 
Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
30 days in hospital 
mortality for patients 
admitted for Heart failure 
Non-significant reduction 0.6 
percentage points; 95% CI, −0.6 to 1.8; 
P = 0.30). [positive impact but not 
significant) 
0** 
Clalit 
Israel, 
1998 
 
 
Low risk  
Annually 
(long time lag)  
Mostly within 
Physicians 
control (10 
processes and 
8 intermediate 
outcomes) 
Absolute 
measure 
Large 
Depend
ent on 
budget 
savings 
Groups Bonuses Gross et al. 2008 
pre/post design 
from 1998 to 
2005) 
Cost containment 
(process) 
Clinics have managed to reduce 10 
percent of budget expenses 
A 
 
+ 
Mammography rates 
(process) 
Mammography rates had risen from 40 
percent to 65 percent 
+ 
Patient satisfaction 
(outcome) 
Patient satisfaction had risen from 
about 76 percent to 85 percent of 
members reporting high satisfaction. 
+ 
Diabetes control 
measures (process) 
Diabetes control measures have 
improved from 35 percent to 48 
percent  
+ 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
Clinical 
Practice 
Improvem
ent Pay  
(CPIP) 
Australia, 
Queenslan
d (started 
2008) 
Low risk  
 
Semi-annually 
(long time lag) 
Within 
physicians 
control (12 
structures and 
7 processes) 
Absolute 
measure 
 
 
Large 
8-10% 
Group Bonuses Clinical Practice  
Improvement 
Centre (2008,  
2010),  
 
Queensland 
Health  
(2010) 
 
Before and after 
(no control 
group) 
Mental health  
Sixteen mental health 
services across 
Queensland participated 
and were provided with 
the opportunity to 
receive incentive 
payments during the 
period between January 
2009 and June 2011. 
Data collection was 
conducted  
Using information 
available on existing 
Queensland Health 
databases.  
State-wide results showed steady and 
continual improvement in the indicator 
over the reporting period. 
A + 
MACCAB
I 
Israel  
2001 
High risk 
Annually 
(long time lag) 
Mostly within 
Physicians 
control (12 
processes and 
5 intermediate 
outcomes) 
Relative 
Most 
likely 
large 
Size not 
reporte
d 
Group Bonus  Friedman, 2006 
Before and after 
(pre-post) no 
control group 
 Mammography rates 
(process) 
Mammography rates had risen from 52 
percent in 2002 to 64 percent in 2004 
B 
 
+ 
Balanced diabetes 
patients (Intermediate 
outcome) 
An increase in the percentage of 
balanced diabetes patients (Hba1c , 7) 
was also noted  
+ 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
measure  Vaccination flu rates 
(process) 
 
Flu vaccination rates had risen from 35 
percent to 47 percent 
+ 
National 
Health 
Insurance 
P4P (NHI-
P4P) 
Taiwan  
2004 
High risk  
Monthly and 
annually 
 12 structures, 
3 final 
outcomes, and 
2 intermediate 
outcomes 
 
Absolute and 
relative 
measures 
Large 
Up to 
20% 
Individuals 
and groups 
Bonuses  Chang et al., 
2008 
Logistic 
regression/pre/po
st (no control 
group) 
One year 
Smoking cessation visits 
(process) 
Odds Ratio (95% CI) Financing 
policy2004* 2005 0.96 (0.87 to 1.06) 
This policy increased the annual 
number of cessation visits per patient. 
B 0** 
Tsai et al., 2010:  
Pre-post design 
compared with 
control (non-
PBF) for 3 years 
Tuberculosis treatment 
default rate (process) 
 
The treatment default rate after “P4P 
on TB” was 11.37% compared with the 
15.56% before “P4P on TB” 
implementation. The treatment default 
rate in P4P hospitals was 10.67% 
compared to 12.7% in non-P4P 
hospitals.  
+ 
Kuo et al., 2011 
Pre-post with 
controls (4 years 
follow up) 
Breast cancer care (BC-
P4P) in Taiwan on care 
quality (process) 
BC-P4P enrollees received higher-
quality care than nonenrollees (P _ 
.001).  
+** 
Breast cancer care (BC-
P4P) in Taiwan on 
patient survival 
BC-P4P enrollees had better 5-year 
overall survival (odds ratio, 0.167; P _ 
.001) 
+** 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
(outcome) 
Breast cancer care (BC-
P4P) in Taiwan on 
recurrence (outcome) 
Less recurrence (odds ratio, 0.370; P _ 
.002) 
+** 
Li et a.l, 2010 
Pre-post 
compared with 
controls: 4 years 
Tuberculosis cure rate 
(intermediate outcome) 
Cure rate: Number cured (cure rate) 
p4p:18 377 (68.1) non p4p:  2778 
(42.4) <0.01 (%) p4p:N 26 977 (80.4)  
non p4p 6559 (19.6) P4P hospital 
0.2911 1.338 (1.159–1.544) <0.0001 
cure rate odds ratio 95% CI 
+** 
Lee at al., 2010 
One year: Pre-
post design with 
control groups 
Diabetes care (diabetes 
specific tests and exams) 
(process) 
Patients in the P4P program (received 
significantly more diabetes-specific 
exams and tests after enrolment (3.8 vs 
6.4, P <.001) than patients not enrolled 
in the program (3.5 vs 3.6, P <.001).  
+** 
Physician visits for 
diabetes (process) 
Patients in the intervention group had 
an average of 2 more physician visits 
for diabetes than those in the 
comparison group (P <.001). 
+** 
Diabetes related 
hospitalizations 
(intermediate outcome) 
Conversely, the intervention group had 
fewer diabetes-related hospitalizations 
(−0.027, P = .003).  
+** 
 
Primary 
care P4P 
High risk  
Annually 
Large 
8-10% 
Individual 
and groups  
Bonuses  *Kirschner et al 
2013 
Mean score diabetes (9 
process indicators) 
10.4* (*=significant, p less than 0.05) B 
 
+** 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
(PC-P4P)  
Netherlan
ds 
(long time lag) 
Within 
physicians 
control (31 
processes) 
Relative 
measures 
Pre-post design 
evaluation after 
one year` with 
control group 
Blood pressure 
controlled  
5.9* +** 
Total cholesterol 
controlled 
8.8* +** 
HbA1c controlled 
(≤7.0%) (Intermediate 
outcome) 
7.7* +** 
Asthma management (4  
process indicators) 
11.5* +** 
Asthma outcome  4.4 0** 
Mean score COPD (5 
process indicators)  
8.1* +** 
COPD outcome  2.5 0** 
Influenza vaccination 
(process) 
-1.2 (negative impact although not 
significant) 
0** 
Cervical cancer 
screening (process) 
0.6 (no significant impact) 0** 
CRVM process 14.7** +** 
CRVM outcomes  8.4** +** 
Primary 
Care 
Renewal 
Low risk 
Annually  
Within 
Small 
2-4%  
Individual 
and groups  
Bonuses  Li et al., 2010 
Difference in 
difference 
Pap smear 0.003*** pless than 0.005 B +** 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
Models 
(PCRM) 
Canada 
Ontario 
Started 
2007 
physicians 
control (12 
processes) 
Absolute 
measure   
estimates 
Cross sectional 
design /time 
series(with 
control 
group)data 
collected from 
1998-2008 
Influenza vaccination 0.009 0** 
Mammograms 0.073*** +** 
Childhood 
immunizations 
-0.008 0** 
Colorectal screening 0.092*** +** 
Physician 
Integrated 
Network 
(PIN) 
Canada 
Manitoba 
2004 
 
Low risk  
Immediately 
after 
performance 
measure (short 
time lag) 
Within 
physicians 
control (only 
processes) 
Absolute 
Maxim
um 
paymen
t 
unknow
n but 
likely 
large 
Groups  Bonuses PIN evaluation 
report, 2012. 
 
Pre post design 
(no control 
group) 
Colon cancer screening 38.7% A + 
Dyslipidaemia screening 35.4% + 
Cervical cancer 
screening 
11.1% + 
Breast cancer screening 12.3% + 
Nephropathy screening 29.6% + 
Lipid profile 22% + 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
 Obesity screening 14.8% + 
HGBA1C screening 12.5% + 
Blood pressure test 5% + 
Renal dysfunction test 11.5% + 
Practice 
Incentive 
Program 
(PIP) 
Australia 
1998 
 
 
Low risk  
Quarterly, 
semi-annually 
and annually, 
Within 
physicians 
control (only 
structures and 
processes) 
Absolute 
measure  
 
Size  
not 
reporte
d 
relative 
to 
income 
but 
likely 
small 
Group  Bonuses PIP Audit report 
No 5 2010-2011 
 
Before and after 
(with control 
group) 
Diabetes 20%points B +* 
Prescribing No significant effect 0** 
Information technology No significant effect 0** 
Quality 
and 
Outcomes 
Low risk  
Annually 
(long time lag) 
Large 
Up to 
30-40% 
Group  Bonuses Calvert et al., 
2009 
 
Diabetes management 
Change in HbA1c levels 
>10% 
The introduction of the quality and 
outcomes framework did not lead to 
improvement in the management of 
A 0** 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
Framewor
k (QOF) 
Mostly within 
physicians 
control (85% 
processes) 
Absolute 
measure  
Retrospective 
cohort design 
(no control 
group) 
Reduction  
Intermediate outcome 
patients with type 1 diabetes, nor to a 
reduction in the number of patients 
with type 2 diabetes who had HbA1c 
levels greater than 10%. 
HbA1c levels of ≤7.5% 
Intermediate outcome 
Odds ratio 1.05 (95% confidence 
interval 1.01 to 1.09; P=0.02). 
+** 
Campbell et al., 
2007 
Adequate control 
Coronary heart disease 
Mean Difference 
(95% CI) P Value 
Intermediate outcome 
 0.53 (−0.01 to 1.08) 0.054 0** 
Asthma 
Intermediate outcome 
0.03 (−0.45 to 0.51) 0.904 0** 
Type 2 diabetes 
management 
Intermediate outcome 
0.08 (−0.32 to 0.49) 0.682 0** 
Taggart et al., 
2012 
2000-2008 
Before and after: 
no control group 
Smoking cessation 
advice 
process 
 
Rapid increases in recording smoking 
status and advice occurred around the 
QOF’s introduction in April 2004. 
Subsequently, compliance to targets 
has been sustained, although rates of 
increase have slowed. 
+ 
Millet et al., 
2009 
Before and after 
with no control 
group 
Achievement of diabetes 
treatment targets for 
blood pressure (< 140/80 
mm Hg), HbA1c (# 
7.0%) and cholesterol 
Patients with co-morbidity remained 
significantly more likely to meet 
treatment targets for cholesterol and 
HbA1c than those without after the 
introduction of pay for performance 
+** 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
(# 5 mmol/L). 
Intermediate outcome 
MacBride-
Stewart, et al,. 
2008 
Before and after 
ITS 
Adequate control 
Changes in prescription 
pattern 
Process 
QOF significant reduction in 
prescribing pattern compared to a non-
significant increase in prescribing 
pattern for the Non QOF control group. 
+** 
Strong et al., 
2009 
Before and after 
with no control 
group 
Accurate spirometry in 
the management of 
COPD 
process 
 
 
There was no association between 
quality, as measured by adherence to 
BTS spirometry standards, and either 
QOF COPD9 achievement (Spearman's 
rho = -0.11), or QOF COPD10 
achievement (rho = 0.01). 
0** 
Vaghela et al,. 
2008 
 
Before and after: 
no control group 
 
A1C <or=7.5%, The estimated annual increase in 
percent of diabetes subjects achieving 
targets was 3.03% (95% CI 2.95–3.10; 
P 0.001) for the A1C target 
+** 
Blood pressure 
<or=145/85 mmHg 
Process  
The estimated annual increase in 
percent of diabetes subjects achieving 
targets was 3.26% (3.18–3.34; P 0.001) 
for the blood pressure target 
+** 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
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or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
Cholesterol <or=5 
mmol/l was determined. 
Process  
The estimated annual increase in 
percent of diabetes subjects achieving 
targets was 3.99 % (3.92– 4.07; P 
0.001) for the cholesterol target. 
 
+** 
Tahrani et al., 
2007  
Before and after 
with no control 
group 
PCTs 
 
Process indicators 95% CI April 2004- March 2006 all p 
values less than < 0.001 
 
BMI Record -19.2 to -14.5 +** 
Smoking record  -54.7 to -47.3 +** 
HBA 1c Record -22.5 to -15.0 +** 
Retinal screening record -42.9 to -32.5 +** 
Peripheral pulses record -63.6 to -52.7 +** 
Neuropathy testing 
record 
-64.2 to -53.2 +** 
BP record -10.8 to -8.2 +** 
Micro albumin testing 
record 
-74.8 to -65.9 +** 
Creatinine record -15.0 to -11.2 +** 
Cholesterol record -17.3 to -13.6 +** 
Outcome indicators 95% CI April 2004- March 2006 all p 
values less than < 0.001 
 
Smoking cessation 
advice 
-15.2 to -9.2 +** 
HbA1c< 7.4 -24.1 to -16.2 +** 
HbA1c< 10 -22.6 to -16.4 +** 
BP< 145/85mmHg -20.3 to -15.9 +** 
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Program  
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risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
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or 
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Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
TC<5 -25.9 to -22.0 +** 
Influenza vaccine -24.6 to -18.1 +** 
Serumaga et al., 
2011 
 
Design 
Interrupted time 
series. 
 
Blood pressure 
monitoring (no change) 
process 
After accounting for secular trends, no 
changes in blood pressure monitoring 
(level change 0.85, 95% confidence 
interval −3.04 to 4.74, P=0.669 and 
trend Change −0.01, −0.24 to 0.21, 
P=0.615), control (−1.19, −2.06 to 
1.09, P=0.109 and −0.01, −0.06 to 
0.03, P=0.569) 
0** 
Treatment intensity (no 
change) 
process 
Treatment intensity (0.67, −1.27 to 
2.81, 
P=0.412 and 0.02, −0.23 to 0.19, 
P=0.706) 
Good quality of care for hypertension 
was stable or improving before pay for 
performance was introduced. Pay for 
performance had no discernible effects 
on processes of care or on hypertension 
related clinical outcomes. 
0** 
Cupples et al., 
2008 
2004-2006 
Cross-sectional 
Study 
Control group  
Blood pressure, 
 
More RoI than NI participants had 
systolic blood pressure >140 mm Hg 
(37% vs 28%, P = 
0.01)  
+** 
Cholesterol  
 
More RoI than NI participants had 
cholesterol >5 mmol/L (24% vs 17%, P 
+** 
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Incenti
ve size  
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receives 
the 
incentive 
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or 
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ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
= 0.02) 
Medications  
 
Fewer participants in the RoI (55% vs 
70%) were prescribed β-blockers. 
ACE inhibitor prescribing was similar 
for both groups (41%; 48%); high 
proportions were prescribed statins 
(84%; 85%) and aspirin (83%; 77%) 
+** 
Smoking status 1 -62.1 (-67.0 to -56.3) 0** 
 
Smoking status 2 -22.7 (-26.4  to -19.0) -** 
Smoking status 3 3.5 (-1.8 to 8.6) 0** 
Smoking status 4 -3.1(-8.4 to 1.8) 0** 
Coleman, 2007 
1990-2005 
Retrospective 
longitudinal 
survey 
Smoking status recording  Compared with the first quarter of 
2003, recording of smoking status 
increased up to the first quarter of 2004 
in (rate ratio = 1.88; 95% CI, 1.87–
1.89)  
+** 
Brief advice to smokers  Compared with the first quarter of 
2003, and in brief advice to smokers 
increased up to  (RR = 3.03; 95% CI, 
2.98–3.09), 
+** 
Campbell, et al.,  
2009 
1998-2007 
Before and after 
Coronary heart disease  Mean change in rate of improvement  -
0.250, 95% CI, -0.401 to 0.100, 
pvalue=0.001 
0* 
Asthma  Mean change in rate of improvement  - 0* 
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Results  
Effect size  
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study 
Interrupted time 
series  
0.468, 95% CI, -0.748 to -0.187, 
pvalue=0.001 
Diabetes  Mean change in rate of improvement  -
0.220, 95% CI, -0.313 to -0.127, 
pvalue=0.001 
0* 
Continuity of care  Mean change in rate of improvement  
0.091, 95% CI, 0.025 to 0.157, 
pvalue=0.001 
+** 
Hippisiley-cox, 
et al., 2007 
 
2001-2006 
Interrupted 
time series 
However, 
absolute mean 
changes were 
reported  
 
Coronary heart disease  This is equivalent to a relative increase 
of 50% (95% CI 37%-63%) over the 
five year study period as shown in the 
graph below 
+** 
Stroke  patients with 
cholesterol < 5 mmol 
356% relative increase (95% CI 182-
637%) in the percentage of stroke 
patients with cholesterol < 5 mmol/l in 
the preceding 15 months 
+** 
Stroke patients  with a 
blood pressure reading < 
150/90 mm hg 
There was a 68% relative increase 
(95% CI 55-83%) in the percentage of 
patients with a blood pressure reading 
< 150/90 mm hg in the preceding 15 
months 
+** 
Diabetes recorded 
prevalence  
Using the new 2006/7 definitions, there 
was a 117% (95% CI 115-120) relative 
increase in the recorded prevalence of 
diabetes (Diabetes1). 
+** 
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Results  
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percentage of diabetes 
patients with cholesterol 
< 5 mmol/ 
there was a 132% relative increase 
(95% CI 95-176%) in the percentage of 
diabetes patients with cholesterol < 5 
mmol/l in the preceding 15 months. 
+** 
Diabetics with a blood 
pressure reading < 
145/85 mm hg 
There was a 56% relative increase 
(95% CI 47-66%) in the percentage of 
patients with a blood pressure reading 
< 145/85 mm hg in the preceding 15 
months. 
+** 
Diabetic High blood 
pressure recorded  
There was a 35% (95% CI -41 - 209) 
relative increase in the recorded 
prevalence of hypertension (BP1). 
 
0** 
Diabetic High blood 
pressure controlled  
There was a 65% (95% CI 51-79%) 
relative increase in the percentage of 
patients with controlled blood pressure 
levels 
+** 
Chronic kidney disease 
chronic kidney disease 
and blood pressure 
recorded 
there was a 20% relative increase (95% 
CI 3-32%) in the percentage of patients 
with chronic kidney disease and blood 
pressure recorded in  preceding 15 
months. 
+** 
Chronic Kidney disease  
percentage of patients 
with a blood pressure 
reading < 140/85 
There was an 89% relative increase 
(95% CI 59-124%) in the percentage of 
patients with a blood pressure reading 
< 140/85 mm hg in the preceding 15 
months. 
+** 
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Types   Effect   
 
Magee, 2010 
Interrupted time 
series 
Nephropathy prevalence Nephropathy prevalence was 15.1% 
and 11.5%, respectively.  
+ 
The median ACR testing 
rate 
The median ACR testing rate was 82% 
compared with a historic figure of 41% 
in 2001/2002 
+ 
Milliet, et 
al.,2007 
2003-2005 
Longitudinal 
cross-sectional 
survey 
Record of smoking status  Significantly more patients with 
diabetes had their smoking status ever 
recorded in 2005 than in 2003 (98.8% 
vs 90.0%, P <.001). 
+** 
Smoking cessation 
advise  
The proportion of patients with 
documented smoking cessation advice 
also increased significantly over this 
period, from 48.0% to 83.5% (P 
<.001).  
+** 
Prevalence of 
smoking/quit rates  
The prevalence of smoking decreased 
significantly from 20.0% to 16.2% P 
<.001) 
+** 
McGovern, 2008 
 
200-2005: serial 
cross sectional 
study 
 Recording and prescribing increased by 
mean 17.1% after the introduction of 
the GMS contract 
+ 
Oluwatowoju, et 
al., 2010 
Diabetes HbA1c <7.5%); In 2006, 39.7% of adults had glycemic 
control within the QOF threshold 
+** 
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2006-2008 
Retrospective 
retrieval of 
computer-held 
biochemical 
measurements 
(HbA1c <7.5%); by 2008, this 
proportion had risen to 52.1% (P 
<.001). 
Diabetes HbA1c >10.0% In 2006, 11.8% of subjects had poor 
glycemic control (HbA1c >10.0%); by 
2008, this proportion had decreased to 
10.1% (P <.001).  
+** 
Diabetes (both HbA1c 
<7.5% and total 
cholesterol ≤5.0 mmol/L) 
The proportion of subjects achieving 
HbA1c and cholesterol targets (both 
HbA1c <7.5% and total cholesterol 
≤5.0 mmol/L) was 30.2% in 2006; in 
2008 this proportion had increased to 
43.7% (P <.001) 
 
+** 
Srirangalingam 
et al., 
(2006) 
Before and after 
cross sectional 
study  
Diabetes  Increase in referrals for poor glycaemic 
control, and the glycaemic threshold 
for referral with poor glycaemic control 
has reduced (9.7% vs 10.6%, P= .006, 
mean difference = 0.9%, 95% CI, 0.4-
1.3%). 
+** 
Simpson et al., 
2010  
Before and after  
Smoking status reporting  The proportion of people with smoking 
status recorded increased by 32.9% 
(from 46.6% in2001/2 to 79.5% in 
2006/7, OR 4.45, 95% CI 4.43 to 4.46) 
+** 
Smoking cessation 
advise  
There was a large increase in provision 
of smoking cessation advice (43.6% in 
+** 
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2001/2, 84%in 2006/7, OR 6.75, 95% 
CI 6.66 to 6.85) 
Smoking cessation 
referral  
The proportion of patients referred to 
stop smoking clinics increased (from 
0.95% to 6.56%, OR 7.32, 95% CI 6.92 
to 7.73) 
+** 
Quit rates  The proportion of people recorded as 
being a smoker reduced from 28.4% in 
2001/2 to 22.4% in 2006/7 (OR 0.73, 
95% 0.72 to 0.73) 
+** 
Simpson et al., 
2011 
No control group 
Hypertension  Increasing treatment for hypertension 
(absolute difference [AD] 9.2%; 95% 
confidence interval [CI] = 9.0 to 9.5) 
occurred throughout the study period. 
 
+** 
Gulliford, et al., 
2007 
Diabetes  HbA1c≤7.4% Among 26 practices in 
South London, the median practice-
specific proportion of patients 
achieving HbA1c≤7.4% each year 
increased: 2000,22%; 2001, 32%; 
2002, 37%; 2003, 38% and in 2005 
from QOF, 57%. 
+ 
Kontopantelis et 
al., 2012 
Interrupted time 
series analysis 
Diabetes  Recorded quality of care improved for 
all subgroups in the pre-incentive 
period. In the first year of the 
incentives, composite quality improved 
+** 
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Types   Effect   
 
Adequate control over-and-above this pre-incentive trend 
by 14.2% (13.7–14.6%).  
By the third year the improvement 
above trend was smaller, but still 
statistically significant, at 7.3% (6.7–
8.0%).  
 
+** 
Western 
New York 
Physician 
Incentive 
Program 
(WNY-
PIP) 
USA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Low risk  
Annually 
(long time lag) 
Mostly 
process: 6 
Process and 3 
outcomes 
Intermediate 
outcome 
Absolute 
measure  
 
Size of 
varied 
from 
$3,000 
till 
$12,000 
large 
Individuals 
Bonus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Beaulieu ND and 
Horrigan DR 
(2005) 8months 
pre-post with a 
control group 
Even though 
they stated that 
there was a 
control group, 
the results 
presented are 
absolute so I will 
treat as no 
control group 
 
Diabetes control: 
HbA1c test (process) 
HbA1c test (1) no significant 
difference 
Significance: p<0.0001 (for all) 
B 
 
0** 
Lipid test (process) Lipid test: significant increase 
 
+** 
HbA1c < 9.5 
(intermediate outcome) 
HbA1c < 9.5: significant increase  
 
+** 
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LDL <130 (Intermediate 
outcome) 
LDL <130: significant increase +** 
Diabetes control: 
HbA1c test (process) 
HbA1c test (1) no significant 
difference 
Significance: p<0.0001 (for all) 
0** 
Kouides et 
al., 1998 
Rochester, 
New 
York, 
USA 
Low risk 
 
Annually 
(long time lag) 
Process 
Absolute 
measure  
Size 
‘Modes
t’ for 
just one 
process
?  
Group 
Bonus 
 
 
 
 
PBF vs. non PBF 
 
Before PBF vs. 
After PBF 
Control group 
 
 
Influenza immunization 
rates 
 
Absolute increase in immunization 
rates (from 1990 [baseline] to 1991) 
was 6.8%; P _ 0.03 Change in 
immunization rates (1991-1990) 
intervention:10.3% , control: 3.5% 
p=0.3 
A 0** 
Ashworth 
et al., 
2004 
UK 2004 
Low risk  
Annually 
(long time lag) 
Process/struct
ure 
Absolute 
measure  
up to 
£5000 
per GP 
(large) 
Up to 
5% 
Groups but 
money 
trickled 
down to 
individuals 
Bonus 
 
 
 
 
Before and after 
incentive (no 
control group) 
 
 
 
Change in use of 
prescription budget 
(overspent/underspent) 
of primary care 
organization (PCO) 
 
PCO prescribing budgets were, on 
average, overspent by 4.5 per cent in 
the first year and marginally under 
spent by 0.6 per cent in the second 
year.  
Many PCOs had successfully turned a 
first year prescribing overspend into a 
A + 
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second year under spend. PCOs that 
successfully reversed their overspend 
(49 out of 84; 58 per cent)  
Cattaneo 
et al., 
2001 
Italy 
 1998-
1999 
Low risk  
Yearly (long 
time lag) 
Process 
Absolute 
measure  
Small 
0.5% of 
annual 
revenue 
deducte
d 
Groups Fines 
 
 
 
 
 
Before and after 
study 
(no control) 
 
 
 
Change in breast feeding 
rates (intermediate 
outcome) 
  
Significant increase in breast feeding 
rates 
B +** 
Fairbrothe
r et al., 
1999 
New York 
12 months 
Low risk  
Annually 
(long time lag) 
Process 
Absolute 
measure  
 
$1000  
Large 
Individuals 
Bonus 
plus 
feedbac
k 
 
 
 
 
 
Before and after 
study with 
control group 
July 1995-July 
1996 
 
 
 
 
Childhood immunization 
coverage rates (process) 
Bonus group improved significantly in 
documented up-to-date immunization 
status, with an overall change of 25.3% 
(P _ 0.01), 
B +** 
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Fairbrothe
r et al., 
2001 
USA 
16 months 
Low risk 
One off 
payment after 
16 months 
(long time lag) 
Process 
Absolute 
measure  
 
1000 
usd 
Individual Bonus  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of 
Preventive Care 
in Medicaid 
Managed Care 
and Medicaid 
Fee for Service 
in Institutions 
and Private 
Practices 
 
Control group 
 
 
 
Change in 
documentation of up-to-
date immunization status.  
The bonus group improved 
significantly in documented up-to-date 
immunization status, with an overall 
change of 5.9% (P _ 0.05) compared 
with the control group. 
N=57 physicians (24 bonus; 12 FFS; 
21 control) 
B +** 
Grady et 
al., 1997 
USA 
 
Low risk  
Quarterly 
payments 
(short time 
lag) 
Process 
Absolute 
Token 
Small? 
, i.e., 
$50 for 
a 50% 
referral 
rate.  
Groups Bonus 
with 
educatio
n  
 
 
Mammography 
referral rates 
(process) 
Mammography referral 
rates (process) 
No significant difference between the 
two groups  
B 0** 
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Measure  Small 
up to 
1% 
Hillman et 
al., 1998 
 
Low risk  
Every 6 
months (long 
time lag) 
Process  
Absolute 
measure 
Large 
Up to 
20% of 
capitati
on fees 
Individuals 
and groups 
Bonus 
and 
feedbac
k 18 
months: 
no 
effect 
RCT 
2 years 
 
 
 
Cancer screening: breast, 
cervical and colorectal 
Mean compliance score 
No significant difference between the 
intervention and control groups for pap 
test  
A  0** 
No significant difference between the 
intervention and control groups for 
colorectal screening  
0** 
No significant difference between the 
intervention and control groups for 
mammography  
0** 
No significant difference between the 
intervention and control groups for 
breast exam   
0** 
Larsen et 
al., 2003 
 
Low risk  
Time lag not 
reported 
Process 
Absolute 
measure  
Small 
Size up 
to 1% 
of 
physici
ans 
compen
sation 
Individuals 
Bonus  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Four years pre-
post: no control 
group 
 
 
 
 
Diabetes care: 
LDL < 130 
Significant difference p<0.001 from 
1998-2002 
39.9% To 69.8% pvalue less than 0.001 
C 
C 
+** 
Average  HbA1c Reduction of 8.1-7.3 +** 
HbA1c>9.5 Reduction of 34.6-21.4 +** 
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HbA1c < 7 
(Intermediate outcome) 
33.5%%To 52.8% 
 
+** 
Annual  HbA1c 78.5-90.5% +** 
Bi annual LDL Increase of 65.9-91.7 +** 
Annual eye exam From 52-62% +** 
LeBaron 
et al., 
1999 
USA 
 
 
Not enough 
information 
reported on 
the costs and 
nature of 
incentives 
 
  
Bonuses 
 
  
Before and after 
(no control 
group) 
 
Childhood immunization 
coverage rates 
Mean change +3 percentage points 
From 1994-1996 
75 (74-76)- 78 (77-79) (95% CI)) 
Can’t 
tell 
+**  
Ritchie  et 
al., 1991 
Scotland: 
UK 
Low risk 
Quarterly 
payments 
(short time 
lag)  
Process  
Absolute 
measure  
 
 
Not 
enough 
informa
tion 
reporte
d on 
size 
Groups  
 
Clinical 
practices 
Bonuses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Before and after 
study 
Study period: 
one year no 
control group 
 
 
 
Percentage immunized 
by practice/ 
immunization rates 
 
Percentage of children aged 5 years 
given preschool boosters in Grampian 
region, 1987-91 rose from 78- 93% 
(p<0-0001).  All 95 general practices in 
Grampian region (313 general 
practitioners). Those aged 5 years on 
the first day of the relevant quarter, 
with an average population of 6600 
B +** 
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Rooski et 
al., 2003 
USA 
 
  
Low risk  
3 month time 
lag in payment 
Process 
Absolute 
measure 
 
 
Size: up 
to 
$10,000 
not 
reporte
d 
relative 
to 
practice 
budget/i
ncome 
Most 
likely 
large. 
Groups  
Bonuses  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RCT 12 Months 
(unbalanced) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adherence to smoking 
cessation clinical 
practice guidelines and 
patients’ smoking 
cessation behaviours. 
 
Percentage of patients, tobacco use 
status identified in the last visit 
(Process) 14.1 vs 6.2(incentive vs 
control) 
A 
 
+* 
Percentage of smokers who received 
advice to quit in the last visit 
(Process)24.2 vs 18.3 (incentives vs 
control) 
+* 
Percentage of smokers who were 
offered assistance to quit in the last 
visit (Outcome) 14.3 vs 8.8 (incentives 
vs control) 
 
+* 
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Quitting rates did not differ statistically 
significantly between the experimental 
conditions. 
 
 
0* 
Harries et 
al., 2005 
Malawi 
National 
Tuberculo
sis Control 
Programm
e 
(four year 
program/0 
  
 
Low risk  
 
6month (short 
time lag) 
process 
absolute 
measure  
 
 
Size: up 
to 
100% 
of usual 
reimbur
sement 
 
Individual 
physicians 
Bonuses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
before and after 
study with 
control groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tuberculosis control and 
other outcome measure. 
Percentage of patients documented as 
smear-positive in the laboratory 
register that are subsequently registered 
for treatment in the TB register. Target 
set at or above 90% 
B 
 
0 
Percentage of patients aged 15 years 
and above registered in the TB register 
as smear-negative PTB patients who 
have had Sputum smears examined 
(data from laboratory register). 
Target set at or above 85%. 
+ 
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Percentage of new smear-positive PTB 
patients who default from 
treatment/transfer out or who complete 
treatment with no smears examined. 
Target set at or below 10%. 
+ 
Percentage of relapse smear-positive 
PTB patients for whom sputum 
specimens arrived at the mycobacterial 
central reference laboratory, Lilongwe, 
for culture and drug sensitivity testing. 
Target set at or above 60%. 
 
0 
Chien et 
al., 2012 
Hudson 
Health 
Plan's P4P 
program 
High risk 
Both process 
and outcomes 
Yearly 
 
Absolute 
300$ 
per 
patient  
 
Groups  
Bonus 
 
 
 
Four years 
(2003–2007) 
Design: case-
comparison 
difference-in-
difference study 
Lipid testing (process) +4%points 
 
B 0* 
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in New 
York  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
using plan-level 
administrative 
data; (2) a 
patient-level 
claims data 
analysis; and (3) 
a cross-sectional 
survey 
(control group) 
HbA1c <9 +8%points 0* 
Hba1c testing (process) 
 
+2%points 0* 
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Hillman et 
al., 1999 
 
USA 
Low risk 
Process 
Absolute and 
relative really 
Payment 
frequency: 
every 6 
months 
 
 
Bonuse
s based 
on total 
complia
nce 
score 
for 
quality 
indicato
rs; full 
and 
partial 
bonuses 
Averag
Payments 
to provider 
groups 
Bonus 
and 
feedbac
k  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RCT 
18MONTHS 
 
RCT (3 arms); 
1993 to 1995; 
49 PC sites (19 
FB_I; 15 FBO; 
15 controls) 
 
 
 
 
Rate of paediatric 
immunization: 
randomly assigned 
primary care sites 
serving children in 
a Medicaid HMO to one 
of three groups: 
a feedback group (where 
physicians received 
written feedback about 
compliance scores), 
a feedback and incentive 
group (where physicians 
received feedback and 
 
However, no significant differences 
were observed between either 
intervention group and the control 
group, for compliance scores  
 
A 0** 
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e 
bonus, 
$2,000 
(range, 
$772 to 
$4682) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a financial bonus when 
compliance criteria were 
met), and a control 
group. They evaluated 
compliance 
with paediatric preventiv
e care guidelines through 
semi annual chart audits 
during the years  
However, no significant differences 
were observed between either 
intervention group and the control 
group, for  immunization rates  
 
0** 
 
Christense
n et al., 
2000 
 
USA 
 
Low risk  
Timing of 
payment not 
reported  
Process 
Absolute 
measure  
$4 for 
cognitiv
e 
services  
Provider 
group Bonuses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RCT (2 arms); 
February 1994 to 
September 1995 
200 pharmacies 
(110 
interventions; 90 
control) 
 
 
Dosage with CS Student t-test Mean rate, 1.59 
interventions per 100 Medicaid 
prescriptions (study pharmacies) vs. 
0.67 (controls); P _ 0.001 
Pharmacists practicing in 110 study 
(financial incentive) and 90 control 
community pharmacies. 
Study pharmacists documented an 
average of 1.59 CS interventions per 
A +** 
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100 prescriptions over a 20-month 
period, significantly more than 
controls, who documented an average 
of 0.67 interventions (P < .05) per 100 
prescriptions. 
Hillman et 
al., 1998 
 
USA 
Low risk 
Payment 
frequency: 
every 6 
months (long 
time lag) 
Process  
Absolute 
measure  
 
 
$1260 
 
Large: 
up 
to20% 
Provider 
group 
Bonuses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RCT (2 arms); 
1993 to 1995; 
52 PC sites (26 
intervention; 26 
control) 
 
 
 
 
 
Compliance with cancer 
screening for women age 
>50 y; aggregate 
compliance scores and 
improvement in scores 
over time 
Repeated-measures ANOVA Absolute 
increase in total mean compliance 
scores for intervention group from 
baseline was 26.3%; control group was 
26.4%. 
No significant differences between the 
groups 
Aggregate compliance scores and 
improvement in scores over time. 
A 0** 
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 Gavagan, 
et al., 
2010 
USA 
 
 
Low risk 
Annually 
(long time lag) 
Processes 
Absolute 
Measure 
 
 
Small  
approxi
mately 
3% to 
4% of a 
provide
r’s total 
salary 
Individual 
physicians 
Bonuses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A retrospective 
review of 
administrative 
data (2003-2007) 
was done to 
evaluate a 
natural quasi-
experiment 
With a control 
group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rates of Papanicolaou 
screening 
Overall, there was no clinically 
significant effect of incentives on 
performance 
 
C 
 
0** 
(non-
significant 
difference) 
Rates of mammography 
 
Overall, there was no clinically 
significant effect of incentives on 
performance 
0** 
(non-
significant 
difference). 
Rates of child 
immunizations 
Overall, there was no clinically 
significant effect of incentives on 
performance 
0** 
An et al., 
2008 
USA 
 
Low risk 
Annual (long 
time lag) 
Process 
Absolute 
measure 
Small 
5000$ 
onetime 
paymen
t at the 
end of 
Groups 
Bonuses 
 
 
 
RCT Clinical 
randomized 
trial?  Compared 
with what: non 
PBF, standalone 
Smoking cessation 
referral rates 
 
 
Intervention clinics referred a mean of 
11.4% (95% CI, 8.0%-14.9%) of their 
smokers compared with 4.2% (95% CI, 
1.5%-6.9%) of smokers visiting usual 
care clinics (t47=3.45; P=.001) 
significant difference 
B +** 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
  
 
 
 the 
progra
mme 
 
 
 
 
scheme  
Intervention 
clinics 
 
 
Glickman 
et al.,2007 
USA 
CMS  
Premier 
program 
 
 
High risk  
Yearly (long 
time lag) 
Process and 
outcomes 
Relative  
  
Small 
2%  
Groups 
(hospitals)  
Bonuses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Patients were 
treated between 
July 1, 2003, and 
June 30, 2006, at 
54 hospitals in 
the CMS 
program and 446 
control hospitals 
 3 years 
pre-post with 
control group  
 
 
Aspirin prescription rate 
 
Pvalue of comparison of intervention 
group to control group 
0.12 
C 
 
0** 
Smoking cessation 
counselling rates 
 
0.05 +** 
In hospital mortality  
 
0.21 0** 
Aspirin at discharge  0.04 +** 
Beta blockers at arrival 0.91 0** 
Beta blockers at 
discharge  
0.98 0** 
ACE inhibitor at 
discharge  
0.51 0** 
CMS composite score  0.16 0** 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
Levin et 
al., 2006 
USA 
 
 
Low risk 
Paid monthly 
(short time 
lag) 
Process 
Relative 
measure 
 
Up to 
20% of 
budget/
salary 
Groups  
Bonuses  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two year 
program 
Pre-post design 
with control 
group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HbAIC screening 
 
PCHI’s performance in HbAIC 
screening in the index health plan 
improved over 2 years by 7 percentage 
points, compared with a statewide 
improvement of 4.9 percentage points 
(p < .05).  
A 
 
+** 
Eye exams 
 
For diabetic eye exams, PCHI’s 
performance improved 18.7 percentage 
points, compared to a slight decline in 
statewide performance (p < .05).  
+** 
LDL screening 
 
For diabetic LDL screening, PCHI 
improved by 13.2 percentage points, 
almost twice that of the state average (p 
< .05), 
+** 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nephropathy screening Nephropathy screening rate improved 
by 15.2 percentage points, over twice 
the state-wide improvement (p < .05).  
+** 
Paediatric asthma 
controller use   
(PCHI improvement 1.7 percentage 
points, state improvement 3.9 
percentage points, p > .05), 3.8* mean 
change (process drug). 
 
0* 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
Mandel et 
al.,  2007 
Cincinnati  
USA 
Can’t tell: not 
enough 
information 
reported 
Process  
Large 
7% fee 
schedul
e 
increase 
Practices 
(groups) 
Bonuses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Between 
October 1, 
2003,andNovem
ber30,2006 
No control group 
but interrupted 
time series 
desing. Good 
quality, so will 
count as control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Asthma improvement in 
children 
 
 
Influenza vaccination 
rates 
all-payer asthma population receiving 
“perfect care” increased from 4% to 
88%, with 18 of 44 practices (41%) 
achieving a perfect care percentage of 
95% or greater  
influenza vaccine increased from 22% 
at baseline (2003- 2004 season 
[September 1 through March 31]) to 
41% for the 2004-2005 season, to 62% 
for the 2005-2006 season, with 7 of 44 
practices (16%) achieving an influenza 
vaccination percentage of 80% or 
greater for the 2005- 2006 season. 
 + 
+ 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
Lindenaue
r et al., 
2007 
 
CMS 
USA 
 
 
 
High risk  
Annual (long 
time lag) 
Processes  
Relative 
measure  
 
Up to 
2% 
usual 
Medica
re 
reimbur
sement  
Group  
Bonuses  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 years 
Natural 
experiment: pre-
post with 
control. 
 
multivariable 
modeling to 
estimate the  
improvement 
attributable to 
financial 
incentives 
 
p4p 
implementedd 
with public 
reporting 
 
 
Aspirin on arrival  Percentage change 3.3**  C +** 
Aspirin on discharge  0.9 0** 
ACE inhibitor  9.9** +** 
Beta blocker on arrival  2.8** +** 
Beta blocker on 
discharge  
2.8** +** 
LV assessment  5.1** +** 
Ace inhibitor for LVSD 2.0 0** 
Antibiotic timing for 
pneumonia patients  
4.3** +** 
Vaccination for 
pneumonia patients 
10.9** +** 
Oxygen assessment  0.6 0** 
                                                                             
375 
Types  (C: low, B: med, A: high); Effect  (+=Positive impact but not statistically significant, +** statistically significant positive effect , 0**=no statistically significant effect, -
** statistically significant negative effect) 
 
Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appropriate care for MI 7.5** +** 
Appropriate care for 
heart failure  
6.0** +** 
Appropriate care for 
pneumonia  
7.1** +** 
Composite process 
scores all 10 measures 
4.3** +** 
Greenberg 
et al., 
2008 
 
Low risk  
Payment every 
three months 
(short time 
lag) 
Process 
Not 
enough 
informti
on 
reporte
d  
 
Individuals Bonuses  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Before and after 
design with no 
control group 
 
 
 
Smoking cessation 
referral rates 
 
 
 Staff referrals increased with program 
incentives (P=.008), with a total of 150 
interventions occurring in the 3-month 
span.  
CANT 
tell 
+** 
Yao H et 
al., 2008 
 
China  
 
 
Not enough 
information 
reported 
Process 
 
$31 694 
for  
spreadi
ng TB 
knowle
dge in 
villages 
Doctors  
Individuals  
Bonuses 
 
 
 
 
Implemented 
with a demand 
side intervention 
Pre-post design 
with control 
group 
TB case detection and 
treatment 
 
The project achieved its case detection 
target: the total number of new smear-
positive TB cases identified in the 
intervention counties during the whole 
project period (November 2004–
October 2005) was 7736, which was 
136% of the project target established 
Can’t 
tell 
0* 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One year period 
evaluation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
in the proposal, according to the 
baseline data of the intervention group. 
However, no improvement on TB case 
finding and case holding was found in 
the intervention group compared with 
the control group (Table 2). At 
baseline, the intervention group had a 
significantly higher case notification 
rate (P < 0.01).  
Fagan et 
al., 2010 
 
 
Low risk  
 
Timing of 
payment not 
reported  
Process and 
structures 
Absolute  
measure  
 
Large  
Up 
20%  
Groups 
Bonuses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2004-2007 
Quasi 
experimental 
9before after and 
control group) 
 
 
 
 
Influenza vaccine Odds ratio 
1.79 (1.37-2.35) 
A +** 
Haemoglobin testing  0.44 (0.33-0.65) -** 
Eye exam 
 
0.98(0.61-1.58) 0** 
Ldl test  0.62(0.44-0.86) _** 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
 Nephropathy test 0.96(0.62-1.46) 0** 
Management of 
hypertension with 
diabetes  
1.11(0.58-2.13) 0** 
Chien et 
al., 2010 
 
USA 
 
 
  
Low risk  
Timing of 
payment not 
reported  
Process  
Absolute 
measure 
Large  
 
Individuals  
Bonuses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Study Design. 
Case-comparison 
and interrupted 
times series 
2003–2007 
 
 
 
 
 
Childhood Vaccination 
rates  
Hudson Health Plan members or by 
private practices were also significantly 
more likely to be immunized (Table 2, 
high number of Hudson enrollees 
OR 5 1.65–1.73, po.001 
B +** on the 
long run 
Jha et al., 
2012 
CMS 
 
High risk  
Yearly (long 
time lag) 
Process and 
outcomes 
Relative 
2% Groups 
hospitals Bonuses  
 
 
 
 
Pre-post with 
control group. 
 
Premier vs non premier 
Mortality rates for 
different conditions 
 
30-day mortality 
The rates of decline in mortality per 
quarter at the two types of hospitals 
were also similar (0.04% and 0.04%, 
respectively; difference, −0.01 
percentage points; 95% CI, −0.02 to 
0.01),  
C 0* 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
measure  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and mortality remained similar after 6 
years under the pay-for-performance 
system (11.82% for  Premier hospitals 
and 11.74% for non-Premier hospitals; 
difference, 0.08 percentage points; 
95% CI, −0.30 to 0.46). 0.36 for 
interaction) 
0* 
We found that the effects of pay for 
performance on mortality did not differ 
significantly among conditions for 
which outcomes were explicitly linked 
to incentives: acute  myocardial 
infarction 
0* 
CABG 0* 
Congestive heart failure 0* 
Pneumonia 0* 
Lynch et 
al.,1995 
Annually  
Paid quarterly  
Absolute 
  
Paid to GP 
practices 
Bonuses  1990 general 
practitioners 
contract 
Uptake of childhood 
immunizations 
 
While this has led to an increase in the 
number of general practitioners 
providing the services 
A + 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
(tournament) 
it would 
between 70% 
and 89%; rates 
below 70% do 
not qualify for 
these 
payments.  
Low risk 
 
Groups  
 
Sussman 
et al., 
2000  
Boston, 
Massachus
etts 
USA 
Low risk   
Yearly (long 
time lag) 
Process 
Absolute 
measure  
Large 
Size: up 
to 10% 
of 
salary 
 
Bonuses  Groups  Before and after 
study (no control 
group) 
 
Percentage of the wRVU 
productivity- 
After the first year of operation of this 
plan, there was an overall 20% increase 
in PCP productivity. 
 
 
A + 
Norton et 
al.,1992  
 
 
 
 
High risk  
Can’t tell  
Timing of 
payment not 
reported: 
yearly 
Outcomes  
Absolute 
measure  
Large 
$126 to 
$370 
 
Groups  Bonuses  RCT (2 arms); 
November 1980 
to April 1983; 36 
SNFs (18study 
facilities; 18 
control facilities) 
Up to 4 years  
Improvement in health 
status 
Patients in experimental homes were 
more likely to be discharged to home 
or to an ICF and had less likelihood of 
hospital admission or death (P _ 0.001) 
 
CANT 
TELL 
+** 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
Shen et 
al., 2003  
Maine, 
USA 
 
 
 
 
Low risk  
Annual 
payment (long 
time lag) 
Process 
Absolute 
measure  
 
Not 
enough 
reporte
d about 
size 
Groups  Bonuses  CBA; FY 1991 
to 1995 
 
Substance abuse 
treatment 
The percentage of OSA outpatient 
clients classiﬁed as most severe users 
dropped by 7 percent ( po50.001) after 
the innovation of performance based 
contracting compared to the increase of 
2 percent for Medicaid clients 
A +** 
Werner et 
al., 2012   
 
CMS  
USA 
High risk  
Yearly (long 
time lag) 
Process and 
outcomes 
Relative 
measure  
Yearly 
HIGH RISK 
Small 
2% 
Groups  BONUS
ES  
Pre-post design 
with control 
group 
5 years  
In house mortality rates  The performance of the hospitals in the 
project initially improved more than 
the performance of the control group: 
More than half of the pay-for 
performance hospitals achieved high 
performance scores, compared to fewer 
than a third of the control hospitals. 
However, after five years, the two 
groups’ scores were virtually identical. 
Improvements were largest among 
hospitals that were eligible for larger 
bonuses, were well financed, or 
operated in less competitive markets 
C 0* 
Basinga et 
al., 2011 
 
Rwanda 
 
Low risk  
 
Monthly and 
quarterly 
payments 
Large 
22-38% 
of usual 
budget 
and 
Individuals 
and groups 
 
Bonuses  
 Pre-post with 
control groups 
Any prenatal care 0·002   p= 0•875 A 0** 
Four or more prenatal 
care visits 
0·008   p= 0•875 0** 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
(short time 
lag) 
Processes 
Absolute 
measure  
 
 
salary Institutional delivery 0·081  p= 0•017 +** 
Tetanus vaccine during 
prenatal visit 
0·051 p= 0•057 0** 
Standardised total quality 
score 
0·157  p= 0•020 +**  
Younger than 23 months 
preventive visit, previous 
4 weeks 
0·119  p= 0•004 +** 
24–59 months preventive 
visit, previous 4 weeks 
0·111  p< 0•0001 +** 
12–23 months fully 
immunised 
−0•055 p= 0•390 0** 
  Canavan 
A. and 
Swai G. 
(2008) 
Tanzania 
Low risk  
 
Payment every 
6 months 
(long time lag) 
Processes 
Large 
5-10% 
of 
hospital 
budget 
and 
Individuals 
and groups 
 
Bonuses  
 Pre-post with 
control groups 
3 years 
In patient department  
 
IPD RR: 0.82 (0.76-0.86) P<0.00001 A 
 
0** 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
 Absolute 
measure 
clinicia
ns 
salary  
 
Change in utilization Utilization in health facilities RR: 0.94 
(0.83 to 1.08) p>0.40) 
No 
significant 
impact 
Sulku, 
2011 
Turkey 
 
Low risk 
Monthly 
payments 
(short time 
lag) 
Process and 
outcomes  
Absolute 
measure  
 
Large 
Up to 
80% of 
budget 
and 
salary  
 
Individuals 
and groups 
 
Bonuses  
Pre-post with 
control group  
5 years 
Mortality rates Hospital mortality rates (increased non 
significantly: 0.01-0.012 p>0.05) 
 
 
A 0 no 
significant 
impact 
Mean outpatient visits Mean outpatient visits increase by 78% 
significantly p<0.01 
+** 
Vergeer 
and 
Chansa, 
Low risk  
 
Absolute 
Up to 
100% 
of 
Individuals 
and groups 
 
Bonuses  
 Pre-post with 
control group. 
ANC No significant change in ANC, 4. No 
significant difference in intervention 
and control hospitals in relation to 
A 0 ** 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
2008. 
Zambia 
 
measure  
Quarterly 
payments 
(short time 
lag)/Processes   
salary  IPD/OPD. Variety of patterns across 
facilities 
 
Ssengooba 
et al., 
2012. 
 
Uganda  
 
Low risk  
6monthly 
payment (long 
time lag) 
Process 
Absolute 
measure  
 
Large 
up to 
11% of 
hospital 
budget  
Groups   
Bonuses  
 Pre-post with 
control group 
Maternal and child health 
process measures 
After 21⁄2 years and three survey 
rounds, the study found no discernable 
impact of bonuses on the provision of 
health services by the PNFP providers 
(group C). Twenty-two out of 23 
facilities receiving performance 
bonuses did reach at least one 
performance target, and 12 reached all 
three, but service levels at group B 
institutions similarly improved. If 
anything, facilities in the bonus group 
performed slightly worse than the 
facilities receiving only the untied base 
grant and about as well as the facilities 
in the control group. 
A 0** no 
significant 
impact. If 
anything, 
bonus group 
performed 
slightly 
worse 
although not 
significant 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
Cutler et 
al., 2007  
 
USA 
(California 
P4P) 
High risk  
 
Annual 
payments 
(long time lag) 
Processes and 
intermediate 
outcomes 
Relative 
measure  
Large  
 
Up to 
5% of 
budget  
Groups  Bonuses  Retrospective 
study: before and 
after (with 
control group) 
Diabetes testing  The LDL-C testing rate for patients in 
the CDCM program 
was 91.5% versus 67.8% for the 
routine care group 
). The LDL-C goal attainment 
rate for the CDCM program was 
78.2%, significantly higher than 
the 55.7% rate for the routine care 
group (P < 0.001 
B +** 
+** 
Rosenthal 
et al., 
2005 
USA 
California 
p4p 
     Cervical screening  Compared with physician groups in 
the Pacific Northwest, the California 
network demonstrated greater quality 
improvement after the pay-for-
performance intervention only in 
cervical cancer screening (a 3.6% 
difference in improvement [P=.02]).  
 
B +** 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
Mammography  Difference in difference result not 
significant  
0** 
Haemoglobin  Difference in difference result not 
significant 
0** 
Gilmore et 
al., 2007 
 
Hawaii 
Medical 
Services 
Associatio
n  
High risk  
 
Annual  (long 
time lag) 
Relative 
Outcomes  
Large 
 
Up to 
7% of 
salary  
Individuals  Bonuses  Before and after 
with control 
group 
Patient satisfaction on 
recommended care 
 
We found a consistent, positive 
association between having seen only 
program-participating providers and 
receiving recommended care for all 6 
years with odds ratios ranging from 
1.06 to 1.27 (95 percent confidence 
interval: 1.03–1.08, 1.09–1.40) 
C +** 
Young et 
al., 2007 
High risk  
 
Annual (long 
time lag) 
Processes 
Relative 
measure  
Large 
5% of 
physici
an fees 
was at 
risk 
Individuals Fines  Before and after 
with control 
group/similar to 
an interrupted 
time series 
design  
Diabetes measures 
 
Based on the absence of a significant 
interaction term for each measure in 
this context, the post-intervention 
trends were not different from the pre-
intervention trends, indicating that the 
overall pattern of performance did not 
change after program  
 
C 0** 
Twardella 
and 
Brenner, 
2007 
High risk  
Annual (long 
time line) 
Outcome  
Unclear  Individuals  Bonuses  RCT Smoking cessation  Self-reported smoking abstinence 
obtained at 12 months follow-up and 
validated by serum cotinine.  
In intention-to-treat analysis, smoking 
C 0** 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
Absolute 
measure 
abstinence at 12 months follow-up as 
3% (2/74), 3% (5/ 144), 12% (17/140) 
and 15% (32/219) in the usual care, 
and interventions 
 
Scott  et 
al., 2009 
PIP 
    Before and after 
with control 
group  
Diabetes test  
HbA1c test  
Model (1) of Table II shows a 
statistically significant effect of 20% 
(1% level) for 
Treatment group 1. This marginal 
effect suggests that the average GP 
working in an average practice of the 
sample that joined the PIP program is 
more than 20 percentage points more 
likely to order an HbA1c test than a 
comparable GP in a practice that has 
not joined 
 +** 
Schauffler 
et al., 
1999 
California 
USA 
Low risk  
 
Annual (long 
time lag) 
Processes  
Absolute 
measure  
 
Small  
 
up to 
2% of 
premiu
ms at 
risk 
Groups  Fines  Before and after 
(no control 
group) 
CHILDHOOD 
IMMUNIZATIONS 
The majority of the HMOs exceeded 
their negotiated targets for most of the 
quality-of care measures However, 
they fell considerably short on 
childhood immunizations, and nearly 
half missed their targets on 
mammograms and Pap smears as well. 
Eight plans missed their targets for 
B + 
CESAREAN 
SECTIONS. 
- 
MAMMOGRAPHIES. + 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
PAP SMEARS childhood immunizations, falling short 
by 3–12 percent. The five plans that 
met their targets exceeded them on 
average by 9.3 percent, with individual 
plans exceeding it by 2–19 percent. 
Only four plans missed their targets for 
cesarean section rates, and they were 
only about 0.7 percent off target. 
+ 
PRENATAL CARE - 
Kouides et 
al., 1993 
Low risk  
Annual 
payment (long 
time lag) 
Processes  
Absolute 
 
Unclear  Individuals  Bonuses  RCT Immunization rates For practices in the incentive group, the 
mean immunization rate was 68.6% 
(SD 16.6%) compared with 62.7% (SD 
18.07 o ) in the control group practices 
(P = .22). The median practice-specific 
improvement in immunization rate was 
+10.3% in the incentive group 
compared with +3.5% in the control 
group (P = .03). 
B +** 
 
St Jacques 
et al., 
2004 
low risk  
Monthly 
payment 
Processes  
Relative  
Large  
Up to 
500 
dollars 
per 
month 
Individuals  Bonuses  Before and after 
No control group  
 
N= 31 
anaesthesiologist
s, 
percentage of first cases 
of the day in the room at 
or before the scheduled 
in-room time 
shows that the percentage of first cases 
of the day meeting the goal of being in 
the OR at or before their scheduled 
start time was significantly higher 
during the sixth month of the study (19 
± 15% vs. 61 ± 19%, p < 0.01),  
B +** 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
 percentage of cases with 
an anesthesia prep time 
less than a target 
and that the percentage of cases 
meeting the goal of an anesthesia 
preparation time of less than 15 
minutes increased over the study period 
(57 ± 18 vs. 73 ± 14, p < 0.01). 
+** 
 percentage of cases 
delayed due to waiting 
for an anesthesiology 
patient evaluation  
delays from waiting for an anesthesia 
attending were not significantly 
changed, whereas delays from lengthy 
anesthesia preparation or emergence 
time were decreased (14 ± 9 vs. 3 ± 3, 
p < 0.01) during the study period. 
+** 
Salize et 
al., 2009  
High risk 
Payment after 
a year 
Outcomes 
(quit rate) 
Absolute  
financia
l 
incentiv
e of 
(€130) 
Individuals  Bonuses  Cluster-
randomised 
smoking 
cessation trial. 
Main outcome 
was cost-
effectiveness but 
abstinence rates 
also compared 
with mixed 
logistic 
regression 
Smoking cessation  The TI intervention was not effective 
compared with TAU. The point 
prevalence of abstinence  at 12 months 
was 3.5% vs 2.7%, OR 1.29, 95% CI 
0.25 to 6.84, p=0.75 
 
C 0* 
McMenam
in et al., 
2003 
Low risk  
Process 
Absolute  
Not 
reporte
d  
Groups  Bonuses  Cross-sectional 
survey  
Control group  
Numbers of HMOs 
providing smoking 
cessation advice and 
OR 3.63 (95% CI 1.70 to 7.76, 
p<0.001), providing NRT starter kit 
OR 2.75 (95% CI 1.33 to 5.65, 
A +** 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
other interventions such 
as self help materials and 
NRT 
p=0.006), providing written materials: 
on pharmacotherapy OR 2.13 (95% CI 
1.04 to 4.33, p=0.034), counselling OR 
3.11 (95% CI 1.50 to 6.44, p=0.002), 
self-help OR 2.33 (95% CI 0.93 to 
5.84) 
Chee et al, 
2007 
GAVI 
Incentives 
for 
national 
governme
nts 
Low risk 
Time lag not 
clear 
Processes  
Absolute 
measure 
  
  
Up to 
15% 
increase
d 
immuni
zation 
funding 
(large) 
National 
governmen
t: 
institutions
/groups  
Bonus the evaluators 
utilized a 
regression model 
for 52 countries 
that received ISS 
funds from 1995 
to 2005 and in-
depth qualitative 
studies in six 
countries (3 
matched pairs of 
countries with 
similar 
circumstances 
and starting 
baseline 
coverage and 
different results). 
 A relationship was found between ISS 
funding and in- creased immunization 
coverage. 
A + 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
Eichler  et 
al., 2007 
Haiti: 
RBF for 
NGO 
Low risk  
Quarterly 
payments 
Processes  
Absolute 
measure 
  
  
Up to 
15% of 
previou
s 
budget 
of NGO 
(large)
  
NGOs: 
groups/inst
itutions 
Bonus Before and after 
with no control 
group  
Immunization coverage 
for children  
6.2%  A + 
Percentage of pregnant 
women  receiving at  
least 3 prenatal care 
visits 
2.2%  + 
Percentage of deliveries  
assisted by a trained  
attendant 
3% + 
Percentage of women 
receiving a postnatal care 
visit 
7.8% + 
CORT 
2007 
Low risk 
Payment every 
three months 
Processes  
Absolute 
measure 
 
  
$4.94 to 
$34.58 
(large 
as per 
Indian 
standar
ds)
  
health 
professiona
ls 
(ASHA’s) 
(individual
s) 
Bonuses The program 
was evaluated 
using a mix of 
quantitative 
(survey) and 
qualitative 
(interviews) 
methods 
Before and after 
with no control 
group  
Institutional deliveries  The proportion of institutional 
deliveries increased from 32.5% to 
65.1% and the number of institutional 
deliveries in the public sector in 
Rajasthan state increased by 36% the 
year after the JSY was established 
compared to a slight decrease (−0.25%) 
the previous year ( 
A + 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
Armour et 
al., 2004 
Low risk 
End of the 
year payments 
Processes 
Absolute 
measure  
Size 
unknow
n 
Individuals  Bonuses  Before and after: 
no control group. 
Cancer screening  Results: From 2000 to 2001, CRC 
screening use increased from 
23.4% to 26.4% (P < .01). Results from 
the multivariate logistic regression 
analysis revealed that the probability 
that a patient received a CRC screening 
was approximately 3 percentage points 
higher in the bonus year, 2001 (P < 
.01). 
Unkno
wn  
+** 
Chen et 
al., 2010 
Low risk  
Annually 
Processes 
Absolute  
Large  
Up to 
7.5% of 
salary  
Individuals  Bonuses  Longitudinal 
study with 
control groups  
Diabetes care Patients with diabetes who saw 
P4Pparticipating physicians were more 
likely to receive quality care than those 
who did not (odds ratio, 1.16; 95% 
confidence interval, 1.11-1.22; P 
<.001).  
B +** 
Patients with diabetes who received 
quality care were less likely to be 
hospitalized than those who did not 
(incident rate ratio, 0.80; 95% 
confidence interval, 0.80-0.85; P 
<.001). 
+** 
During 1 year, there was no difference 
in hospitalization rates between 
patients with diabetes who saw P4P-
participating physicians versus those 
who did not.  
0* 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
However, patients with diabetes who 
saw P4P-participating physicians in 3 
consecutive years were less likely to be 
hospitalized than those who did not 
(incident rate ratio, 0.75; 95% 
confidence interval, 0.61-0.93; P <.01). 
+** 
Greene et 
al., 2004  
High 
Yearly  
Process and 
outcomes 
Relative  
Large  
Up to 
20% of 
capitati
on fees  
Individuals  Withhol
ds 
Fines  
Before and after 
with control 
group 
Stated that they 
had used a 
historical control 
but reported 
results for before 
and after studies  
 
N= 
approximately 
900 credentialed 
primary care 
physicians as of 
December 1999, 
October 2000, 
Proper hospital care  A statistical process control chart 
showed a shift toward recommended 
treatment patterns after our 
intervention. The rate of exceptions per 
episode of acute sinusitis decreased 
20%, from 326 exceptions per 1000 
episodes between January 1, 1999, and 
October 31, 2000, to 261 between 
November 1, 2000, and December 31, 
2001.  P < .005. 
C +** 
Decreased use of less effective or 
inappropriate antibiotics accounted for 
most of the change (199 to 136 
exceptions per 1000 episodes [32% 
change]). Azithromycin use decreased 
30%, from 97 to 68 prescriptions per 
1000 episodes. P < .005. 
+** 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
and December 
2001.  
Firstline antibiotic (amoxicillin and 
doxycycline) use increased 14%, from 
451 to 514 prescriptions per 1000 
episodes.  
+** 
Inappropriate radiology use decreased 
20%, from 15 to 12 per 1000 episodes. 
These changes were significant at P < 
.005. 
+** 
Bardach et 
al., 2014 
Low risk 
Unclear 
timing of 
payment 
Processes  
Absolute 
measure  
large Groups  bonuses Rct  
Participating 
practices (n=42 
for each group) 
had similar 
baseline 
characteristics, 
with 
a mean (median) 
of 4592 (2500) 
patients at the 
incentive group 
practices and 
Aspirin therapy, with 
IVD or DM 
Odds ratio 1.28 (1.10 to 1.50) Pvalue= 
.001 
A +** 
Blood pressure 
controlNo IVD or DM 
1.23 (1.05 to 1.44) Pvalue=.01 +** 
Blood pressure control 
IVD 
0.71 (0.40 to 1.24) Pvalue=0.23 0* 
Blood pressure control 
DM 
1.52 (1.12 to 2.07) Pvalue=.007 +** 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
3042 (2000) at 
the 
control group 
practices. 
Blood pressure control 
IVD or DM 
1.37 (1.07 to 1.75) Pvalue=.01 +** 
Cholesterol control 0.86 (0.67 to 1.09) Pvalue=.22 0* 
Smoking cessation 
intervention 
1.30 (1.04 to 1.63) Pvalue= .02 +** 
Bischoff 
et al, 2012  
Low risk 
Payment after 
a year 
Processes 
Absolute  
Unclear  Groups  Bonuses  Before and after  
No control group  
N=123 residents  
Completion of discharge 
summary  
With implementation of the bundle, the 
average time from patient discharge to 
completion of the discharge summary 
fell from 3.5 to 0.61 days (p<0.001).  
A +** 
Percentage of summaries 
completed on day of 
discharge  
The percentage of summaries 
completed on the day of discharge rose 
from 38% to 83% (p<0.001)  
+** 
The percentage of 
summaries that included 
all recommended 
elements 
The percentage of summaries that 
included all recommended elements 
increased from 5% to 88% (p<0.001). 
+** 
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Perceived 
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receives 
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or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
Boland et 
al., 2010 
Low risk 
Payment at 6 
months 
intervals 
Processes  
Absolute 
measure e 
Up to 
$5000 
annuall
y  
Large  
Individuals  Bonuses  Before and after  
no control group  
N=81 radiologist 
Radiologist report 
turnaround time 
The mean C–F times for all 
radiologists significantly decreased 
from the baseline (42.7 hours) to the 
immediate period (31.6 hours) to the 
post period (16.3 hours) (p < 0.0001).  
B +** 
Similarly the mean C–P time also 
declined for all three periods from 20.0 
hours at baseline to 19.0 hours at the 
immediate period to 11.9 hours during 
the post period (p < 0.0001).  
+** 
Kruse et 
al., 2013 
Low risk 
Payment after 
2 years 
Processes 
Absolute 
 
Large 
Approx
imately 
5% 
Groups  Bonuses  Before and after 
with control 
group 
Smoking status 
documentation 
Documentation increased from 48% of 
207,471 patients before P4P to 71% of 
227,574 patients after P4P. 
Improvement occurred both among 
P4P-eligible patients, 56% to 83% 
(AOR, 3.6; 95% CI, 2.9 to 4.5) and the 
comparable subset of non-P4P-eligible 
patients, 56% to 80% (AOR, 3.0; 95% 
CI, 2.3 to 3.9).  
The difference in improvement 
between groups was significant (AOR, 
1.3; 95% CI, 1.1 to 1.4, p=0.009). 
A +** 
Peabody 
et al., 
Low risk  
Payment date 
Large 
approxi
Groups and 
individuals  
Bonuses  Controlled trial 
N = 10 for both 
Composite scores of 
about 4 process measures  
at thirty-six months after the 
intervention, bonus sites were 9.7 
A +** 
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Program  
 
Perceived 
risk  
Incenti
ve size  
Who 
receives 
the 
incentive 
Fines 
or 
bonuses 
Author/Evaluat
ion design 
Objectives /clinical area 
 
Results  
Effect size  
 
Types   Effect   
 
2011 no known 
Process 
Absolute 
mately 
5% of 
clinicia
ns 
salary 
populations percentage points higher than baseline 
(p < 0:001). 
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D2: Formulas and calculations used to convert effect estimates of P4P to standardized mean 
difference                                                                                                                                                       
 
Formulas 
Conversion from percentage or number of events to odds ratio 
Where sample size (N) and percentages or number of events were reported, I was able to estimate odds 
ratio (OR) and associated standard errors (SE), using the formulas below: 
OR = (Nei /Ni- Nei) / (Nec/Nc- Nec) 
Where:  
 Nei = number of events in intervention group 
 Ni   = total sample size in intervention group 
 Nec= number of events in control group 
 Nc= total sample size in control group 
 
SE (logOR)=  √{ (1/ Nei) + (1/ Ni- Nei)  + (1/Nec ) + (1/ Nc- Nec)} 
 
Conversion from odds ratio (OR) or mean difference (MD) to standardized mean difference (d) 
d = logoddsratio * √3/ π 
Varianced = Variance of log odds * 3/ π
2  
d= mean difference/SD 
SEd= √Varianced 
SEd= SE*√3/ π 
Combining effect sizes for multiple outcomes within a study  
Summary effect for two outcomes in a study 
 
 
Variance  
 
Or 
Summary effect for more the two outcomes in a study 
 
Variance  
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Where v= mean of all variance, r= mean of all correlations. 
 
Variance inflation factor (VIF)= Variance * VIF 
 
Where m is the number of outcomes and r is the correlation  
Other important formulas used in the conversion 
If a 95% confidence interval is available for an absolute measure of intervention effect (e.g. SMD, risk 
difference, rate difference), then the standard error can be calculated as 
SE = (upper limit CI – lower limit CI) / 3.92. 
Variance =SE
2 
SE = √Variance  
Standard deviation (SD) = √N * (upper CI limit-lower CI limit)/3.92 (FOR 95% CI) 
SD= √N * SE 
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D4: Extraction of raw numbers used in the meta-analyses and meta-regression                                                         
 
 
Program Study  
 
Effect 
type 
Outcome  Intervention  
Data 
Control  
Data 
Reported 
effect size 
LCI UCI d 
Standardized 
mean 
difference)  
 
Vd 
Standardize
d variance)  
 
 
SEd  
Standardiz
ed 
standard 
error  
 
Kouides et 
al 1998 
 
Kouides 
et al 
1998  
 
% Change  Immunizatio
n rates in the 
elderly  
The mean 
immunization 
rate was 68.6% 
(SD 16.6%)  
N=53 
 
62.7% (SD 
18.0%) in the 
control group 
practices (P = 
.22). 
N=82 
   0.197  0.243 
An et al., 
2008 
An et al., 
2008 
%Change  Smoking 
cessation 
referral rates  
11.4% (95% CI, 
8.0%-14.9%) 
N=25 
4.2% (95% CI, 
1.5%-6.9%) 
N=24 
   0.059  0.089 
Premier 
program  
 
Glikman 
et al., 
2007 
Odds ratio 
 
CMS 
composite 
measure  
0.91 
(95% CI 0.84-
0.99) 
N=54 
0.97 
(95% CI 0.94-
0.99) 
N=446 
   -0.015  0.022 
California 
P4P 
Cutler et 
al., 2007 
% Change Diabetes 
care ldl test 
72.8%  
N=165  
55.7% 
N=1694 
   0.180  0.100 
Rosentha
l et al., 
2005 
Mean 
difference  
Cervical 
screening  
 N=300 3.6     0.115 0.003 0.058 
Mammograp
hy  
1.7  0.065 0.003 
r estimated 
at 0.5 
 
Vd= 0.001 
0.058 
 
 
SEd =0.032 
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Program Study  
 
Effect 
type 
Outcome  Intervention  
Data 
Control  
Data 
Reported 
effect size 
LCI UCI d 
Standardized 
mean 
difference)  
 
Vd 
Standardize
d variance)  
 
 
SEd  
Standardiz
ed 
standard 
error  
 
St Jacques, 
et al, 2004 
St 
Jacques, 
et al, 
2004 
% change  percentage 
of first cases 
of the day in 
the room at 
or before the 
scheduled 
in-room time 
61 ± 19%, (SD) 
±6.5% (CI) 
N-1439 
 
19 ± 15%  
(SD) 
±4.5% (CI) 
N= 1261 
   0.454 0.002 0.049 
 percentage 
of cases with 
an 
anesthesia 
prep time 
less than a 
target 
73 ± 14%  (SD) 
±5.1% (CI) 
N-1439 
57 ± 18% 
(SD) 
±5.3% (CI)  
N= 1261 
 
 
  0.171 0.002 0.045 
percentage 
of cases 
delayed due 
to waiting 
for an 
anesthesiolo
gy patient 
evaluation  
3 ± 3%  (SD) 
±1% (CI) 
N-1439 
 
14 ± 9%%  
(SD) 
±2.9% (CI) 
N= 1261 
  0.399 
 
Dtotal= 0.341 
0.009 
 
r= 0.75 
Vd total 
=0.0008 
 
0.096 
 
SE d=  
0.029 
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Program Study  
 
Effect 
type 
Outcome  Intervention  
Data 
Control  
Data 
Reported 
effect size 
LCI UCI d 
Standardized 
mean 
difference)  
 
Vd 
Standardize
d variance)  
 
 
SEd  
Standardiz
ed 
standard 
error  
 
Bischoff et 
al, 2012 
Bischoff 
et al, 
2012 
 (%) 
Before and 
after data 
Percentage 
of 
summaries 
completed 
on day of 
discharge  
38% 
N=563 
83% 
N=2560 
   0.497 0.003 0.056 
Inclusion of 
all 
recommende
d elements 
on summary  
5% 
N=80 
88% 
N=80 
  1.03 
 
Dtotal=0.76 
0.101 
 
VD= 0.077 
0.318 
 
0.227 
National 
Health 
Insurance 
P4P (NHI-
P4P) 
Taiwan  
 
Lee et 
al., 2010 
Mean 
difference  
Essential 
diabetes 
exams and 
tests 
All patients in 
the P4P 
program (n = 
12,499). 
Comparison 
group (n = 
26,172)  
 
2.450  
 
  0.655  0.005 
Rwanda 
PBF 
program  
Basinga 
et al., 
2011 
Mean 
difference 
Any prenatal 
care 
N=80 N=86 0·002  
 
−0•02
1  
0•025 0.013 0.006 0.079 
Four or more 
prenatal care 
visits 
0·008  −0•06
3  
0•079 0.017 0.005 0.077 
Institutional 
delivery 
0·081  
 
0·015  0·146 0.035 0.005 0.077 
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Program Study  
 
Effect 
type 
Outcome  Intervention  
Data 
Control  
Data 
Reported 
effect size 
LCI UCI d 
Standardized 
mean 
difference)  
 
Vd 
Standardize
d variance)  
 
 
SEd  
Standardiz
ed 
standard 
error  
 
Tetanus 
vaccine 
during 
prenatal visit 
0·051  
 
−0·00
2  
0·103 0.148 0.006 0.078 
Standardized 
total quality 
score 
0·157  
 
0·026  0·289 0.188 0.006 0.078 
Younger 
than 23 
months 
preventive 
visit, 
previous 4 
weeks 
0·119  
 
0·041  0·198 0.243 0.006 0.078 
24–59 
months 
preventive 
visit, 
previous 4 
weeks 
0·111  
 
0·059  0·162 0.178 0.006 .079 
12–23 
months fully 
immunized 
−0·055  
 
−0·18
4  
0·074 -0.065 
d=0.095 
0.006 
r=0.5 
0.002 
0.078 
 
0.041 
QOF Campbel
l et al., 
Mean 
difference  
Coronary 
heart disease  
  -0.250 
n=42 
-
0.401  
0.100  -0.302 0.024 .155 
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Program Study  
 
Effect 
type 
Outcome  Intervention  
Data 
Control  
Data 
Reported 
effect size 
LCI UCI d 
Standardized 
mean 
difference)  
 
Vd 
Standardize
d variance)  
 
 
SEd  
Standardiz
ed 
standard 
error  
 
2009  
Asthma  -0.468 
n=42 
 
 
-
0.748  
0.187 . -0.302 0.024 .154 
Diabetes  -0.220 
n=42 
 
-
0.313  
 -
0.127 
-0.717 0.023 0.153 
Continuity 
of care 
0.091 
n=42 
 
0.025 0.157 0.413 
d=-0.227 
0.023 
r=0.5 
0.053 
0.153 
 
0.229 
AQ 
 
Sutton et 
al, 2012 
 
Percentage 
points 
30 day 
Mortality for 
CABG and 
other heart 
related 
diseases  
N 134435  
Percentage 
change -1.8% 
N 722139 
Percentage 
change -0.9% 
1.3  
 
0.4 2.1 0.166  0.013 
Premier  
 
Jha et al., 
2012 
 
Percentage 
points  
30 day 
Mortality for 
CABG and 
other heart 
related 
diseases 
11.82% 
N= 137287 
 
11.74% 
Control=1094
034 
 
0.08 −0.30 0.46 0.002  0.005 
Premier  
 
Lindenau
er et al., 
Percentage 
points 
Composite 
measure of 
N= 116613 N=192381 4.3  3.0 5.7 0.155  0.008 
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Program Study  
 
Effect 
type 
Outcome  Intervention  
Data 
Control  
Data 
Reported 
effect size 
LCI UCI d 
Standardized 
mean 
difference)  
 
Vd 
Standardize
d variance)  
 
 
SEd  
Standardiz
ed 
standard 
error  
 
2007 
 
process 
indicators 
QOF   Kontopa
ntelis et 
al. 2012 
 
Percentage 
points  
Composite 
quality score 
on diabetes 
in the first 
year 
 
67.3% Ntotal= 
23,780 
60% 
7.3 
 
 
6.7 8.0 0.270  0.011 
QOF 
 
Before and 
after 
QOF design 
Simpson 
et al., 
2011 
 
OR 
 
Blood 
pressure 
below target 
<150/90 
1.11 (1.04 to 
1.19) 
 
 
0.74 (0.67 to 
0.82) 
N=315 
 
  0.097  0.030 
QOF  
 
Srirangal
ingam et 
al., 2006 
 
Percentage 
points  
Number 
with HbA1c 
>7.4% (%) 
 
No (%) 
32, 296 9.7% 
0.031 0.003 
No (%) 
34, 285 10.6% 
 
0.029 0.004 
0.9 
 
- 0.4, 1.3 1.104 
0.259 
 
d=0.024 
 0.143 
QOF 
 
Cupples 
et al., 
2014 
 
Percentage 
points  
Smoking 
status 
documentati
on 
 
No (%)76 (16.9)  
N=449 
76/449-
76=0.204 
0.013, 0.003 
N (%) 40 
(13.4) 
N=299 
40/229-
40=0.212 
0.025 0.005 
3.5 -1.8 8.6 OR=0.962. 
Se= 0.214 
 
D= -0.009 
 0.118 
QOF Vaghela 
et al, 
Percentage 
points  
Diabetes 
outcome 
N =2087478 
N reaching 
N =1764063 
N reaching 
   0.086 0.001
2
 0.001 
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Program Study  
 
Effect 
type 
Outcome  Intervention  
Data 
Control  
Data 
Reported 
effect size 
LCI UCI d 
Standardized 
mean 
difference)  
 
Vd 
Standardize
d variance)  
 
 
SEd  
Standardiz
ed 
standard 
error  
 
2008  target  
A1C 
<or=7.5%, 
target=1186695 
 
target=845522 
Blood 
pressure 
<or=145/85 
mmHg 
N =2087478 
N reaching 
target=1518780 
N =1764063 
N reaching 
target=106499
5 
   0.134 0.001
2
 0.001 
Cholesterol 
<or=5 
mmol/l was 
determined 
N =2087478 
N reaching 
target=1545301 
N =1764063 
N reaching 
target=109295
4 
3.99  
 
3.92 
  
 
4.07 0.134 
 
d=0.118 
0.001
2 
 
0.000002 
0.001 
 
0.001 
National 
Health 
Insurance 
P4P (NHI-
P4P) 
Taiwan  
Chang et 
al, 2008 
 
OR Smoking 
cessation  
N= 3446 N=1823  0.96 0.87 1.06 SMD= -0.010 
SE of log 
odds=0.048 
 
 SE (d)= 
0.026 
National 
Health 
Insurance 
P4P (NHI-
P4P) 
Taiwan  
 
Kuo et 
al., 2011 
OR 
(control vs 
interventio
n) 
And mean 
in 
interventio
n and 
Quality of 
care of 
breast cancer  
 (enroless vs 
non 
enrollees) 
 
0.70 
N= 4,528 
patients in total 
0.63 0.062 0.050 0.074 0.664  0.003 
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Program Study  
 
Effect 
type 
Outcome  Intervention  
Data 
Control  
Data 
Reported 
effect size 
LCI UCI d 
Standardized 
mean 
difference)  
 
Vd 
Standardize
d variance)  
 
 
SEd  
Standardiz
ed 
standard 
error  
 
control 
National 
Health 
Insurance 
P4P (NHI-
P4P) 
Taiwan  
 
Li et al., 
2010 
OR TB cure rate 
in the first 
12 months  
 
N= 25754 N= 33536 1.338 1.159 1.544 0.070 
SE=0.098  
 
 
 0.054 
Hawaii 
medical 
group 
 
Gilmore 
et al., 
2007 
 
OR Recommend
ed care (a 
composite 
score from 
11 
indicators) 
N was not 
reported 
 
 1.27  1.09 1.40 0.057 
SE = 0.079 
 
 0.044 
Hudson 
health plan 
Chien et 
al., 2010 
 
OR Childhood 
vaccinations 
 
N=155  
 
N=16 1.65  
 
  0.120 
SE= 0.24 
 
 0.132 
McMenami
n et al, 2003 
 
McMena
min et al, 
2003 
 
OR Smoking 
cessation 
advise 
  3.63 
N=1104 
1.7 7.76 0.309 
SE= 1.546 
 
 0.852 
 
Salize et al 
2009 
Salize et 
al 2009 
 
OR Smoking 
abstinence 
 
N=20 
We might need 
patient sample 
N=21 1.28 0.25 6.48 0.059 
SE= 1.589 
 
 0.876 
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Program Study  
 
Effect 
type 
Outcome  Intervention  
Data 
Control  
Data 
Reported 
effect size 
LCI UCI d 
Standardized 
mean 
difference)  
 
Vd 
Standardize
d variance)  
 
 
SEd  
Standardiz
ed 
standard 
error  
 
 here 
Twardella 
and 
Brenner, 
2007 
 
Twardell
a and 
Brenner, 
2007 
 
OR Smoking 
cessation 
 Participants: 
577 patients in 
82 practices 
1.26 
 
N=557 
0.65 2.43 0.055 
SE= 0.454 
 
 0.250 
Kruse et al., 
2013 
 
Kruse et 
al., 2013 
 
OR Smoking 
status 
Documentati
on 
N =227574 N 207,471  
 
1.3 1.1 1.4 0.062 
SE= 0.077 
 
 0.042 
 
Chen et al., 
2010 
 
 
Chen et 
al., 2010 
 
OR Quality of 
diabetes care 
19,193 32,365 1.16 
 
 
1.11 1.22 0.035 
SE= 0.028 
 
 0.015 
QOF 
 
Coleman 
et al., 
2007 
 
OR Brief advise 
to smokers 
No N  3.03 2.89 3.09 0.265 
SE= 0.051 
 
 0.028 
QOF 
 
Calvert 
et al., 
2009 
 
OR HbA1c 
levels of 
≤7.5% 
 N=147  
 
1.05 
 
1.01 1.09 0.011 
SE= 0.020 
 0.011 
QOF Simpson OR Smoking Total N= 525   4.45  4.43  4.46 0.357 0.004
2 
0.004 
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Program Study  
 
Effect 
type 
Outcome  Intervention  
Data 
Control  
Data 
Reported 
effect size 
LCI UCI d 
Standardized 
mean 
difference)  
 
Vd 
Standardize
d variance)  
 
 
SEd  
Standardiz
ed 
standard 
error  
 
 
 
et al., 
2010 
status 
reporting  
R=0.75 
Smoking 
cessation 
advise  
6.75 6.66  6.85 0.457 0.026
2 
0.026 
Smoking 
cessation 
referral  
7.32  6.92  7.73 0.467 0.013 0.114 
Quit rates  0.73   0.72 0.73 -.075 
d=0.3015 
0.001
2 
 
r= 0.75 
0.013 
0.001 
0.115 
Bardach et 
al, 2014 
Fagan et al., 
2010 
 
. 
 
Bardach 
et al, 
2014 
OR Aspirin 
therapy, with 
IVD or DM 
N=42 
R=0.75 
N=42 1.28 
 
1.10 1.50 0.059 0.003 0.056 
Blood 
pressure 
control 
No IVD or 
DM 
1.23 
 
1.05 1.44 0.050 0.003 0.055 
Blood 
pressure 
control 
IVD 
0.71 
 
0.4 1.24 -0.82 0.014 0.118 
Blood 1.52 1.12 2.07 0.100 0.018 0.134 
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Program Study  
 
Effect 
type 
Outcome  Intervention  
Data 
Control  
Data 
Reported 
effect size 
LCI UCI d 
Standardized 
mean 
difference)  
 
Vd 
Standardize
d variance)  
 
 
SEd  
Standardiz
ed 
standard 
error  
 
pressure 
control 
DM 
 
Blood 
pressure 
control 
IVD or DM 
1.37 
 
1.07 1.75 0.075 0.009 0.096 
Cholesterol 
control 
0.86 0.67 1.09 -0.36 0.003 0.059 
Smoking 
cessation 
intervention 
1.30 1.04 1.63 0.063 
mean d=-
0.119 
0.007 
0.033 
0.083 
0.183 
Fagan et 
al., 2010 
OR Influenza 
vaccine 
N= 1587 
Around 
diabetes= 0.75 
N=19356 1.79  1.37 2.35 0.139 0.019 0.138 
Hemoglobin 
testing  
0.44  0.33 0.65 -0.196 0.031 0.176 
Eye exam 0.98 0.61 1.58 -0.005 0.285 0.534 
Ldl test  0.62 0.44 0.86 -0.114 0.053 0.231 
Nephropathy 
test 
0.96 0.62 1.46 -.010 
dtotal= -
0.0372 
 
0.184 
r=0.75 
0.366 
0.429 
0.605 
Gavagan et 
al, 2010 
Gavagan 
et al, 
2010 
0R Pap smears       0.162 0.043 0.208 
Mammogra
ms  
  0.093 0.096 0.309 
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Program Study  
 
Effect 
type 
Outcome  Intervention  
Data 
Control  
Data 
Reported 
effect size 
LCI UCI d 
Standardized 
mean 
difference)  
 
Vd 
Standardize
d variance)  
 
 
SEd  
Standardiz
ed 
standard 
error  
 
Pediatric 
immunizatio
n  
  0.426 
r=0.5 
dtotal= 0.187 
0.721 
 
0.382 
0.849 
 
0.618 
Larsen  et al 
, 2003  
Larsen  
et al , 
2003  
% change  Diabetes 
care  
N=9436 
52.85 
N= 5785 
33.5% 
   0.190  0.019 
Tsai et al., 
2010 
Tsai et 
al., 2010 
% change Tb treatment  N= 16434 
89.96% no 
default in 
treatment  
N= 638 
87.30% no 
default in 
treatment  
   0.047  0.067 
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D5. Estimates of effect sizes, standard errors, and study characteristics used in Meta-regression analyses                                                                                                                                      
 
Study name Outcome  Effect size 
(standardized mean 
difference: d) 
SEd  Who revives 
the incentive 
Size of 
incentive 
Risk  TYPE 
 
Control group  
1. Kouides et al 1998 Immunization rates in the 
elderly  
0.197 0.243 Groups  Large 
 
Low  A Yes  
2. An et al., 2008 Smoking cessation referral 
rates  
0.059 0.089 Groups 
 
Small  Low  B Yes  
3. Glikman et al., 2007 CMS composite measure on 
mortality  
-0.015 0.022 Groups  Small  High  C Yes  
4. Cutler et al., 2007 Diabetes care ldl test 0.180 0.100 Groups 
 
Large  High  B Yes  
5. Rosenthal et al., 2005 Summary of cancer 
screening  
0.09 0.032 Groups 
 
Large  High  B Yes  
6. St Jacques, et al, 2004 Summary measure for 
anesthesia care 
0.341 0.029 Individuals  
 
Large 
 
Low  B No  
7. Bischoff et al, 2012 Summary of discharge 
processes 
0.76 0.277 Groups  Large  Low  C No  
8. Lee et al., 2010 Essential diabetes exams and 
tests 
0.655 0.005 Groups  Large  High  B Yes  
9. Basinga et al., 2011 Summary measure for 
maternal health indicators 
0.095 0.041 Groups Large  Low  A Yes  
10. Campbell et al., 2009 Summary measure for 
diabetes process indicators 
-0.227 0.229 Groups  Large  Low  A Yes  
11. Sutton et al, 2012 30 day Mortality for CABG 
and other heart related 
diseases  
0.016 0.013 Groups  Small  High  C Yes  
12. Jha et al., 2012 30 day Mortality for CABG 
and other heart related 
diseases 
0.002 0.005 Groups  Small  High  C Yes  
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Study name Outcome  Effect size 
(standardized mean 
difference: d) 
SEd  Who revives 
the incentive 
Size of 
incentive 
Risk  TYPE 
 
Control group  
13. Lindenauer et al., 
2007 
Composite measure of 
process indicators 
0.155 0.008 Groups  Small  High  C Yes  
14. Kontopantelis et al. 
2012 
Composite quality score on 
diabetes in the first year 
0.270 0.011 Groups  Large  Low  A Yes  
15. Simpson et al., 2011 Summary measure for 
improvement in hypertension 
0.097 0.030 Groups  Large  Low  A No  
16. Srirangalingam et al., 
2006 
Number with HbA1c >7.4% 
(%) 
0.024 0.143 Groups  Large  Low  A No  
17. Cupples et al., 2014 Smoking status 
documentation 
-0.009 0.118 Groups  Large  Low  A Yes 
18. Vaghela et al, 2008 Summary measure for 
improvements in diabetes 
intermediate outcomes 
0.118 0.001 Groups  Large  Low  A No  
19. Chang et al, 2008 Smoking cessation  -0.010  0.026 Groups  Large  High  B No  
20. Kuo et al., 2011 Quality of care of breast 
cancer  
0.664 0.003 Groups  Large  High  B Yes  
21. Li et al.,2010 TB cure rate in the first 12 
months  
0.070 0.54 Groups  Large  High  B Yes  
22. Gilmore et al., 2007 Recommended care (a 
composite score from 11 
indicators) 
0.057 0.044 Individuals  Large  High  C Yes  
23. Chien et al., 2010 Childhood vaccinations 0.120 0.132 Individuals  Large  Low B Yes  
24. McMenamin et al, 
2003 
Smoking cessation advise 0.309 0.852 Groups  Large  Low  A Yes  
25. Salize et al., Smoking abstinence 0.059 0.876 Individuals  Small  High C Yes  
26. Twardella and 
Brenner, 2007 
Smoking cessation 0.055 0.250 Individuals Small  High  C Yes  
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Study name Outcome  Effect size 
(standardized mean 
difference: d) 
SEd  Who revives 
the incentive 
Size of 
incentive 
Risk  TYPE 
 
Control group  
27. Kruse et al., 2013 Smoking status 
Documentation 
0.062 0.042 Groups  
 
Large  Low  A Yes  
28. Chen et al., 2010 Quality of diabetes care 0.035 0.015 Individuals  
 
Large  Low  B Yes  
29. Coleman et al., 2007 Brief advise to smokers 0.265 0.028 Groups  Large  Low  A No 
30. Calvert et al., 2009 HbA1c levels of ≤7.5% 0.011 0.011 Groups  Large  Low  A No 
31. Simpson et al., 2010 Summary effect of smoking 
related indicators 
0.3015 0.115 Groups  Large  Low  A No 
32. Bardach et al, 2014 Summary measure for heart 
disease process  
-0.119 0.183 Groups  Large  Low  A Yes  
33. Fagan et al., 2010 Summary measure of 
essential tests and exams for 
diabetes  
-0.0372 0.605 Groups  Large  Low  A Yes  
34. Larsen et al., 2003  Diabetes care 0.190 0.019 Individuals  Small  Low  C No 
35. Gavagan et al., 2010 Cancer screening  0.187 0.618 Individuals  Small  Low  C Yes 
36. Tsai et al., 2010 Tb treatment  0.042 0.067 Groups  Large  High  B  
 
 
 
D6. Statistical output for the multifactorial multilevel logistic regression analysis (Model B variant 2)                                                                                                                                                      
 Univariate  Multivariate  
Type 2 3.41[0.98-11.89] p=0.054 1.72[0.63-4.69] p=0.291 
Type 3 3.99[0.58-27.67] p=0.161 2.36[0.47-11.80] p=0.296 
Evaluation  17.91[4.76-67.47] p<0.0001 
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Appendix E  
EI. Detailed description of incentivized health services in the Nigerian P4P scheme                 
 No  Name MPA Service  Description  Primary Data 
Collection Tools1  
Secondary Data Collection Tools2  
1  New outpatient consultation  Any new curative care visit during the 
past month  
Curative Care Register  Original prescription for drugs 
dispensed kept at the pharmacy which 
includes cost of drugs. Drugs register 
and stock cards conform.  
2  New outpatient consultation of 
an indigent patient  
During the past month, indigents who 
have been consulted as an outpatients. 
Indigents are locally identified. 
Maximum of 20% of all new curative 
consultations during the previous 
month.  
Indigent outpatient 
register  
Proceedings indigent committee  
Community Client Satisfaction Survey: 
post-identification questionnaire 
application  
3  Minor Surgery  Any new minor surgical intervention 
during the past month. Minor Surgery 
defined as (i) Suture; (ii) incision and 
drainage; (iii) minor excisions.  
Minor Surgery Register  Original prescription for drugs and 
medical consumables dispensed kept at 
the pharmacy which includes cost of 
drugs/consumables. Drugs register and 
stock cards conform 
 
4  Referred patient arrived at the 
General Hospital  
Counter-referral slip available at the 
Health facility. Fully filled in by the 
MD. The number of valid counter-
referral slips is counted.  
Original of counter-
referral slip available at 
the Health facility.  
Copy of the counter-referral slip 
available at the General Hospital. 
Referred patient registered in the 
outpatient’s department register.  
5  Completely Vaccinated Child  Child less than 12 months old which 
has received all vaccines according to 
the national protocol (BCG; DTP3; 
Measles)  
Vaccination Register  Under-five card with vaccination 
records, held by the mother.  
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6  Growth monitoring visit Child  Any new quarterly growth monitoring 
visit of a child less than five years old 
during the past month. These growth 
monitoring visits ought to be monthly 
according to the protocol, however, 
here, a quarterly visit is remunerated.  
Under-five 
clinic/Nutrition Register  
Under-five card with growth curve 
plotted, held by the mother  
7  2 - 5 Tetanus Vaccination of 
Pregnant Woman  
Each second to fifth TT vaccination of 
a pregnant woman during the past 
month  
ANC register  
Individual Card kept at 
the HF  
ANC card held by the mother  
Vaccination register  
8  Postnatal consultation  A post natal consultation held within 
48 hours after giving birth, during the 
past month.  
Delivery register  Partogram or inpatient form  
9  First ANC consultation before 
four months pregnancy  
A first ANC consultation occurs 
before 4 month’s pregnancy, during 
the past month.  
ANC register  
Individual Card kept at 
the HF  
ANC card held by the mother  
10  ANC standard visit (2-4)  Any 2-4th standard visit according to 
the focused antenatal care visit 
schedule and approach. Second visit 
between 24-28 weeks; third visit at 32 
weeks and the fourth visit at 36 weeks. 
During the past month.  
ANC register  
Individual Card kept at 
the HF  
ANC card held by the mother  
Medical prescriptions for Ferrosulphate, 
Vermox and SP kept at the pharmacy. 
Drugs register and stock cards conform 
 
11  Second dose of SP provided to 
a pregnant woman  
The second dose of SP (IPTp), 
according to the protocol, during the 
past month.  
ANC register  
Individual Card kept at 
the HF  
ANC card held by the mother; medical 
prescription for SP kept at the 
pharmacy. Drugs register and stock 
card conform.  
12  Normal delivery  A delivery attended by a trained 
attendant at the health facility during 
the past month.  
Delivery Register  Partogram; eventual drugs and medical 
consumables dispensed through the 
prescriptions kept at the pharmacy; 
drugs register and stock cards conform.  
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13  FP: total of new and existing 
users of modern FP methods  
Any new or existing user of injectable 
contraceptive or oral contraceptive 
pills, during the past month. An 
injection represents three month’s 
protection and a FP visit for OAC 
should provide three months’ worth of 
pills.  
FP register  
Individual Card kept at 
the HF  
Eventual drugs and medical 
consumables dispensed through the 
prescriptions kept at the pharmacy; 
drugs register and stock cards conform.  
14  FP: implants and IUDs  Any new user of implant or IUD, 
during the past month.  
FP register  
Individual Card kept at 
the HF  
Eventual drugs and medical 
consumables dispensed through the 
prescriptions kept at the pharmacy; 
drugs register and stock cards conform.  
15  VCT/PMTCT test  Any new VCT or PMTCT test carried 
out during the past month.  
VCT register  Laboratory register; stock records  
16  PMTCT: HIV+ mothers and 
children born to are treated 
according to protocol  
Any new HIV+ mother and newborn 
child treated according to the PMTCT 
protocol, during the past month.  
ARV register; delivery 
room register  
PMTCT register; laboratory register; 
stock records.  
17  STD treated  Any new STD treated according to 
syndromic treatment protocol, during 
the past month  
Curative Care Register  Drugs and medical consumables 
dispensed through the prescriptions 
kept at the pharmacy; drugs register and 
stock cards conform.  
18  New AAFB+ PTB patient  A new AAFB sputum positive 
Pulmonary Tuberculosis patient 
diagnosed, at the facility, during the 
past month.  
Tuberculosis register  Laboratory register. Slides kept for 
counter-verification/quality assurance.  
19  PTB patient completed 
treatment and cured  
A former AAFB+ PTB patient 
completed DOTS, and cured after 
treatment proven by negative sputum 
examinations, during the past month.  
Tuberculosis register  Laboratory register. Slides kept for 
counter-verification/quality assurance.  
Drugs register.  
20  ITN Distributed  ITN distributed, during the past 
month.  
ITN register  Stock control card conform. Proof of 
acquisition, purchase of ITNs available.  
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21  New family using a latrine                  During the past month, the individual effort of a community 
health worker who has delivered a package of behavioral 
change communication including on hygiene to a family. The 
objectively verifiable measure of his BCC is the use of a newly 
constructed latrine in the catchment area (Ward), next to the 
household of this family, during the past month. Construction 
according to the norms. Maximum one latrine per household.  
 
E2. Quality checklist of the Nigerian P4P scheme explained                                                   
1 General Management [max 11 points] YES NO 
1.1 Presence of map of health facility catchment area 1 0 
1.1.1 
Health map of the health area available and on the notice board of HF showing 
villages, main roads, natural barriers, special points and distance   
1.2 HMIS reports - business plan - minutes of meetings and patient cards  well stored 2 0 
1.2.1 In cupboard and in box files and accessible by duty manager 
  
1.3 
Staff duty roster available and well displayed up to date for current month and 
visible for staff and patients 
1 0 
1.4 Technical meetings with staff conducted monthly and minutes available 3 0 
1.4.1 
Each monthly minutes contain: (i) date of the meeting; (ii) signed list of 
participants; (iii) follow-up of decisions taken during the previous meeting; (iv) 
there is a list of developed recommendations or decisions taken; (v) each month 
the monthly financial balance is discussed; (vi) minutes of the meeting are signed 
by the chair. Each report according to norms = 1 p 
  
1.5 Standard Sheets for referral available 1 0 
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1.5.1 At least 10 sheets 
1.6 
Availability of radio or mobile phone for communication between health facility 
and general hospital 
1 0 
1.6.1 
Radio or mobile phone functional with batteries and/or call credit and contact details on 
the phone 
1.7 
HMIS reports are filled, updated and transmitted to the LGA on schedule 1 0 
1.7.1 
After verification of the SPHCDA of the monthly MPA invoice and signed receipt of 
acknowledgement available 
1.8 HMIS data analysis report for the quarter being assessed concerning priority 
problems 
1 0 
1.8.1 
Three priority health problems are followed each quarter and data have been updated 
up to the month prior to the supervisor's visit 
Total Points (11) ../11 xxxx 
2 Business Plan [max 9 points] YES NO 
2.1 Quarterly business plan for the current period made and accessible 
2 0 
2.1.1 Valid and renegotiated 
2.2 
Business plan prepared with key stakeholders 
2 0 
2.2.1 Facility RBF Committee Members involved 
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2.2.2 
Representative (s) of subcontracted private clinics or health posts involved (if 
applicable) 
2.3 
Business plan contains convincing geographic coverage plan 
1 0 
2.3.1 Strategies for sub-contracts (e.g. villages at more than one hour by foot) 
2.3.2 Mobile strategies (EPI, FP; PNC, LITN distribution, latrines) 
2.4 
Business plan analyses presence of untrained informal practitioners in 
catchment area 
1 0 
2.4.1 HF treats this subject in the BP, and suggests a strategy for discouraging 
2.5 
Business plan analyses presence of trained practitioners operating without any 
permission 1 0 
2.5.1 BP may suggest to include them or to discourage if quality conditions are not met 
2.6 Business plan shows a plan to assure financial accessibility for the population  
2 0 
2.6.1 Business plan shows negotiated rates between HF, committee and community 
2.6.2 Business plan shows planning for care for the indigents 
Total Points (9) ../9 xxxx 
3 Finance [max 10 points] YES NO 
3.1 Financial and accounting documents available and well kept 
2 0 
3.1.1 Monthly report of treasury available and correctly filled 
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3.1.2 Theoretical balance of cash-book corresponds to liquidity in cash 
3.2 
Document available to show that quarterly calculation of incomes, running costs, investments 
and variable performance subsidies are done 
3 0 
3.2.1 
This document guarantees running costs: = salaries, purchase of drugs and equipments, subcontracts, 
petty cash fro small expenditures, social marketing, maintenance and rehabilitation 
3.2.2 
This document calculates the performance bonus according to the formula: performance bonuses = 
income of the quarter - running costs 
3.3 
Contract salaries and benefits + performance bonuses do not exceed 50% of total HF income 
through PBF 2 0 
3.4 Existence of fixed basic salaries and monthly performance bonus system is know by staff 
3 0 
3.4.1 
Established criteria for the performance bonus calculation through (i) basic performance index + (ii) 
seniority + (iii) responsibility + (iv) overtime hours worked - hours lost + (v) quarterly performance 
evaluation 
Total Points (10) ../10 xxxx 
       
N_R Revenue Categories Revenues N_E Expense Categories Expenses 
1 Cost recovery (user-charges)   9 Salaries      
2 Cost recovery (pre-payment)   10 Performance bonuses   
3 Salaries from Gov. & other sources   11 Drugs and medical consum.   
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4 PBF Subsidies from fund holders   12 Subsidies for sub-contracts   
5 Contributions from other sources   13 Cleaning and office costs   
6 Other   14 Transport costs   
7 Cash in hand   15 Social marketing   
8 Bank balance at the end of the quarter   16 Infrastructure rehabilitation   
  Total Revenue   17 Equipment and furniture   
   
18 Other   
   
19 Put into reserve   
   
  Total Expenses   
   
Total Revenue - Total Expenses   
4 Care for the Indigents [max 7 points] YES NO 
4.1 Planning for Care for the Indigents expenditures 
1 0 
4.1.1 
20% of curative consultations of the previous month: documented quantity in monthly management 
meetings 
4.2 Indigent committee meets monthly 
6 0 
4.2.1 
The Indigent committee meets monthly to review the Care for the Indigent Category use. Each monthly 
minutes contain: (i) date of the meeting; (ii) signed list of participants; (iii) follow-up of decisions taken 
during the previous meeting; (iv) there is a list of developed recommendations or decisions taken; (v) 
each month the monthly financial balance is discussed; (vi) minutes of the meeting are signed by the 
chairman. Each report according to norms = 2 p 
Total Points (7) ../7 xxxx 
5 Hygiene and Sterilization [max 25 points] YES NO 
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5.1 Fence health facility available and well-maintained 
1 0 
5.1.1 Fence exists, can be closed at night and there are no holes 
5.2 Availability of a garbage bin in the courtyard 
1 0 
5.2.1 Bin with lid accessible to clients which is not full 
5.3 Presence of sufficient latrines/toilets which are well-maintained 
5.3.1 At least two latrines/toilets  1 0 
5.3.2 Floor without fissures with single hole and lid 0.5 0 
5.3.3 Recently cleaned without visible fecal matter 0.5 0 
5.3.4 Door lockable from the inside, super structure with roofing, without flies and no smell 0.5 0 
5.3.5 Smells of disinfectant 0.5 0 
5.4 Presence of sufficient showers which are well-maintained 
5.4.1 At least one bathing facility 1 0 
5.4.2 Bathing facility with running water, or container with at the least 20 L of water 0.5 0 
5.4.3 Evacuation of the waste water in a sanitation pit 0.5 0 
5.5 Waste pit for Heath Care Waste is available and according to the norms 
5.5.1 
Waste disposal pit minimum 2 meters deep, lined with clay, concrete or brick or plastic, it is fenced 
and has a bright flag.   
6 0 
5.5.2 
The waste pit is a minimum of 15 meters from the health facility, minimum of 50 meters from a 
household, and 100 meters from a water source 
5.5.3 Health Care Waste is not visible (covered by at the least 10 cm of soil or lime) 
5.5.4 
The health facility maintains a register indicating the date of the creation of the pit(s), and the location 
(s) 
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5.6 Courtyard clean 
1 0 
5.6.1 No waste or medical waste in the courtyard 
5.7 Sterilization according to norms using a pressure sterilizer 
3 0 5.7.1 Sterilizer functional 
5.7.2 Sterilization protocol available and utilized 
5.9 Hygienic conditions assured during wound dressing and injections 
2 0 
5.9.1 Yellow and Red Bins for medical waste with lid and foot pedal, lined 
5.9.2 Security box for needles well positioned, and used 
5.9.3 Needle cutter available and used 
5.9.4 Container/bowl with lid containing disinfectant used for putting used instruments 
5.10 Disposal of Health Care Waste according to National Norms 
6   
5.10.1 Waste disposal of non-contaminated waste in Black Bin with lid and foot pedal, lined 
5.10.2 Waste disposal of contaminated HCW in Yellow Bins with lid and foot pedal, lined 
5.10.3 Waste disposal of organically HCW in Red Bins with lid and foot pedal, lined 
5.10.4 
Protective gear for personnel managing HCW available; boots, plastic shorts, thick plastic/rubber 
gloves 
Total Points (25) ../25 xxxx 
6 Curative Consultations [max 34 points] YES NO 
6.1 Good conditions in waiting area 
1 0 
6.1.1 Sufficient benches and or chairs protected against sun and rain and waiting area is not inside room 
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6.2 Unit fees of drugs displayed to the public 
1 0 6.2.1 
Easily visible in the waiting area, updated, with (i) unit price per item; (ii) price for a standard treatment of 
the drug 
6.2.2 Drugs are all generics 
6.3 Existence of waiting card system with numbers 1 0 
6.4 Consultation room in good condition 
3 0 
6.4.1 
Walls with durable materials well painted, floor paved with cement without fissures, undamaged ceiling 
6.4.2 Consultation room and waiting space separated assuring confidentiality 
6.4.3 Windows with curtains 
6.4.4 Functional door with lock 
6.5 Consultation room (where emergencies are received) has 24/7 light 
1 0 
6.5.1 Electricity or solar light or functioning high pressure kerosene light present 
6.6 Consultations are done by skilled staff 
2 0 
6.6.1 Identification of consulting staff in register 
6.7 Consulting staff is well-dressed 
1 0 
6.7.1 Clean blouse and footwear 
6.8 Correct numbering of registers 
1 0 
6.8.1 Correct numbering and closed at the end of the month 
6.9 Service availability 7/7 
1 0 
6.9.1 Supervisor verifies entries in register for the last three Sundays 
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6.10 Malaria protocol put on wall and accessible for staff 
1 0 
6.10.1 National protocol for diagnosis and treatment of simple and severe malaria 
6.11 Simple malaria correctly treated 
1 0 
6.11.1 Register see last five cases of simple malaria and review treatment acc protocol 
6.12 WHO flow diagram for ARI put on wall and accessible for staff 1 0 
6.13 ARI protocol applied 
1 0 
6.13.1 See last five cases of ARI and review treatment acc protocol 
6.14 WHO protocol for Diarrhea put on wall and accessible for staff 1 0 
6.15 Diarrhea protocol applied 
1 0 
6.15.1 See last five cases of Diarrhea and review treatment acc protocol 
6.16 Proportion of consultancies treated with antibiotics <30% 
4 0 
6.16.1 See last 100 cases in register, check diagnosis and calculate the rate (< 30 cases) 
6.17 MSF treatment guidelines available in consultancy room 1 0 
6.18 Knowledge of tuberculosis danger signs and criteria for referral 
1 0 
6.18.1 Select any available qualified medical staff, and ask the question on TB dangers signs 
6.18.2 
Answer must contain at least 4 of the following signs: (i) weight loss; (ii) loss of appetite; (iii) fever; (iv) 
cough of more than 15 days duration; (v) night sweating 
6.19 Stethoscope and BP machine available and functional 
1 0 
6.19.1 Let nurse check BP and review measure 
6.20 Thermometer available and functional 1 0 
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6.21 Otoscope available and functional 1 0 
6.22 Examination bed available with mattress 
1 0 
6.22.1 Non-torn, plastic cover, specific for the OPD consultations only 
6.23 Weighing scale available and functional 
1 0 
6.23.1 Inspect in comparison with known weight of supervisor: after weighing, the balance should return to zero 
6.24 Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses strategy is applied 
2 0 6.24.1 Protocol is available in the consultation room 
6.24.2 The last five IMCI cases are traced in the register and comply with the IMCI strategy 
6.25 Determination of nutritional status 
2 0 
6.25.1 Determination of nutritional status of all children under 5 who come for consultation 
6.25.2 Determination of nutritional status of all women with a sick child under 6 months of age 
6.25.3 Screening record of nutritional status available, up to date and properly filled out 
Total Points (34) ../34 xxxx 
7 Family Planning [max 22 points] YES NO 
7.1 At least one qualified staff trained in Family Planning 2 0 
7.2 Confidentiality in consultancy room assured 
2 0 
7.2.1 Room with closed doors, curtains at windows or non transparent glass 
7.3 
Family planning methods available and visible in demonstration box for potential users 
2 0 
7.3.1 Condoms; OAC; Injectable; Implant; IUD; beads are available in the demonstration box 
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7.3.2 Penis model available on the desk; box with condoms available with at the least 50 condoms 
7.4 Staff correctly calculates number of clients expected monthly for oral and injectable contraceptives 
1 0 
7.4.1 
For example for 10.000 population (target is entire ward catchment pop) = 10.000 * 22.5% * 25%/12 * 4 * 90% 
(assuming 25% unmet need; 22.5% target population; 90% of oral/inject AC at HC level 
7.5 Business plan contains strategy to achieve FP targets 
3 0 7.5.1 
Collaboration with public sector, private sector and social marketing, mobile strategies, advocacy among local 
leaders etc 
7.5.2 Involvement of HF staff in strategies 
7.6 Stock of oral and injectable contraceptives in adequate 
2 0 
7.6.1 for example for 10.0000 pop 72 doses of oral (3 month cycles) and injectable methods combined 
7.7 IUD available and staff trained to use it 
3 0 
7.7.1 at least five IUDs and at the least one staff trained to use it 
7.8 Implant method available and staff trained to use it 
3 0 
7.8.1 at least five implants available and staff trained to use it 
7.9 Strategies available for transfer of persons to hospital seeking permanent FP methods  
2 0 
7.9.1 Referral system worked out - strategy to reduce prices; mobile strategy for surgery? 
7.10 FP individual cards available and filled according to the format 
2 0 
7.10.1 Check at least five cards for BP, hepatomegaly, varices, weight 
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Total Points (22) ../22 xxxx 
8 Laboratory [max 10 points] YES NO 
8.1 Laboratory technician or technologist available  1 0 
8.2 Laboratory is open every day of the week 
1 0 
8.2.1 Supervisor verifies the last 4 Sundays in laboratory register 
8.3 List of laboratory examinations visible for the public with fees 1 0 
8.4 
Results recorded correctly in laboratory register and match with results in inpatient sheets or OPD examination 
cards 1 0 
8.4.1 Supervisor verifies last five results 
8.5 Availability of parasites demonstrations 
1 0 
8.5.1 On plastic paper, in a color book, or put on wall 
8.5.2 Blood smear: Vivax, Ovale, Falciparum and Malariae 
8.5.3 Stools: Ascaris, entamboeabae, ankylostoma and schistosome 
8.6 Microscope available and functional 
1 0 8.6.1 functional objectives; immersion oil available, mirror or electricity 
8.6.2 blades, cover glass, GIEMSA available 
8.7 Malaria rapid tests available 
1 0 
8.7.1 At the least 20 tests available in the laboratory; non-expired 
8.8 Centrifuge available and functional 1 0 
8.9 Waste evacuation correctly carried out 1 0 
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8.9.1 Organic waste in a bin with lid with disinfectant 
8.9.2 Security box for sharp objects available and destroyed according to waste disposal guidelines 
8.10 Personnel adequately washes dirty pipettes in containers with disinfectant 1 0 
Total Points (10) ../10 xxxx 
9 In-patient Wards [max 10 points] YES NO 
9.1 Guard duty roster clearly visible for staff and followed up 
1 0 
9.1.1 Supervisor verifies guard duty's report - names and signatures 
9.2 Furniture available and in good state 
2 0 
9.2.1 Each bed has a (i) plastic covered mattress, (ii) mosquito net, (iii) clean sheets, (iv) night table 
9.3 Patient comfort and hygiene 
9.3.1 The wards are clean: no debris on the floor; and wards smell of disinfectant 0.5 0 
9.3.2 Space between the beds is at the least one meter 0.25 0 
9.3.3 Each ward has access to drinking water 0.25 0 
9.4 Light available in each ward 
2 0 
9.4.1 Electricity; solar light or rechargeable battery lamp 
9.5 Confidentiality 
1 0 
9.5.1 Women in separate ward from men; the inside of the wards are not visible from the outside 
9.6 In patient register available and is well maintained 
2 0 
9.6.1 check identity and hospital bed days 
9.7 Recording forms for hospitalizations available and well filled and well stored 
1 0 
9.7.1 At least 10 blanks; supervisor verifies 5 filled forms 
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9.7.2 Weight, temperature, and eventual laboratory exams recorded 
9.7.3 Treatment monitoring checked 
Total Points (10) ../10 xxxx 
10 Essential Drugs Management [max 20 points] YES NO 
10.1 Staff maintains stock cards for ED showing security stock levels = monthly average consumption / 2 
4 0 
10.1.1 Supply in register corresponds with physical supply: random sample of three ED 
10.2 
Health facility purchases drugs, equipment and consumables from the Pharmaceutical Council of Nigeria 
certified distributor, approved by SMOH/SPHCDA 
3 0 
10.2.1 Latest Pharmaceutical Council of Nigeria certified distribution center list for the State available 
10.2.2 Last procurement list is shown which shows the certified distributor which sold the drugs 
10.2.3 All drugs and medical consumables are (i) NAFDAC certified and (ii) Generic 
10.3 
Main pharmacy store delivers drugs to health facility departments according to requisition 
10 0 10.3.1 Supervisor verifies whether quantity requisitioned equals quantity served 
10.3.2 Drugs to clients are uniquely dispensed through prescriptions. Prescriptions are stored and accessible 
10.3.3 Drugs and medical consumables prescribed, are all in generic form 
10.4 Drugs stored correctly 
2 0 10.4.1 Clean place, well ventilated with all drugs on cupboards, labeled shelves 
10.4.2 Drugs and medical consumables stored on alphabetical order, first in - first out basis 
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10.5 Absence of out of date drugs or drugs with unreadable labels 
1 0 
10.5.1 Supervisor verifies randomly three drugs and 2 consumables 
10.5.2 Out of date drugs well separated from stock 
10.5.3 Destruction protocol for out of date drugs available and applied 
Total Points (20) ../20 xxxx 
11 
Tracer Drugs (min. stock = Monthly Av. Consumption / 2) [max 30 
points] 
Available 
YES > 
MAC / 2 
Available 
NO < 
MAC / 2 
11.1 Paracetamol 500 mg tab 1 0 
11.2 Ibuprofen 200 mg caps 1 0 
11.3 Promethazine 25 mg tab 1 0 
11.4 Oxytocin 10IU/ml vial 1 0 
11.5 Mebendazole 100 mg tab 1 0 
11.6 Ferrous Sulfate 325 mg tab 1 0 
11.7 Penicillin V 250 mg tab 1 0 
11.8 Amoxicillin 500 mg tab 1 0 
11.9 Amoxicillin 200 mg/5ml suspension 1 0 
11.10 Co-trimoxazol 480 mg tab 1 0 
11.11 Co-trimoxazol 40mg/200mg - 5ml susp 1 0 
11.12 Doxycycline 100 mg caps 1 0 
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11.13 Erythromycin 250 mg tab 1 0 
11.14 Co-artemeter 20/120 mg tab 1 0 
11.15 Sulfadoxine/pyrimethamine 500 mg tab 1 0 
11.16 ORS sachet 1 0 
11.17 Condom  1 0 
11.18 Metronidazol 250 mg tab 1 0 
11.19 Sterile gloves 1 0 
11.20 Venflon 18G 
1 0 
11.20.1 Min stock = 10; MAC applies only when higher than 10 
11.21 Venflon 22G 
1 0 
11.21.1 Min stock = 10; MAC applies only when higher than 10 
11.22 IV giving set 
1 0 
11.22.1 Min stock = 10; MAC applies only when higher than 10 
11.23 Ringers lactate 1L 
1 0 
11.23.1 Min stock = 5L; MAC applies only when higher than 5L 
11.24 Dextrose 5% 1L 
1 0 
11.24.1 Min stock = 5L; MAC applies only when higher than 5L 
11.25 IV colloids 500 ml 
1 0 
11.25.1 Min stock = 5 bags; MAC applies only when higher than 5 bags 
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11.26 Syringe 5ml 1 0 
11.27 Syringe 10ml 1 0 
11.28 Needle 18G 1 0 
11.29 Needle 22G 1 0 
11.30 ITN 1 0 
Total Points (30) …./30 xxxx 
12 Maternity [max 21 points] YES NO 
12.1 Sufficient water with soap in delivery room 
1 0 
12.1.1 A functioning water source or at the least 20L 
12.2 Light in delivery room 24 hours 
1 0 
12.2.1 Electricity, solar light or rechargeable battery lamp or kerosene lamp filled with kerosene 
12.3 Waste from Maternity correctly handled 
1 0 
12.3.1 Bin with lid and safe needle disposal container, specific for the maternity room use only 
12.4 Delivery room is well-maintained 
12.4.1 Walls with durable materials and painted 1 0 
12.4.2 Curtain between delivery bed and door 1 0 
12.4.3 Delivery room smells of disinfectant 1 0 
12.4.4 Floor level cement, without fissures and ceiling not damaged 1 0 
12.4.5 Windows with curtains and functional door 1 0 
12.5 Availability and use of the partogramme 1 0 
                                                                             
436 
 
12.5.1 At the least 10 forms available for use 
12.5.2 Verify three randomly selected partograms whether filled according to the norms 
12.6 Deliveries performed by skilled personnel 
2 0 
12.6.1 Identification of the obstetrician from names in the register 
12.7 Availability of scales for weight/length, an obstetrical stethoscope and an aspirator 
12.7.1 Tape to measure length 1 0 
12.7.2 Scale to measure weight (check functionality) 1 0 
12.7.3 Aspirator plunged into a non-irritating disinfectant or functional manual/electric aspirator 1 0 
12.8 Availability of at the least 10 pairs of sterile gloves 1 0 
12.9 Availability of at the least 2 sterilized obstetrical boxes 
2 0 
12.9.1 Content at the least 1 pair of scissors, 2 pliers and one needle holder 
12.10 Availability of at the least one episiotomy box 
1 0 12.10.1 One sterilized box with needle holder, needles, 1 anatomical plier and 1 surgical plier 
12.10.2 Catgut and nylon sutures; antiseptic, local anesthetics, sterile swaps 
12.11 Delivery table in good state 
1 0 
12.11.1 Table in two parts with removable non-torn plasticized mattress and two functional leg supports 
12.12 Available equipment for care of the newborn 
1 0 12.12.1 Sterile tying string or clip for umbilical cord 
12.12.2 1% tetracycline eye ointment  
12.13 Adequate in-patient rooms 
1 0 
12.13.1 Mattress covered in impermeable plastic 
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12.13.2 Sheets, blankets and mosquito nets on each occupied bed 
Total Points (21) ../21 xxxx 
13 EPI and Pre-School Consultation [max 18 points] YES NO 
13.1 Personnel calculates correctly target for fully vaccinated children 
1 0 13.1.1 Target = population * 4% / 12  
13.1.2 The target population concerns the ward population 
13.2 EPI fridge 
3 0 
13.2.1 Presence of a fridge - temp form available, filled twice a day including the day of the visit 
13.2.2 Temperature remains between 2 and 8C in register sheet 
13.2.4 Supervisor verifies functionality of thermometer 
13.2.5 Temperature between 2 and 8C also according to the thermometer 
13.3 Chemical Temperature Indicator 
1 0 
13.3.1 Presence of a chemical temperature indicator which shows temperature acc to the norms 
13.4 Appropriate storage of vaccines 
1 0 
13.4.1 Freezing compartment: Measles 
13.4.2 Non-freezing compartment: BCG, DTP + HepB, TT, thinners 
13.4.3 Absence of vaccines which are expired 
13.4.4 Readable labels on all vaccines 
13.5 Appropriate stock of vaccines 
1 0 13.5.1 BCG, DPT, Polio, Yellow Fever, HBV, Measles, Tetanus 
13.5.2 Presence of stock control cards for all vaccines; concordance paper and physical stock verified 
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13.6 Cold Chain maintenance 
1 0 
13.6.1 If kerosene fridge: stock of at the least 14L Kerosene; if solar fridge: battery not damaged 
13.7 Cold packs are well frozen 
1 0 
13.7.1 At the least 5 
13.8 Syringes available 
1 0 
13.8.1 Auto-blocking at least 30; for dilution - at least 3 
13.9 Waste collection availability of safe disposal box 1 0 
13.10 Stock of U5 growth cards available 
1 0 
13.10.1 At the least 10 
13.11 Child immunization register well maintained 
1 0 
13.11.1 System is capable of identifying drop outs and Fully Vaccinated Children 
13.12 Conditions in waiting area for immunization services 
1 0 
13.12.1 Sufficient benches and or chairs, protected against sun and rain 
13.13 Patients receive numbered waiting buttons according to their arrival 1 0 
13.14 Baby weighing scale available and in working condition 
1 0 
13.14.1 Balance calibrated to zero + pants available, clean and in good condition 
13.15 Group IEC/BCC 
1 0 
13.15.1 Group meeting held before vaccinations 
13.15.2 
Existence of updated IEC report with (a) topic, (b) number of participants, © leader of activity, (d) date and (e) 
signature 
                                                                             
439 
 
13.16 Existence of a system to recover drop-outs 
1 0 
13.16.1 Schedule, record of appointments, classified invidual charts 
Total Points (18) ../18 xxxx 
14 Antenatal Care [max 12 points] YES NO 
14.1 
Business plan contains convincing strategies to effectively conduct ANC for all pregnant women in catchment 
area 1 0 
14.1.1 Fixed strategy; and advanced strategy for distant villages: catchment area covers entire ward 
14.2 Weighing scale present, functional and calibrated to zero 1 0 
14.3 ANC form for HF available and well filled in: last five forms verified 
3 0 
14.3.1 All: Examinations: weight - BP, Size, Parity, Date of last menstruation 
14.3.2 All: Laboratory: albuminuria, glucose 
14.3.3 All: Obstetrical examination done: Fetal heart rate, Uterine height, presentation, Fetal movement recorded 
14.4 
ANC form for HF shows the administration of Ferrous Sulphate/Folic Acid and Mebendazole and SP (for the 
last five forms above) 
2 0 
14.5 ANC cards for mother available: at least 10 in stock 1 0 
14.6 ANC register available and well filled in 
2 0 14.6.1 Complete identity, state of vaccinations, date visit, whether high risk pregnancy or not/danger signs 
14.6.2 All columns well filled including the identification of problems if any, and actions taken 
14.7 ANC conducted by qualified personnel 
1 0 
14.7.1 Nurse; midwife CHO or CHEW, verified on ANC cards 
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14.8 Group IEC/BCC 
1 0 
14.8.1 Group meeting held before FP consultation 
14.8.2 
Existence of updated IEC report with (a) topic, (b) number of participants, (c) leader of activity and (d) date and (e) 
signature 
Total Points (12) ../12 xxxx 
 
15 HIV/TB [max 10 points] YES NO 
15.1 Well-equipped HIV counseling room ensuring privacy:  
1 0 
15.1.1 Plastered and painted wall of solid material 
15.1.2 Smooth cement floor 
15.1.3 Ceiling in good condition 
15.1.4 Windows with glass and curtains 
15.1.5 Doors that close 
15.2 Availability of IEC/BCC material related to HIV 
1 0 15.2.1 Penis model on the table 
15.2.2 A box of condoms on the table which has at the least 50 condoms 
15.3 Existence of a VCT/PMTCT councelling register and lab register acc norms 1 0 
15.4 Staff trained in councelling 
1 0 15.4.1 At the least one staff trained as a councilor 
15.4.2 All councelling done by a trained councilor 
15.5 Referral system and follow up for HIV clients 1 0 
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15.5.1 Individual client cards available; planning for CD4 cell counts 
15.6 Referral system and follow up for TB patients 
2 0 15.6.1 
Each AAFB PTB patient has a person attached to him/her who supervises DOTS: proof of in register; mobile phone 
number of such a supervisor is registered 
15.6.2 [Define further composite criteria] 
15.7 Laboratory equipment for testing for PTB 
1 0 15.7.1 [Define reagents for AAFB testing; stock control cards for reagents; slides etc] 
15.7.2 [Define measures for quality assurance testing of slides] 
15.8 Availability of anti-tuberculosis drugs 
1 0 
15.8.1 Rifampicine-isoniazide-pyrazinamide : cp120+50+300mg  
15.8.2 Streptomycin 1 gr  
15.8.3 Etambutol tabs 400 mg 
Total Points (10) ../10 xxxx 
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E3. A sample performance verification and tariff for each incentivized health service in the Nigerian P4P scheme                                                                                                                                    
INDICATOR CLAIMED QTT. VALIDATED QTT. TARIF AMOUNT (NAIRA) 
New outpatient consultation by a Doctor 547 403 150 60,450 
Counter-referral slip arrived at the Health facility 9 9 350 3,150 
Minor Surgery 12 10 900 9,000 
Major Surgery (ex CS) 4 4 3,000 12,000 
Normal delivery 36 36 1,850 66,600 
Assisted delivery 0 0 2,000 0 
CS 0 0 3,250 0 
Impatient Day 308 308 400 123,200 
Postnatal consultation 31 31 350 10,850 
First ANC consultation before 4 months pregnancy 13 12 350 4,200 
ANC standard visit (2-4) 49 49 350 17,150 
FP: total of new users of modern FP methods 12 12 750 9,000 
FP: implants and IUDs 0 0 1,300 0 
FP: vasectomy and bilateral tuba ligation 0 0 2,000 0 
VCT/PMTCT/PIT test 354 354 150 53,100 
PMTCT: HIV+ pregnant mothers and children born to are treated according to protocol 1 1 3,000 3,000 
STD treated 0 0 1,000 0 
New Client put under ARV treatment 20 20 2,000 40,000 
New AFB+PTB patient 3 3 3,500 10,500 
PTB patient completed treatment and cured 2 2 7,000 14,000 
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E4. Baseline trends for incentivized maternal and child health services in health facilities in 
Adamawa, Nassarawa, and Ondo States 
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Appendix F 
 
FI. Consideration of other methods of data collection in the qualitative study of the formative 
evaluation of the Nigerian P4P scheme                 
Observation: There are two main methods of observation: participant and non-participant observation. 
Participant observation where the researcher is an active member (participating and interacting with other 
members of the group which is being observed and non-participant observation is a method where the 
researcher does not interact with the group that is being observed (Barbour, 2013). While this method 
allows for a richly detailed insight of the topic or theme investigated (Kawulich, 2005), it is difficult to 
observe ‘why’ participants do what they do (reasons for their attitudes or behaviours) (Gobo, 2011, 
Creswell, 1998), which makes it quite impractical for this doctoral thesis, as I am interested in ‘why’ 
performance varies across different health facilities in three Nigerian States, which will require large 
amounts of time and resources. 
Document analysis : Document analysis is a method generating data in which existing documents such as: 
public records, personal records, and physical evidence (found within the study setting) are interpreted by 
the researcher to give meaning around the investigated topic (Atkinson and Coffey, 2011). In contexts 
where documents relevant to the research question exist, they usually are not regarded as a completely 
accurate representation of data for the research topic, but are seen as valuable sources of data in situations 
where direct observation or questioning of the key participants is not possible (Bowling, 2014a). This 
method data collection was not employed in this study because there were no publicly available documents 
relevant to the research question, as this is a new area of inquiry in the Nigerian context and it will be 
possible to engage the key participants directly, which is regarded as a superior method of collecting data.  
Focus groups : Focus group is a method that exploits communication between research participants, 
collecting data from several people simultaneously (Barbour, 2013). In focus groups, the participants are 
encouraged to talk to one another: asking questions, exchanging anecdotes and commenting on each other's 
experiences and points of view (Bowling, 2014b). Both focus group discussions and in-depth interviews 
are particularly useful in exploring participants’ knowledge and experiences, and can be used to examine 
not only what people think but how they think and why they think that way (Carter and Henderson, 2005). 
Focus groups are more appropriate where interaction between participants is likely to provide more insight 
on the topic being investigated and/or where the purpose of the research is study group norms or group 
meanings (Barbour, 2013), which is not completely relevant to this study, as I am not only interested in 
group meanings or norms but also in individual meanings and experiences.  In addition, focus group 
discussions fall short in the area of maintaining confidentiality and anonymity within the group, making 
participants likely to be hesitant in expressing their thoughts (Carter and Henderson, 2005, Bowling, 
2014b, Barbour, 2013). Hence, it was not a suitable or effective method for exploring some of the sensitive 
areas in this study such as uncertainty in payment and role of management, both of which are likely to 
involve corruption and transparency issues.  Furthermore, focus group discussions might produce biased 
outputs and unlikely to achieve the ‘in-depthness’ obtained from interviews as a result of dominating 
participants within the group, which is often a problem with inexperienced focus groups moderators (Finch 
and Lewis, 2004, Bowling, 2014b). 
In depth interviews (unstructured and semi-structured): In-depth interviews are encounters between 
the researcher and participant, expressed through words and relay the participant’s thoughts, feelings and 
motivations (Barbour, 2013). The two main types used in qualitative research are unstructured and semi-
structured interviews (Carter and Henderson, 2005). 
Unstructured interviews : Unstructured interviews are entirely participant led; the participants tell their 
own stories in their own words (to give a deep meaning of the participants’ world) with little or no 
direction from the researcher, and in most cases, the researcher returns to one participant over a period of 
time to build up a vivid picture (Bowling, 2014b). The interviewer approaches the interview with the aim 
of discussing a limited number of topics, sometimes as few as one or two which are covered in great detail 
(Miller and Glassner, 2011). This method of interviewing is mostly used in history projects or project 
involving people’s lifetimes or biographies (Carter and Henderson, 2005). This method was not used in this 
study for two main reasons. First, it is very time consuming, which limits the sample size and areas of 
enquiry of the research (Bowling, 2014b). Second, the data produced, though richly detailed is often non-
comparable to other participants (Carter and Henderson, 2005, Bowling, 2014b), which is needed to 
achieve some of the objectives in this study. 
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F2. Evidence of Ethics Approval for the qualitative study of the formative evaluation of the Nigerian 
P4P scheme                                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
    
   
 
 
 
 
21 May 2013 
 
DEPARTMENT OF  
HEALTH SCIENCES 
 
c/o Department of Philosophy 
Heslington 
York YO10 5DD 
 
Telephone (01904) 433253 
Fax  (01904) 321383 
E-mail                smh12@york.ac.uk 
 
Dr Stephen Holland 
 
www.york.ac.uk/healthsciences 
 
 
Miss Y K Ogundeji 
University of York 
Department of Health Sciences 
YO10 5DD 
 
Dear Yewande 
 
Attitudes and beliefs of Nigerian health workers participating in the Nigerian Performance Based 
Financing (PBF) pre-pilot program 
 
Thank you for submitting the above research study to the Health Sciences Research Governance Committee 
and for attending the committee’s meeting on Monday, 20 May 2013 to respond to our queries.   
 
The committee have approved the study but asked me to reiterate the following points: 
 
1. The researchers name and (work) contact email should be added to the Patient Information Sheet.   
 
2. Some of the bullet points on the consent form could be combined to make it shorter and clearer.  On the 
other hand, the option of being interviewed but not audio-recorded (answers being written by the 
researcher by hand) should be listed on the consent form, with a ‘tick box’. 
 
3. You should reconsider whether you want to use the data gathered from participants who withdraw 
during the study.  If so, this will need to be made explicit in the Patient Information Sheet and Consent 
Form. 
 
The committee is happy for you to take up this feedback with your supervisor and does not need to see the 
study again, but if you make any substantial amendments to the study then you might need further approval.  
If you have any questions regarding the committee’s decision then please contact me. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
Stephen Holland 
Chair: HSRGC 
 
cc. Professor Trevor Sheldon 
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F3. Original Information sheet for potential participants in the qualitative study of the formative 
evaluation of the Nigerian P4P scheme                                                                                   
 
Information Sheet 
Date: 24/04/2013 
Study title 
Attitudes and beliefs of Nigerian health workers participating in the Nigerian Performance Based 
Financing (PBF) pre-pilot program 
Introduction 
My name is Yewande Ogundeji, a PhD student at The University of York in the United Kingdom.  I am 
collaborating with the federal ministry of health on the implementation of Performance Based Financing 
(PBF) pilot programmes in Nigeria. I am interested in ways to improve the quality of healthcare in Nigeria. 
I am conducting research on how pay for performance programmes (the use of incentives) in healthcare 
can be better designed and implemented for maximum impact on health care. 
 You are being invited to take part in my research study. Before you decide if you want to take part in this 
research or not, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will 
involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and ask me any question(s) if there is 
anything that is not clear or if you would like more information about the research. Take time to decide 
whether or not you wish to take part. 
What is the purpose of the study? 
Performance Based Financing has recently been proposed as a way to encourage the changes needed to 
improve the quality of care in Nigeria. The proposed PBF program is currently in its pre-pilot stage. 
Evidence shows certain factors affect the success of the program (such as: the size of incentive, degree of 
uncertainty in achieving targets and receiving incentives, and the way the scheme is 
implemented).Therefore, the purpose of this study is to explore the views (and thoughts) of the health 
workers and health facility mangers participating in the new PBF scheme in the Nigerian context regarding 
issues (such as payments, administration, management, and experience with the scheme) in order to 
understand how these views affect the impact of the scheme on quality of care and health facility 
performance. The results of this research will be used to inform new design and implementation of the PBF 
pilot schemes in Nigeria. 
Why have I been approached to participate? 
You have been approached because the PBF program is being implemented in the health facilities where 
you work. 
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What will happen to me if I take part? 
This research involves one on one interview sessions that will around one hour and would be audio-
recorded with your permission. If you want to take part in the research and are not willing to be audio-
recorded, this can be arranged and I will take down written notes only. I will be asking you questions about 
your about your roles at work, management, changes in the health facility, and I will also ask about your 
thoughts and opinions about new incentive program. You do not have to answer any questions that you do 
not feel comfortable with. If you decide to take part, you are still free to withdraw at any time and without 
giving a reason.  A decision to withdraw at any time, or a decision not to take part, will not affect your job.  
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
Your privacy is very important to me and participation in this research does not put you at risk in any way. 
If you are willing to be a part of the research and be interviewed, I will not collect your name during the 
interview sessions (I will give you identification numbers instead). This way, your rights are protected and 
whoever reads the findings of this research will not be able to link anything in the research to you.  
Do I have to take part? 
Taking part in this research is entirely voluntary. It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you 
do decide to take part you will be asked to sign a consent form. As stated earlier, if you decide to take part 
you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.  
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
I will provide a brief summary/feedback of the research on a Local Government Area level (not specific to 
any individual or health facility) at its completion and it will be made available through the health facility 
manager.  
The main findings of this research would be submitted as part of my PhD thesis; results may also be 
published in academic journals and World Bank reports. Some extracts of the interviews may appear in a 
published paper but you would not be identified and it will not be traced back to you. The audio recordings 
would be deleted after I accurately transcribe the audio recordings but the transcripts will then be stored in 
secure folders on a password-protected computer for up to 5 years after the end of the research. Only my 
supervisor and I will have access to the raw transcripts. 
If you have any questions about this research, please ask me now.  
 
If you have any concerns about confidentiality and anonymity, please do not hesitate to contact my 
supervisor Professor Trevor Sheldon at trevor.sheldon@york.ac.uk. 
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F4. Participant Consent form for participants in the qualitative study of the formative evaluation of 
the Nigerian P4P scheme                                                                                                                
 
Participant Consent Form 
Title of research: Attitudes and beliefs of Nigerian health workers participating in the Nigerian 
Performance Based Financing (PBF) pre-pilot program 
Health facility (LGA): 
Name of researcher: Yewande Ogundeji 
Participant ID: 
Thank you for reading the information about this research project. If you would like to take part, please 
read, tick the appropriate box, and sign this form. 
                                                                                                                                           YES     NO 
              
I have a copy to keep, and I understand what the research is about.  
 
from this study at any time 
  
 I understan  
questions 
  
permission 
 I understand that the audio recordings will  
      kept as secure computer files  
  
 I understand Excerpts from the research may appear in publications bu  
under no circumstances will my name be included in the report.                
  
 
Name ……………………………… Signature …………………………  
Date ………………………………  
 
 
Name of researcher …….……………..… Signature …………………  
Date …………………………………………  
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F5. Amended information sheet for participants qualitative study of the formative evaluation of the 
Nigerian P4P scheme                                                                                                                                   
 
Information Sheet (amended sheet for the health workers) 
Date: 24/04/2013 
Study title 
Attitudes and beliefs of Nigerian health workers participating in the Nigerian Performance Based 
Financing (PBF) pre-pilot program 
 
My Name is Yewande Ogundeji a PhD student from the university of York working in conjunction with 
the NPHCDA on the PBF program. 
The PBF program is still very new and it is in its implementation of the stage. The implementers of the 
program are still open and willing to make adjustments in some of the design features and the way the 
scheme is implemented, in order to make the program more successful. So the purpose of my research is to 
explore some areas of the design on the program, to hear your thoughts and views, which will help inform 
design of the program in the scale up program. 
 
Taking part in this interview is entirely voluntary and if you decide you do not want to be a part of it, it will 
not affect your job in any way. However, if you do decide to take part; you will be asked to sign a consent 
form, the interview sessions will be one on one, will last around one hour, and would be audio-recorded 
with your permission. If you do not wish to be audio recorded, only written notes would be taken. In 
addition, you do not have to answer any questions that you do not feel comfortable with and you are still 
free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason.  A decision to withdraw at any time, or a decision not 
to take part, will not affect your job.  
No one apart from me will have access to the recordings and whatever you say here will be in confidence 
and will not be traced back to you. The audio recordings would be deleted after I write down the necessary 
information, which would be stored securely. 
 
I will also write a report but it will be a general report that will include information from other health 
workers in the other health facilities and this report would be made available through your health facility 
manager. In addition, the main findings of this research would be submitted as part of my PhD thesis; 
results may also be published in academic journals and World Bank reports. Some extracts of the 
interviews may appear in a published paper but you would not be identified and it will not be traced back 
to you. 
If you have any questions about this research, please ask me now.  
Thank you  
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Evidence of ethical approval for amendment on the information sheet 
Stephen Holland <stephen.holland@york.ac.uk> 
 
28/08/2013 
 
 
 
 
to me, trevor.sheldon, cath.jackson, Sandi 
 
 
 
Dear Yewande, 
 
Many thanks for informing us of this amendment to your study.  I am writing to approve by Chair's Action 
the change to the information sheet.  If you require a more formal letter to this effect, let me 
know.  Otherwise, good luck with the study. 
 
Best wishes, 
 
Stephen Holland 
Chair HSRGC 
 
 
F6. Final/refined Interview Questions for the qualitative study of the formative evaluation of the 
Nigerian P4P scheme                                                                                                                                  
In the interview, I asked about experience with the scheme so far and changes in the health facility since 
the start of the scheme. Then we moved on to talk about views about the payment systems, delay in 
payments, and the assessment of performance. Listed below is a set of semi structured questions that 
guided me through the areas I am interested in covering for the interview. These questions are numbered 
but might not necessarily follow that sequence as the participant may talk about something I had the 
intention of asking later on in the interview. 
1. Tell me about what you do (your role) in the health facility? 
2. So what do the health workers think about the program?  
3. What has changed since the start of the program?  
[Prompts]  
a) Effects of the program on the health facility/patient outcomes 
b) Administrative burden 
c) Motivation  
d) Supervision 
e) Has it had any effect on you/change professionally 
f) Any negative effects 
4. Can you please tell me more about how this scheme works in this health facility?  
[Prompts] 
a) How did you get to know about it? 
b) Aim of the program 
c) Training received 
d) What activities attract payment of bonuses? 
e) What do you have to do to earn bonuses 
f) Size of potential incentives?   
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5. We will move on to talk about how the health facility has changed so far; Performance data 
collected so far shows that performance has improved for some activities. Can you tell me about 
some of the approaches that have been used in this health facility to improve performance? 
Follow up questions/can also serve as prompt depending on the situation with the participants 
 For example, you performed so well (judging from your scores before and after PBF) in (insert 
activity), could you please tell me some of the approaches you used in improving performance. 
 So what happened in this particular activity (insert activity), the health facility didn’t perform so 
well in it. Can you tell me what happened? (Prompts: mobility, competition from other facilities, 
distance, cost, and staff strength) 
      [Prompts] 
a) Approaches e.g. Supervision and monitoring, training, health promotion, investing in 
infrastructure, drugs etc. 
b) Challenges/ease 
c) Have you had to change any attitude or behaviour?  
d) How has the community perceived or received it?  
6. Tell me about the use of feedback in this health facility 
{Prompt] How has this knowledge of how you have performed compared to other health facilities 
impacted you in anyway (feedback)?  
7. How you would feel about sharing information about your ranks or performance results with other 
health facilities. 
Prompt: do you think it will it have any effect on performance at all? 
8. I would like to hear about the incentive; how it is used in this facility 
[For the health facility manager]: How do you decide how to utilize the incentives earned?  
9. I’ve heard that payments are sometimes delayed or have been delayed in the past; can you please 
share your experiences with the delay in payments of incentives.  
Prompts: 
a) How does this make you feel?  
b) Did this affect the performance of the facility at all? 
10. Are explanations for the delays in payments communicated to you through the manager? [for the 
managers:….to you through the scheme implementers] 
Follow up question: … and how does this affect the health care workers?  
11. What about explanations for any other changes in the program? 
            Follow up question: … and how does this make you feel? 
12. Have you been satisfied with the payments so far?  
Follow up: Why? 
Now, let us move on to talk about how individual performance is measured for payment of bonuses. 
13. What are your thoughts about the way the bonuses are shared to the health workers  
In cases where is sense hesitation: What do the other health workers in the health facility feel about this 
method of deciding how much to pay the individual workers? 
Prompts:  
a) Does it have any effect on performance or health worker motivation 
b) Are there any other way(s) of measuring individual performance that you would prefer? 
c)  If yes, can you explain it to me? 
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14. What are your thoughts toward assessment by the contribution you make to performance (increase 
in activities) or to the quality of care in order for the health facility to earn incentives:  
Prompt: How will that affect your performance? 
 
Is there any other thing you’d like us to discuss regarding this scheme? 
Thank you very much, for taking part of this research. 
 
P.S. all questions ended with “is there any other thing you would like to add” 
 
 
F7. A list of the health facilities in each State (and their characteristics) positioned according to 
performance                                                                                                                                                         
Adamawa 
1. Gurin (Health Center): Responsable: Mrs. Mable M. Zubairu, Phone number: +234-7082662007, 
Population: 41,945 (2012), Status: Public, Staff size: 9 
2. Farang (Health Center): Responsable: Mrs. Ruth Simon, Phone number: +2348098162148, 
Population: 25,798 (2012), Status: Public, Staff size: 8 
3. Furore MCH (Health Center): Responsable: Mrs. Aishatu Ahmadu Tukur, Phone number: +234-
8032920598/8052, Population: 13,631 (2012), Status: Public, Staff size: 9 
4. Wuro Bokki (Health Center): Responsable: Mrs. Ungopwa Dauda, Phone number: +234-
8039092743/8051, Population: 12,598 (2012), Status: Public, Staff size: 6 
5. Mayo-Ine (Health Center): Responsable: Mrs. Aishatu Kadiri, Phone number: +234-8082534289, 
Population: 10,149 (2012), Status: Public, Staff size: 5 
6. Chigari (Health Center): Responsable: Mrs. Uwami Ayuba, Phone number: +234-
8058782153/8050, Population: 20,160 (2012), Status: Public, Staff size: 6 
7. Furore General Hospital (General Hospital): Responsable: Dr. Peter Tihze Kanu, Phone 
number: +2348054178797, Population: 240,160 (2012), Status: Public, Staff size: 20 
8. Malubu: Responsable: Mrs. Damaris Bilison, Phone number: +234-8074496353, Population: 
12,598 (2012), Status: Public, Staff size: 8 
9. Pariya (Health Center): Responsable: Mrs. Aishatu Hayatu A., Phone number: +234-8130001718, 
Population: 40,060 (2012), Status: Public, Staff size: 13 
10. Dasin Hausa (Health Center): Responsable: Mrs. Peace S. Audu, Phone number: +234-
8037890837, Population: 10,475 (2012), Status: Public, Staff size: 5 
11. Kabilo (Health Center): Responsable: Mr. Tadawus Tula, Phone number: +234-8067554243, 
Population: 10,011 (2012), Status: Public, Staff size: 3 
12. Ribadu (Health Center): Responsable: Mrs. Pwanagoshi Emmanuel, Phone number: +234-
8161592783/8134, Population: 10,475 (2012), Status: Public, Staff size: 6 
13. Choli (Health Center): Responsable: Mr. HarunaI. Domlek, Phone number: +234-8022789389, 
Population: 10,379 (2012), Status: Public, Staff size: 2 
14. MCH Yadim/st mary? (Health Center), Status: Public, Staff size: 2 
15. Karlahi (Health Center): Responsable: Mrs. Suzana E. Yagah, Phone number: +234-
8063919391/7052, Population: 10,283 (2012), Status: Public, Staff size: 7 
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Ondo 
1. Bolorunduro (General Hospital): Responsable: Dr Agosile, Phone number: 08052159504, 
Population: 90,454 (2011), Status: Public, Staff size: 11 
2. Fagbo (Health Center): Responsable: Mrs. Cocker, Phone number: 07030710798, Population: 
8,353 (2011), Status: Public, Staff size: 5 
3. Orisumbare (Health Center): Responsable: Mrs Akinboye, Phone number: 08032136636, 
Population: 9,394 (2011), Status: Public, Staff size: 3 
4. Kolawole (Health Center): Responsable: Mrs Adegbayemu, Phone number: 08033697742, 
Population: 5,538 (2011), Status: Public, Staff size: 3 
5. Asatan (Health Center): Responsable: Mr Adeoyin, Phone number: 08101121200, Population: 
8,261 (2011), Status: Public, Staff size: 3 
6. Epe (Health Center): Responsable: Mrs. Awosika, Phone number: 08039559530, 
Population: 13,528 (2011), Status: Public, Staff size: 3 
7. Owena Bridge (Health Center): Responsable: Mrs. Adesiyan, Phone number: 08032469936, 
Population: 9,486 (2011), Status: Public 
8. Oboto (Health Center): Responsable: Mr. Falekulo, Phone number: 07033524686, Population: 
8,592 (2011), Status: Public, Staff size: 4 
9. (8)Owena Tepo (Health Center): Responsable: Mrs Oyewole, Phone number: 08072662377, 
Population: 5,862 (2011), Status: Public, Staff size: 2 size: 3 
10. Italuworo (Health Center): Responsable: Mrs Olafusi, Phone number: 08060867543, Population: 
12,308 (2011), Status: Public, Staff size: 3 
Nassarawa 
1. Wamba (General Hospital): Responsable: Dr Usman A.T., Phone number: +2348069569208, 
Population: 85,328 (2011), Status: Public, Staff size: 32 
2. Zalli (Health Center): Responsable: Jacob Momana Audu, Phone number: +2348024608614, 
Population: 18,163 (2011), Status: Public, Staff size: 7 
3. Nakere (Health Center): Nakere Ward, Responsable: Laiatu Mathiew, Phone number: 
+2348065467694, Population: 7,520 (2011), Status: Public, Staff size: 14 
4. Wamba (Health Center): P.o .Box 59 Wamba, Responsable: Juliana Umaru, Phone number: 
+2348035045456, Population: 6,803 (2011), Status: Public, Staff size: 20 
5. (4 as well)Wayo Matti (Health Center): Responsable: Ludya A. Tanze, Phone number: 
+2348036232353, Population: 6,989 (2011), Status: Public, Staff size: 8 
6. Kwabe (Health Center): Responsable: Monha D. Haruna, Email: mangachawa@yahoo.com, 
Phone number: +23480332500161, Population: 6,677 (2011), Status: Public, Staff size: 5 
7. Arum Chugbu (Health Center): Responsable: Rebecca Thomas, Phone number: +2347080173450, 
Population: 4,012 (2011), Status: Public, Staff size: 6 
8. Mararaba Gongon (Health Center): Gitta Ward, Responsable: Rose Joshua, Phone number: 
+2348020860860, Population: 12,224 (2011), Status: Public, Staff size: 13 
9. Gwagi (Health Center): Responsable: Shehu Usman Zakari, Phone number: +2348133216819, 
Population: 7,177 (2011), Status: Public, Staff size: 9 
10. Kwarra (Health Center): Responsable: Danjuma Nubu, Phone number: +2348029601166, 
Population: 8,549 (2011), Status: Public, Staff size: 11 
11. Yashi Madaki (Health Center): Responsable: Polycarp Danjuma, Phone number: 
+2348029186098, Population: 7,214 (2011), Status: Public, Staff size: 8 
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F8. Appointment forms for potential participants in the qualitative study of the formative evaluation 
of the Nigerian P4P scheme                                                                                                            
 
Appointment form 
 Please if you wish to take part in this interview, pick an appropriate date and time. 
 Please note that I might need to reschedule your appointment due to clashes. 
 Your interview date would be confirmed with a phone call. 
 If you do not wish to participate in this research, please leave this appointment form blank but still 
put it in the sealed envelope and hand it to your manager. 
 If you are willing to participate, please bring along your information sheet along to the interview. 
Name: 
Telephone number: 
(Please circle what days and times you would be available for the interview) 
Available days:  Monday   Tuesday Wednesday  Thursday  Friday  Saturday 
Available times: 10-11am       11:30-12:30am     1-2pm        2:30-3:30pm  
 
F9. Factors linked with worst performing facilities (sample chart) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
worst 
performers  
lower levels of 
motivation mostly 
from the bonuses 
Health workers 
have average 
working 
knowledge of the 
PBF scheme 
health facility 
managers dont 
judge and 
priorotise the 
needs of the health 
facility  
major challenges: 
mobility, 
infastructure, and 
competiton  
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F10. Relationship between themes, categories and concepts (sample chart) 
 
Reduced motivation 
Higher performance  
Reduced awareness Uncertainty  
Increased motivation  
Lower performance  
Knowledge  
Poor 
communication  
Infrastructure Increased awareness  
Health facility mangers, 
nurses, and Lab 
technicians   
CHEWs and 
JCHEWs  
Poor management  
Good 
management  
Delay in 
payment  
Incomplete 
payment 
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APPENDIX G 
G1. Executive summary of report submitted to the NPHCDA on the formative evaluation of the 
Nigerian P4P scheme 
 
Introduction  
Pay for Performance (P4P) has been proposed as a way to incentivise the changes in behaviour needed to 
improve the quality of care and health indicators in three selected States (Ondo, Nassarawa, and 
Adamawa) in Nigeria.  
Evidence on effectiveness of P4P schemes is mixed (with heterogeneous results), and preliminary results 
of the Nigerian P4P scheme show similar variation in results among the three sites in the selected States. 
A detailed consideration of the literature and theory from behavioural economics expounding on how 
people respond to incentives, suggest certain key aspects of P4P schemes, such as: design, context, and 
implementation are likely to affect the impact of the scheme and possibly explain the heterogeneous 
results. 
The aim of this study was to carry out a formative evaluation to explore differences in implementation 
and contextual factors between the States and health facilities. 
 
Methods 
Face to face in-depth interviews were then conducted on health workers participating in the scheme in 
Ondo and Nassarawa State to explore their views, thoughts and attitudes on factors such as uncertainty in 
payment, role of management, infrastructure, and understanding of the scheme. 
The study sample of health workers was drawn from top, average, and worst performing facilities in each 
State, reflecting diversity in performance to facilitate comparisons.  
Data obtained from interviews were transcribed verbatim and analysed using the framework approach. 
 
Results 
Thirty-six health workers comprising of 13 health facility mangers, 7 nurses, 6 laboratory technicians, 6 
Community Health Extension Workers (CHEWs) and 4 Junior Community Health Extension Workers 
(JCHEWs) were interviewed. 
The findings from this study suggest that delay in payment, doubt in the method of allocation of bonuses 
to individual health workers, and ineffective communication led to uncertainty and distrust in the P4P 
payment system, which reduced motivation of health workers and or performance of health facilities. 
Another key finding was that health worker understanding of the scheme appeared to be related to 
motivation and performance and participants in top performing facilities had a better understanding of the 
scheme. A third interconnected theme was that some health facility mangers in top performing facilities 
or Nassarawa State appeared to have superior managerial skills, which was evident in the unique 
strategies they used to motivate the health workers and improve performance in their facilities such as 
hiring additional staff and infrastructural improvement, which led to improvement in performance 
reflected in the preliminary results. The fourth major finding was that other factors not inherent to the 
PBF scheme such as issues with mobility and lack of infrastructure in Ondo State or lack of manpower in 
Nassarawa State were sources of demotivation for the health workers. However, some health facility 
managers in Nassarawa State took initiative and had a swift response to the lack of manpower problem 
leading to hiring of additional staff whereas infrastructural problems did not improve in Ondo State, 
possibly explaining why Nassarawa State appeared to have performed better than facilities in Ondo State. 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations   
As the Nigerian PBF program is set to last till 2018, the continual evolution of the program to maximize 
effectiveness and cost effectiveness is necessary. Based on the findings from this study, the following 
recommendations were made for consideration in the scaling up of the P4P scheme. 
 To make timely quarterly payments to the each health facility for delivery of services as agreed 
in the PBF contract. 
 To ensure clear communication strategies about changes and difficulties encountered in the 
scheme between stakeholders, particularly to inform and keep the health workers up to date.  
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 To ensure that the assessment tool (basis by which individual health workers earn bonuses) 
includes a criterion/a set of criteria that clearly captures actual contribution and direct input of 
the health worker in helping the facility earn money. For example a criterion on outreaches or 
home visits can be added on, which this study has shown is instrumental in increasing utilisation 
of health services.  
 To ensure clearer and shorter guidelines are also needed to encourage the use of the tool instead 
of ranks to allocate bonuses to the health workers.  
 To carry out training and regular workshops for health workers and equipping health facility 
managers with materials to properly inform the health workers on how the P4P scheme operates.  
 To help health facility managers improve their managerial skills, with a focus on their autonomy, 
setting priorities, and recognising and meeting the needs of the health facility or how to motivate 
the health workers, whether it is infrastructure or hiring additional staff.    
 To introduce ideas and suggestions on how the health facilities can improve performance on 
areas they are lagging behind should be introduced to the feedback forms. 
 To move towards ‘true pay for performance’ (e.g. change in utilisation from baseline) as 
opposed to pay for reporting.  
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